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Nanak Chandra Laxman Das v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Lucknow.

Allahabad High Court
Feb 10, 1982
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rastogi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, M/s. Nanak Chandra Laxman Das, a registered firm manufacturing and selling bricks, disclosed a net profit of Rs. 27,030 for assessment year 1963-64 (accounting period October 26, 1961 to October 31, 1962) on receipts of Rs. 2,23,399. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) did not accept this disclosed profit and, applying a 17½% net profit rate on total receipts, estimated the profit at Rs. 2,30,000. The Appellate Tribunal ultimately sustained net profit at Rs. 34,500.

The ITO further found that during the relevant previous years the assessee had taken certain hundi loans. Three loans dated September 5, 1962 (Rs. 17,000 from M/s. Jethanand Madan Das; Rs. 25,000 from M/s. Amar Mal Mool Chandra; Rs. 20,000 from M/s. Govind Das Nichal Das) aggregating Rs. 62,000 were treated by the ITO as income from undisclosed sources because, despite confirmations being filed, the assessee did not produce the creditors for cross-examination and the ITO relied on confessional statements by those creditors disowning the advances.

On appeal, the Additional Assistant Commissioner (AAC) set aside the assessment and remanded the matter to the ITO, directing opportunity for cross-examination and further evidence. The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal, after calling for and receiving a remand report, agreed with the parties that it would decide the matter on materials already on record and proceeded to reappraise that material. The Tribunal accepted genuineness of the loan from M/s. Govind Ram Nichal Das but rejected the genuineness of the loans from two other creditors (including M/s. Jethanand Madan Das), confirming an addition in respect of those amounts.

Pursuant to directions by this Court, a question was referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of this Court concerning whether the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the assessee's explanation for the credit entries in favour of M/s. Jethanand Madan Das and whether the Tribunal's finding was vitiated by irrelevant consideration or misappreciation of law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the assessee's explanation for the credit entries standing in favour of M/s. Jethanand Madan Das?
  2. Whether the Tribunal's finding in that regard was vitiated on account of irrelevant consideration or misappreciation of law (in particular whether the Tribunal wrongly applied s. 69 instead of s. 68 of the Income-tax Act)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Assessee's) Arguments

  • The Tribunal erred in treating the matter under s. 69 of the Income-tax Act; the assessee contended that s. 68 was applicable such that the onus to prove that the credits were not genuine lay on the Department (i.e., the ITO).
  • The assessee relied on precedents (including Chaturbhuj & Co., Nabadwip Chandra Roy, and Radhakrishna Behari Lal) to support the contention that where credits appear in the name of a third party the burden may shift and that mere rejection of explanation without a finding did not justify treating the amount as the assessee's income.
  • Implicitly or explicitly, the assessee also challenged whether the Tribunal had been influenced by irrelevant considerations or had misappreciated law in rejecting the confirmation letter evidence.

Respondent's (Revenue / Tribunal / ITO) Position (as recorded)

  • The ITO treated the aggregate of the disputed hundi loans (Rs. 62,000) as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources because the assessee did not satisfactorily produce creditors for cross-examination and relied on confessions by creditors disowning the advances.
  • The Tribunal proceeded on the available material, taking the view that the burden to explain the nature and source of credits lay on the assessee (relying on the statutory provision and relevant authorities), and held that a mere confirmation letter was not a sufficient discharge of that burden under s. 68.
  • The Tribunal accepted genuineness of one loan (Govind Ram Nichal Das) but rejected others (including Jethanand Madan Das) based on the insufficiency of the evidence on record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kale Khan Mohammad Hanif v. CIT, [1963] 50 ITR 1 Laid down that the onus is on the assessee to explain the nature and source of cash credits (whether in the assessee's account or a third party's), though in certain circumstances the onus may shift to the ITO if the assessee discharges it. The court relied on this decision to confirm that the initial burden of explanation lies upon the assessee and to explain when and how the onus might shift to the Department. It supported the view that merely producing a confirmation letter did not discharge the assessee's burden.
Chaturbhuj & Co. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P., [1959] 36 ITR 386 Held that where money appearing in the books as belonging to another person is sought to be taxed as the assessee's income, mere rejection of an explanation (without a finding that it was unsatisfactory, unreasonable or false) does not justify an inference that the money belongs to the assessee. The court observed that this decision did not appreciably help the assessee on the facts, essentially because the Tribunal made findings on the sufficiency of the explanation and evidence rather than merely rejecting it without a finding.
Nabadwip Chandra Roy v. CIT, [1962] 44 ITR 591 Distinguished burden of proof where credit appears in the assessee's own name (onus on assessee) versus where amount appears in the name of a third party (prima facie not the assessee's receipt; Department must show otherwise). The court noted this decision and explained why it did not help the assessee on the present facts: here the ITO had reasons to doubt genuineness (confessional statements by creditors), and the assessee had not discharged the burden on him to satisfy the ITO of the genuineness.
Radhakrishna Behari Lal v. CIT, [1954] 26 ITR 344 Held that if a cash credit stands in the assessee's name the burden is on him; if it stands in the name of a third party, the onus is on the Department to show it belongs to the assessee. (Decision was on facts under s. 34 of the 1922 Act.) The court observed that this decision was fact-specific and under an earlier Act; it did not materially assist the assessee in the present case in view of the Supreme Court authority and the facts found by the Tribunal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal strands of analysis: (1) whether the Tribunal was influenced by irrelevant considerations and (2) whether there was any misappreciation of law in the Tribunal's approach (specifically the contention that the Tribunal applied s. 69 instead of s. 68).

On the question of irrelevant considerations, the Court found nothing to show that the Tribunal was improperly influenced. The AAC had remanded the matter to the ITO to permit the assessee an opportunity to produce or cross-examine creditors; subsequently before the Tribunal both parties agreed that the Tribunal should decide the matter on the material then on record. The Tribunal therefore reappraised the evidence available and concluded that a mere confirmation letter from the alleged creditor was insufficient to discharge the assessee's burden. The Court agreed that such a confirmation alone could not be treated as sufficient evidence of genuineness.

On misappreciation of law, the Court examined the contention that s. 68 (which applies where any sum is found credited in the books and the assessee offers no satisfactory explanation) should govern and that the onus lay on the Department. The Court explained the statutory text of s. 68 and stressed the statutory recognition that unexplained cash credits may be charged as income. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Kale Khan Mohammad Hanif, the Court reiterated that the initial onus is on the assessee to explain the nature and source of cash credits whether appearing in the assessee's books or in a third party's account; only in certain circumstances, if the assessee discharges his burden, may the onus shift.

The Court considered the other authorities relied on by the assessee (Chaturbhuj, Nabadwip, Radhakrishna) and explained why they did not materially assist on the facts: Chaturbhuj did not support the assessee because that decision addressed a different factual posture (mere rejection without a finding); Nabadwip and Radhakrishna were fact-specific and involved distinctions that did not apply given the background here (notably the confessional statements by creditors that gave the ITO reason to doubt genuineness, even if the Tribunal did not rely on those confessions because the assessee had not been afforded cross-examination).

The Court emphasized that the assessee had to prove the identity and creditworthiness (capacity to advance) of the creditor by plausible evidence. In the present case the only material for the disputed transaction was a confirmation letter and a G.R. number; that material was insufficient. Moreover, the assessee agreed that the Tribunal should decide the matter on the materials on record, thereby foreclosing further enquiry. The Court characterized the Tribunal's conclusion as a pure finding of fact and found no error in it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The referred question is answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Department.

Implications:

  • The Tribunal was justified in rejecting the assessee's explanation in respect of the credit entries standing in favour of M/s. Jethanand Madan Das on the materials before it; the disputed amount was rightly treated as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources by the Tribunal on the facts found.
  • The assessee's submissions that the Tribunal misapplied the law (by invoking s. 69 rather than s. 68) were rejected because the statutory regime and authoritative precedent place upon the assessee the initial burden to explain cash credits; a mere confirmation letter was insufficient to discharge that burden.
  • Costs were awarded to the Department in the amount of Rs. 250.
  • No broader novel legal principle was announced by the Court beyond application and clarification of existing authorities; the decision operates as a fact-specific affirmation of the Tribunal's finding and the established principle regarding the assessee's burden in explaining cash credits under s. 68.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not introduce material not present in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Rastogi, J.:— M/s. Nanak Chandra Laxman Das, Allahabad, a registered firm, hereinafter referred to as “the assessee” carried on business in the manufacture and sale of bricks. For the assessment year 1963-64, the relevant accounting period being October 26, 1961 to October 31, 1962, the assessee disclosed a net profit of Rs. 27,030 on sales and cartage receipts amounting to Rs. 2,23,399. The ITO did not accept the disclosed profit and, applying a net profit rate of 17 ½ per cent. on the total receipts, estimated it at Rs. 2,30,000. Ultimately, the Appellate Tribunal sustained the net profit at Rs. 34,500.

2. The ITO further found that during the relevant previous years the assessee had taken some hundi loans. One such creditor was M/s. Jethan-and Madan Das, r/o-4/1, Madan Street, Calcutta, and a loan of Rs. 17,000 was shown to have been taken from him on September 5, 1962. On the same date there was a loan of Rs. 25,000 taken from M/s. Amar Mal Mool Chandra, whose residence was the same as that of M/s. Jethan and Madan Das and there was a third loan of Rs. 20,000 taken on the same date from M/s. Govind Das Nichal Das of Calcutta. The assessee filed a confirmation letter from these creditors but, despite opportunities given, did not produce them before the ITO. Accordingly, the ITO treated the aggregate amount of these loans which came to Rs. 62,000 as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources.

3. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal. The AAC set aside the assessment order and directed the ITO to make it afresh after allowing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine these parties and also to produce such evidence as it may like. It may be noted that the ITO had relied upon some confessions made by these creditors in which they had disowned the advance of such loans. The assessee was not satisfied with the remand order passed by the AAC and went in second appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal, vide its order dated February 26, 1973, called for a remand report from the ITO. The ITO complied with that order and submitted his report. Thereafter, when the appeal came up for hearing before the Tribunal the parties agreed that the Tribunal would not be required to see what more could have been done by the ITO or the assessee. In the Tribunal's own words: “what we have to see is what has been done or what has been brought on record and what is our impression from the material on record”. With that end in view the Tribunal proceeded to reappraise the material brought on record. The Appellate Tribunal was also of the opinion that the onus to prove the nature and source of credit was upon the assessee and that the filing of a mere confirmation letter would not amount to a sufficient discharge of the burden placed upon the assessee under s. 69 of the I.T Act. The assessee has to prove not only the identity of the creditor but has further to prove that the creditor had the capacity to advance the loan. The Tribunal then found that the identity of the creditors could not be disputed because they were all assessees on record and also had made statements before the Department. As for their capacity to advance the loans, the Tribunal accepted the genuineness of the loan taken from M/s. Govind Ram Nichal Das, but in regard to the other two did not accept the genuineness of the same. As for the alleged loan from M/s. Jethanand Madan Das the only evidence on record was the confirmation letter of the party, which, in the opinion of the Tribunal, was not sufficient to discharge the burden which lay on the assessee. Accordingly, the addition of that amount was confirmed.

4. At the instance of the assessee and as directed by this court, the Appellate Tribunal drew up a statement of the case and referred the following question for the opinion of this court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tri bunal was justified in rejecting the assessee's explanation for the credit entries standing in favour of M/s. Jethanand Madan Das and, in particular, whether the finding of the Tribunal is vitiated on account of irrelevant consideration and misappreciation of law?”

5. So far as the question as to whether or not the Tribunal was influenced by any irrelevant consideration is concerned, nothing could be pointed out to us in support of it. As noted above, in first appeal, the AAC had accepted the assessee's contention that proper opportunity had not been given to it to produce its evidence before the ITO. The AAC accordingly remanded the case with certain directions to the ITO to make the assessment afresh. The assessee was even then not satisfied and took up the matter in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the AAC and called for a remand report from the ITO. After the remand report was received the assessee and the Department both agreed before the Tribunal that it was not required to see what more could have been done by the ITO or the assessee. The Tribunal was left to decide the matter on the basis of the material on record. The Tribunal, thereafter, decided the question of the genuineness of this loan on the basis of that material and we agree that a mere confirmation letter from the alleged creditor could not have been treated as sufficient evidence to prove the genuineness of the loan. The Tribunal was not swayed by any irrelevant consideration in arriving at this finding.

6. Now, coming to misappreciation of law, it was submitted before us on behalf of the assessee that the Tribunal erred in considering the case under s. 69 of the Act because it was s. 68 which was applicable and the onus lay on the Department to prove that the credits appearing in the books of the assessee were not genuine. We find no merit in this contention. It is correct that s. 68 would be applicable to the facts of the case because certain sums were found credited in the books of the assessee maintained for the relevant previous year. The question arises as to what is the nature of onus of proof under this provision. This section reads:

“68. Where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee maintained for any previous year, and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer, satisfactory, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year.”

7. There was no provision in the 1922 Act corresponding to this section. The section, however, gives a statutory recognition to the principle that cash credits which are not satisfactorily explained may be assessed as income. It would be seen that where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee, the assessee is required to offer an explanation about the nature and source thereof. If the explanation offered by him is not considered as satisfactory by the ITO, the sum so credited can be treated as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources. It is not necessary for the ITO to locate the exact source of the credits. We may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Kale Khan Mohammad Hanif v. CIT, [1963] 50 ITR 1, where it has been laid down that the onus is on the assessee to explain the nature and source of cash credits, whether they stand in the assessee's account or in the account of a third party. Irrespective of the fact that a credit entry is in the name of the assessee or is in the name of a third party, the burden lies upon the assessee to explain the credit entry. It is correct that in certain circumstances the onus might shift to the ITO. For instance, if the assessee succeeds in showing that entries regarding cash credits in a third party's account are genuine and the sums were in fact received from the third party as loans or deposits, he had discharged the onus and in such a case it will be for the third party to explain the source of the moneys and that cannot be charged as the assessee's income in the absence of any material to indicate that they belong to the assessee.

8. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the assessee to a decision of this court in Chaturbhuj & Co. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P, [1959] 36 ITR 386. We do not think that that decision in any way appreciably helps the assessee. What has been laid down therein is that where moneys appearing in the books of account of the assessee as belonging to another person, is sought to be taxed as the income of the assessee, the assessee may be required to give an explanation in respect of the entry in the accounts, but the mere rejection of the explanation given by him, without a finding that the explanation was unsatisfactory or unreasonable or false, did not provide any material for an inference or finding that the money belonged to the assessee and not to the person to whom it purported to belong according to the entry in the books of account.

9. It would appear that the initial onus is on the assessee to offer an explanation and that explanation has to be to the satisfaction of the ITO. If the explanation is not found satisfactory or reasonable, the ITO can treat such money as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources. The assessee has to prove that the credit entry is genuine and that fact can be proved by establishing from some plausible evidence the identity of the creditor and his creditworthiness. In the instant case the only material on record in regard to the impugned transaction was the so-called confirmation letter from the creditor. That alone could not have served the purpose. The same was the position in regard to the furnishing of the G.R number of the creditor. Apart from this, the assessee itself foreclosed any further enquiry in the matter by agreeing to the decision of this question on the basis of the material already on the record. The finding of the Appellate Tribunal in this behalf is a pure finding of fact.

10. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the assessee on a decision of the Assam High Court in Nabadwip Chandra Roy v. CIT, [1962] 44 ITR 591. In that case a distinction was drawn on the question of the burden of proof in regard to a credit entry appearing in the assessee's own name and the one appearing in the name of a third party. As for the credit entry appearing in the assessee's own name, the view taken was that the burden lay on the assessee to prove the source and nature of a particular-receipt and that the receipt is not in the nature of an income. However, in cases where the amount is shown to have been deposited by a third party, it was held that prima facie it cannot be regarded as a receipt by the assessee, much less a taxable income, and in that event it is for the Department, if they, want to tax it as income of the assessee, to show by some materials that the amount standing in the name of the third party does not belong to that third party but belongs to the assessee. That was a decision rendered on its own facts. The receipt under consideration appeared in the books of the assessee in his own name and it was in the nature of bonus receipt in respect of which the assessee had claimed exemption as being casual and of non-recurring nature. So, the question of burden of proof in regard to a credit entry appearing in the name of a third party was not directly involved in that case. However, even this decision will not help the assessee because here what had provoked the ITO to doubt the genuineness of the entry was the confessional statement made by the creditor himself. It is another thing that the Tribunal did not place any reliance on that statement, and very rightly so, because the assessee had not been given an opportunity to cross-examine the person. None the less, there was some background for disputing the genuineness of the entry on the part of the ITO and that being so, the assessee was required to satisfy him that the entry was genuine. The last case, on which reliance was placed, is the decision of the Patna High Court in Radhakrishna Behari Lal v. CIT, [1954] 26 ITR 344. We do not think that that decision improves the case of the assessee in any appreciable manner. That court also took the view that if a cash credit stands in the assessee's name in his books the burden of proof is upon him to show that the item of receipt is not of an income nature but in regard to a sum shown in the name of a third party the position is different. In such a case the onus of proof is not upon the assessee to show the source or nature of the amount of cash credit. The onus shifts on to the Department to show by some material that the amount standing in the name of the third party does not belong to him but belongs to the assessee. We find that that decision was rendered on the facts of that case and it was a proceeding taken under s. 34 of the 1922 Act. We have already referred in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kale Khan Mohammad Hani f v. CIT, [1963] 50 ITR 1 and of our court in Chaturbhuj & Co. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P, [1959] 36 ITR 386 (All). In our opinion, on the facts found by the Tribunal the disputed amount was rightly treated as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources.

11. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The Department is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.