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Raj Narain Jain v. Iiird Additional District Judge

Allahabad High Court
Aug 18, 1979
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petition arises from a dispute involving tenancy rights over premises previously owned by Manoharlal and Nirmal Kumar. The petitioner purchased the property at a court auction. The premises had been leased to the tenants (opposite parties) by a registered lease deed dated 20th March 1948, which included a covenant restricting eviction of tenants except on the ground of arrears of rent for a full year. The petitioner, stepping into the landlords' shoes, sought eviction under Section 21 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The tenants raised a preliminary objection citing Section 21(4) of the Act, which was upheld by the Prescribed Authority and subsequently by the Third Additional District Judge, Kanpur. The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging these orders. The learned Single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench due to the importance and difficulty of the questions involved.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the covenant in the lease deed restricting eviction only on the ground of non-payment of rent for a year is a covenant running with the land.
  2. Whether a purchaser at a court auction is bound by such a covenant running with the land.
  3. Whether the statutory provision under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972, which allows eviction on landlord's personal need, overrides the covenant in the lease deed.
  4. Whether the petitioner, as purchaser at court auction, is bound by the terms of the lease deed despite the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the U.P Urban Buildings Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The covenant restricting eviction is not binding on the petitioner because, under Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, its provisions do not apply to a purchaser at a court auction.
  • If the main provisions of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply, its principles cannot apply either.
  • In the alternative, the statutory provision under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings Act permitting eviction on landlord's personal need overrides the lease covenant.

Tenants' Arguments

  • The covenant in the lease deed is a covenant running with the land and thus binds the petitioner as successor-in-interest.
  • The tenants are immune from eviction except on the ground of non-payment of rent for a year, as per the lease deed.
  • The petitioner is bound by the lease terms despite being a purchaser at court auction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nanuu Mal v. Ram Chander, AIR 1931 Allahabad 277 Principles of covenants running with the land under the Transfer of Property Act Referenced by petitioner to argue non-applicability of lease covenant to purchaser at court auction
Lalta Prasad v. Brahmanand Principles related to covenants running with the land Relied upon by petitioner for similar reasons as Nanuu Mal
Breams Property Investment Co. v. Stroulger Covenant by lessor restricting eviction binds assignee of lessor's reversion Applied to hold the covenant in the lease deed ran with the land and bound successors
Jamini Bala Dasi v. Administrator General of West Bengal Covenant binding assignee of reversion; privity of estate Supported the conclusion that covenant in lease deed binds assignees including purchaser at auction
Sarda Kripa Lala v. Bepin Chandra Pal, AIR 1923 Cal. 679 Covenants running with the land bind assignees of lessor and lessee Reinforced binding nature of such covenants on assignees
Nabjan Sardar v. Neburali Molla, AIR 1933 Cal. 503 Binding effect of covenants running with the land on assignees Supported binding effect on purchaser at auction
Nur Mohammad Peerbhoy v. Dinshaw Hormasji Motiwalle Judicial sales and protection of purchaser's title from antecedent contracts Distinguished as not concerning covenants running with the land
Gordhandas Vithaldas v. Mohanlal Naneklal Doshi Restrictive covenants under Section 40 of Transfer of Property Act Distinguished as not applicable to the covenant in question
Ahmadabad Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdul Gafur Purchaser at court auction takes property subject to defects and covenants running with the land Applied to hold purchaser bound by covenant running with the land
Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Rati Lal Bhagwandas and Co. Validity of agreement waiving statutory protections under rent control laws Distinguished as not relevant to U.P Act No. 13 of 1972; however, principle of waiver of statutory rights accepted
Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar v. Asharam Hiraman Patil Beneficial legislation conferring tenant protections Supported view that U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 is tenant-protective legislation
Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam Waiver of statutory protections under landlord-tenant laws Applied to hold that landlord can waive rights conferred by statute

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined whether the covenant restricting eviction to non-payment of rent for a year was a covenant running with the land. Applying established legal tests and authoritative texts (Cheshire, Foa), the Court held that the covenant affected the landlord and tenant in their normal capacities and thus touched and concerned the land, qualifying it as a covenant running with the land.

The Court then considered whether such a covenant binds a purchaser at a court auction. It distinguished precedents relied upon by the petitioner, noting that those concerned restrictive covenants under Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act, which differ from covenants running with the land. The Court emphasized that the petitioner, as purchaser by court auction, is an assignee of the reversion and there exists privity of estate between the petitioner and the tenants. The Court found no legal basis to exempt the petitioner from the covenant on the ground of being a purchaser at auction.

On the contention that Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings Act, 1972, which allows eviction on landlord's personal need, overrides the covenant, the Court rejected this. It reasoned that the Act restricts landlord's rights to certain grounds but does not enlarge them beyond general law. The landlord can waive rights left intact by the Act, and the covenant in the lease deed is such a waiver. The Court found no public policy forbidding such waiver and distinguished cases relied upon by the petitioner, which involved different statutory contexts and principles.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the covenant in the lease deed is binding on the petitioner and that the statutory provision does not annul the covenant's effect.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed with costs.

The Court held that the covenant restricting eviction only on the ground of non-payment of rent for a year is a covenant running with the land and binds the petitioner, who is a purchaser at court auction. The statutory provision under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings Act, 1972 does not override this covenant. Consequently, the petitioner cannot evict the tenants on grounds other than those specified in the lease covenant.

The direct effect is that the petitioner’s claim for eviction under Section 21 of the Act was not maintainable. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the binding nature of covenants running with the land on purchasers at court auction and the permissibility of waiving statutory eviction rights by agreement.

Show all summary ...

Yashoda Nandan, J.:— This petition which should normally have been decided by a learned single Judge is before us since when it came up for hearing before N.D Ojha, J., he was of the opinion that the questions involved in the case were of considerable importance and not free from difficulty and he consequently thought it desireable that it may be decided by a Division Bench.

2. The material facts giving rise to this petition are that previously one Manoharlal and Nirmal Kumar were the owners and landlords of the premises in dispute. At a court auction the petitioner purchased the property in question. By means of a registered deed dated 20th March, 1948 the then landlords had leased out the premises to the tenants opposite parties. One of the terms of the registered lease deed was that the tenants shall not be liable to ejectment at the instance of the landlords, except on the ground that they were in arrears of rent for a full year. Having stepped into the shoes of the landlords, the petitioner applied under Section 21 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act before the Prescribed Authority for an order of eviction of the tenants-opposite parties from the building under their tenancy. They resisted the petitioner's claim by raising a preliminary legal objection to the effect that by reason of Section 21(4) of the Act, the petitioner landlord had no right to obtain an order for their eviction. The Prescribed Authority held that under the terms of the lease, the opposite parties could be evicted only if one year's rent remained unpaid and there was no provision in the registered lease deed under which eviction could be ordered on the ground of the landlord's personal need. The Prescribed Authority consequently upheld the objection of the opposite parties and rejected the application under Section 21 holding that it was not legally maintainable. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority which was dismissed by the learned Third Additional District Judge, Kanpur. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the learned Third Additional District Judge, Kanpur the petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for a writ, direction or order in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 18th May 1973 and 28th September, 1974 be passed by opposite parties nos. 2 and 3. Before the learned single Judge, the orders passed by the authorities under the Act were supported by the tenants, opposite parties, who contended that under the terms of the lease dated 20th March, 1948 they were not liable to be ejected from the accommodation in question except on the ground of non-payment of lent for full one year. It was urged that the provision in the lease deed which gave Immunity to the tenants from being evicted from the premises leaded to them except on the ground of default in payment of rent for a year was a covenant running with the land and the petitioner who was the successor-in-interest of the previous landlords was bound by that covenant. On behalf of the petitioner, it was urged by the learned counsel that the law regarding covenants running with the land was codified in the Transfer of Property Act and since in view of Section 2(d) thereof the provisions of this Act save as provided by Section 57 and Chapter IV thereof did not apply to a purchaser at a court auction, the petitioner was not bound by the aforesaid term of the lease even though the covenant contained therein may be one running with the land. It was further urged that if the main provisions of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply the principles thereof also, could not apply and in support of his contention, reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decisions of this Court in Nanuu Mal v. Ram Chander A.I.R 1931 Allahabad 277. and Lalta Prasad v. Brahmanand.2 Another submission made in the alternative before the learned single Judge by the counsel for the petitioner was that assuming that the term of the lease was binding on the petitioner, its legal efficacy had been obliterated by the statutory provision contained in Section 21 of the Act Inasmuch as the said section entitled the petitioner to evict the tenant in case he bonafide needed the accommodation for his own use. The term in the lease deed, it was submitted, being in conflict with Section 21(1)(a) became inoperative. The learned single Judge was tentatively of the view that the submission made in the alternative was without any substance. Since the learned single Judge was of the opinion that the question as to whether the covenant contained in the lease relied upon by the tenant; bound the petitioner or not and as to whether it afforded the tenants immunity from eviction in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act except-on the ground specified therein required consideration by a large Bench, he referred the entire case to a larger Bench.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the tenants opposite parties. The first question arising for consideration is as to whether the term in the lease restricting the landlord's right to evict the tenant on the sole ground of his being default of payment of rent for a year was a covenant running with the land. According to Cheshire's Modern Law of Real Property (Ninth Edition) page 427 covenants running with the land are covenants that touch and concern the land demised, for it is only, these, as distinct from these merely affecting the persons, that are capable of running either with the reversion or with the land.” It has further been stated in the same work that:

“If the covenant has direct reference to the land, it lays down something which is to be done or is not to be done upon the land, or, and perhaps this is the clearest way of describing the test, if it affects the landlord in his normal capacity as landlord or the tenant in his normal capacity as tenant, it may be said to touch and concern the land.”

(Emphasis supplied)

4. Discussing the subject, Foa in General Law of Landlord and Tenant (Eighth Edition page 422) states that:

“Covenants of a lease (and in this respect conditions stand on the same footing as covenants are sometimes said to be of two kinds; those which touch and concern the thing demised (usually spo-ken of as “running with the land” though this is not altogether accurate since they run also with the reversion) and those which are merely of personal to the covenantor (usually spoken of as “collaterar”.) It has been said that, as a general principle, a covenant ought to run with the land, if it is of such a nature that it directly affects the use of the demised premises in a manner in which the lessor chooses to assume will be beneficial to him.”

5. A covenant by the lessor not to serve on the lessee a notice to quit unless he required the premises for his own occupation was in Breams Property Investment Co. v. Stroulger held to be a covenant running with the land, and binding on the assignee of the lessor's, right of reversion.

6. Applying the tests mentioned above, it is clear that the covenant in the registered lease deed under consideration affects the landlord in his normal capacity as landlord and the tenant in his normal capacity as tenant and consequently may by said to touch and concern the land. The covenant which came up for consideration in Breams Property Investments Co. v. Stroulger (Supra) was a covenant by the landlord disentitling him to require the tenant to quit except under a specified condition. Harries, C.J and Das, J. in Jamini Bala Dasi v. Administrator General of West Bengal applying the abovementioned tests and relying on Mansel v. Norton 1883 22 Ch. D. 769. held that a covenant by the landlord to pay for the improvements by the lessee on the termination of the tenancy attached to the reversion and to the person in whom the reversion vested. We consequently unhesitatingly hold that the covenant relied upon by the opposite parties in the lease deed executed in their favour by the previous landlords was a covenant running with the land.

7. Covenants running with the land attach to the reversion and to the person in whom the reversion vests and there is ample authority for the proposition that such a covenant binds the assignee of the lessor as also the assignee of the tenant by act of patties. See Sarda Kripa Lala v. Bepin Chandra Pal A.I.R 1923 Cal. 679. Nabjan Sardar v. Neburali Molla A.I.R 1933 Cal. 503. and Jamini Bala Dasi v. Administrator General of West Bengal I.L.R 1953 1 Cal. 34.. In the instant case, however, the petitioner is not an assignee of the landlord's right as a consequence of a voluntary transfer effected by the earlier owners and the question is whether a purchaser at a court auction is bound by a covenant running with the reversion.

8. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that assuming the term in the lease deed relied upon by the tenants opposite parties was a covenant running with the land, it was Ineffective to bind the petitioner who was a purchaser at a court auction. Reliance was strongly placed by the learned counsel on the Privy Council decision in Nur Mohammad Peerbhoy v. Dinshaw Hormasji Motiwalle. Our pointed attention was Invited to conservations of the Judicial Committee to the effect that “Judicial sales would be robbed of all their security if vague references to antecedent contracts contracts could be held to invalidate the buyer's title.” In that decision, the Privy Council was not concerned with a covenant running with the land. The decision was based on the assumption that the covenant under consideration was of the nature contemplated by Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act.

9. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Gordhandas Vithaldas v. Mohanlal Naneklal Doshi was also concerned with a restrictive covenant of the nature envisaged by Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act. The view taken therein that a mere restrictive covenant by which the owner of an immovable property restricts the ordinary user of the property does not bind a purchaser unless he has notice has no application to the instant case.

10. it cannot be disputed that the petitioner is an assignee of the rights of the previous owners and initials lessors of the tenants opposite parties. According to Cheshire's views expressed at page 436 in the book from which a passage has been quoted earlier,

“The term ‘assignee’ is very comprehensive it applies to all persons who take the estate either by act of party or by act of law such as the executors of a lessee or assignee, and persons taking the premises by way of execution for debt………….”

(Emphasis supplied).

11. In General Law of Landlord and Tenant, Foa states in Chapter IV that,

“The relation of landlord and tenant may be created by assignment where the lessee assigns his term, or where the lessor assigns his reversion. The former assignment creates the relation of landlord and tenant between the lessor and the assignee, the latter creates it between the assignee and the lessee, while the concurrence of both creates it between the two assignees. Either kind of assignment too may be affected in two ways by act of parties and by act of law”

12. There is a clear distinction between ‘privity of contract’ on the one hand ‘privity of estate’ on the other. Though there is no privity of contract' between an assignee of the lessor's right of reversion and the tenancy rights of the lessee, there is ‘privity of estate’ between such assignees. According to Cheshire:

“Privity of estate describes the relationship between two parties who respectively hold the same estates as those created by the lease. This is the position where one holds the original reversion and the other the original term or rather, the whole of what is now left of the original term. Thus there is privity of estate between the lessor and an assignee from the lessee of the residue of the terms also between the lessee and an assignee of the Reversion also between an assignee of the reversion and an assignee of the residue of the term…………”

13. In the instant case, the petitioner undisputably is an assignee of the interests in the premises in question and consequently there exists ‘privity of estate’, between the petitioner and the opposite parties even though the petitioner stepped into the shoes of the previous owners and landlords by virtue of an auction sale.

14. It was urged before as, as it was before the learned Single Judge, that the law regarding covenants running with the land has been codified in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act and since in view of Section 2(d) thereof the provisions of the Act “Save as provided by Section 57 and Chapter VI” do not apply to purchaser at court auction, the petitioner was not bound by the aforesaid term of the lease even though the covenant contained therein might be one running with the land. This contention, in our opinion, is unsound and is consequently unacceptable.

15. Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act, on which reliance has been placed for the submission that the entire law on the subject regarding covenants running with the land has been codified is not concerned with covenants running with the land. A mere reading of the Section shows that the provision deals with easements and restrictive covenants as distinguished from covenants running with the land. Under the heading “Summary of law as to covenants running with the land”, it has been stated by Foa that.

“The result seems to be that the assignee of the term will be bound by the following classes of covenants:—(1) All covenants running with the land. (2) Any other covenants of a negative or restrictive nature contained in the lease, or in any document forming part of the chain of title, of which he has constructive notice (3) All other covenants of a restrictive kind, of which he has actual notice, relating to the user of the demised premises, and entered into by the lessee under the lease”.

16. Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act is not concerned with the covenants of the nature mentioned at (1) of the passage quoted above.

17. It must be borne in mind that the Transfer of Property Act is not an exhaustive or consolidating Code (See Satyabadi Bohara v. Harabat Bangga Das v. Gena Lal Mohammad Shafikul Haq. v. Krishna Govinda Chotesha v. Maktumoi. There is judicial precedent for the view that where a case is not contemplated by any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, High Courts as Courts of Equity are entitled to administer principles of equity as laid down by English or Indian decisions not distinctly prohibited by statute. In Ahmadabad Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdul Gafur it has been held that it is axiomatic that the purchaser at a court auction takes the property subject to all the defects of title and the doctrine caveat emptor (let the purchaser beaware) applies to such purchaser. A covenant running with the land creates no defect in the title of the purchaser but in its true character becomes an incident of the property itself. It strikes us as unequitable that the auction purchaser should be allowed to rid himself of such a covenant to the detriment of the lessee.

18. It was ultimately urged that because of the statutory provision contained in U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 which entitled the landlord to obtain an order of eviction of his tenant on the ground of his personal need under Section 21(1)(a) of that Act, the covenant which restricted the right of the lessor to evict his tenant only on the ground of non-payment of rent for a year stood obliterated. It is contended that the term in the lease being inconsistent with Section 21(1)(a) of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 ceased to be of any legal effects. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Rati Lal Bhagwandas and Co.. That decision has, in our opinion, no relevance to the statute under consideration or to the facts of the present case. The material facts giving rise to the appeal before the Supreme Court were that the landlord had entered into an agreement permitting sub-letting by the lessee which was prohibited by Section 15 of the Bombay Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. The Supreme Court held that the agreement was prohibited by Section 15 of the Act and consequently was void by reason of section 23 of the Contract Act. A number of other cases were relied upon in which section 23 of the Contract Act was pressed in aid for the purpose of holding particular clauses in agreement as void. Section 21 of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 does not prohibit a landlord from entering into a covenant of the nature we are Concerned with by which the landlord confined his right to obtain eviction of his tenant on a certain specific ground, and relinquished his right to evict him on any other ground including his personal need. Under the general law of landlord and Tenant, the landlord has an unrestricted right to obtain possession of the property leased out to a tenant subject only to such restrictions as have been laid down with regard to termination of tenancy etc. provided for by the Transfer of Property Act.

19. U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 does not enlarge the right which a lessor possessed either under the general law dealing with the subject of landlord and Tenant or under the provision of the Transfer of Property Act. The Act has placed restrictions on the rights of the landlord to obtain eviction of his tenant on such grounds as are mentioned in Section 20 or 21 of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. Like the enactment which cane up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar v. Asharam Hiraman Patil. it is a piece of beneficial legislation conferring on the tenants additional rights and protections against eviction as a matter of public policy. If the lease deed had contained a covenant surrendering any protection provided to him by U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 it might have been possible to successfully contend that such a covenant was against public policy and consequently void by reason of section 23 of the Contract Act. There is noting in the Act, however, to prevent the landlord from waiving such rights as have been left to him by U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. There is no public policy involved in Section 21 of the Act as far as it restricts the rights of a landlord to obtain an order for the eviction of his tenant on certain limited grounds specified in that provision. For the principle enunciated above, we are fortified in our view by the decision of the-Supreme Court in Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam† 1A of U.P Act No. 3 of 1947 made in-applicable the provisions of that Act to buildings constructed after the 1st January, 1951. In the case before the Supreme Court, the facts were that the appellant had been occupying a shop belonging to the respondent for a very long time on a specified monthly rent. In 1962 that is to say after the 1st January, 1951 since the respondent wanted to construct rooms on the upper story of the shop for his own residence, the parties entered into an agreement on June 4, 1962 in which it was provided that the appellant would vacate the shop in his tenancy on the condition that as soon as the required construction had been completed he would resume possession of the shop. One of the terms of the agreement was that after the construction of the shop, the first party shall be entitled to get the same amount as rent from the second party. All the Section of the U.P Rent Control and Eviction Act shall be fully applicable to this house. The first party shall in no case be entitled to derive benefit from it as the property built after 1-1-51.” After the shop had been reconstructed, as contemplated by the agreement the appellant entered into possession of the reconstructed shop and when the offered rent to the respondent, he declined to accept the same and the tenant was compelled to make the deposit of rent due in court under Section 7-C of U.P Act No. 3 of 1974. The respondent served a notice under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to terminate the tenancy of the appellant and instituted a suit for his ejectment for desault in payment of rent and for damages. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the appellant was entitled to the protection conferred by Section 3 of U.P Act No. 3 of 1947 which was applicable. On appeal, the learned District Judge took a different view and decreed the suit. The High Court on appeal affirmed the judgment of the District Judge and took the view that the respondent was entitled to rely on Section 1-A of U.P Act No. 3 of 1947 and the appellant could not be given the benefit of Section 3. The tenant consequently took the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question as to whether it was open to the respondent-landlord to give up the benefit of Section 1-A of V.P Act No. 3 of 1947 and waive it by means of an agreement of the nature which was entered into between the appellant and the respondent. Act No. 3 of 1947 which in its scope and objective is very similar to the U.P Act No. 3 of 1972, it was held that.

“The Act was enacted for affording protection to the tenants against eviction except in the manner provided by the Act……………… At the same time it appears that the legislature was conscious of the fact that the Act might retard and slacken the pace construction of new buildings because the landlords would naturally be reluctant to invest money in properties, the letting of which would be governed by the stringent provisions of the Act. It was for that purpose that the saving provisions is section 1-A seems to have been inserted. The essential question that has to be resolved is whether section 1-A was merely in the nature of an exemption in favour of the landlords with regard to the building constructed after January 1, 1951 and conferred a benefit on them which they could give up or waive by agreement or contractual arrangement and whether the consideration or object of such an agreement would not be lawful within the meaning of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.”

20. The Supreme Court found it unable to hold that the performance of the agreement which was entered into between the parties in the case before it would involve an illegal or unlawful Act. It was observed that:

“In our judgment S. 1A. was meant for the benefit of owners of buildings which were under erection or were constructed after January 1, 1951. If a particular owner did not wish to avail of the benefit of that Section there was no bar created by it in the way of his waiving or giving up or abandoning the advantage or the benefit contemplated by the Section. No question of policy, much less public policy was involved and such a benefit or advantage could always be waived;”

21. In the result, the appeal was allowed and the view taken by this Court was over-ruled.

22. As observed earlier in the Transfer of Property Act there was no restriction with regard to the grounds on which the landlord could obtain eviction of his tenant, except such as those to which the parties might have agreed. The effect of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 is that the landlords rights to obtain the eviction of his tenants has become confined to certain specified grounds. It is clearly open to the landlord to waive even such rights and confine his rights to evict his tenant on conditions specified in the agreement of the lease. There is no element of public policy involved in the landlord waiving such rights as have been left intact to him by the provision of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. For the reasons given, we find no merits in this petition, which we accordingly dismiss with costs to opposite-parties Nos. 1 and 2.

U.P Act No. 13 of 1972