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Shafiq Ahmad v. Smt. Sayeedan .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Defendant's Second Appeal)
Factual and Procedural Background
On January 23, 1971 the respondent and her husband, Mohammad Yasin (since deceased), executed a registered sale in favour of the appellant for a portion of a disputed house for Rs. 2,000. On the same date the appellant executed a separate written agreement promising to reconvey the property to the vendor on receipt of Rs. 2,000 within three years. That period was extended by a written agreement on January 16, 1974 to December 31, 1974.
Despite notice from the vendor, the appellant did not reconvey. The plaintiffs (the vendors) brought a suit for specific performance on January 31, 1975, alleging readiness and willingness to perform. The appellant admitted execution of the sale deed and the January 23, 1971 reconveyance agreement but pleaded that his thumb-mark on the January 16, 1974 agreement was obtained under the impression that the extension was only until February 28, 1974; he alleged fraud and limitation, asserted that the plaintiffs had not always been ready and willing to perform, and claimed that an earlier tenancy in his favour subsisted.
The trial court decreed specific performance on August 5, 1976, finding no fraud as to the January 16, 1974 agreement, that the suit was within limitation, and that the plaintiffs had been ready and willing. The defendant's first appeal was dismissed in December 1976; the lower appellate court also held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession and that the appellant's tenancy did not subsist. This opinion is the defendant's second appeal against those conclusions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant's pre-existing tenancy survived the sale and agreement to reconvey (i.e., whether the tenancy subsisted despite the sale and reconveyance agreement).
- Whether the subsequent agreement dated January 16, 1974 was procured by fraud and thus invalid.
- Whether the words allegedly interpolated ("Wapsi mai Qabzey ke kar doonga") constituted a material alteration of the agreement of January 23, 1971, rendering it void.
- Whether the plaintiffs were at all material times ready and willing to perform their part of the reconveyance agreement (an essential requirement for specific performance).
- Whether the transaction should be treated as a mortgage by conditional sale under the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether the suit was barred by limitation (as pleaded by the appellant).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contended that because he had been a tenant of the portion before January 23, 1971 and subsequently entered into an agreement to reconvey, his tenancy should be deemed to subsist despite the sale.
- He pleaded that his thumb-mark on the January 16, 1974 agreement was obtained under a mistaken impression (that the extension was until February 28, 1974) and that the contents of that agreement were based on fraud.
- He argued that words (“Wapsi mai Qabzey ke kar doonga”) were interpolated into the January 23, 1971 agreement and that such an interpolation was a material alteration rendering the agreement void.
- He contended that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiffs had not always been ready and willing to perform their obligations under the contract.
- Implicitly, by relying on certain Calcutta High Court decisions, the appellant urged a view that retention of tenancy or the parties' intention might preserve a pre-existing tenancy despite a sale-plus-reconveyance agreement.
Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Position
- The plaintiffs alleged they were ready and willing to perform: they had repeatedly offered Rs. 2,000 and given notice requiring execution of reconveyance.
- They asserted that the appellant had failed to reconvey despite notice and that the sale and reconveyance agreement were valid and enforceable.
- The respondents relied on recorded findings below that there was no fraud in the making of the January 16, 1974 agreement and that the suit was within limitation; these factual findings were not re-opened before the Court in this appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh (AIR 1951 SC 186) | Where the lessor purchases the lessee's interest, the lease is extinguished; the same person cannot be both landlord and tenant. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold that, upon the appellant's purchase vesting both lessor and lessee interests in him, the lease was extinguished under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. |
| Reoti Saran v. Hargu Lal (AIR 1964 All 542) | A Division Bench followed Badri Narain Jha and held that when transfer is by sale deed and governed by S.111(d), the question of intention hardly arises; focus is on merger of interests. | The Court followed this Division Bench decision as binding and applied the principle that the lease is determined by merger of interests rather than by an inquiry into parties' intention in such sale transactions. |
| Prabhu Dayal Marwari v. Tinkari Bala Dassi (AIR 1974 Cal 35) | A contrary view (Calcutta Single Judge) suggesting that retention of tenancy might be found. | The Court noted this contrary authority but rejected its applicability; the Court preferred the Division Bench and Supreme Court rulings and found nothing in the present facts to justify retaining the tenancy. |
| Suraj Chandra Mondal v. Beharilal Mondal (AIR 1939 Cal 692) | Earlier Calcutta Division Bench decision cited in support of the appellant's authorities. | The Court acknowledged this earlier decision but declined to follow it in the present matter, distinguishing the facts and preferring the binding precedents cited above. |
| Loonkaran Sethia v. Ivan E. John ((1977) 1 SCC 379; AIR 1977 SC 336) | Principles on material alteration of a deed: an alteration in a material part of a deed after execution, made without consent of the party bound, renders the deed void as against that party; a material alteration is one that varies rights or liabilities as originally expressed. | The Court applied the material-alteration test from this Supreme Court authority (and the underlying Halsbury principle) and held that even assuming interpolation, the additional words were redundant and did not vary rights or liabilities; therefore the agreement was not rendered void. |
| Nathu Lal v. Mt. Gomti (AIR 1940 PC 160) | Observations of the Privy Council consistent with the rule on material alteration of deeds. | The Court cited this authority as supporting the legal position on material alteration and relied on it in concluding the alleged interpolation was not material. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a step-by-step manner, applying statutory provisions, common-law concepts and binding precedents to the facts shown in the record.
- Lease Determination under Section 111(d) TPA: The Court emphasised that a lease determines under Section 111(d) when the interests of lessee and lessor in the whole property vest at the same time in one person in the same right. The appellant, having purchased the property by sale deed on January 23, 1971, acquired both interests; accordingly his pre-existing tenancy lost its identity and was extinguished. The Court supported this by reference to the nature of ownership and lease (separation of ownership and possession) and followed the Supreme Court decision in Badri Narain Jha and the Division Bench decision in Reoti Saran v. Hargu Lal.
- Intention of the Parties: Although intention can be relevant in some contexts, when a sale deed effects merger of interests under S.111(d) the question of intention "hardly arises." On the facts there was nothing, expressly or by necessary implication, to indicate that the parties intended to preserve the tenancy despite the absolute terms of the sale deed and the reconveyance agreement.
- Conditional Sale / Mortgage Argument (Section 58(c) proviso): The Court observed that because the agreement to reconvey was not incorporated into the sale deed (per the proviso to Section 58(c)), the transaction could not be treated as a mortgage by conditional sale. The sale deed was unqualified and did not manifest retention of tenancy.
- Effect of the January 16, 1974 Agreement: The Court noted the lower courts' concurrent finding of no fraud in relation to this subsequent agreement, a factual finding the appellant conceded could not be re-agitated in this appeal. The January 16, 1974 instrument included language contemplating interim possession and a licencee status up to December 31, 1974 if registration were delayed, but the Court read the document as a whole and saw no basis to infer that tenancy was intended to survive the sale.
- Material Alteration Claim: The appellant argued that certain words were interpolated in the January 23, 1971 agreement and that such interpolation amounted to a material alteration voiding the instrument. The Court applied the established test (as discussed in Loonkaran Sethia and supporting authorities): an alteration is material if it varies rights or liabilities as originally expressed. Even assuming these words were interpolated, the deed in its original recitals already contained an undertaking to reconvey; the additional words were redundant and did not change the parties' rights or liabilities. Hence no material alteration was found that would void the agreement.
- Readiness and Willingness: On the factual record the plaintiffs had given notice under registered cover requesting reconveyance on acceptance of Rs. 2,000, had offered the sum repeatedly and had replied to correspondence from the appellant. The Court accepted that plaintiffs were not required to show they had the physical cash at all times in their possession; the lower appellate court correctly declined to attach significance to an isolated statement in another suit suggesting potential need for a loan.
Holding and Implications
Final Holding: The appeal is dismissed. Specifically, the Court affirmed the decree for specific performance and the entitlement of the plaintiffs to recover possession; the appellant's contention that his tenancy survived the sale was rejected, as were his contentions regarding fraud, material alteration, limitation and lack of readiness and willingness.
Direct Implications:
- The trial court's decree for specific performance (dated August 5, 1976) and the lower appellate court's dismissal of the defendant's appeal (December 1976) are upheld by this Court.
- The appellant's alleged earlier tenancy is held to have been extinguished by the merger of interests following the sale; the plaintiffs are entitled to possession and enforcement of the reconveyance agreement.
The opinion does not purport to set a new rule of law beyond applying existing statutory provisions and binding precedents; its conclusions follow established authorities cited in the judgment.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed with costs.
1. This is a defendant's second appeal.
2. On January 23, 1971, the respondent and her husband. Mohammad Yasin (since dead) executed a sale in favour of the appellant under registered instrument for consideration of Rs. 2,000/- in respect of a portion in dispute of the house concerned. On the same date there was a separate agreement executed in writing by the appellant in the respondent's favour stipulating that he would reconvey the property to the vendor on receipt of. Rs. 2000/- within three years from the date of the agreement. The period was extended further up to December 31, 1974, by a subsequent agreement entered into on January 16, 1974 in writing. Despite notice from the vendor, the appellant did not execute re-conveyance. The plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. With these allegations the plaintiffs brought the suit for specific performance on Jan. 31, 1975. In defence the appellant admitted the execution of the deed of sale and the agreement dated 23-1-1971. In relation to the subsequent agreement, however, the plea taken was that he appended his thumb-mark under the impression that the time was being extended up to February 28, 1974. The contents of this agreement, according to him, are based upon fraud played against him, and the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs had not always been ready and willing to perform their part under the contract. It was also pleaded that he had been a tenant of this portion and due to the agreement of reconveyance executed by him the tenancy is to be considered as subsisting.
3. The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance on Aug. 5, 1976 finding that there was no fraud relating to the subsequent agreement dated 16-1-1974: that the suit was within prescribed limitation and that the plaintiffs had been ready and willing to perform their part. An appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed on December, 1976. The lower appellate court specified also that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession along with specific performance of the agreement to reconvey and that the tenancy in the appellant's favour cannot be taken to susbsist.
4. Sri Murli Dhar, learned counsel for the defendant appellant, contends that in face of the agreement dated Jan. 23, 1971, to reconvey, the tenancy existing earlier in favour of the appellant is to be considered as still subsisting. The submission is that the intention of the parties governs and that regard being had to the great protection accorded under the general law to tenancy, it cannot be assumed that this was determined on the facts hereof, the contention cannot, in my view, be sustained either upon principle or on authority. There is no dispute that prior to the purchase made by him on January 23, 1971, the appellant was the tenant of the vendors in this premises. The sale made in his favour was absolute. In terms of S. 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act:
“111. Determination of lease: A lease of immovable property determines:
(d) in case the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property becomes vested at the same time in one person in the same right:
5. As a result of the purchase the interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the property in dispute became vested at the same time in the defendant-appellant in his same capacity as an individual. The owner normally has the right to use and enjoy the thing owned, the right to manage it, i.e the right to decide how it shall be used and right to the income from it. The owner has a liberty to use the thing (Sec Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, page 246). A lease is that form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the possession and use of property owned by some other person. It is the outcome of the separation of ownership and possession (ibid, page 424). This also follows from the definition of the expression ‘lease’ given in S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act as meaning a transfer of a right to enjoy the property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised. The right to enjoy the property is carved out of ownership and conveyed to the lessee. Upon the lessee acquiring the ownership itself in the property, his right to retain enjoyment thereof in capacity as a lessee evidently loses its identity.
6. In Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh (AIR 1951 SC 186) it was pointed out that if the lessor purchases the lessee's interest, the lease is extinguished as the same man cannot at the same time be both a landlord and a tenant. In Reoti Saran v. Hargu Lal (AIR 1964 All 542) a Division Bench of this Court followed this decision of the Supreme Court and held that when the transfer is made under a sale deed and the case is governed by S. 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, the question of intention of parties hardly arises and we have to decide whether, on the facts of the case, the lease determined under S. 111(d) on account of the merger of interest of the lessee. A contrary view was no doubt, taken by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Prabhu Dayal Marwari v. Tinkari Bala Dassi (AIR 1974 Cal 35) following an earlier decision of a Division Bench of that court reported in Suraj Chandra Mondal v. Beharilal Mondal (AIR 1939 Cal 692) cited for the appellant. With great respect. I am unable to accede to the proposition that the mere execution of an agreement to reconvey title to the property acquired under a deed of sale is to be construed in all cases as exhibiting retention of the interest as lessee intact. Apart from the fact that the view taken by the Division Bench of our Court is binding, there is nothing to infer in the instant case expressly or by necessary implication the intention of the parties that the pre-existing interest as a tenant in favour of the appellant be allowed to subsist despite the purchase taken by him merely on the footing that he entered into the agreement to reconvey within a period of three years from the date of the purchase.
7. As mentioned above, the deed of sale executed between the parties is in unqualified terms. Nothing is pointed for the appellant therein to suggest retention of interest as a tenant by the appellant. In view of the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the agreement to reconvey being not incorporated in the deed of sale itself, the transaction cannot under the law be taken to be that of a mortgagee by conditional sale. The agreement to reconvey dated 23-1-1971 is also unequivocal in its terms. Both the courts below have recorded concurrent finding to the effect that there was no fraud in relation to the execution of the subsequent agreement dated January 16, 1974. The appellant's learned counsel candidly submitted that this finding of fact cannot be reagitated before this Court. In the subsequent agreement of January 16, 1974, we also find it stated by the appellant that in case the registration of the deed of sale is not permitted up to December 31, 1974, to which date the period was being extended he would accept a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and put the vendor in possession over the property and further that subsequent to the reconveyance being executed by him in case the same has to be done earlier, he would continue as a mere licencee up to December 31, 1974. It being ruled out, and mentioned above, that there was no fraud brought to play against the appellant in the matter of execution of this agreement, there is no sound reason for not reading this document as a whole. This serves as well to negative an assumption that the tenancy was intended to be retained despite the transaction of sale and reconveyance agreement.
8. The other contention of the appellant's learned counsel then is that in the agreement dated Jan. 23, 1971 the words “Wapsi mai Qabzey ke kar doonga” were specifically interpolated as found by the trial court and therefore, it is argued, that agreement is rendered void as a whole. The contention is that the addition of these words constitutes a material alteration in the instrument. In support of this submission reliance was “placed upon the observation of the Supreme Court in Loonkaran Sethia etc. v. Mr. Ivan E. John ((1977) 1 SCC 379 : AIR 1977 SC 336 at page 347). The legal position cited by the Supreme Court in this case is as under:—
“Question No. 5: Before proceeding to determine this question, it would be well to advert to the legal position bearing on the matter. As aptly stated in paragraph 1378 of Volume 12 of Hals-bury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition)” if an alteration (by erasure, interlineation or otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed, after its execution, by or with the consent of any party to or person entitled under it, but without the consent of the party or parties liable under it, the deed is rendered void from the time of the alteration so as to prevent the person who has made or authorised the alteration, and those claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to enforce against any party bound by it, who did not consent to the alteration, any obligation, covenant, or promise thereby undertaken or made.
A material alteration, according to this authoritative work, is one which varied the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertaned and as such void, or which may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed.
The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed.”
To the same effect are the observations made by the Privy Council in Nathu Lal v. Mt. Gomti (AIR 1940 PC 160).”
9. Applying this test it will be observed that the instant case may not be taken to be that of material alteration. Assuming that the words referred above were interpolated in the agreement dated 23-1-1971 the deed nonetheless recites in original admittedly that “Hissa Mubligh jo main ney khareed kiya hai apney kharoh par Aap……………key had men ragistry kar doonga” This was the specific stipulation on the part of the defendant appellant in that agreement to reconvey. These words themselves incorporate the undertaking to reconvey the rights acquired under the deed of I sale. On account of the addition of the words “Wapsi mai qabzey ke kar doonga” there is no variation in the rights, liabilities or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state. The words impugned are in other words redundant and superfluous even if subsequently incorporated. The agreement to reconvey is therefore, not rendered void on this account.
10. Lastly the submission of Sri Murlidhar, the learned counsel, faintly made was that the plaintiffs had not been always ready and willing to perform their part under the contract. Their pleading is not alleged or shown to be lacking in statutory requirements in this behalf. As for the proof, it is on the record that the plaintiffs gave notice under registered cover to the defendant appellant requiring him to execute the sale on acceptance of Rs. 2,000/- as consideration.
11. The notice given by the defendant appellant dated 4-3-1974 was duly replied also for the respondents on March 15, 1974 followed by another notice dated March 20, 1974. All along the plaintiffs offered the sum of Rupees 2000/- and expressed their preparedness to take the sale on the date when the defendant might come over to the office of the sub-Registrar. It was argued that in another suit No. 13 of 1975 Mohammad Yasin stated on July 11, 1975 that he would have arranged for Rs. 2000/- on taking loan from someone else and this should suggest that he was not possessed of that ready money to take the sale. The lower appellate court has rightly declined to attach importance to this since it is settled that the plaintiffs did not have to establish that they had with them all the time ready the amount of the sale consideration. There being nothing to suggest that the plaintiffs were not in a position to raise this amount of Rupees 2000/- upon the resale being made, the readiness and willingness on their part is not adversely effected.
12. The appeal for these reasons fails and is dismissed with costs.
13. Appeal dismissed.
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