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Meerut Collegiate Association, Meerut And Others v. Arvind Nath Seth And Others

Allahabad High Court
Dec 22, 1981
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Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition under Article 226 challenges an interlocutory order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (as amended in Uttar Pradesh). Meerut Collegiate Association (petitioner No. 1), which runs Meerut College, had an Executive Committee of 33 members (21 elected). Following elections held on 10 May 1981, Raja Ram Mittal was elected President, P.S. Rastogi Vice-President and J.D. Singhal (petitioner No. 2) Honorary Secretary; twenty-one committee members were also elected. Two unsuccessful candidates, Arvind Nath Seth (respondent No. 1) and Vishwa Nath Agarwal (respondent No. 2), filed a reference under Section 25 on 13 May 1981 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Meerut (respondent No. 3) — Case No. 2/12 of 1981 — challenging the election of the office-bearers and committee members. The petitioners entered appearance and filed preliminary objections. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate (also personally made party as respondent No. 4 during the proceedings) passed an interlocutory order on 10 June 1981 directing that the Executive Committee meeting fixed for that day and future meetings shall not be held pending the reference. That interlocutory order is the subject-matter of the present writ petition. Counter and rejoinder affidavits were exchanged.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act (as amended in Uttar Pradesh), the Prescribed Authority has power to pass an interlocutory or interim order (such as a stay of meetings or suspension of functioning) pending disposal of a reference under that section.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Prescribed Authority lacks competence to pass any interim order pending the reference because no power to do so is conferred expressly or by necessary implication under the Act.
  • Counsel for the petitioners relied upon a number of precedents to support the proposition that implied ancillary powers cannot be read in unless they are absolutely essential for exercising the statutory power.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Counsel for the respondents contended that Section 25 itself confers a power on the Prescribed Authority to pass interlocutory orders.
  • Alternatively, reliance was placed on Section 19-A of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act to support the existence of inherent or ancillary powers — the argument being that when a power is conferred on a statutory authority, absent restriction, necessary powers to execute that power are also available.
  • Counsel argued that an authority should have powers reasonably necessary for execution of the power conferred and cited decisions in support.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.D.O., Faizabad v. S.N. Singh, (1969) 1 SCC 825 : AIR 1970 SC 140 Where a statute confers jurisdiction, an implied power is available only if it is absolutely essential for discharge of that power; mere convenience is insufficient to imply ancillary powers such as suspension. The Court applied the principle "on all fours" to the present case, concluding that suspension or stay pending reference is not absolutely essential under S.25 and hence cannot be implied.
Babu Nandan v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Salempur, AIR 1966 All 158 Authority cited and approved in S.N. Singh as supporting the limitation on implying ancillary powers. Referenced as antecedent authority underpinning the rule applied from S.N. Singh.
Jagul Kishore v. District Magistrate, 1971 All WR (HC) 727 Under Arms Act, suspension is permissible only on grounds specified in section 17(3); suspension cannot be for the entire duration of proceedings pending revocation. Used as an illustration that where statute specifies limited grounds, a suspension power cannot be implied beyond those grounds.
Iqbal Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 299 of 1978) Supports the proposition that suspension powers are limited to statutory grounds and cannot be implied for the pendency of related proceedings. Cited as a supporting decision consistent with Jagul Kishore.
Sarjoo Singh v. District Magistrate, Ballia (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6245 of 1978) Same proposition as above concerning limits on implied suspension powers under statute. Cited as another supporting decision.
Baleshwar Dayal v. State of U.P., 1971 All LJ 1074 : AIR 1972 All 12 (Full Bench) Where statutory powers are wide, ancillary powers (including power to pass stay orders) may be inferred to secure effective exercise of the primary power (example: S.7-F of U.P. Rent & Eviction Act). Invoked as an example where the court accepted implication of ancillary powers because the statute conferred broad powers enabling effective discharge of duties.
Smt. Bhagwati Devi v. Baij Naih, 1966 All WR 631 Held that powers under S.7-F are wide enough to enable the State Government to pass stay orders during pendency of revision; stay operates from date made. Cited as authority that was later approved by the Full Bench in Baleshwar Dayal.
M.K. Mohammad Kunhi v. Income-tax Officer, 1966 (59 ITR 171) (Ker) Held that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has power to stay recovery of tax pending disposal of an appeal; ancillary powers implied because of wide powers conferred. Used as an example of an authority endowed with wide powers where ancillary powers (stay) were implied.
Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 Supreme Court affirmed that an express grant of statutory power carries by necessary implication all reasonable means/incidental powers to make that grant effective. Quoted to support the proposition that wide statutory grants carry ancillary powers; used as contrast to the present case where S.25 is not of comparable width.
Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420 : AIR 1981 SC 606 Tribunal or body should be considered to have such ancillary/incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively and to do justice between the parties (illustrated by power to set aside ex parte award). Cited as an example where an industrial tribunal exercised ancillary powers in the interest of justice despite lack of express provision.
B.B.L and T. Merchants' Association v. Bombay State, AIR 1962 SC 486 Doctrine of implied powers: implied powers can be invoked when a duty or power cannot be exercised without some auxiliary power; otherwise statute would be a "dead letter". Quoted to explain the test for implying ancillary powers and to emphasize necessity, not convenience, as the test.
Asstt. Collector of Central Excise Calcutta v. National Tobacco Co., (1972) 2 SCC 560 : AIR 1972 SC 2563 Affirmed the same legal principle concerning implication of powers; supports the doctrine applied in earlier cases. Cited in support of the legal standard governing implication of ancillary powers.
Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 Officials executing lawful search may use reasonable force to remove obstruction; supports the maxim that when law commands a thing it authorises what is necessary to execute it. Invoked by petitioners' counsel to illustrate the maxim that statutory duty may carry necessary incidental powers; cited by the Court as part of the authorities considered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of logical steps, each tied to statutory text and precedent:

  1. Examination of Section 25 (U.P. version): The Court reproduced Sub-section (1) of Section 25 (introduced by the State of Uttar Pradesh), which permits the Prescribed Authority, on a reference by the Registrar or at least one-fourth of society members, to "hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office bearer" and to "pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit." The Court noted the later-inserted proviso which prescribes specific grounds on which an election may be set aside (corrupt practice, improper rejection of nomination, materially affected result by improper acceptance/reception/refusal/rejection of votes), and the rule-making power vested in the State Government (which had not been exercised).
  2. Plain-language and scope analysis: The Court held that a plain reading of Section 25 does not either expressly or by necessary implication confer power to make interim orders of stay. The word "orders" in the plural does not, by itself, broaden the section to include interim stays beyond the statutory scope. The Prescribed Authority may need to take procedural steps (summoning witnesses, requiring appearances, receiving evidence) but those procedural adjuncts do not amount to a power to suspend or stay the functioning of the committee pending reference.
  3. Consideration of Section 19-A, U.P. General Clauses Act: The Court quoted Section 19-A, which supplies ancillary powers "necessary to enable a person, officer or functionary to do or enforce" a conferred act. However, the Court emphasized that ancillary powers can be implied only where they are "absolutely essential" for discharge of the statutory duty; the statutory background and the nature of powers expressly conferred determine whether ancillary powers can be read in.
  4. Reliance on precedent distinguishing necessity from convenience: The Court applied the principle in S.N. Singh (and its antecedents), which holds that an implied power may be read in only if it is absolutely essential and not merely convenient. The Court found that, on the facts and the summary nature of proceedings under Section 25, it was not absolutely essential for the Prescribed Authority to stay the committee's functioning in order to decide the reference.
  5. Comparative statutory examples: The Court contrasted situations where ancillary powers were implied because the statute conferred wide or comprehensive powers (e.g., S.7-F of the U.P. Rent & Eviction Act as held in Baleshwar Dayal and Bhagwati Devi; Sections 254/255 of the Income-tax Act as interpreted in M.K. Mohammad Kunhi and affirmed by the Supreme Court) with situations where the statute prescribes limited, specific powers (e.g., Section 17 of the Arms Act and the cases restricting suspension to grounds specified). Those comparisons supported the conclusion that implication of an interim-stay power depends on the statutory scheme and necessity for effective discharge of duties.
  6. Application to present case: Applying those principles, the Court concluded it was not possible to say that an interim stay of committee meetings was "absolutely essential" to the Prescribed Authority's ability to hear and decide a dispute under Section 25, especially given the summary nature of the proceedings and the statutory framework. Therefore, ancillary power to pass the kind of interlocutory stay imposed by respondent No. 3 could not be implied in Section 25.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The impugned interlocutory order dated 10th June 1981 passed by respondent No. 3 (Sub-Divisional Magistrate) is quashed and the writ petition is allowed.

Consequences and implications:

  • Immediate effect on the parties: The order suspending or staying the meetings of the Executive Committee was set aside and the petitioners were awarded costs to be paid by the respondents, as the Court expressly directed that the petitioners "will get their costs from the respondents."
  • Scope of precedent: The Court's decision rests on interpretation of Section 25 and application of established principles concerning implication of ancillary powers (necessity, not convenience). The opinion applies existing precedent to refuse to imply an interim-stay power in Section 25; it does not purport to create a novel or broader rule beyond those established principles. In other words, the decision directly affects the parties by quashing the particular interlocutory order and does not indicate the imposition of a new, broader precedent beyond applying the settled test for implying ancillary powers.
Show all summary ...

R.R Rastogi, J.:— This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution involves the scope of the power of the Prescribed Authority to pass an interim order pending reference made to it under S. 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, hereafter, ‘the Act’.

2. The facts are these: Meerut Collegiate Association, petitioner No. 1, is a society registered under the Act. The Society runs and administers the Meerut College, Meerut. The affairs of the college are looked after by an Executive Committee of the Society consisting of 33 members, out of whom 21 members are elected. The term of the Executive Committee is for three years and the last election of the Executive Committee of the Society was held on 19th Feb., 1978 under bye-law 12(a) of the Society. Thereafter fresh elections were held on 10th May, 1981. In that election Sri Raja Ram Mittal was elected President, Sri P.S Rastogi Vice-President and Sri J.D Singhal, Petitioner No. 2 the Honorary Secretary. Twenty-one members of the Executive Committee as well were elected. Sri Arvind Nath Seth, respondent No. 1 and Sri Vishwa Nath Agarwal, respondent No. 2, were also candidates for the posts of President and Honorary Secretary respectively. Both of them lost the election. Soon after these respondents along with some others made a reference under Sec. 25 of the Act seeking to challenge the election of the aforesaid office bearers and members of the Executive Committee before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Meerut, respondent No. 3, on 13th May, 1981 being Case No. 2/12 of 1981. The petitioners put in appearance and filed preliminary objections. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate who has also been personally made party as respondent No. 4 during the course of these proceedings, passed an interlocutory order on 10th of June, 1981 directing that pending the reference, the meeting of the Executive Committee fixed for that day and in future shall not be held till further orders. This order forms the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged.

3. The question which falls for our consideration thus is as to whether in proceedings under S. 25 of the Act the Prescribed Authority can pass an interlocutory or interim order. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the Prescribed Authority is not competent to pass any interim order pending the reference because there is no such power conferred on it either expressly or by implication under the relevant provisions of the Act. He invited our attention to a number of decisions in his support. On the contrary Sri S.S Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the respondents, urged that in the first instance S. 25 of the Act itself confers a power on the Prescribed Authority to pass such an order. Apart from this in view of S. 19-A of the U.P General Clauses Act there is now no difficulty in spelling out on inherent power in the Prescribed Authority to make an interim order. According to Sri Bhatnagar when a power is conferred on a statutory authority, unless there is any restriction or limitation provided, the authority shall have all the powers to do such acts as are reasonably necessary for the execution of the power conferred. He also cited some decisions in support of his contentions.

4. We shall first see whether S. 25 of the Act confers any such power on the Prescribed Authority expressly or by implication. Sub-section (1) of S. 25 as introduced in the Act by the State of Uttar Pradesh reads:

“25. Disputes regarding election of office bearers:— (1) The Prescribed Authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or by at least one-fourth of the members of Society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office bearer of such society and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit.”

5. There is a proviso to this sub-section which has been inserted by a later amendment. It provides for the grounds on which election of an office bearer shall be set aside. These grounds are:—

(a) commission of corrupt practice by such office bearers.

(b) improper rejection of the nomination of any candidate, or

(c) where on account of improper acceptance of any nomination or by improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote etc. the result of the election has been materially affected.

Explanation I to this proviso provides what amounts to corrupt practice. Explanation II says that a “promise” of individual advantage or profit to a person includes a promise for the benefit of the person himself, or of any one in whom he is interested. Then comes Explanation III which says:—

“The State Government may by rule prescribe the procedure for hearing and decision of doubts and disputes in respect of such elections and make provision in respect of any other matter relating to such elections for which insufficient provision exists in this Act or in the rules of the society.”

6. No rules have been framed by the State Government in this behalf. A bare reading of this sub-section would go to show that a dispute in regard to election of office-bearers may be referred to the Prescribed Authority by the Registrar or by at least one-fourth of the members of the society registered under the Act. The Prescribed Authority is required to hear and decide any such doubt or dispute in a summary manner and he may pass such order in respect thereof as he deems fit. The grounds on which the election of an office bearer shall be set aside have now been provided in the proviso to this sub-section. The State Government could frame rules and prescribe procedure for hearing and deciding doubts or disputes in this behalf up-till now it has not framed any such rules. The Prescribed Authority is certainly a statutory authority. It may be emphasised that these are only summary proceedings. We do not find that this provision confers any power to make an interim order either expressly or by necessary implication. The Prescribed Authority can only decide any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance of an office bearer of such society. For this purpose it may pass such orders as it deems fit. The fact that the word “orders” which is in plural number has been used does not mean that it can pass an order beyond the scope of the powers conferred on it by this section. The Prescribed Authority may have to require the parties to appear before it and furnish evidence as they desire. It may also have to summon witnesses. In other words, apart from passing the final order the Prescribed Authority may have to pass some such orders also. But, that does not mean that it can pass an interim order of stay.

7. Section 19-A of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act 1904 which has been inserted by Act 54 of 1955 reads:—

“19-A. Ancillary powers — Where by any Uttar Pradesh Act, a power is given to a person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of any act or thing, all such powers shall be deemed to be given as are necessary to enable a person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of the act or thing.”

8. This section provides for ancillary powers. Such powers can be spelt out only in a case where the power expressly conferred under a statute necessarily implies, for the proper execution of that power. The nature of proceedings and the powers expressly conferred are to constitute the backgrounds for spelling out ancillary or inherent powers, we would illustrate the difference by reference to certain specific instances.

9. The U.P Panchayat Raj Act 1947 has conferred on the State Government certain powers of control and supervision over the Gaonsamaj and its office bearers. These powers are enumerated in S. 95. Under Section 95(1)(g) power it conferred on the Government to suspend or to remove a member of the Gaon Panchayat or Joint Committee (Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti) or an office bearer of a Gaon Sabha or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. No specific power to suspend the Pradhan pending enquiry into the charges levelled against him has been conferred on the State Government. In view of S. 96-A the power conferred on the Government under S. 95 can be delegated to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may deem fit to impose. The State Govt.'s power under Sec. 95(1)(g) has been delegated to the Sub-Divisional Officers. A question arose in S.D.O, Faizabad v. S.N Singh, (1969) 1 SCC 825 : AIR 1970 SC 140, as to whether the State Government has power to suspend the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha pending enquiry into the charges levelled against him. The Court gave the answer in the negative and approved decision of this Court in Babu Nandan v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Salempur, AIR 1966 All 158. The principle laid down by the Court in para 8 is:—

“It is well recognised that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. But before implying the existence of such a power the Court must be satisfied that the existence of that power is absolutely essential for the discharge of the power conferred and not merely that it is convenient to have such a power. We are not satisfied that the power to place under suspension an officer is absolutely essential for the proper exercise of the Power conferred under S. 95(1)(g). It cannot be said that the power in question cannot be properly exercised without the power to suspend pending enquiry. The mere possibility of interference with the course of enquiry or of further misuse of powers are not sufficient to enlarge the scope of a statutory power.”

10. In our opinion, this decision applies on all fours to the present case. The power conferred on the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Act is to hear and decide any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance of an office-bearer or of such society. It is required to do so in a summary manner. The question arises whether it is essential for the discharge of the power conferred that pending reference the Prescribed Authority may suspend the office bearer of the elected committee of management from carrying on its work, on the possibility or supposition that the office bearer for the committee may further misuse their powers. We do not think that it can be said that it is absolutely essential for the Prescribed Authority to pass such an order for the discharge of the power conferred on it. It may be seen that S. 19-A of the U.P General Clauses Act in a way, gives a statutory recognition to the principle of law laid down in S.N Singh's case and does not provide for spelling out inherent or ancillary powers in every case.

11. Another instance can be gathered from the provisions contained in S. 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959. Under Sec. 17 of the Arms Act the licensing authority has the option to pass either an order of suspension or an order of revocation. An order of suspension can be passed only on the grounds mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 17. An order of suspension cannot be passed for the duration of the proceedings that may be taken before an order of revocation is ultimately passed, vide Jagul Kishore v. District Magistrate, 1971 All WR (HC) 727. This decision was given by a learned single Judge. Thereafter, there are two Division Bench decisions laying down the same proposition and they are Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 299 of 1978, Iqbal Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh, decided on 9-1-1978 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6245 of 1978, Sarjoo Singh v. District Magistrate, Ballia, decided on 24-7-1978.

12. On the contrary where the statute confers on an officer, Tribunal or Appellate or Revisional Authority — powers wide enough for discharge of the power conferred, then power to pass interim order of stay can certainly be spelt out. The power of the State Government to pass stay orders under S. 7-F of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, is an instance on this point. A Full Bench of our Court in Baleshwar Dayal v. State of U.P, 1971 All LJ 1074 : (AIR 1972 All 12) had occasion to consider this question. In Smt. Bhagwati Devi v. Baij Naih, 1966 All WR 631, it had been held that powers of the State Government under S. 7-F of the Act aforesaid are wide enough to enable it to pass stay orders during the pendency of the revision before it and that the stay order passed by it would operate from the date it is made. Subsequently another Division in Bench doubted the decision in Smt. Bhagwati Devi's case and then the question came up before the Full Bench in Baleshwar Dayal's case. The Full Bench approved the decision in Smt. Bhagwati's case and took the view that once the State Government summons the record under S. 7-F of the Act power to make orders with the view to make it certain that it may be able to pass an appropriate and effective order must per necessity be conceded to it Prime facie such an order would be necessary to be made to secure the ends of justice.

13. Another instance may be given from the Income-tax Act 1961, Sec. 254 of that Act provides for the powers of the Appellate Tribunal while disposing of an appeal. It says that the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. Section 255 of that Act provides for the procedure of Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (6) of this section lays down that the Appellate Tribunal shall, for the purpose of discharging its functions, have all the powers which are vested in the Income-tax Authorities referred to in S. 131 and any proceeding before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding and the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of S. 195 and Chap. XXXV of the Cr. P.C 1898. In M.K Mohammad Kunhi v. Income-tax Officer, (1966) 59 — ITR 171 (Ker), a question arose as to whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has the power to stay recovery of tax pending the disposal of an appeal before it. The Kerala High Court acting upon the principle that where statute confers a power on an authority, such ancillary and incidental power must be provided for the exercise of that power, held that the Income-tax Tribunal has the power to stay recovery of tax pending the disposal of an appeal before it. The Department took up the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court vide the Income Tax Officer, Cannanore. v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430. The Court affirmed the view of the Kerala High Court and laid down:

“It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective ……. The powers which have been conferred by S. 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective.”

14. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, contains a statement at page 350 that “where an Act confers a jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution”.

15. There is another recent decision of the Supreme Court which is also an illustration of this aspect. It is in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420 : AIR 1981 SC 606. In that case the Govt. of India, Ministry of Labour had referred an industrial dispute existing between the employers in relation to the Grind-lays Bank Ltd., Calcutta and their workmen, to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its powers under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication. Parties appeared before the Industrial Tribunal but ultimately an ex parte award was given. That ex parte award was later on set aside on the defaulting party showing that they were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the reference was called for hearing on the date fixed. The question was whether the Industrial Tribunal had any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award particularly when it was based on evidence. The High Court declined to interfere. An appeal by special leave was filed before the Supreme Court and the Court took a contrary view. There is no express provision in the Industrial Disputes Act or the rules framed therein giving the Industrial Tribunal jurisdiction to set aside ex parte award. The Court, however, ruled that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It was observed (at p. 608):—

“But it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.”

16. What follows, therefore from these decisions is that ancillary or incidental powers can be inferred only if for the discharge of power or functions conferred under the Act effectively, and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties it is necessary to spell out such power. In this behalf it would be useful to recall what his Lordship Late Gajendragadkar while speaking for the Court said in B.B.L and T. Merchants' Association v. Bombay State AIR 1962 SC 486 (at p. 494):—

“The doctrine of implied powers can be legitimately invoked when it is found that a duty has been imposed or a power conferred on an authority by a statute and is further found that the duty cannot be discharged or the power cannot be exercised at all unless some auxiliary or incidental power is assumed to exist. In such a case, in the absence of an implied power the statute itself would become impossible of compliance. The impossibility in question must be of a general nature so that the performance of duty or the exercise of power is rendered impossible in all cases. It really means that the statutory provision would become a dead letter and cannot be enforced unless a subsidiary power is implied.”

17. The same law has been laid down in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise Calcutta v. National Tobacco Co., (1972) 2 SCC 560 : AIR 1972 SC 2563.

18. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari , AIR 1956 SC 44. In that case in execution of certain warrants of search when the officers were obstructed, it was alleged that they assaulted and manhandled the persons who laid the obstruction and offered resistance. In connection with the complaints filed by them a question arose as to whether prior sanction under S. 197, Criminal P.C 1898 was required for the prosecution of such officers. The view taken was that the officials conducting the authorised and lawful search had a right to remove or cause to be removed the obstruction or resistance offered by the employment of reasonable force and the remedy of the aggrieved party was to resort to the police or the Magistrate with a complaint and for that purpose prior sanction under S. 197-C was pre-requisite, Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edn., Page 312 was quoted with approval. That Maxim is:—

“It is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command.”

19. Applying the principles enunciated in the decisions referred to above, it is not possible to say that for hearing and deciding any doubt or dispute in regard to the election of the office bearer of the petitioner committee it was absolutely necessary for the Prescribed Authority to stay the functioning of the committee pending decision of the reference and further more so when the proceedings are summary in nature.

20. The impugned order, therefore, is liable to be quashed.

21. The petition, hence, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by respondent No. 3 dated 10th of June, 1981 is quashed. The petitioners will get their costs from the respondents.

22. Petition allowed.