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Ratan Lal And Others v. Hari Shanker And Others
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a second appeal brought by the plaintiffs against dismissal of their suit for a permanent injunction and, in the alternative, for partition of a house (the suit property described as a Chabutra) and mesne profits. The trial court examined the evidence and held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the property was ancestral, that it had been partitioned in their favour, or that they had ever been in possession; the court further found that the defendants had been in exclusive and adverse possession and dismissed the suit for failure to prove title and possession.
On appeal, the lower appellate court reviewed the evidence and the plaintiffs' contentions and affirmed the trial court's findings: it concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown the property was part of a joint ancestral house or that any partition gave them the Chabutra, and it accepted the defendants' evidence that their ancestors had been in exclusive and adverse possession for more than 12 years before the suit, thus acquiring absolute proprietary title by prescription. The appellate court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment and decree. This second appeal challenges those conclusions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the partition document relied upon by the plaintiffs (Exhibit 1, dated 1897) was compulsorily registerable and, if so, whether it is admissible.
- Whether an unregistered but compulsorily registerable deed (like Ex. 1, if so found) may be looked into for a collateral purpose and, if so, whether that collateral purpose can establish partition or allotment of immovable property.
- Whether a written family arrangement (reduction into writing of terms of a family arrangement) requires registration and if an unregistered written family arrangement is admissible.
- Whether oral evidence of partition based on Exhibit 1 is barred by Section 91 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether the principle of adverse possession (prescription) can be applied to defeat the plaintiffs' claim here, and specifically whether the principle would be inapplicable if the claimant were a reversioner.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The partition document (Ex. 1), executed in 1897, was not compulsorily registerable and therefore the Registration Act, 1908 does not apply to it; earlier Registration Acts pre-dated 1908 and analogous provisions may not have existed.
- Even if Ex. 1 were not registered, it could be looked into for a collateral purpose, and thus could support the plaintiffs' case regarding partition.
- The deed (Ex. 1) could be treated as a family arrangement, and a family arrangement is not compulsorily registerable (implying admissibility notwithstanding lack of registration).
- Implicitly, the appellants challenged the conclusion that the defendants had acquired title by adverse possession and invoked authority suggesting adverse possession may be inapplicable to a reversioner.
Respondents' / Defendants' Position (as found by the courts)
- The defendants' evidence established that their ancestors had been in exclusive and adverse possession of the suit property for a period exceeding 12 years prior to the suit, thereby prescribing an absolute proprietary title.
- On the facts found by the courts below, the plaintiffs failed to prove ancestral title, partition, allotment of the Chabutra to their share, or possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976 SC 807 | The Supreme Court's principle that an oral family arrangement needs no registration, but if the terms are reduced to writing the written document must be registered to be admissible. | The court applied this principle to hold that Exhibit 1, being in writing, would have required registration to be admissible as a family arrangement; lacking registration, it could not be looked into to prove partition or family arrangement. |
| P. Kanakamma v. B. Krishnamma, AIR 1949 Mad 445 | The Full Bench observation (as cited) that possession adverse to one party may not be adverse to a reversioner—i.e., adverse possession may not operate against a reversioner in certain circumstances. | The court considered the authority but found it inapplicable on the facts before it because there was no question of a reversioner in the present case; therefore the principle did not affect the conclusion that the defendants had prescribed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the parties' contentions and the findings of the courts below in a sequence that mirrors the points raised on appeal:
- On the registration argument concerning Exhibit 1 (a deed dated 1897), the court noted the appellants' contention that the Registration Act, 1908 did not apply because the document pre-dated that Act and because earlier Acts (1871 and 1877) may have lacked provisions analogous to Section 49 of the 1908 Act. The court observed that this contention had not been raised below and found no merit in it. The court did not accept the argument that the 1908 Act's registration requirement was inapplicable to Ex. 1.
- Regarding the collateral-purpose submission, the court accepted the legal proposition that a compulsorily registerable document that is unregistered can, in limited circumstances, be admissible only for a collateral purpose. The court analysed the scope of "collateral purpose" and concluded its scope is narrow: it does not permit the party to use an unregistered deed to establish that the deed created, declared, assigned, limited, or extinguished a right to immovable property. Accordingly, the court held that the collateral-purpose exception could not be used to prove partition or allotment of immovable property from Ex. 1.
- On the family-arrangement argument, the court relied on the precedent in Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and summarized the principle that a family arrangement if oral requires no registration, but once reduced to writing it must be registered. Because Exhibit 1 was in writing, it required registration; being unregistered, it was inadmissible for establishing a family arrangement or partition.
- The court further held that oral evidence attempting to prove partition on the basis of Exhibit 1 was barred by Section 91 of the Evidence Act, reinforcing the inadmissibility of Ex. 1 for that substantive purpose.
- Turning to adverse possession, the court considered the contention that adverse possession might not be applicable against a reversioner and reviewed the Full Bench decision in P. Kanakamma v. B. Krishnamma. The court concluded that the cited principle was inapplicable because there was no reversioner in the present dispute. The factual findings—accepted by the appellate court—were that the defendants had exclusive, adverse possession of the Chabutra for more than 12 years prior to the suit. Applying the law of prescription/adverse possession as found by the lower appellate court, the trial court's dismissal was sustained: the defendants had prescribed for an absolute proprietary title.
- Overall, the court found no error—either in law or in appreciation of evidence—in the lower appellate court's findings and reasoning concerning inadmissibility of Exhibit 1 and the defendants' acquisition of title by adverse possession.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The court found no merit in the appellants' contentions regarding registration, collateral purpose, or family-arrangement exceptions, and upheld the lower courts' conclusion that the defendants had acquired an absolute proprietary title by adverse possession.
Direct consequences: The dismissal means the judgments and decree of the courts below are affirmed: the plaintiffs' suit for permanent injunction and, alternatively, partition and mesne profits remains dismissed, and the defendants' claim to the suit property by virtue of exclusive adverse possession for over 12 years is sustained. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
The opinion does not announce or rely upon any novel legal doctrine; it applies existing principles (as cited) to the facts and does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond the application of those authorities to these facts.
1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for partition of a house and mesne profit has been dismissed by both the courts below. The suit property is a Chabutra. The trial court after considering the evidence on record held that the plaintiffs could not prove the alleged ancestral nature of the property or even its partition and the disputed Chabutra being allotted to their share. He also held that the plaintiffs were never in possession thereof and the defendants had been in exclusive and adverse possession of the suit property. The trial court dismissed the suit, for the plaintiffs failed to prove their title and possession over the property in suit.
2. The lower appellate court on an appraisal of the evidence on record and after considering the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs held that the plaintiffs could not prove that the suit property ever pertained to any joint ancestral house of the parties or that on a partition it was allotted to their exclusive share. They also failed to prove that they were in possession of the suit property. The court further found that the defendants' evidence proved that their ancestors had been in exclusive and adverse possession over the suit property for a period more than 12 years preceding the suit and had thus prescribed an absolute proprietary title. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the judgement and decree of the trial court was affirmed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants raised three contentions: Firstly; that the document of partition Ex. 1 was not compulsorily registerable. He urged that this was a document executed in 1897, and provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 had no application to it. The Registration Act, 1908 did not come into play, but there were earlier Registration Acts of the year 1871 and 1877. It could not be shown that the provisions analogous to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 were not there in the previous Registration Acts. This contention was never raised in the court below, and I find no merits in this contention.
4. The second contention was that the partition deed, even if it was not registered, could certainly be looked into for a collateral purpose. This proposition is correct that if a document is compulsorily registerable and has not been registered, it will be admissible in evidence only for a collateral purpose, but the collateral purpose has a limited scope and meaning. It cannot be used for the purpose of saying that the deed created or declared or assigned or limited or extinguished a right to immovable property. If these could not be established by the collateral purpose, then in that event how could the document be used for showing that the property was partitioned or that particular properties were given to the various parties in the partition. If the document was unregistered, then it could not be used for showing that is created, declared, assigned, limited or extinguished a right to immovable property. The term ‘collateral purpose’ would not permit the party to establish any of these acts from the deed. In my opinion, the contention that it would be used for collateral purpose does not advance the case of the plaintiffs at all. It still falls short in proving that there was a partition between the parties.
5. Learned counsel then contended that the deed could be treated to be a family arrangement and a family arrangement was not compulsorily registerable. This contention, in my opinion, is not correct. The Supreme Court in the case of Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, ((1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976 SC 807), held that a family arrangement in case it is oral needs no registration, but if the terms thereof were reduced into writing, it became imperative to have the document registered and unless it was registered, it could not be looked into. The plea of family arrangement is sought to be derived from Exhibit-1. That document is in writing. Even if it was treated to be a family arrangement, it required registration, and having not been registered, it could not be looked into for the purpose of showing it to be a family arrangement.
6. The oral evidence regarding partition on the basis of this document, Ex. 1, could not be led, as it was barred by Section 91 of the Evidence Act. For the reasons indicated above, it is clear that the lower appellate court has rightly recorded that the document Ex. 1 was inadmissible in evidence. The finding is correct and in accordance with law.
7. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the conclusion of the lower appellate court that the defendants were in exclusive and adverse proprietary possession was also vitiated because the principle of adverse possession would not be applicable in the case of a reversioner. He cited a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Kanakamma v. B. Krishnamma, (AIR 1949 Mad 445), where it was observed that “the possession of Andalmmal and her daughters was undoubtedly adverse to Seethamma, but it was not adverse to the respondent as the reversioner”, I do not see how the principle laid down in the above case is applicable to the facts of the present case. There is no question of any reversioner in the present case. There were two parties in the suit. Each were claiming right on the Chabutra. The defendants claimed that they were in exclusive possession thereof.
8. This possession of theirs has been accepted. The lower appellate court has found that their possession being possession for more than 12 years, they had prescribed for themselves an absolute proprietary title, I do not find any error of law in this conclusion. The finding arrived at by the lower appellate court is not vitiated by any error of law, either in the appreciation of the evidence or in the application of the principle of law.
9. No other point was argued. I find no merits in this appeal.
10. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
11. Appeal dismissed.
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