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Janardan Prasad And Another v. Girja Prasad Seth .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Division Bench — Yashoda Nandan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This Second Appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation and ejectment of the defendant-respondent. Two plaintiffs (the donees) were minors when their maternal grandmother gifted two houses to them by a registered gift deed which provided that their mother would manage the gifted property during their minority. The defendant was the tenant of the property.
A composite notice under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the defendant by the appellants' mother. The defendant did not pay rent or deliver possession. The plaintiffs' father, as natural guardian and next friend, instituted the suit. The defendant resisted the suit, inter alia, by contending that the notice served by the mother was invalid.
The trial court dismissed the ejectment claim but granted part of the claim for arrears of rent. The lower appellate court increased the decree for arrears of rent but held that the notice served by the mother was invalid because, in its view, the mother had not been shown to be the agents of the minors under the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and the minors' natural guardian was their father.
On appeal, a learned single Judge referred a specific question to the Division Bench for opinion concerning whether a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Act given by the mother of a Hindu minor (over five years of age) amounted to dealing with the minor's property and whether such notice was valid.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the giving of a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, on behalf of a landlord who is a Hindu minor (over five years old) by the mother of the minor amounts to a dealing with the property of the Hindu minor within the meaning of Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and whether such a notice will be valid.
- Whether the minors' mother, appointed in the gift deed by the donor to manage the gifted property, could be considered the minors' agent (and therefore a "landlord" under Section 2(c) of the U.P. Act) and thus competent to serve a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of that Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The act of issuing a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Act does not amount to "disposing of, or dealing with, the property" of minors within Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
- Relying on precedent, it was argued that service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary where the suit is governed by a State Rent Control Act; consequently, even if Section 106 service were defective, it would not bar ejectment if requirements of the State Act (U.P. Act) were satisfied. The single Judge hearing the appeal had relied on V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal in this connection.
- They contended that the mother, having been nominated in the registered gift deed to manage the gifted property (and the father having accepted the gift), could be treated as agent/manager for the property and therefore competent to act as "landlord" under Section 2(c) of the U.P. Act.
Respondent's / Trial and Lower Courts' Position
- The defendant resisted the claim by (among other legal pleas) contending that the notice served by the mother of the plaintiffs was invalid.
- The lower appellate court held that because the plaintiffs were over five years of age their natural guardian was their father and, in the absence of evidence that the mother had been appointed as agent for issuing the notice, the notice was invalid and the tenancy had not been validly terminated.
- The learned single Judge who referred the question took the view that a mother nominated as "guardian" in the gift deed could not be considered an agent for the minor (because a minor cannot act on his own and so could not have an agent in the ordinary sense) and that issuance of the notice by a non-natural guardian amounted to dealing with the minors' property for the purposes of Section 11 of the Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Kumar v. Onkar Nath (AIR 1972 All 81) | Held that giving of notice of demand and filing a suit was not "disposing of or dealing with the property" within the contemplation of Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. | Noted as a precedent whose conclusion the referring Judge disagreed with; the Court referenced it in discussing earlier conflicting views on whether issuance of notices/suits by persons other than natural guardians amount to dealing with a minor's property. |
| V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal ((1979) 4 SCC 214 : AIR 1979 SC 1745) | Authority for the proposition that service under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act may not be necessary where the suit is governed by a State Rent Control Act. | The learned single Judge had relied on this decision to hold that Section 106 service was not necessary in the present context; the Division Bench recorded that reliance when describing the single Judge's reasoning on procedural formalities. |
| Anandi Devi v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1932 All 444) | Acceptance of a gift need not be express and may be inferred. | Used to support the proposition that a gift to minors may be accepted on their behalf and that acceptance can be inferred (relevant to the father's acceptance of the gift and its terms). |
| Kalyanasundaram v. Karruppa (AIR 1927 PC 42) | Delivery of a gift deed to the donee constitutes acceptance of the transfer for the purposes of the Transfer of Property Act. | Cited alongside other authorities to show that delivery/registration of the gift deed demonstrated acceptance of the gift in law, supporting the conclusion that the father's production of the registered gift deed evidenced acceptance. |
| Venktasubba Srinivas v. Subha Rama (AIR 1928 PC 86) | Similar principle as to delivery and acceptance of a registered gift. | Referred to for the same purpose as Kalyanasundaram — to show legal effect of delivery/registration of a gift deed on acceptance. |
| Balmukund v. Bhagwan Das (1894) ILR 16 All 185 | Acceptance of a gift proved by the donee's possession of the gift deed. | Relied upon to support an inference of acceptance when the registered gift deed was produced by the plaintiffs' father. |
| Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya (AIR 1949 FC 218) | Federal Court held that a guardian or manager had no power to give a covenant binding on the minor or his estate similar to English law; resolved earlier conflict about de facto guardian's powers to bind the minor by covenant. | Used to explain the historical evolution of the law on de facto guardians and to show limits on the powers of guardians/managers. The Court distinguished the present case on the basis of statutory provisions and accepted that some managerial functions can be recognized when sanctioned by the natural guardian. |
| Rajalaxmi v. Minor Ramachandran ((1966) 2 Mad LJ 420 : AIR 1967 Mad 113) | Held that mere fact that a person gifts property to a minor does not entitle him to appoint a guardian for the minor in respect of that property. | Noted by the Court and distinguished: while a donor cannot unilaterally appoint a guardian, a natural guardian's acceptance of a gift containing a provision nominating a manager may amount in law to recognition or appointment of that manager as agent for the gifted property. |
| Hunoomanpersaud v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393 | Privy Council opinion indicating that under Hindu Law a de facto manager may have the same power of alienating the property of his ward as a natural guardian, subject to circumstances. | Referred to as historical authority that influenced High Courts' decisions prior to the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act; used to set out the background against which the Act must be construed. |
| Girdhari Lohar v. Anant Lohar (AIR 1967 Pat 8) | Held that institution of a suit by a next friend who is not a natural guardian is not prohibited by Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. | Relied on to support the view that Section 11 should not be interpreted to invalidate remedies available under civil procedure (e.g., suits by next friends) and that State enactments governing rent and ejectment are not impliedly repealed by the Guardianship Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the referred question in two sequential parts: (1) whether the mother nominated in the gift deed could be considered the minors' agent and thereby a "landlord" under Section 2(c) of the U.P. Act entitled to give notice under Section 3(1)(a); and (2) whether such a notice, if given by her, would amount to "disposing of, or dealing with" the minors' property within the meaning of Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
On the first question the Court proceeded as follows:
- The gift deed was a registered document and was produced by the plaintiffs' father; under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act a gift to a donee can be accepted "by or on behalf of the donee" and acceptance need not be in express words but may be inferred (citing Anandi Devi and other precedents).
- The father, as natural guardian, accepted the gift and its terms, including the provision that the mother would manage the gifted property. The Court treated this acceptance and non-repudiation of terms as ratification and recognition of the mother's appointment to manage the property.
- Given that an agent may be appointed by a person of full capacity and that a natural guardian can perform acts on behalf of a minor (including employing an agent under Section 183 of the Indian Contract Act), the Court held that the father's acceptance of the gift amounted in law to his appointing the mother as agent/manager of the gifted houses.
- Consequently, in that capacity the mother became a "landlord" within Section 2(c) of the U.P. Act and was entitled to serve a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of that Act.
On the second question — whether issuing the notice constituted "dealing with" or "disposing of" the minors' property under Section 11 of the Guardianship Act — the Court reasoned as follows:
- Section 11 of the Guardianship Act prohibits "de facto guardians" from disposing of or dealing with a minor's property merely on the ground that they are de facto guardians. The Court examined Section 11 in light of Section 8 of the Act, which defines the powers of natural guardians (Section 8(1)–(3)).
- Section 8(2) explicitly enumerates transactions that constitute disposal of immovable property (mortgage, charge, transfer by sale/gift/exchange, and certain leases). Section 8(1) empowers natural guardians to do acts necessary or reasonable for the benefit or protection of the minor's estate but prohibits binding the minor by a personal covenant.
- The Court concluded that a mere notice of demand does not directly affect the minor's property; at best it addresses the tenant and seeks performance (payment of rent). By issuing a demand notice the guardian is not effecting a transfer, charge, lease exceeding specified terms, or other disposition described in Section 8(2). Thus, such a notice cannot be fairly characterized as "disposal" or "dealing" with the minor's property for the purposes of Section 11.
- The Court accepted the ordinary meaning of "deal" (e.g., traffic, trade, do business with/in) and found that an expanded interpretation to include issuing a demand notice would be inconsistent with the statutory context and the historical background of the law that the Act codified.
- The Court also reasoned by alternative analysis: Section 11 targets de facto guardians who are self-appointed intermeddlers. The mother's status here was not that of a de facto guardian but of an agent/manager recognized by the father's acceptance. Therefore Section 11's prohibition against de facto guardians dealing with the minor's property did not apply to the notice in question.
- Finally, procedural law (Order 32, Rule 4(1) Civil Procedure Code) specifically authorizes filing suits on behalf of minors by a next friend and does not limit that right to natural guardians. The Court observed that Section 11 cannot be read to impliedly repeal such rights under procedural enactments or to create differing consequences for Hindus vis-à-vis non-Hindus in the operation of Rent Control statutes and CPC provisions.
Based on the above analysis the Court answered the referred question in the appellants' favour.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
In the circumstances of the case, giving of a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P. Act III of 1947 on behalf of the landlord, who was a Hindu minor (aged over five years) by his mother did not amount to dealing with his property within the meaning of Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and the notice was valid.
Implications — Direct effect on the parties and procedure:
- The Court held that the mother's notice under Section 3(1)(a) was valid because (a) the mother was the agent/manager for the gifted property by virtue of the father's acceptance of the gift and (b) issuing a rent-demand notice does not amount to "dealing with" or "disposing of" the minor's property under Section 11.
- The Division Bench's opinion was to be placed before the learned single Judge so that the remainder of the appeal — other questions, if any — could be decided and the appeal disposed of.
- No broader changes to other enactments were declared; the Court emphasized that neither the Guardianship Act nor its Section 11 was intended to impliedly repeal State Rent Control Acts or procedural rights such as a next friend's standing under the Civil Procedure Code. The opinion does not assert or claim to set aside other statutes; it limited itself to the question referred and its direct consequences for this case.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and reasoning explicitly contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion text has been added or inferred.
Yashoda Nandan, J.:— When this plaintiffs' Second Appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation and for ejectment of the defendant-respondent came up for hearing before a learned single Judge, he referred the following question for the opinion of a Division Bench:—
“Whether the giving of a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947, on behalf of a landlord, who is a Hindu minor (aged over, 5 years) by the mother of the minor amounts to a dealing with the property of a Hindu minor, and whether the giving of such a notice will be a valid notice?”
2. Occasion for reference of the above quoted question arose because a learned single Judge of this Court in K. Kumar v. Onkar Nath (AIR 1972 All 81) has held that giving of notice of demand and filing a suit is not “disposing of or dealing with the property” within the contemplation of Sec. 11 of Act 32 of 1956. The learned Judge hearing the appeal found himself in disagreement. For a proper appreciation of the controversy involved in resolving the question referred, it is necessary to set out in brief the relevant facts which have given rise to it. The two plaintiff-appellants were minors when the property in dispute was gifted to them by their maternal grandmother. In the deed of gift which was a registered document she mentioned that their mother would manage the property of the donees during their minority. The defendant-respondent is the tenant of the property. A composite notice under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (U.P Act No. III of 1947) and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the defendant by the appellants' mother. Since the defendant neither paid the rent within the time permitted by law nor delivered possession of the property to the landlords the father of the plaintiffs who was their natural guardian as their next friend instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal. The claim was resisted on various grounds including certain legal pleas, inter alia that the notice served by the mother of the plaintiffs was invalid. The trial court dismissed the suit for ejectment but decreed the claim for arrears of rent in part. The lower appellate court partly allowed the plaintiffs' appeal and modified the decree for the amount realisable as arrears of rent by decreeing it for a larger sum. It held that since the plaintiffs were over five years of age in view of the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), their natural guardian was their father who was alive. It was found that in the absence of any evidence on the record that the plaintiff-appellant had appointed their mother as their agent for the purpose of issuing the notice in view of the provisions of the Act the notice served by her was invalid and the defendant's tenancy had not been terminated in accordance with law.
3. When the appeal came up for hearing before a learned single Judge, it was argued before him that the act of issuing a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 did not amount to ‘disposing of, or dealing with, the property’ of the minors within the meaning of Section 11 of the Act and consequently the courts below had gone wrong in holding that the notice was invalid. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal ((1979) 4 SCC 214 : AIR 1979 SC 1745) the learned single Judge held that service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary since the suit accommodation was governed by the provisions of a State Rent Control Act and thus assuming that the notice under Section 106 was invalid it would not be a bar to decreeing the claim for ejectment if the case fulfils the requirement of Section 3 of U.P Act No. III of 1947. According to Section 2(c) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 “landlord” means “a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir, or assignee of such person.” The learned single Judge appears to have been of the view that the mother by reason of the fact that she had been appointed guardian of the property of the minors by the donor could not be considered to be their agent as would appear from the following observations made in the referring order:—
“A minor cannot act on his own. He must act through a guardian, either natural or one appointed through Court. If he cannot act on his own how can he have an, agent, attorney or assignee, to act on his behalf? His mother cannot be his agent or attorney or assignee for in each case such a person must be appointed as such. It postulates an act by or on behalf of such a person i.e the minor. Since the minor cannot act on his own and can act only through a guardian, consequently, the guardian must be one who is legally competent to act as guardian.”
4. The learned single Judge further appears to have been inclined to take the view that giving of a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 by the mother who was not the appellants' natural guardian within the meaning of Section 4(c) of the Act read with Section 5 thereof amounted to dealing with their property for the purposes of Section 11 of the Act and the notice consequently was illegal.
5. The question referred by the learned single Judge has to be considered from two different aspects. In the first place, it has to be examined as to whether the mother of the appellants appointed by the donor as guardian of the property gifted to them by the gift deed could be considered to be their agent for the purposes of Section 2(c) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 and was thus competent as ‘landlord’ to give a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of that Act. If the conclusion is that she was a ‘landlord’ within the meaning of Sec. 2(c) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 being an agent of the appellants, the next question that would need consideration is as to whether such a notice amount to dealing with the appellants' property within the meaning of Section 11 of the Act. We shall now proceed to consider the first question.
6. Neither the Hindu Law nor the Act prohibit either a natural or a de facto guardian from acquiring a property for a minor in the absence of there being any onerous consequences as a result of the acquisition on the minor. By means of the gift deed dated 15th Feb., 1956 which was a registered document and is on record, the grand-mother of the appellants had gifted to them two houses. The gift deed provided that not the father but the mother of the minors would act as the guardian for the gifted property. The father of the appellants acting as their natural guardian was clearly entitled to accept the gift since the mere fact that it provided that the mother will act as guardian of the minors for the property gifted cannot be characterised as an onerous term involving any burden on the property or on the minors personally. Under Sec. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act a gift of existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration by the donor can be ‘accepted by or on behalf of the donee’. The use of the words ‘accepted by or on behalf of the donee’ shows that the donee might be a person unable to express acceptance of a gift being a minor and it may be accepted on his behalf by his natural guardian. Sec. 122 does not require the acceptance of a gift of movable or immovable property being express and it may be inferred (Anandi Devi v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1932 All 444). Where a gift deed was delivered by a donor to the donee it has been held by the Privy Council that on delivery of the deed there was acceptance of the transfer within the meaning of the section and the gift became effectual subject to registration as required by Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. (See Kalyanasundaram v. Karruppa, AIR 1927 PC 42 and Venktasubba Srinivas v. Subha Rama, AIR 1928 PC 86). Acceptance has been held proved by this court also in a case under the Hindu Law by the donee's possession of the gift deed (See Balmukund v. Bhagwan Das, (1894) ILR 16 All 185).
7. The registered gift deed was produced by the father of the appellants. It thus can safely be held that the gift was accepted by the minors' natural guardian with the condition that their mother would act as guardian in respect of the property gifted. No term of the gift deed was repudiated by the father of the appellants. There was in fact acquiescence and ratification of all the terms of the gift deed. It was observed by Kania, C.J in Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya (AIR 1949 FC 218) that:—
“In my opinion, much of the apparent conflict of views will disappear if a de facto guardian is described as a de facto manager. In law there is nothing like a de facto guardian. There can only be a de facto manager, although the expression ‘de facto guardian’ has been used in text books and some judgments of Courts.”
8. By reason of Section 6 of the Act the mother of the minors could not in law be the natural or de jure guardian of the property of the minors and her status would thus merely be of a de facto manager or an agent of the donees. The act of the natural guardian of the minors in accepting the gift together with all the terms contained therein, in our view, amounted to a ratification and recognition of the appointment of the mother of the minors as their de facto manager for the property in suit. In our opinion, this act of the natural guardian amounted to his appointing the mother as the agent of the minors as far as the property gifted is concerned. We have already stated that acting on the basis of the notice issued by the mother it was the father of the minors who had in fact instituted the suit which has resulted in this appeal. It is true as held in Rajalaxmi v. Minor Ramachandran, (1966) 2 Mad LJ 420 : (AIR 1967 Mad 113) that the mere fact that a person gifts property to a minor does not entitle him to appoint a guardian for the minor in respect of that property but we are of the view that a gift can be accepted on behalf of a minor by a natural guardian containing a condition that of the gifted property the person nominated in the gift deed shall act as a manager. The acceptance of a gift with such a condition in the eye of law would amount to recognition by the natural guardian of the nominated person as the manager or agent of the minor for the purposes of such property.
9. Under Section 183 of the Indian Contract Act any person who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, may employ an agent. The minor himself since he has no consenting mind cannot appoint an agent but surely his natural guardian is capable of doing so and in the instant case, in the circumstances discussed above, we hold that the father of the appellants while accepting the gift of the disputed property in the eye of law appointed the appellants' mother as their agent for the purpose of the property and consequently she became in that capacity a ‘landlord’ within the meaning of Section 2(c) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 and was entitled to serve on the respondent-tenant a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of that Act.
10. We now move on to the question as to whether the notice served on the defendant under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 under the signature of the mother which was followed up by a suit by the father as next friend of the minors could be characterised as an act of dealing with the property of minors within the meaning of Sec. 11 of the Act. The question as to under what limitations and to what extent guardians of Hindu minors de jure or de facto were entitled to alienate the property of minors has been the subject-matter of discussion by the ancient commentators of Hindu Law as also of decisions by law courts for more than a century. As far back as in the year 1856 it was held by the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonweree, (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393 that a de facto guardian has the same power of alienating the property of his ward as a natural guardian as would appear from the following passage occurring in the judgment as reported,
“Upon the third point, it is to be observed that under the Hindu Law, the right of a bona fide incumbrancer who has taken from a de facto Manager a charge on lands created honestly, for the purpose of saving the estate, or for the benefit of the estate, is not (provided the circumstances would support the charge had it emanated from a de facto and de jure manager) affected by the want of union of the de facto, with the de jure title.”
11. This opinion of the Judicial Committee formed the foundation for all the decisions of Indian High Courts till the coming into force of the Act. Its interpretation, however, led to a conflict of views on the question as to whether a de facto guardian of a Hindu minor could pass a promissory note in the name of the minor so as to bind his estate and become consideration for a conveyance executed by the de facto guardian. The conflict was set at rest by the Federal Court in the case of Sriramulu (AIR 1949 FC 218) (supra) in which a unanimous decision was taken that according to English Law a guardian or manager had no such power and similarly in India also there existed no such authority in a guardian to give a covenant which would be binding on the minor or his estate.
12. It was in this state of this aspect of the Hindu Law as interpreted by authoritative pronouncements that the Act was passed by the Parliament which came into force on the 25th August, 1956. We have to construe the provisions of the Act in the historical background of the existing exposition of the Hindu Law by commentators on the subject and the pronouncements which were till then binding and prevailing. The preamble to the Act discloses that it is “An act to amend and codify certain parts of the law relating to minority and guardianship among Hindus”. It does not purport to amend either U.P Act No. III of 1947, the Civil Procedure Code or any other enactment. According to Section 4(c) read with Section 6(a) of the Act the natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in respect of his person and property in the case of a boy is the father, provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years is to be ordinarily with the mother. According to the finding recorded, on the date of the suit none of the appellants was less than five years of age and consequently their natural guardian for the purpose of the Act was, it has to be conceded, their father. Sec. 5 of the Act enacts that “Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law on any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in the Act.” This makes it clear that apart from matters provided for by the Act itself even Hindu Law continues to remain intact for all other purposes. The relevant part of Section 8 of the Act runs as follows:—
“8. Powers of natural guardian.— (1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian can in no cast bind the minor by a personal covenant.
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court,—
(a) Mortgage, or charge, or transfer by sale, gift exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor, or
(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.
(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.
(4) ………………………”
13. Section 11 of the Act on which reliance has been placed as interdicting service of a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 by the mother of the appellants is in the following terms:—
“11. De facto guardian not to deal with minor's property.—After the commencement of this Act, no persons shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor.”
14. If issuing a notice under Sec. 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 can be considered to be an act by the mother of the appellants, assuming she was a de facto guardian of her sons amounting to disposal of, or dealing with, the property of her minor sons the notice was clearly bad. A close analysis of Section 8 of the Act, however, discloses that a mere notice of demand cannot be characterised either as an act of disposal of the minors' property or as one dealing with their property. The scope of Section 11 must be considered in the light of Sec. 8 of the Act which provides intrinsic evidence in support of the conclusion we are drawing. Sub-section (3) makes disposal of immovable property of a minor by a natural guardian in contravention of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8 voidable at the instance of minors etc. Sub-section (2) enumerates specific transactions which are considered disposal of immovable property, viz. mortgaging, charging or transferring by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise. Creation of leases of immovable property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority is also disposal of property and cannot be effected without the Court's previous permission. Though sub-section (2) is confined in its application to immovable property, sub-section (1) is not. It may be further noticed that in the circumstances set out in sub-sec. (1) the natural guardian of a minor is empowered by it not only to dispose of a minor's property without the Courts permission if the disposal is not of the nature contemplated by sub-sec. (2) but also to deal otherwise with the minor's movable or immovable property. To take a concrete case if a natural guardian creates a lease of a minor's property to last for a period of less than five years he may do so without the sanction of the Court but it must satisfy the requirements of sub-section (1). Acts of the nature mentioned above amounts to disposal of the minor's property both within the meaning of Section 8 as also Section 11 of the Act. Sec. 8(1) also empowers the natural guardian of a minor to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor's estate. If the natural guardian realizes rent due to a minor and appropriates it, it may be assumed he has dealt with the minor's property but by merely issuing a notice to the tenant requiring him to pay rent in arrears he cannot be said to be dealing with the minor's property. The demand has no direct effect on the minor's property at all and the guardian can be said at best to be dealing with the tenant. The extended meaning attempted to be given to the word “deal” by the learned single Judge, is, in our opinion, not justified taking into account the context in which the word occurs and the historical background of the law existing which was amended and codified by the Act. The word “deal” according to Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary inter alia means “to traffic; to trade; to do business with or in” and in our view it is in this sense that the expression has been used in Section 11 of the Act.
15. As noticed earlier, the Act beyond amending and codifying certain parts of the law relating to minority and guardianship among Hindus does not purport to affect either any State or Central enactments. The Civil Procedure Code by Order 32, Rule 4(1) thereof specifically authorises even filing of a suit on behalf of a minor through a next friend and the right is not confined to a natural guardian. This fact had been taken note of in the case of K. Kumar, AIR 1972 All 81 (supra). The Patna High Court also in Girdhari Lohar v. Anant Lohar (AIR 1967 Pat 8) has held that institution of a suit by a next friend who is not a natural guardian is not prohibited by Section 11 of the Act. Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 cannot be held to be in such conflict with the requirement of the provisions of the Act that they can be held to have been impliedly repealed. U.P Act No. III of 1947 and the Code of Civil Procedure apply to Hindus as well as non-Hindus and we see no justification for interpreting Section 11 of the Act in a manner which would render a notice issued under Section 3(1)(a) by an agent of a Hindu minor illegal or a suit by a next friend other than the natural guardian invalid but have different legal consequences in the case of non-Hindu minors.
16. The question as to whether the notice by the mother of the plaintiffs under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 was invalid on account of Section 11 of the Act may be considered from another point of view also. A de facto guardian is a self appointed inter-meddler with the minor's property. In this sense the plaintiffs' mother was not a de facto guardian of her sons at all. Assuming that the issuing of a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act No. III of 1947 amounts to an act of dealing with the minor's property, the notice under consideration not having been issued by a de facto guardian did not attract Section 11 of the Act. For reasons detailed out in an earlier part of the judgment, we have held that the mother's position on the acceptance of the gift of the suit property became that of an agent for the management of the gifted houses appointed or in any event recognised and sanctioned as such by their natural guardian.
17. An agent need not according to Section 186 of the Indian Contract Act be appointed in any express manner. There is nothing in Sec. 11 that could render a notice issued under Section 3(1)(a) by an agent of the owner of the demised premises illegal.
18. For the reasons given, our answer unreservedly to the question referred is that,
“In the circumstances of the case, giving of a notice of demand under Section 3(1)(a) of U.P Act III of 1947 on behalf of the landlord, who was a Hindu minor (aged over five years) by his mother did not amount to dealing with his property within the meaning of Section 11 of the Act and the notice was valid.”
19. Our opinion shall be laid before the learned single Judge for deciding the other questions, if any, raised in the appeal and disposing it of.
20. Answered accordingly.
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