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Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Lucknow v. Madan Lal Bhargava.

Allahabad High Court
Sep 5, 1979
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Tribunal referred to this Court the question whether the amount of Rs. 11,250 received by the assessee (Madan Lal Bhargava) from M/s. G.W. Lawrie & Co. was liable to tax. The assessee was one of six partners in M/s. G.W. Lawrie & Co. Three partners (including the assessee) withdrew from the firm with effect from 30th June 1969 under a retirement deed dated 1st July 1969. The partners retired because of disputes which hindered effective business, and dissolution of the firm was not feasible. Under paragraph 4 of the retirement deed, the retiring partners could withdraw their capital and their proportionate share of audited profits for nine months up to 30th June 1969. In addition they were given amounts quantified as the value of their share of the firm’s goodwill; the assessee was paid Rs. 11,250 for his share of goodwill.

The Income Tax Officer (ITO) treated this Rs. 11,250 as taxable — characterized as capital gain (relying on s. 28(2) of the Act as mentioned in the opinion). The assessee appealed. The Assessing Assistant Commissioner (AAC), relying on a Supreme Court decision (CIT, U.P., Lucknow v. Gangadhar Baijnath), treated the amount as a taxable business receipt, viewing it as in lieu of profits. The Tribunal, however, examined the retirement deed and concluded that the payment did not indicate compensation for surrender of profits and, relying on certain High Court and Supreme Court authorities, held the amount exempt under section 47(ii) of the Income-tax Act. The Department contested that view before this Court and asked for reconsideration of the authorities relied upon.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the amount of Rs. 11,250 received by the assessee from M/s. G.W. Lawrie & Co. was not liable to tax?

Arguments of the Parties

Department's Arguments

  • Counsel for the department (Mr. R.K. Gulati) urged that the goodwill of a firm is a capital asset and that the amount paid to a retiring partner for his share in goodwill constitutes a transfer of a capital asset as defined in s. 2(47) of the Income-tax Act.
  • It was argued that s. 47(ii) merely exempts distribution of capital assets on dissolution, so distributions otherwise made (for example on retirement) should be taxable; the definition of "transfer" in s. 2(47) (which includes extinguishment of any right) is wide and captures retirement payments that extinguish a partner's rights.
  • The department urged reconsideration of decisions that treated such retirement payments as non-taxable, relying on the broader statutory definition of "transfer" in the present Act (as compared to the old Act's language).

Assessee's Position (as accepted by the Tribunal)

  • The Tribunal concluded (and thus the assessee's position) that the retirement deed did not show that the Rs. 11,250 was paid as compensation for surrendering future profits; rather it represented the assessee's share of partnership assets, including a quantified value of goodwill.
  • On that basis, the Tribunal treated the amount as falling within the exemption in s. 47(ii) and not being a taxable transfer under s. 2(47)/s. 45.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
CIT, U.P., Lucknow v. Gangadhar Baijnath, General Ganj, Kanpur, [1972] 86 ITR 19 (SC) Used by the AAC to treat the retirement payment as a taxable business receipt (amount in lieu of profits). The AAC relied on this authority to view the payment as taxable; the Tribunal and this Court examined whether that characterization fit the retirement deed and facts.
CIT v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai, [1973] 91 ITR 393 (Gujarat High Court) Held that the goodwill of a firm is a capital asset and that on retirement a partner receives his share of partnership assets, so the amount received is not chargeable under the relevant provision (older provision cited in the opinion). The Court relied on this decision (and followed it in its reasoning) to support the view that a retiring partner taking his share is not subject to capital gains taxation under s. 45 where no extinguishment/transfer (as defined) takes place.
Cit, Up v. Sh. Bankey Lal Vaidya (Dead) By Lawyers†, [1971] 79 ITR 594 (Supreme Court) Cited by the Tribunal as supportive authority in its exemption view (details in the opinion indicate it was one of the authorities relied upon by the Tribunal). The Tribunal invoked this decision in holding the payment exempt under s. 47(ii); this Court noted the Tribunal’s reliance when reviewing the question.
Addl. CIT v. Smt. Mahinderpal Bhasin, [1979] 117 ITR 26 (All.) Held that goodwill of a firm is a capital asset but s.45 is not attracted on retirement because the retiring partner receives his share of partnership assets and not compensation for goodwill. This Court expressly followed and relied upon this decision to support the conclusion that retirement receipts representing a partner's share do not amount to a transfer under s.2(47).
CIT v. Rathnam Nadar, [1979] 71 ITR 433 (Madras High Court) Held that the goodwill of a firm is not a capital asset (as contemplated by s. 45) because its growth does not involve expenditure in money. The Court noted this decision as part of the contrasting line of authorities (Madras, Calcutta, etc.) that treat goodwill as not falling within s.45 for the reasons stated; it was part of the background of divergent authorities.
CIT v. Chunilal Prabhudas & Co., [1970] 76 ITR 566 (Calcutta High Court) Held that goodwill of a firm is not a capital asset for purposes of s.45 under the older Act. Noted by this Court as part of the line of High Court authorities taking the view that such goodwill is not a capital asset for s.45 purposes; the Court contrasted these with the Gujarat/All-India decisions.
Jagdev Singh Mumick v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, [1971] 81 ITR 500 (Delhi High Court) Followed the view that goodwill is not a capital asset for s.45 under the older Act. Noted among authorities that declined the capital-asset classification of firm-goodwill under s.45; used as background to the divergent authorities examined by the Court.
CIT v. E.C. Jacob, [1973] 89 ITR 88 (Kerala High Court) Held (following the Madras/Calcutta view) that goodwill is not a capital asset for s.45 purposes under the older Act. Referenced as part of the group of High Court decisions holding that firm-goodwill did not attract s.45; the Court contrasted these authorities with Gujarat and the decision it followed.
CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty, [1974] 96 ITR 667 (Karnataka High Court) Also part of the line holding firm-goodwill not to be a capital asset for s.45 under earlier legislation. Noted by the Court as one of several High Court authorities adopting the non-capital-asset approach under the older Act; placed in the context of divergent authority.
CIT v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., [1973] 89 ITR 45 (Supreme Court) Considered the purpose of inserting a proviso (to allay fears) and explained that certain provisos were clarifying rather than expanding the scope of the substantive provision (discussed with reference to s.12B of the old Act). The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s explanation to treat the similar provision in s.47 as clarificatory/precautionary, and therefore rejected the department’s argument that s.47’s text showed legislative intent to tax retirement distributions that were not on dissolution.
Abdul Rahim (Travancore Confectionery Works) v. CIT, [1977] 110 ITR 595 (Kerala High Court) Held that where a partner had brought his own property into the firm (so exclusive rights were lost), the partner’s interest was extinguished on incorporation of the asset into the firm's common funds. This Court distinguished Abdul Rahim: it found that Abdul Rahim involved an influx of fresh assets into the firm and consequent extinguishment of exclusive rights, whereas in the present case the retiring partner merely took away his existing share.
A.S. Krishna Setty & Sons v. Addl. CIT, [1975] 100 ITR 587 (Karnataka High Court) Found a transfer where particular assets (mills, factory plant) were transferred exclusively to some partners and the partnership structure changed. The Court distinguished this case on the facts: Krishna Setty involved exclusive transfers of specific firm assets; by contrast, in the present case the retiring partner received his existing share rather than a transfer of particular assets.
CIT v. Tribuvandas G. Patel, [1978] 115 ITR 95 (Bombay High Court) Distinguished between (a) cases where, after accounting, a retiring partner is paid his share of partnership assets (not a transfer) and (b) cases where a lump-sum payment is made in consideration of retirement/assignment without accounting (treated as a transfer under s.2(47)). The Court considered Tribuvandas and held it distinguishable: in the present case accounting and withdrawal of capital and profits occurred and the retirement deed did not provide for a lump-sum payment without reference to accounts.
CIT v. Home Industries and Co., [1977] 107 ITR 609 (Bombay High Court) Held that self-generated goodwill is not a capital asset chargeable to capital gains under s.45. The opinion referenced this decision in discussing the Bombay High Court’s line of reasoning; the present Court treated it as consistent with the conclusion that self-generated goodwill may not attract s.45 absent a relevant transfer.
CIT v. H.R. Aslot, [1978] 115 ITR 255 (Bombay High Court) Turned on the interpretation of the retirement deed and, following Tribuvandas, held that assignment of the retiring partner’s interest could amount to a transfer under s.2(47). The Court noted Aslot but found it factually distinguishable because the present retirement deed involved accounting and specific withdrawal of capital and profits rather than a lump-sum assignment without accounting.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, applying statutory text and precedent strictly as found in the opinion:

  1. Statutory framing: The Court examined the definition of "transfer" in s. 2(47) (which includes sale, exchange, relinquishment or extinguishment of any right) and observed that to attract s.2(47)/s.45 there must be a capital asset and a sale/exchange/relinquishment/extinguishment of rights in that capital asset.
  2. Comparison with earlier law: The Court compared s. 47 of the present Act with the earlier s.12B(1) of the old Act and the provisos that had been inserted in the older statute, relying on the Supreme Court's interpretation in CIT v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. to conclude that provisions like s.47 had been inserted as clarificatory language and should not be read as expanding substantive reach beyond what earlier law covered.
  3. Scope of "transfer" and purpose of s.47: The Court rejected the department’s argument that the modern, broad textual definition of "transfer" (s.2(47)) automatically captures the retirement payment. It reasoned that the older s.12B already covered transfers (even if not using the word "extinguishment") and that the insertion of a clarificatory proviso in the earlier law (and the parallel language in s.47) did not change the underlying legal character of distributions on retirement.
  4. Precedential analysis on goodwill and retirement payments: The Court surveyed conflicting High Court authorities. It noted that certain courts (Madras, Calcutta, Delhi, Kerala, Karnataka) had held that firm-goodwill is not a capital asset for s.45 purposes under the older Act; the Gujarat High Court (Mohanbhai Pamabhai) and this Court in Mahinderpal Bhasin had taken the contrary view that goodwill is a capital asset but nevertheless concluded that s.45 does not apply to retirement receipts because the retiring partner receives his share of partnership assets rather than compensation for extinguishing rights.
  5. Distinguishing factually different precedents: The Court carefully distinguished authorities relied upon by the department and other High Courts. It accepted that there are situations where retirement-related payments or assignments do amount to transfers under s.2(47) — for example, where a partner brings in his own property into the firm and thereby loses exclusive rights (Abdul Rahim), or where a lump-sum payment is made to a retiring partner without accounting and in consideration of assignment of interest (Tribuvandas; Aslot). The Court emphasized factual differences: in such cases there is an extinguishment or assignment of rights distinct from simply taking away an existing share of partnership assets.
  6. Application to the present facts: The retirement deed here expressly permitted withdrawal of capital and proportionate audited profits and quantified the value of the retiring partner's share in goodwill. The deed did not provide for a lump-sum payment without reference to accounts; the assessee actually took away his capital as shown in books and his share of audited profits, together with the quantified goodwill value. The Court concluded that the assessee thus took away his existing share in partnership assets and there was no element of sale, exchange, relinquishment or extinguishment of rights that would fall within s.2(47).
  7. Conclusion of legal effect: Because the facts did not bring the transaction within the scope of s.2(47), s.45 (capital gains) was not attracted, and the Tribunal's view that the amount was not taxable under s.45 (and was exempt under s.47(ii) as applied) was sustained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department — i.e., the amount of Rs. 11,250 received by the assessee from M/s. G.W. Lawrie & Co. on retirement was held not to be liable to tax under the provisions considered.

Direct consequences and costs: The assessee was entitled to costs assessed at Rs. 200, and counsel’s fee was assessed at Rs. 200 (as ordered by the Court).

Implications: The direct effect is that on these facts (retirement under a deed providing for withdrawal of capital, proportionate audited profits and a quantified value of goodwill, with accounting rather than a lump-sum assignment) the retirement payment was held not to be a transfer under s.2(47) and hence not chargeable to capital gains under s.45. The opinion distinguishes fact patterns (e.g., lump-sum payments without accounting or infusion-of-asset scenarios) where a transfer may be found. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel, broad precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities; its holding is directed to the facts and legal comparisons expressly described in the opinion.

This summary is prepared strictly from the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

C.S.P Singh, J.:— The Tribunal has referred the following question for opinion of this court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the amount of Rs. 11,250 received by the assessee from M/s. G.W Lawrie and Co. was not liable to tax?”

2. The assessee was a partner in a firm, M/s. G.W Lawrie & Co. Madan Lal Bhargava, the assessee, and two others, Kishan Lal Bhargava and Vishwanath Bhargava, who were three out of the six partners withdrew from the firm with effect from 30th June, 1969, by an agreement dated July 1, 1969. The reason for their withdrawing from their firm was that differences and disputes had arisen between the partners, which was standing in the way of effective running of the business. However, as it was not feasible to dissolve the firm owing to its business commitments and involvements, the three partners decided to retire. Under para. 4, of the retirement deed, the partners were allowed to withdraw their capital and their proportionate share of audited profits for nine months up to the 30th June, 1969. In addition the three retiring partners were given certain amounts, as the value of their share of the goodwill of the firm. Madan Lal Bhargava was given an amount of Rs. 11,250. The ITO brought this amount to tax as a capital gain treating it as compensation received on retirement from the firm. He was obviously relying on s. 28(2) of the Act for including this amount. The assessee appealed. The AAC relying on the case, Cit, U.P, Lucknow v. Gangadhar Baijnath, General Ganj, Kanpur, [1972] 86 ITR 19 (SC), treated the amount as a taxable business receipt. He was of the view that the amount had been received in lieu of profits which the assessee had got on retirement from the firm. On further appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal found that the agreement dated 1st July, 1969, on the basis of which the payment was received, did not indicate that the amount paid to the assessee for his share in the goodwill was compensation for surrendering his profits. Relying upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai, [1973] 91 ITR 393 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cit, Up v. Sh. Bankey Lal Vaidya (Dead) By Lawyers† , [1971] 79 ITR 594, the Tribunal held that the amount was exempt under s. 47(ii) of the Act. Counsel for the department urged that the goodwill of a firm is its capital asset, and the amount of money paid to a retiring partner for his share in the goodwill is a transfer of a capital asset as defined in s. 2(47). This being so, as the case of retirement of partner from a firm is not exempt under s. 47(ii), the amount received by the partner for his share in the goodwill is liable to tax under s. 45. Cases of payment made to a retiring partner for goodwill have been considered by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai, [1973] 91 ITR 393 and our own court in the case of Addl. CIT v. Smt. Mahinderpal Bhasin, [1979] 117 ITR 26. In Mohanbhai's case two questions were considered, one whether the goodwill of a firm is a capital asset and, secondly, whether compensation received by a retiring partner amounts to a transfer as defined in s. 2(47) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court, disagreeing with the view of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Rathnam Nadar, [1979] 71 ITR 433 and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Chunilal Prabhudas & Co., [1970] 76 ITR 566, held that the goodwill of a firm is a capital asset. The Madras and the Calcutta High Courts have held that the goodwill of a firm is not a capital asset as contemplated by s. 45, for the capital asset contemplated by s. 45 is one the acquisition of which had cost the transferor something in terms of money, and as growth of goodwill does not cost anything in terms of money to the firm it is not a capital asset as contemplated by s. 45, although it may be so under the general Act, The decisions of the Madras High Court and the Calcutta High Court were given while interpreting the provisions of the Indian I.T Act, 1922. This view of the Madras High Court and the Calcutta High Court has been followed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Jagdev Singh Mumick… v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax…, [1971] 81 ITR 500 and the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. E.C Jacob, [1973] 89 ITR 88 [FB] and the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. B.C Srinivasa Setty, [1974] 96 ITR 667. The word ‘capital asset’ had been defined in s. 2(4A) of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and is now defined in s. 2(14) in the present Act. The definition of the word ‘capital asset’ in the present Act so far as it is relevant for this case is in pari materia with the definition contained in the old Act. The Gujarat High Court, however, went on to hold that when a partner retires all that he receives is his share of the partnership asset, and as no consideration is received as a result of the extinguishment of his interest in the partnership asset. The amount received would not be chargeable under s. 44. In the case of Addl. CIT v. Smt. Mahinderpal Bhasin, [1979] 117 ITR 26 (All), it has been held that the goodwill of a firm is a capital asset, but the provisions of s. 45 are not attracted in case a partner retires, as what he receives is his share of the partnership assets and not compensation for goodwill.

3. Mr. Gulati contends on behalf of the department that these decisions require reconsideration. The reasons set forth are these. It is urged that s. 2(47) defines transfer in very wide terms, and where a partner retires from a firm there is an extinguishment of his rights, and the asset which he receives in consideration for this extinguishment would be a transfer as contemplated by s. 2(47). It was also urged that, as s. 47(ii) exempts distribution of capital assets only on dissolution of a firm, it is obvious that the legislature intended that a distribution of capital assets otherwise made should be liable to tax. Section 47, on a first reading, creates an impression that distribution of capital asset on dissolution of a firm is a transfer, but when one has a look at the other clauses, specially s. 47(i), it appears that this provision was put in by way of abundant caution as has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., [1973] 89 ITR 45. It is, however, urged that the decision of the Supreme Court in Madurai Mills' case no longer holds good, as the word “transfer” has been defined now by the present Act in very wide terms, while s. 12B of the old Act did not embrace cases of the type which now fall within the purview of s. 2(47). It will be useful to read s. 12B(1) of the old Act along with its first proviso:

“12B. (1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head ‘Capital gains’ in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st day of March, 1956, and such profits and gains shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer took place:

Provided that any distribution of capital assets on the total or partial partition of a Hindu undivided family or under a deed of gift, bequest or will shall not for the purposes of this section be treated as a sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of the capital assets……………”

4. It will be noticed that section 12B also referred to cases of sale, exchange, relinquishment and transfer, and the third proviso also provided that the distribution of capital assets of a firm on its dissolution shall not be treated as a sale, exchange or transfer of capital assets. This proviso was thereafter deleted by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1956 with effect from April 1, 1957. When one compares the language of the third proviso to s. 12B(1) with s. 47(ii) there is no difference, for, like s. 47(ii), which treats such distribution as not amounting to a transfer, the third proviso to s. 12B(1) did likewise. The Supreme Court expressly considered this provision and observed as under (p. 51):

“This contention, in our opinion, is not well founded. It appears to us that the cases of the distribution of capital assets on dissolution of a firm or other association of persons or liquidation of a company were mentioned in the third proviso under the earlier Act, as a matter of clarification to allay fears even though the language of sub-section (1) of section 12B was not intended to apply to such cases. Provisos, as mentioned on page 221 of Crates on Statute Law, sixth edition, are often inserted to allay fears. A proviso is inserted to guard against the particular case of which a particular person is apprehensive, although the enactment was never intended to apply to his case or to any other similar case at all.”

5. It is, however, suggested that the transfer as now defined in s. 2(47) includes not only sale, exchange or relinquishment but also extinguishment of any right and, thus, the scope of section 45 is wider than section 12B. This argument omits from consideration the fact that s. 12B applies not only to cases of sale, exchange and relinquishment but also to cases of transfer. The word “transfer” was not defined in the Act. When a transfer takes place there is an extinguishment of the right of one person, i.e, the transferor and the creation of right in another, viz., the transferee. Thus, although s. 12B did not contain the word “extinguishment” it took care of such cases by making the provision applicable in the cases of transfer. This being so, the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be distinguished on the ground suggested. We must, in view of these considerations, read s. 47 in the same light as s. 12B of the old Act, i.e, it is a provision introduced as a matter of abundant caution. This being so, the contention based on s. 47 fails.

6. We may now examine as to whether s. 2(47) applies to a case where a retiring partner is given a particular amount of money or part of the assets of the firm on his retiring from the partnership.

7. This provision runs as under:

“2. (47) ‘Transfer’, in relation to a capital asset, includes the sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset or the extinguishment of any right therein or the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law.”

8. It will be noticed that in order to attract this provision there must be a capital asset, and a sale, exchange or relinquishment of that asset or the extinguishment of any right therein or its compulsory acquisition under any law. We have already noticed the decisions of the Madras High Court, the Calcutta High Court, the Delhi High Court and the Kerala High Court where the view has been taken that the goodwill of a firm is not a capital asset for purposes of s. 45 of the Act although under the general law it may constitute a capital asset. The Gujarat High Court has taken a contrary view in Mohanbhai Pamabhai's case, [1973] 91 ITR 393. Our court in the case of Smt. Mahinderpal Bhasin, [1979] 117 ITR 26 has followed the Gujarat decision. On the view that we propose to take it is not necessary to consider in this case as to whether the goodwill of a firm is a capital asset as contemplated by s. 45. We are of the opinion that when a partner on retirement received an amount of money or any particular asset representing his share in the partnership there is no element of sale, exchange, relinquishment or extinguishment of his rights in his asset, inasmuch as he takes away the asset representing his interest in the partnership. We are fortified in the view that we take by the decision of our own court in Smt. Mahinderpal Bhasin, [1979] 117 ITR 26 and that of the Gujarat High Court in Mohanbhai Pamabhai, [1973] 91 ITR 393 already referred to. Sri R.K Gulati appearing for the department, however, urged that the view taken in these cases is not correct, and the correct law has been laid down by the Kerala High Court in the case of Abdul Rahim, Travancore Confectionery Works v. CIT, [1977] 110 ITR 595 (Ker) [FB]. The decision of the Kerala High Court is, however, distinguishable, for, in that case, what had happened was that a partner had brought in his own property for the purpose of business of the firm, with the result that he could not claim or exercise any exclusive right in that property. It was, as such, a case of influx of fresh assets, and on the assets being brought in the common funds of the firm, the exclusive rights of the partner had come to an end. It was in these circumstances that the Kerala High Court held, and with due respect, we think rightly that the interest of the partner in the assets brought by him in the firm had been extinguished. The present case is of a reverse type. Here the partner has retired, and has taken away his share of assets. Thus, while in the first case, the partner received consideration by way of increase in his share in the firm, in a case of retiring partner there is neither any increase nor decrease of his share, for all that he takes is his existing share in the business of the firm. The decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of A.S Krishna Setty and Sons v. Addl. CIT, [1975] 100 ITR 587 is also distinguishable, for, in that case, the oil mills and coir factory, which were being run by seven partners and two minors, who were admitted to the benefits of the partnership, were transferred exclusively in favour of some of the partners. Thereafter, the two sets of the partners entered into separate deeds of partnership amongst themselves, and some new persons, in respect of these items of business. It was in these circumstances that it was held that a transfer of machinery and plant had been made by the assessee-firm in favour of its two sets of partners. Here no transfer of any asset of the firm has been made to the assessee, as all that has happened is that he has been given his share in the partnership asset including the value of his share in the goodwill. Two decisions of the Bombay High Court now require consideration. One, CIT v. Tribuvandas G: Patel, [1978] 115 ITR 95 and the other, CIT v. H.R Aslot, [1978] 115 ITR 255. In Tribuvandas's case a lump sum amount was paid to the retiring partner, and the question arose as to whether it amounted to a transfer under s. 2(47). The Bombay High Court drew a distinction between a case where a retiring partner gets his share of asset after deduction of liabilities and prior charges and taking of accounts on the footing of notional sale of partnership assets, and where a lump sum payment is made in consideration of the partner retiring without any accounting being done: It was held that in a case where the partner is paid a particular amount of money, as his share, in the partnership asset after accounting, it would not amount to a transfer, but where a lump sum amount is paid in consideration for his retirement from the partnership, and assignment of his interest to the other partners, it would be transfer as denned in s. 2(47). The Bench followed an earlier decision of its own court in the case of CIT v. Home Industries and Co., [1977] 107 ITR 609 (Bom), where it was held that the goodwill of a firm, which was a self-generated asset, was not a capital asset, the transfer of which would be chargeable to capital gains under s. 45 of the Act: Referring, however, to the terms of the retirement deed it was held that it was a transfer as defined by s. 2(47)-and liable to tax under s. 45 of the Act. In the present case, the assessee took away his capital as shown in the books, and also his share in the audited profits for the period ending 30th June, 1969., Apart from this, he was given his share in the goodwill, which was valued at Rs. 11,250. The deed of retirement did not give him a lump amount without any reference to the accounts of the firm. This fact distinguishes the case from that of Tribuvandas, [1978] 115 ITR 95 (Bom). The other decision of the Bombay High Court, namely, Aslot's case, [1978] 115 ITR 255, turned on the interpretation of the retirement deed, and the view that the assignment of the interest of the retiring partner amounted to a transfer was based on the principle laid down in the case of Tribuvandas, [1978] 115 ITR 95 (Bom). We are of the view that none of these cases can apply to the facts of the present case as all that the assessee received on his retirement from the firm in respect of his share in the goodwill was its value to which he was all along entitled. The case did not fall within the purview of s. 2(47) of the Act and a fortiori s. 45 becomes inapplicable.

9. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel's fee is assessed at the same figure.