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The Philips India Ltd. Etc. v. The Union Of India .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.C. Agrawal, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged in the manufacture and sale of electrical and electronic articles, including lamps; it operates factories and holds excise licences for goods it manufactures. Besides its own manufacture, the petitioner purchased electric lamps and tubes from Hind Lamps Limited, a separate company with a factory at Shikohabad, which sold such lamps to the petitioner and other leading companies on a principal-to-principal basis. Hind Lamps manufactured and supplied lamps bearing the petitioner's trade name in accordance with the manufacturer's own specifications (which generally conformed to Indian Standards), and Hind Lamps retained exclusive control and management of its production.
Following Trade Notice No. 236 of 1975 (issued by the Collector, Central Excise, Kanpur) interpreting the revised definition of "manufacturer" under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act to require licences for persons who got goods manufactured to their specifications under their brand names, the Superintendent, Central Excise, Shikohabad, issued notices dated December 10, 1975 and June 7, 1976 calling upon the petitioner to obtain a manufacturing licence under Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The petitioner replied denying liability and subsequently filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of those notices.
The Central Excise Authorities contested the petition, asserting that the petitioner controlled and managed Hind Lamps Limited (or that Hind Lamps was effectively controlled by the petitioner) and that because the goods bore the petitioner's trade name and were manufactured to its specifications, the petitioner should be treated as a "manufacturer" and required to obtain a licence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act in respect of goods purchased from Hind Lamps Limited, and therefore liable to obtain a manufacturing licence under Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
- Whether the use of the petitioner's trade name or branding on goods manufactured by Hind Lamps Limited, or a director commonality between the two companies, is sufficient to treat the petitioner as the manufacturer (or to treat Hind Lamps Limited as a dummy company) for purposes of the Act and Rules.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner contended it was not a "manufacturer" within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act in respect of lamps purchased from Hind Lamps Limited and therefore was not required to obtain a manufacturing licence under Rule 174.
- The petitioner asserted that Hind Lamps Limited was the actual manufacturer, exercised exclusive control over production, and the petitioner merely purchased finished goods; thus the relationship was that of buyer and seller (principal to principal) and not that of manufacturer/contractor or agent.
Respondent (Central Excise) Arguments
- The respondents argued that transactions between the petitioner and Hind Lamps Limited were not genuine purchaser–seller transactions; instead, they contended Hind Lamps was controlled and managed by the petitioner such that the petitioner should be treated as the manufacturer.
- The respondents relied on the facts that bulbs and tubes were produced according to the petitioner's specifications and bore the petitioner's trade name (and that Hind Lamps' name did not appear on goods) to contend the petitioner engaged in manufacture under Section 2(f).
- Respondents further suggested that common directorship (one director in Hind Lamps also being a director of the petitioner) indicated that Hind Lamps was a dummy company for the petitioner.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ganga Dhar v. Collector, Central Excise (Writ Petition No. 3306 of 1958; decided 25-3-1964) | That the person who actually undertakes the manufacturing process (e.g., owners of mills doing the manufacture) is the "manufacturer" and a person who merely supplies raw material and pays manufacturing/crushing charges is not the manufacturer. | The court applied this ratio to hold that only the person who actually does the manufacturing can be considered the manufacturer; accepting the respondent's view would result in treating two persons as manufacturers of the same commodity, which the court rejected. |
| Hind Lamps Limited v. Union of India (Writ Petition No. 2189 of 1973; decided 14-5-1974) | That Hind Lamps Limited is a separate legal entity carrying on business on its own account. | The court relied on this earlier decision to reject the contention that Hind Lamps Limited was a dummy company for the petitioner, reinforcing that Hind Lamps carried on business independently. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis focused on the statutory definition of "manufacturer" in Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act and on the requirements of Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (which requires every manufacturer to obtain a licence).
The court first examined the amendment effected by Finance Act No. 5 of 1964 to Section 2(f), noting that the words "if they are intended for sale" were omitted. The court concluded the amendment only broadened the definition to include persons who manufacture on their own account irrespective of whether the goods are intended for sale, but it did not otherwise alter the fundamental interpretation of who falls within the definition.
The court parsed Section 2(f) into two categories of persons: (a) Those who directly employ hired labour and bring into existence or fabricate an article (i.e., the owners/operators of factories who do the manufacturing); and (b) Those who engage in production or manufacture on their own account without necessarily employing labour themselves.
The opinion concentrated on the meaning of the phrase "engages ... on his own account." The court interpreted these words together to require that a person who is to be regarded as a manufacturer (even if not physically performing the manufacturing) must be one by whom, or under whose direction and control, the articles are made. In short, there must be direction and control or ownership of the manufacturing process to attract the label "manufacturer."
Applying that test to the facts, the court found that where a buyer simply places orders with a manufacturing company for articles made according to the manufacturer's own schedule, capacity and controls, and the manufacturing concern retains exclusive control and management of production, the buyer remains a purchaser and cannot be treated as the manufacturer. The court emphasized that complying with a buyer's requirements or bearing the buyer's trade name on the product does not, as a matter of law, convert the buyer into the manufacturer.
The court rejected the respondents' contention that branding (use of the petitioner's trade name with absence of the manufacturer's name) made the petitioner a manufacturer, observing that a trade mark denotes origin or ownership in trade but does not necessarily import that the user of the trade mark performed the manufacturing. Trade mark and manufacture are distinct concepts.
The court also addressed the respondents' reliance on common directorship as evidence of control, concluding that one person being a director of two separate companies does not itself indicate that one company is a dummy or that control sufficient to treat the purchaser as manufacturer exists. The earlier decision in Hind Lamps Limited v. Union of India, which held Hind Lamps to be a separate legal entity carrying on business on its own account, supported this view.
Finally, the court applied the ratio of Ganga Dhar to reinforce the conclusion that only the actual manufacturer (the entity conducting and controlling the manufacturing process) can be the "manufacturer" for purposes of the Act and Rules; a buyer who merely orders or specifies a product is not thereby transformed into a manufacturer unless the manufacturing company is merely a sham or dummy for the buyer.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The court directed the respondents to withdraw the notices dated December 10, 1975 and June 7, 1976, and to desist from taking any action against the petitioner for failing to obtain a licence under the Central Excises and Salt Act.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The specific notices requiring the petitioner to obtain a manufacturing licence under Rule 174 were quashed, and the respondents were ordered not to take action against the petitioner for non-obtaining of such licence.
- The court applied existing authorities (Ganga Dhar and Hind Lamps Limited v. Union of India) and statutory interpretation of Section 2(f); the opinion primarily resolved the parties' dispute on the facts and statutory construction rather than announcing a novel legal principle beyond that analysis.
Order: Petition allowed with costs; respondents directed to withdraw the specified notices and desist from further action on the basis of those notices.
K.C Agrawal, J.:— This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a Writ of Mandamus shaking a prayer for quashing the notices dated December 10, 1975, and June 7, 1976, sent by the Superintendent, Central Excise, Shikohabad, district Mainpuri, calling upon the petitioner Company to obtain Central Excise License under Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
2. The petitioner is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It carries on business of manufacture and sale of diverse electrical and electronic articles, including lamps and components. It has its own factories at various places in the country where the goods are manufactured. The petitioner holds licenses in respect of excise goods which are manufactured by it at various factories. It pays excise duty on such goods under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Besides manufacturing its own lamps at its factory at Thana (Bombay), the petitioner also purchases electric lamps and tubes from Hind Lamps Limited (Briefly stated as the Company), having its registered office and factory at Shikohabad. The said Company carries on business of manufacture and sale of electric bulbs, fluorescent lamps, miniature bulbs and components of its bulbs and lamps etc. at its factory at Shikohabad. The Company sells lamps and tubes, referred to above, to the petitioner and other leading Companies such as Bajaj Electrical Limited, Crompton Greaves Limited, General Electric Company of (India) Limited and Mazda Lamps Company Limited. The sales of the goods by the Company to the petitioner and other customers, referred to above, is on principal to principal basis in the ordinary course of business. The Company manufactures goods according to its own schedule, budget, capacity, availability of raw materials, supply of power and maximum supplies to customers against their orders. The lamps manufactured by the Company are supplied to its various customers, including the petitioner. These lamps are, however branded differently in accordance with the arrangement which the company has with its customers. These specifications are not stipulated by the customers but are the Company's own specifications conforming generally to the Indian Standard Specifications. The entire production of lamps is under the exclusive control and management of the Company. The case of the petitioner was that it had not engaged the Company nor was the Company its contractor for the manufacture of any one of its goods. The Company was also not the agent of the petitioner. Under the Act and the Rules made thereunder, every manufacturer of an excisable article is required to obtain a licence. As the petitioner was not a manufacturer of the lamps purchased by it from the Company, it did not obtain any licence with respect to the said lamps.
3. In October 1975, a Trade Notice No. 236 of 1975 was issued by the Collector, Central Excise, Kanpur, to the Superintendent, Central Excise, calling upon him to insist on obtaining of manufacturing licence by persons who had no factories of their own and who got excisable goods manufactured in the duly licensed factories according to their own specifications, under their own brand names or trade names. The Collector's view was that in the light of the revised definition of the term ‘Manufacturer’ under Section 2(f) of the Act, a person falling in the aforesaid category was required to obtain a manufacturing licence under Rule 174 of the Rules made under the Act.
4. By a letter dated December 10, 1975, the Superintendent of Central Excise, Shikohabad, called upon the petitioner to obtain a licence under Rule 174 in respect of the lamps and other articles purchased by it from the company. The petitioner replied to the said letter on December 26, 1975, and denied its liability under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to obtain a manufacturing licence under Rule 174. The petitioner's case was that the petitioner not being a manufacturer within the meaning of the words, as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act, in respect of the goods purchased from the Company, it was not required to obtain a licence under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner, however, received another notice dated June 7, 1976, calling upon the petitioner and certain other parties to obtain a licence under Rule 174. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present writ petition challenging the said two notices dated December 10, 1975, and June 7, 1976, requiring the petitioner to obtain a licence. The petitioner's case was that the insistence of the Excise Authorities to obtain the licence under Rule 174 of the Rules was unjustified, and that the petitioner not being a manufacturer could not be called upon to obtain such a licence in respect of the goods purchased from the Company, viz., Hind Lamps Limited.
5. The writ petition has been contested by the Central Excise Authorities. The case taken in the counter-affidavit is that the transactions between the petitioner and the Company are not that of a purchaser and seller. Hind Lamps Limited is controlled and managed by the petitioner and that since the lighting bulbs and fluorescent tubes are not only manufactured in accordance with the specifications and orders placed with the Company but also the trade name given is that of the petitioner, the petitioner is a ‘manufacturer’ and, as such, liable to obtain the licence.
6. For deciding the point relating to the requirement of obtaining the licence, it is necessary to refer to the definition of the word ‘manufacturer’ given in the Act. The definition of ‘manufacturer’ under Section 2(f) of the Act, as it stood before amendment made by Finance Act No. 5 of 1964, was as under:
“Manufacture includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product……… The word “manufacturer” shall be construed accordingly and shall include not only a person who employs hired labour in the production or manufacture of excisable goods, but also any person who engages in their production or manufacture on his own account if those are intended for sale.’
7. By Finance Act No. 5 of 1964, the definition of the word ‘manufacturer’ was amended. Section 60 of the said Act provided that the words “beginning with” and the word “manufacturer” and ending with “are intended for sale” shall be omitted. After amendment, the definition will read as under:
“Manufacture includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product; ………… The word ‘manufacturer’ shall be construed accordingly and shall include not only a person who employs hired labour in the production or manufacture of excisable goods, but also any person who engages in their production or manufacture on his own account.”
8. At this place, reference may also be made to Rule 174 of the Rules framed under the Act in accordance with which the case of the Central Excise is that the petitioner was required to obtain a licence. Under this Rule, every manufacturer is required to take out a licence and is not authorised to conduct his business in regard to such goods other than by the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted by a duly authorised officer in the proper form.
9. It appears that the amendment in the definition of the word ‘manufacturer’ given in Section 2(f) was made on account of the controversy as to whether a person not manufacturing goods for sale was also required to obtain a licence. By the amendment, the words “if they are intended for sale” were dropped. As a result thereof, no scope for argument was left that a person manufacturing goods not intended for sale, was not required to obtain a licence. The distinction between ‘manufacture of goods for sale’ and ‘manufacture of goods for one's own purpose other than sale’ ceased to exist. The amendment, therefore made by Finance Act No. 5 of 1964 does not make any material difference in the interpretation of the word ‘manufacturer’ excepting for taking within its purview also those persons who manufactured goods on his own account irrespective of the fact as to whether the goods manufactured were meant to be sold of not.
10. The definition of the word ‘manufacturer’ lays down two categories of persons who would fall within its ambit. The first category would consist of all those persons who bring into existence or make or fabricate an article or a product by employing his own hired labour needed for the production or manufacture of excisable goods. The second category would, however be comprised of those persons who do not directly employ their own labour but engage themselves in production or manufacture of goods on their own account. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the first category of persons as admittedly the case of the petitioner would fall, if at all, within the second category. As already noted above, the Central Excise has taken a stand that since the manufacturing and making of the brand names on the bulbs and fluorescent tubes of the petitioner's trade name attracts the provisions of Sec. 2(f) of the Act, the petitioner would be deemed to be engaged in the manufacture of these articles.
11. The words which require consideration for understanding the true scope are ‘engages’, ‘production’ ‘manufacture’ and ‘on his own account’. Taking these words together, it appears to us that he must be a person, though not owning a factory, nor himself doing the manufacturing process, be considered to be a manufacturer, if he was a person by whom or under whose direction and control the articles or materials are made. In order to bring a person within the ambit of this clause, it is necessary that a person gets the goods manufactured by others under his direction and control. If a person simply places orders with a Company for getting certain goods manufactured according to his specifications and details, such a person would not be considered a manufacturer inasmuch as the owner of a factory alone could be said to be engaged in the manufacturing activity “on his own” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act.
12. In a case where a company requiring certain goods places orders for manufacturing articles according to its requirements, such a company cannot be said to have hired any labour and also does not have any control over the working of the manufacturing concern, hence such a company will not be considered to be a ‘manufacturer’ within the definition of the term given in Section 2(f) of the Act. A person placing orders for manufacturing of articles would only be a buyer and thus cannot be the manufacturer. Simply because the goods are manufactured in accordance with the requirements of the buyer, complying with his standard, the same would not make him a manufacturer inasmuch as such a person does not engage himself either in manufacture or production of goods on his own account. He does not incur any financial involvement needed for manufacturing or producing the goods and also does not have any control or supervision over the manufacturing process. Manufacturing company was not dummy company nor a buyer placing orders for its manufacturing could be considered to be a manufacturer. It is only if those who own a factory are a dummy concern or a camouflage for the buyer of goods produced, that the latter can be considered to be a manufacturer.
13. Great emphasis was, however, laid by Sri Chand Kishor on behalf of the Central Excise on the fact that since the manufacturing and making of the trade names of the bulbs and tubes are those of the petitioner, and that the name of the manufacturing Company, i.e, Hind Lamps Limited, is not put on any of the goods, the petitioner Company should be considered to be a manufacturer within the meaning of Section 2(f). The sub-mission made does not appear to be correct.
14. A trade mark is only a sign, device, or mark by which the articles produced are dealt in by a particular person or organization. The objects of a trade mark are to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the article. It is only a business autograph of the owner, amounting to a representation, indicating the connection in the course of trade between the goods and the person having a right to use the trade mark. The use of a trade mark does not necessarily nor as a matter of law import that the articles on which it is used are manufactured by its user. It may be enough that they are manufactured for him, that they pass through his hands in the course of trade, and that lie gives to them the benefit of its reputation or of his name or business style. Trade marks and manufacture of goods are two different concepts. They should not be intermixed, and a person using a trade mark need not be considered to be a manufacturer.
15. In Writ Petition No. 3306 of 1958, Ganga Dhar v. Collector, Central Excise (decided on 25-3-1964), the petitioner manufactured and sold vegetable oils. He also supplied his own stock of oil seeds and manufactured oil out of these seeds. The petitioner paid manufacturing charges. The question arose as to whether the petitioner was a manufacturer under the Central Excise Act. A learned single Judge held that the owners of the Mills, and not the petitioner, were manufacturers of the oil manufactured out of the seeds supplied by the petitioner. The view of the High Court was that the petitioner had simply paid crushing charges to the oil mills and, as such, he could not be considered to be a manufacturer.
16. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid case, with which we respectfully agree, we find that it is only a person who did the manufacturing that could be considered to be a manufacturer. If the stand of the Central Excise is accepted, the same would result in making two persons as manufacturers of the same commodity whereas there cannot be more than one. Mere fact that a manufacturing Company produces goods bearing brand names of the customer company, and the customer company sells the goods with that brand name, these facts did not make the customer company a manufacturer.
17. Counsel for the Central Excise also suggested that since one of the Directors of Hind Lamps Ltd., is a director of Philips India Limited, the former Company should be deemed to be controlled by the latter. Placing reliance on this circumstance, counsel urged that Hind Lamps Limited is only a dummy company and, as such, for all intents and purposes, the petitioner company should be deemed to be a manufacturer. The circumstance pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent is not relevant for treating Hind Lamps Limited as a dummy company. A person being a director of two Companies is not indicative of the one company being dummy for the other. These are two distinct legal bodies.
18. In Writ Petition No. 2189 of 1973, Hind Lamps Limited v. Union of India, (decided on 14-5-1974*) a Division Bench of the Court had gone into this matter when the same had been raised in connection with the liability of the excise duty. The Bench held that Hind Lamps Limited was clearly a separate legal entity and was carrying on business on its own account.
19. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. We direct the respondents to withdraw the notices dated December 10, 1975, and June 7, 1976, and to desist from taking any action against the petitioner for failing to obtain a licence under the Central Excises and Salt Act.
20. Petition allowed.
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