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Smt. Madora Bibi And Others v. Mohd. Mateen And Another
Structured Summary of the Court Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit and related execution proceedings concerning possession of a house (No. 99/72-A Manna Purwa, Becon Ganj, Kanpur). Defendants-appellants (decree-holders) initiated execution No. 5/59 against respondent No. 2 to satisfy a decree in Suit No. 1057/59 (Madaro Bibi v. Abdul Latif) of the Court of 3rd Addl. Munsif, Kanpur.
The executing process involved attempts to deliver possession through an Amin and later a Commissioner. The plaintiff-respondent (respondent No. 1) resisted the first attempted delivery on 21-1-1959; after 30 days the decree-holder sought a fresh warrant and the Commissioner attempted delivery again but met resistance on 7-2-1959. On 6-3-1959 the decree-holder initiated proceedings under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C.; the executing Court rejected the plaintiff's objection based on limitation and allowed the decree-holder to be put in possession.
The plaintiff-respondent then filed a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, C.P.C. to establish his right to the present possession, alleging (inter alia) that he occupied on behalf of Anjuman Islamia Musalmeen (a registered society) which had purchased the property by registered sale deed dated 20-10-1957. The trial Court maintained the ejectment order but held the application under Order 21, Rule 97 to be within time from the second resistance. The plaintiff appealed; the lower Appellate Court (Addl. District Judge, Kanpur) reversed the trial Court's decree on 15-5-1972 and decreed the suit. The present document is the defendant's appeal against that appellate decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. must be initiated within 30 days from the first resistance only, or whether the decree-holder may initiate a fresh proceeding within 30 days of a subsequent resistance (second resistance) and thereby evade the bar of limitation applicable to the first resistance.
- Whether the plaintiff-respondent (occupying on behalf of Anjuman Islamia Musalmeen) can be evicted in execution of a decree against a third party.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (defendant-appellant)
- The appellant contended that Article 167 of the Indian Limitation Act (Article 129 of the new Limitation Act referenced in the opinion) provides a 30-day limitation "from the date of resistance or obstructing" but does not specify that the 30 days must run only from the first resistance; therefore a fresh proceeding initiated within 30 days from a second resistance is within time.
- The appellant argued that a decree-holder remains entitled to possession so long as the decree subsists and, even if no proceeding was initiated within 30 days of the first resistance, proceedings could be started within 30 days from a subsequent resistance.
- Reliance was placed on Narain Das v. Hazari Lal ((1896) ILR 18 All 233) and Maneklal Nathalal v. Ochhavlal Chhaganlal (AIR 1970 Guj 49) in support of the proposition that limitation runs from the particular resistance complained of.
Respondents' Arguments (plaintiff-respondent)
- The respondents contended that a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97 must be initiated within 30 days from the first resistance and not from the second resistance.
- They relied on Kesari Narain v. Abdul Hasan ((1904) ILR 26 All 365) and Mukund Bapu Jadav v. Tanu Sakhu Pawar (AIR 1933 Bom 457 (Full Bench)) to support the position that where an obstruction exists and the decree-holder fails to apply within 30 days, a later application in respect of the same obstruction will be barred by limitation even if a fresh warrant is issued.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narain Das v. Hazari Lal ((1896) ILR 18 All 233) | Holds that the 30-day limitation governs a cause of action arising out of a particular resistance; a fresh complaint about a fresh obstruction is governed by limitation from that obstruction. | The opinion acknowledges this decision as supporting the view that a fresh application within 30 days of a second obstruction is not barred; however, the court ultimately did not follow this line as binding. |
| Maneklal Nathalal v. Ochhavlal Chhaganlal (AIR 1970 Guj 49) | Follows the principle that Article 129 (Limitation Act) bars only applications about a resistance made more than 30 days ago and that a complaint about a second obstruction is not barred if within 30 days of that second obstruction. | The court cited this decision as consistent with Narain Das but noted it as a view from another High Court which it did not follow as binding. |
| Kesari Narain v. Abdul Hasan ((1904) ILR 26 All 365) | Holds that once an obstruction has been created a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97 must be filed within 30 days of that resistance and a subsequent application (even after a fresh warrant) is not maintainable if based on the same obstruction. | The court considered this Division Bench decision of the Court, regarded it as discussing the earlier 1896 case, and felt itself bound to follow the Division Bench view. The court applied this precedent to hold that the later Rule 97 proceeding was barred by limitation. |
| Mukund Bapu Jadav v. Tanu Sakhu Pawar (AIR 1933 Bom 457, Full Bench) | Full Bench view that Article 167 does not prevent the decree-holder from obtaining a fresh warrant (Order 21, Rule 35) but that Article 167 remains applicable to subsequent applications in respect of the same obstruction; if obstruction is by same person in same character a fresh warrant does not create a fresh obstruction. | The court noted this Full Bench Bombay decision as expressing a contrary view to Narain Das/Maneklal; it considered the Full Bench view but preferred and followed the Division Bench authority of its own Court (Kesari Narain). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the competing authorities and the statutory provision (referred to as Article 167 of the Limitation Act and also Article 129 in the opinion). Two lines of authority were identified:
- Authorities (1896 ILR 18 All 233; AIR 1970 Guj 49) holding that limitation is tied to the particular resistance and a fresh resistance gives rise to a fresh cause of action to which the 30-day period applies; thus an application within 30 days of a later resistance would not be barred.
- Authorities ((1904) ILR 26 All 365; AIR 1933 Bom 457 Full Bench) holding that where the obstruction is by the same person in the same character the first failure to apply within 30 days cannot be remedied simply by obtaining a fresh warrant and resisting under a later warrant — the subsequent application is in respect of the same obstruction and is barred by limitation.
The court observed that the earlier 1896 decision had been discussed in the later Division Bench decision reported in (1904) ILR 26 All 365. Because the Division Bench decision represents binding precedent of the court, the judge felt bound to follow the Division Bench view in preference to the decisions of other High Courts, however recent those decisions might be.
Applying the Division Bench principle, the court concluded that Article 167 (Limitation Act) gives a 30-day limitation from the resistance or obstruction caused by any person and that the law does not permit the removal of the cause of action or extension of the limitation period merely by successive failed attempts at execution resisted by the same person. Therefore, the proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C., which was initiated after 30 days from the first resistance, was time-barred and the order directing that the decree-holder be put in possession was illegal.
Separately, both the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court had found that Anjuman Islamia Musalmeen was the real owner of the property and that the plaintiff (an employee/office secretary of Anjuman Islamia) occupied on behalf of that society. The court accepted those concurrent findings and concluded that the plaintiff-respondent's claim to possession was substantiated and he could not be evicted in execution of a decree against a third party.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court held that the proceeding initiated under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. after 30 days from the first resistance was barred by limitation and the order putting the decree-holder in possession was illegal. The plaintiff-respondent, found to occupy on behalf of Anjuman Islamia Musalmeen (the owner), cannot be evicted in execution of a decree against a third party.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the decree and judgment of the Addl. District Judge (which reversed the trial Court and decreed the suit) stand; the defendant-appellant's challenge fails.
- The order that had put the defendant-appellant (decree-holder) in possession was declared illegal because the Rule 97 proceedings were time-barred by limitation measured from the first resistance.
- The plaintiff-respondent's possession, held on behalf of Anjuman Islamia Musalmeen (the recorded owner), is protected; he cannot be evicted in execution of any decree against a third party.
- No broader or new precedent was created by this decision beyond the court's explicit choice to follow the earlier Division Bench authority ((1904) ILR 26 All 365) on the limitation question.
Additional procedural outcome: The appeal was dismissed and there was no order as to costs.
1. This is the defendant's appeal filed against the decree and judgment dated 15-5-1972 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Kanpur, reversing the decree of the trial Court and decreeing the suit.
2. The facts of the case in brief are that defendants-appellants brought execution No. 5/59 against respondent No. 2 for possession of the premises in suit for satisfying her decree in Suit No. 1057/59 (Madaro Bibi v. Abdul Latif) of the Court of 3rd Addl. Munsif, Kanpur. The Amin went for delivery of the possession. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 resisted the said execution on 21-1-1959. The Court Amin made report to this effect to the executing Court. After expiry of 30 days; defendants-appellant (decree-holder) moved another application before the executing Court for giving possession through the Commissioner. The Commissioner went on the spot for delivery of possession, but this time again, the plaintiff-respondent resisted the said execution. On 7-2-59, report was given to this effect by the Commissioner. Thereafter, on 6-3-1959, the defendant-appellant (decree-holder) initiated proceeding against the plaintiff-respondent under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C. It was contested by the plaintiff-respondent on the ground of limitation as having been filed after 30 days from the first resistance, which took place on 21-1-1959, but the objection of plaintiff-respondent was rejected. The order allowing the applicant's application and directing that the applicant (decree-holder) be put in possession of the property in dispute was passed. Thereupon, the plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, C. P. C. to establish the right, which he claimed to the present possession of the property. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the defendant-applicant and the respondent No. 2 on the allegation that he is the office Secretary of Anjuman Islamia Musal-meen, Kanpur a registered society. He purchased house No. 99/72-A Manna Purwa, Becon Ganj, Kanpur, through a registered sale deed dated 20-10-1957 from Smt. Khairaul Kisan, widow and sole heir of Abdul Karim, deceased, to whom the said house originally belonged. At the time of the execution of the sale deed, plaintiff-respondent No. 2 was in possession in a portion of the said house, which is in dispute and who vacated the same after a few months of the said sale. It is alleged that the plaintiff is in occupation of the accommodation after the respondent No. 2 vacated it, on behalf of Anjuman Islamia. It was further alleged that the summary order passed by the trial Court dated 23-8-1960 under Order 21, Rule 98, C. P. C. in Misc. Case No. 35 of 1969 was illegal. Plaintiff was no party to the decree, which was sought to be executed against the judgment-debtor by defendant-appellant. The plaintiff resisted the said execution on 21-1-1959 and no suit was filed within 30 days from the date of the resistance. The defendant-appellant again tried to take possession through the Commissioner. It was again resisted by the plaintiff-respondent on 7-2-1959. Therefore, the suit was filed beyond time, but the Court illegally held it to be filed within time from the date of second resistance and passed the order of ejectment of the plaintiff-respondent, which was illegal. The plaintiff-respondent is entitled to remain in possession over the accommodation in dispute and is not liable for ejectment in this proceeding. The defendant-appellant contested the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent on the allegation that Abdul Karim was her real brother and she purchased benami in the name of Abdul Karim, the plot on which the house in suit was built by her capital. It was also asserted that Karimul Nisan was not the widow of Abdul Karim and had no right to sale the house in-dispute and no valid sale had been executed by her. The trial Court recorded a finding that Anjuman Islamia Musalmeen had purchased the property in suit from rightful owner. But he maintained the order of ejectment dated 23-8-1960 passed under Order 21, Rule 98, C. P. C. It was held by the Munsif that the application under Order 21, Rule 97 initiated by the defendant-appellant was within time from the date of the second resistance. The plaintiff-respondent preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court, which was reversed by the lower Appellate Court. The decree of the lower Appellate Court has been challenged by the defendant-appellant in this appeal.
3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in spite of the fact that no proceeding against the plaintiff-respondent was initiated under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C. within 30 days from the first resistance, the proceeding which was initiated within 30 days from the second resistance was within time. According to him, Article 167 of Indian Limitation Act (Article 129 of the new Limitation Act) provides limitation of 30 days from the date of resistance or obstructing. There is no mention that the 30 days limitation will run from the first resistance and not from the second resistance. A decree-holder is entitled to get possession so long the decree subsists and in spite of the fact that no proceeding has been initiated within 30 days of the first resistance under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C., proceeding could be started within 30 days from the subsequent resistance. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Narain Das v. Hazari Lal ((1896) ILR 18 All 233) and Maneklal Nathalal v. Ochhavlal Chhaganlal (AIR 1970 Guj 49). It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the proceeding tinder Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C. could be initiated within 30 days from the first resistance and not from the second resistance. Reliance was placed upon Kesari Narain v. Abdul Hasan ((1904) ILR 26 All 365) and Mukund Bapu Jadav v. Tanu Sakhu Pawar (AIR 1933 Bom 457 (FB)).
4. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for both the parties. In (1896) ILR 18 All 233 (supra), it has been held that the period of limitation for initiating proceeding within 30 days is a limitation, which governs a cause of action arising out of a particular resistance or obstruction. So far as that resistance or obstruction is concerned, the decree-holder, if he wishes to initiate proceeding, must do so within one month from the time of such resistance or obstruction. But the bar created by the limitation of this Section does not extend to and hold good so as to bar complaints against acts of resistance or obstruction made upon fresh proceedings taken by the decree-holder. This view has been followed in AIR 1970 Guj 49 (supra), wherein it has been held that:--
"In view of the nature of the proceedings and the language of Article 129 Limitation Act it is more imaginary than real to say that a decree-holder, filing his application under Order 21, Rule 97 in respect of the first obstruction beyond time will defeat the provision of the limitation act by taking out a fresh warrant and then making an application in time for a second obstruction, though it may be more than 30 days after the first resistance. Article 129 Limitation Act only bars an application about a resistance made more than 30 days ago. If a second obstruction is made, the complaint is not about the first obstruction but only about the second. Since the law allows the decree-holder to make such an application, it cannot be said that Article 129, Limitation Act is made nugatory."
Thus an application under Order 21, Rule 97 in respect of a second resistance to delivery under a fresh warrant under Order 21, Rule 35 filed more than 30 days after a first obstruction to a similar delivery, but within 30 days after the second obstruction is not barred under Article 129, Limitation Act.
" But a contrary view has been expressed in ( 1904) ' ILR 26 All 365 (supra), wherein it has been held that once an obstruction has been created, a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C, could be filed within 30 days of the resistance and the second application was held to be not maintainable. A similar question came for consideration before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court (AIR 1933 Bom 457) (supra), It was held that"Where the judgment-creditor fails to apply for removal of an obstruction under Order 21, Rule 97 within 30 days, he is not debarred from making an application under Order 21, Rule 35 to obtain a fresh warrant for possession. Article 167, Limitation Act, has nothing to do with such an application, for warrant for possession, but it will be applicable notwithstanding the fresh order for possession, to a subsequent application in respect of the same obstruction. And if the obstruction is by the same person and in the same character, the mere fact that the decree-holder is applying under a fresh warrant for possession would not make the obstruction a fresh obstruction.
Article 167, Limitation Act provides 30 days limitation from the resistance or obstruction caused by any person. There is no mention whether the limitation will run from the first resistance or from the second resistance. It gives a right to the decree-holder to initiate proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C. within 30 days from the date of resistance. The law does not contemplate removal of cause of action or extension of limitation for initiating a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C. merely by putting second or any number of subsequent applications being resisted every time by the same person and initiating a proceeding within 30 days of the second or the last resistance. Learned counsel for the appellant has unsuccessfully tried to distinguish the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in (1904) ILR 26 All 365 (supra) and contended that this case is covered by the decision of this Court in (1896) ILR 18 All 233 (supra) and the rules and decision reported on this point in AIR 1970 Guj 49 (supra). But, I find that in (1904) ILR 26 All 365, the earlier case of this Court reported in (1896) ILR 18 All 233 (supra) has been discussed. Therefore, I feel myself bound to follow the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court reported in (1904) ILR 26 All 365 (supra) in preference to the view of any other High Court, howsoever, recent it may be. I hold that the proceeding initiated under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C., after 30 days from the first resistance was beyond time and the order to put the defendant-appellant (decree-holder) in possession was illegal.
5. The plaintiff-respondent has filed a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, C. P. C. to establish his right to claim to present possession of the property. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that Anjuman Islamia Musalmeen happened to be the real owner of the property in suit, the plaintiff, who is the employee of Anjuman Islamia will be deemed to be occupying the premises on behalf of the Anjuman Islamia, as mentioned by the plaintiff. In view of the finding, the claim of the plaintiff-respondent stands substantiated. He, therefore, cannot be evicted in execution of any decree against any third party.
6. I find no force in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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