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M.P Poddar And Company v. Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, Gorakhpur, Varanasi Camp
Structured Summary of the Opinion (C.S.P. Singh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (assessee) had four revision petitions pending before the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, Gorakhpur, listed for hearing on 22 February 1973. The assessee's pairokar (court clerk) arrived at court at about 10 a.m. and found the presiding officer not sitting; after attending to other business he returned at about 2 p.m. and was informed that the Additional Judge had left for the day after finishing court work. The pairokar visited again on 23 February 1973 with a letter from the assessee's counsel explaining the counsel's illness on 22 February; that letter was not entertained.
The assessee then sent an application dated 26 February 1973, which the revising authority's office received on 28 February 1973; the application prayed that the petitioner be heard. The petitioner was not informed of any order on that application. An ex parte order of the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, was passed on 16 March 1973. The assessee filed a restoration application on 10 April 1973, which the Judge (Revisions) dismissed on two grounds: (1) undue delay by the assessee in seeking restoration, and (2) absence of any specific statutory provision in the Sales Tax Act for setting aside an ex parte order.
The assessee subsequently brought the matter before this Court by petition under Article 226 of the Constitution (the petition was entertained in 1976), challenging the revising authority's refusal to restore and contending error in the revising authority's approach.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the revising authority was correct in holding that the assessee had unjustifiably delayed in moving the restoration application.
- Whether the revising authority lacked jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order because the Sales Tax Act contained no specific provision for setting aside such orders.
- Whether this Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 on the ground that an alternative remedy (a reference under the U.P. Sales Tax Act) was available.
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee / Petitioner
- The assessee (through facts placed before the Court) asserted that an application for restoration had been moved on 26 February 1973 and was received in the revising authority's office on 28 February 1973 (the same day the revisions were disposed of), so there was no delay attributable to the assessee.
- The assessee contended that the application filed on 26 February should have been put before the presiding officer on 28 February and was improperly withheld by the office; therefore dismissal for delay was erroneous.
Revising Authority / Respondent (as represented by standing counsel and the department)
- The revising authority dismissed the restoration application on two stated grounds: (a) that the assessee had delayed in moving the restoration application, and (b) that the Sales Tax Act contained no specific provision for setting aside an ex parte order, implying lack of jurisdiction.
- The standing counsel for the respondent argued that the revising authority's view was correct and relied upon a decision (Property Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur) to contend limitations on the power to review/reopen; and further contended that an alternative remedy (reference under the U.P. Sales Tax Act) was available and that this Court should therefore decline to interfere under Article 226.
- In its counter-affidavit the department admitted that the application dated 26 February 1973 was received in the revising authority's office on 28 February 1973 (as recorded in para. 7 of that affidavit).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P., [1952] 22 ITR 104 | Held that the Appellate Tribunal had inherent power to set aside an order of dismissal for default or an ex parte order where there was no service of notice or sufficient cause for non-appearance. | Used as an early authority supporting the proposition that an appellate body has inherent power to set aside ex parte orders. |
| Murlidhar Sarda v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, [1973] 92 ITR 189 (Calcutta High Court, Single Judge) | Held that if a party did not get an opportunity of placing its case before the Tribunal, the Tribunal could hear the appeal again after giving notice — the power is incidental/ancillary to appellate jurisdiction and inherent in it. | Cited to support the view that appellate authorities possess ancillary or inherent power to reopen matters decided ex parte. |
| Income-tax Officer, ‘F’ Ward v. Murlidhar Sarda, [1975] 99 ITR 485 (Calcutta High Court, Division Bench) | Affirmed the single judge's view that the Tribunal's power to rehear is part of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute. | Relied upon to show a higher court's affirmation that rehearing powers are within the scope of appellate jurisdiction. |
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, [1979] 120 ITR 231 (Kerala High Court) | Held that if an ex parte order was passed without giving reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to set aside the order and pass a fresh order; such power is an essential part of appellate jurisdiction and is not barred by absence of express provision. | Invoked to show that absence of an express statutory provision does not preclude the appellate body from setting aside ex parte orders where reasonable opportunity was denied. |
| Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi, [1977] 106 ITR 653 (Supreme Court) | Held that a High Court has inherent power to recall an earlier order declining to answer a reference (even if the reference had been returned) where sufficient reason for non-appearance is shown; inherent power is not confined to cases of non-service of notice. | Relied upon to demonstrate that inherent power to recall/rehear extends beyond instances of lack of notice to include cases of sufficient cause for non-appearance; used to rebut a narrower interpretation of inherent power. |
| Property Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur, AIR 1966 All 424 | Held that the U.P. Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947 does not confer a power of review on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. | Distinguished by the Court as not on point; used by the standing counsel but rejected as inapplicable because the present proceedings concern restoration (reopening) and not statutory review under the Rent Control Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two principal strands of analysis: (A) whether there was delay in moving the restoration application, and (B) whether the revising authority had jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order in the absence of an express statutory provision.
A. Delay: The Court noted that an application dated 26 February 1973 was admitted by the department to have been received in the revising authority's office on 28 February 1973 — the very date on which the revisions were disposed of. The Court held that the office should have placed that application before the presiding officer on 28 February and should not have withheld it while disposing of the revisions. Because an application for restoration was already pending on the date judgment was delivered, the revising authority was wrong to treat the subsequent restoration application as delayed or inexcusable. The Court also observed that the later restoration application was filed within a month of receipt of the ex parte order, but it was unnecessary to decide issues of delay in relation to the later application because the earlier application had already been pending when judgment was given.
B. Jurisdiction to set aside ex parte order: The Court reviewed the "unanimous weight of judicial authority" and concluded that revising/appellate authorities enjoy the jurisdiction to set aside ex parte orders. The Court relied on multiple authorities (both High Court and Supreme Court decisions) showing that such a power stems from either the inherent nature of appellate jurisdiction, is ancillary/auxiliary to statutory appellate powers, or flows from inherent powers vested in the appellate body. The Court rejected the relevance of Property Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur because that decision concerned the absence of review power under the U.P. Rent Control and Eviction Act and did not address restoration/reopening of proceedings.
The Court also addressed the respondent's contention that an alternative statutory remedy (a reference under the U.P. Sales Tax Act) existed and that this Court should therefore refuse to interfere under Article 226. The Court observed that it was unnecessary to decide whether such a reference remedy lay, but even assuming it did, that fact would not prevent the Court exercising its Article 226 powers in the circumstances of this case. The petition had been entertained without objection in 1976, and, in any event, equitable considerations were relevant: after about half a decade had passed, it would be inequitable now to refuse relief on the ground of alternative remedy as any reference application would by then be hopelessly time-barred.
On these bases — (1) the absence of delay attributable to the assessee given the pending application on 28 February, and (2) the established jurisdictional principle that appellate/revising authorities may set aside ex parte orders even where no express statutory provision exists — the Court found the revising authority's reasoning erroneous and its order incorrect.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court quashed the revising authority's order and allowed the petition. The Court's core ruling is expressed as:
Petition allowed; the revising authority's order is quashed and the restoration application is to be disposed of on merits.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The revising authority is directed to consider and dispose of the pending restoration application on its merits in accordance with law and in light of the observations made by this Court.
- The petition is allowed with costs in favour of the petitioner.
Broader implications noted by the Court (as reflected in the opinion):
- The opinion affirms the proposition, supported by precedent, that appellate or revising authorities may possess an inherent or ancillary power to set aside ex parte orders even in the absence of an express statutory provision to that effect.
- The Court exercised Article 226 in the circumstances despite the respondent's contention of an alternative statutory remedy; the opinion emphasises equitable considerations and procedural fairness (timely receipt of the 26 February application) as grounds for intervention.
No portion of this summary invents facts or principles beyond what appears in the provided opinion; all statements reflect the Court's findings, cited authorities, and directions as contained in the opinion.
C.S.P Singh, J.:— The assessee, who is the petitioner here, had filed four revisions before the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, Gorakhpur. These revisions were listed for hearing on 22nd February, 1973. The applicant's case is that its pairokar went to the court at 10 A.M and found that the presiding officer was not sitting in the court. He then went to civil courts in connection with some other case, and came back again at 2 P.M when he was told that the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, had left the court after finishing court work for that day. It is averred that the pairokar of the assessee went to the court of the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, on the next day, i.e, 23rd February, 1973, along with a letter of the counsel for the assessee to the effect that he could not attend the court on 22nd February, 1973, as he was ill. This letter was not entertained. Thereafter he sent an application on 26th February, 1973, which was received in the office of the revising authority on 28th February, 1973. A prayer was made in this application that the petitioner be heard. The petitioner was not informed of the order passed on this application. On receiving the' ex parte order of the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, on 16th March, 1973, he filed a restoration application on 10th April, 1973. The Judge (Revisions) has dismissed this application on two grounds. In the first place he has taken the view that there was no justification for the assessee for waiting till 10th April, 1973, for moving the restoration application, and further that there was no specific provisions in the Act for setting aside the ex parte order. We are of the view that the revising authority is in error on both the counts.
2. We have already adverted to the fact that the petitioner had moved an application on 26th February, 1973, for setting aside the ex parte order. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the department, it has been admitted in para 7 that such application was received in the office on 28th February, 1973. It is, however, stated that the report of the Reader dated 2nd March, 1973, regarding this application was placed before the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, on 5th March, 1973, whereupon the Additional Judge (Revisions) directed it to be filed, inasmuch as the revisions had been disposed of on 28th February, 1973. The revising authority has not referred to this application at all. There was no delay in making this application, and in fact the application had reached the office of the revising authority on 28th February, 1973, on which date the judgment was given.
3. The office of the revising authority should have put up this application before the revising authority on the same date, and should not have withheld this application, as the case was being disposed of on that date, and all pending applications in the case should have been put up before the Presiding Officer for disposal. Inasmuch as an application had already been moved on 26th February, 1973, and was received on 28th February, 1973, on the date when the case was being disposed of, there was no delay on the part of the assessee in moving the restoration application. There also does not appear any delay on the part of the assessee in moving the second application as it was moved within a month of the assessee having received the copy of the order of the revising authority. It is, however, not necessary to consider the delay or haste in moving the second application for restoration, as there was already a pending application for restoration of the case on the date when the judgment was delivered. It was thus erroneous on the part of the revising authority to have held that there was delay on the part of the assessee in moving the restoration application, and further that it was inexcusable.
4. Coming now to the question as to whether the revising authority had jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order. The unanimous weight of judicial authority is that he enjoyed such a jurisdiction.
5. The revising authority in taking the view which he did was impressed by the fact that there was no specific provisions in the Sales Tax Act for setting aside any ex parte order. But that is not conclusive. Under the Indian Income-tax Acts, 1922, and 1961, provisions have been made for an appeal being filed before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Both these Acts do not contain any specific provisions for setting aside an ex parte order, but time and again it has been held that the Tribunal enjoys such a power, due either to the inherent nature of the appellate jurisdiction which it enjoys, or alternatively on the ground that such a power is auxiliary or ancillary to the appellate power. The exercise of such a power has also been upheld on the ground of inherent power conferred on the Appellate Tribunal. It would be profitable to begin with a case of our own court, which is the earliest in the point of time. In Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P, [1952] 22 ITR 104 it was held that the Tribunal had inherent power to set aside an order of dismissal for default or an order passed in an appeal heard ex parte, when it is satisfied that there was no service of notice or that there was sufficient cause which prevented the appellant or the respondent from appearing on the date fixed. We next come to two decisions of the Calcutta High Court, which were brought to our notice. The first being Murlidhar Sarda v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, [1973] 92 ITR 189. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that if in a particular case it appeared to the Tribunal that a party did not get an opportunity of placing its case before the Tribunal, the Tribunal had the power to decide the appeal again, after notice to the party or after giving the party an opportunity of being heard. It was held that such a power is incidental or ancillary to the jurisdiction given to the Tribunal. Such a power was also justified on the ground that it was inherent in the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal. The other case is the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Officer, ‘F’ Ward v. Murlidhar Sarda, [1975] 99 ITR 485, which decision was given on appeal from the first decision. The Division Bench affirmed the view of the single Judge, and justified such a power on the ground that it was a part of the jurisdiction that the Tribunal has been given by the statute conferring appellate powers. The Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, [1979] 120 ITR 231 held that in a case where the Tribunal was satisfied that an ex parte order was passed without giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved party, it had jurisdiction to set aside the order and pass a fresh order. Such a power was justified on the basis that it was an essential part of the appellate jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. It was also held that as there was no specific provision in the Act prohibiting the exercise of such a power, the Appellate Tribunal could set aside an ex parte order.
6. It would also be profitable to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi, [1977] 106 ITR 653 (SC). In that case a reference application under the Income-tax Act had come up for hearing in this Court. None appeared for the applicant and this Court passed an order declining to answer the reference on account of default of the applicant, and also on the ground that paper books had not been filed. This order was passed on 26th August, 1970. On 21st September, 1970, the clerk of the Advocate, who was appearing in the case discovered that notices of the reference had been received from the High Court. On inquiry being made it was found that the matter had been disposed of on 26th August, 1970. Thereupon, an application was filed for permission to file paper books, and for rehearing of the reference. This Court held that on the reference being returned, it had become functus officio to entertain the application. This view was reversed by the Supreme Court. It was held that if a party or its counsel are prevented from appearing at the time of hearing of the reference, and the party shows subsequent to the order declining to answer the reference, that there was sufficient reason for non-appearance, the High Court had inherent power to recall its earlier order and dispose of the reference on merits. It was further held that as there was no specific provisions in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which either expressly or by necessary implications prohibited the High Court from recalling an order of dismissal for default, the High Court had jurisdiction to set aside the earlier order. We have purposely referred to this case, to thwart an argument raised by the standing counsel that the inherent power to set aside an ex parte order reaches only to a case where the order has been passed without due notice to an assessee or the opposite party. It is clear that the reach of inherent power exercised by a Tribunal extends beyond this region too, and embraces cases where a party shows sufficient cause for not being present on the date when the matter is up for hearing.
7. The standing counsel tried to dissuade us from taking this view by reciting a decision of this Court in the case of Property Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur AIR 1966 All 424. This case is not in point, for all that it lays down is that the U.P Rent Control and Eviction Act of 1947 does not confer any power of review on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In the present case we are not concerned with a review order. The proceedings arose out of an application for restoration and not for review.
8. As a last resort the standing counsel contended that the assessee had an alternative remedy, viz., by a reference to this Court under the U.P Sales Tax Act, and as such this Court should decline to interfere under article 226 of the Constitution. It is not necessary to consider as to whether a reference lies against the impugned order. We may assume that it is so. That, however, is not sufficient in the circumstances of the present case to deter us from exercising the powers under article 226 of the Constitution, for this Court entertained the petition in 1976 without any objection on the ground of alternative remedy.
9. It would not now be equitable, after the expiry of half a decade to throw out the petition on the ground of an alternative remedy, for by this time the reference application would be hopelessly beyond time. We are satisfied that the order of the revising authority is incorrect, and deserved to be quashed.
10. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs. The revising authority is directed to dispose of the restoration application on merits in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made above.
11. Petition allowed.
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