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L. Kashi Nath Seth v. Collector Central Excise, Allahabad, And Others
Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion (Deoki Nandan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This special appeal challenges a judgement of a learned single Judge dated 19 May 1975 that dismissed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6429 of 1971. The same single-Judge judgment disposed of another writ petition (No. 563 of 1972; Munshi Ram v. Collector, Central Excise) and that other petition was partly allowed; the present appeal does not relate to the part that was allowed.
The petitioner originally attacked the constitutionality of Sections 71 and 73 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. The single Judge found that while those sections had been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Badri Prasad v. Collector of Central Excise, the defect identified by the Supreme Court had been removed by the Gold Control (Amendment) Act, 1971, and therefore the Sections as amended could not be said to be unconstitutional.
The petitioner was later permitted (by order dated 21 Dec. 1977) to amend the writ petition to add new grounds. The surviving basis for relief is a supplementary affidavit describing a search of the petitioner's business premises at 20, Jhandawala Park, Lucknow on 27 April 1971, seizure of certain gold articles, earlier writ petition(s) challenging search and seizure (Writ Petition No. 2939 of 1971) and related proceedings which resulted in some seized items being returned and some remaining in departmental custody. The respondents issued a show cause notice dated 11 Oct. 1971 (Annexure-III), initiating adjudication under Section 71 (confiscation) and Sections 74–75 (penalties) of the Act. The petitioner seeks quashing of that show cause notice and return of the ornaments still retained by the department.
Temporarily, by order dated 10 Jan. 1978, final orders in the adjudication proceedings were stayed; the adjudication itself was directed to continue but final orders were not to be signed until further orders of the Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Sections 71 and 73 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (as amended by the Gold Control (Amendment) Act, 1971) are unconstitutional.
- Whether the earlier writ petition and Special Appeal No. 447 of 1971 (L. Kashi Nath / Collector Central Excise proceedings) operate as res judicata so as to preclude the petitioner from seeking return of the ornaments now retained by the department.
- Whether the show cause notice dated 11 October 1971 (Annexure-III) and the adjudication proceedings initiated thereby should be quashed in whole or in part — specifically:
- whether an item not in the custody of the Department (including items returned and sold) can be the subject of confiscation under Section 71; and
- whether the adjudication and penalty proceedings under Sections 74–75 must be limited to items lawfully in departmental custody.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner-Appellant's Arguments
- The petitioner initially contended that Sections 71 and 73 of the Act were unconstitutional.
- After amendment of proceedings, petitioner relied on the supplementary affidavit describing the April 27, 1971 search and seizure, and argued that many seized items were returned (some sold) while certain ornaments remained detained; the petitioner claimed those remaining items must be returned.
- Petitioner submitted that the earlier Special Appeal (No. 447 of 1971) and the judgment in L. Kashi Nath entitled it to return of all remaining ornaments under the doctrine of res judicata (i.e., the earlier judgment established the illegality of that seizure).
- On the law of confiscation under Section 71, petitioner (through Mr. S.C. Khare) argued that confiscation applies only to gold "found" on search and seized — i.e., only articles in the custody of the department as a result of lawful seizure can be confiscated; therefore confiscation proceedings must be limited to such items and cannot extend to items no longer in custody.
- Petitioner challenged departmental recorded weights and provided re-weighment figures and a reconciliation chart to show discrepancies and to identify what remains in departmental custody.
Respondent Authorities' Arguments
- Respondent's counsel (Mr. V.K. Barman) argued that the petitioner's omission in the earlier writ petition to claim return of the ornaments now at issue amounted to waiver and that the petitioner had effectively given up that relief.
- Respondent also relied upon the rule of constructive res judicata, attempting to apply prior adjudications to bar the present claim.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Badri Prasad v. Collector of Central Excise ((1971) 2 SCC 1 : AIR 1971 SC 1170) | Supreme Court had held Sections 71 and 73 of the Gold (Control) Act to be unconstitutional (defect identified by Supreme Court). | The Court noted that the vice pointed out in Badri Prasad was removed by the Gold Control (Amendment) Act, 1971, and therefore the Sections as they stood after amendment could not be said to be unconstitutional (this was the reasoning of the single Judge below and recited in the appeal). |
| Munshi Ram v. Collector, Central Excise (Writ petition No. 563 of 1972) | Referenced as the other writ petition disposed by the same single-Judge judgment; factual/procedural context. | Court recorded that the other writ petition was partly allowed; the present special appeal did not concern that part of the judgment. |
| L. Kashi Nath v. Collector Central Excise (AIR 1972 All 16) | Judgement in earlier writ petition describing the facts and result of the search and seizure; established that seizure of certain ornaments was illegal and those ornaments were returned. | Court relied upon the recital of facts in that earlier judgment to identify which seized items had been covered by earlier proceedings and which had been returned; used that record to determine whether the present items in custody were within the subject-matter of the earlier case. |
| Collector Central Excise v. L. Kashi Nath Jewellers (Special Appeal No. 447 of 1971; AIR 1972 All 231) | Division Bench judgment dismissing the respondent's appeal in the earlier matter; held seizure of certain ornaments unlawful and directed their return; observed that failure to maintain accounts in GS forms can attract Section 87. | Court treated that Special Appeal judgment as final between the parties for the items it covered, concluded that the bulk of the ornaments seized earlier had been returned pursuant to that decision, and held that the items still retained were not the subject-matter of that earlier judgment. |
| Raj Laxmi Dassi v. Banmali Sen (AIR 1953 SC 33) | Test of res judicata is identity of title in two litigations and not identity of the actual property involved. | Court applied the principle: because the property in the earlier writ petition and the present special appeal were not identical, identity of title could not be established and the rule of res judicata did not automatically bar the present claim. |
| Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1334) | Observation that the bar of Order II, Rule 2 CPC may not apply to a petition for a high prerogative writ under Article 226; illustrates the interplay between procedural bars in CPC and writ proceedings. | Court noted the observation but also noted that in that case the Supreme Court did not reverse the High Court's order; the opinion used the case to frame discussion whether O.II R.2 should be applied to writ petitions (but emphasized differences in earlier/succeeding proceedings in other cases). |
| Ram Kishore Sharma v. Addl. Dist. Judge, Saharanpur (1969 All LJ 225 : 1970 Lab IC 582) | Illustrated application of principles concerning omission of claims in earlier civil proceedings and later invocation before other fora; related to whether O.II, R.2 should be applied to writ petitions. | Court treated the case as distinguishable but as part of the matrix of authorities showing that the bar of O.II, R.2 may not automatically apply to Article 226 proceedings; used to explain why O.II, R.2 principles might be applied as general law though not mechanistically. |
| M.P. Ragawan Nair v. State Insurance Officer (AIR 1971 Ker 175) (Full Bench) | Full Bench held principles underlying Limitation Act, Section 11 and O.II, R.2 CPC are applicable to petitions under Article 226; these are public policy principles of repose and prevention of piecemeal litigation. | Court endorsed the majority view of that Full Bench, treating the principles of repose and prevention of multiplicity of litigation as applicable to writ petitions and relevant to the present facts (i.e., refusal to allow piecemeal re-litigation of the same cause of action). |
| A' Court v. Cross ((1825) 130 ER 540) | Quoted on the principle that "Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice" — support for repose and preventing piecemeal litigation. | Court reproduced the sentiment to support the application of repose principles underlying statutory bars and procedural rules when considering whether petitioner should have raised the point earlier. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise, fact-specific analysis strictly tied to the record and to precedent cited in the opinion:
-
Constitutionality of Sections 71 and 73:
- The single Judge had held that although the Supreme Court in Badri Prasad had found Ss.71 and 73 unconstitutional, the defect had been cured by the Gold Control (Amendment) Act, 1971. The appeal originally could only challenge that finding. The Court did not reopen or disturb that aspect in the present decision on the amended grounds now pressed.
-
Scope and content of the earlier proceedings:
- The Court scrutinized the record of the earlier writ petition (L. Kashi Nath) and the Special Appeal (No. 447 of 1971) to determine precisely which seized items were the subject of those proceedings and which items were returned pursuant to those decisions.
- From the factual recital and the reconciliation table supplied by petitioner, the Court concluded that the bulk of the 2,583 pieces (weighing approximately 21,581.080 gms on re‑weighment according to petitioner) had been returned. The items still in custody amount to 2,768.450 grams (2,599.350 gms from safe on ground floor + 169.100 gms from first floor), and these were not the subject matter of the earlier writ petition or the special appeal.
-
Application of res judicata and related principles:
- The Court invoked Raj Laxmi Dassi to explain that res judicata turns on identity of title/subject-matter, not simply identity of the originating search. It found the property in the earlier proceedings was not identical to the property now claimed; therefore a straight rule of res judicata could not be invoked to automatically invalidate the seizure of the remaining ornaments.
- The Court observed that petitioner omitted to challenge the seizure of the items now in dispute in the earlier proceedings, and considered the omission significant: the conduct suggested the petitioner chose not to press a claim on those items earlier (possibly to avoid jeopardizing the main claim). Applying the rationale underlying O.II, R.2 CPC, the Court concluded that this omission undermined the petitioner's present claim that those seizures were wrongful.
- The Court considered, but rejected, the respondent's invocation of constructive res judicata; instead it found the appropriate doctrinal analogue to be the principle embodied in O.II, R.2 CPC (bar on raising matters that could and should have been raised earlier), while recognizing jurisprudence observing limits to mechanically applying O.II, R.2 to Article 226 petitions (citing Devendra Pratap and Ram Kishore Sharma). The Court relied on policy considerations about preventing multiplicity of writ petitions and accepted the view in M.P. Ragawan Nair that the underlying principles of repose are applicable to Article 226 petitions.
-
Effect on confiscation and penalty proceedings:
- On the narrow question whether confiscation can be ordered only in respect of gold in departmental custody resulting from lawful seizure, the Court accepted the logical foundation of the petitioner's submission that confiscation under Section 71 applies to goods "found" and seized and therefore which are in custody — but the Court declined to conduct a full inquiry into lawfulness of the remaining seizures at that interlocutory stage because the earlier proceedings had already resulted in the return of the bulk of the ornaments, and the small quantity remaining had not been shown prima facie to be unlawfully seized.
- Consequently, the Court ordered that confiscation proceedings could not continue in respect of ornaments already released pursuant to the earlier orders; those parts of the show cause notice referring to confiscation of released items must be stopped. However, confiscation proceedings relating to the ornaments still retained by the department (the 2,768.450 grams identified from Appendices A and B) can continue and be concluded after proper inquiry under the Act.
- With respect to penalties under Sections 74 and 75: the Court declined to pre-empt the adjudicating authority on penalty (Section 74) in respect of gold still in custody; it allowed the penalty inquiry to proceed for gold still retained. As for Section 75 (penalty in relation to any gold which rendered it liable to confiscation), the Court expressly declined to limit the inquiry for imposition of penalty under Section 75 to only the ornaments still in custody — i.e., the inquiry under Section 75 was not restricted in the same way as confiscation and Section 74 penalties.
-
Disposition informed by costs and procedural equity:
- The Court took cost and conduct into account: it found the petitioner's conduct (not claiming return earlier) supported refusing the broad relief sought. The interlocutory stay preserved the status quo on final orders but permitted the departmental adjudication to proceed within the limits prescribed by the Court.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE APPEAL FAILS; the writ petition is dismissed.
Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered by the Court):
- The show cause notice (Annexure-III) dated 11 Oct. 1971 and the adjudication proceedings initiated thereby are not wholly quashed.
- The inquiry for confiscation under Section 71 and for imposition of penalty under Section 74 is to be confined to the gold ornaments still in the custody of the respondent authorities (the items identified in Appendix A and Appendix B as remaining in departmental custody).
- For the purpose of imposition of penalty under Section 75 of the Act, the Court imposed no such limitation — that inquiry may address the entire gold ornaments which were the subject matter of the search and seizure, if on inquiry the petitioner is found to have contravened any provision of the Act, rules or orders made thereunder.
- The writ petition stands dismissed with costs; however, the parties are ordered to bear their own costs of the appeal (the judgement contains the reservation described above regarding the limited inquiry). Final orders in the departmental adjudication were stayed earlier and were to await further orders of the Court; the Court allowed adjudication to proceed but limited its scope as described.
Implications beyond these parties: The opinion frames its relief narrowly and confines the practical effect to the parties and the particular seized items. The opinion does not purport to create a broader new precedent beyond applying established principles (res judicata identity-of-title test, the salutary effect of O.II, R.2 CPC principles where appropriate in writ proceedings, and the statutory scheme of the Act with regard to confiscation and penalty).
Decision
Writ appeal and petition dismissed.
Deoki Nandan, J.:— This special appeal is directed against the judgement of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6429 of 1971. The judgement under appeal is dated May 19, 1975.* Two writ petitions were disposed by the same judgement. The other writ petition was numbered 563 of 1972. Munshi Ram v. Collector, Central Excise. That was partly allowed. The present special appeal does not relate to that part of the judgement.
2. The only point raised by the petitioner in the writ petition No. 6429 of 1971 before the learned single Judge was that the provisions of Sections 71 and 73 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 were unconstitutional and void. The learned single Judge found that although Sections 71 and 73 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Badri Prasad v. Collector of Central Excise, ((1971) 2 SCC 1 : AIR 1971 SC 1170), the vice pointed out by the Supreme Court was removed by amendment of those Sections by the Gold Control (Amendment) Act, 1971 and that neither of the two Sections, as they stood after the amendment, could be said to be unconstitutional. Therefore, in the special appeal as originally filed, the only grievance which could be raised, was against the view of the learned single Judge that Ss. 71 and 73 of the Act are not unconstitutional. However, by an application presented on 9th Aug., 1977 (Civil Misc. Application No. 5859 of 1977) before the Special Appeal Bench, the petitioner-appellant was allowed by order dated 21st Dec., 1977, to amend the writ petition and to add certain new grounds in the special appeal. The supplementary affidavit filed along with the application, is the only surviving basis on which relief in now claimed by the petitioner-appellant. It has been stated therein that there was a search of the petitioner-appellant's business premises at 20, Jhandawala Park, Lucknow on April 27, 1971; that certain articles of gold were seized at that search; that the petitioner-appellant had challenged the search and seizure by a Writ Petition No. 2939 of 1971; that all the articles seized from the first floor of the petitioner-appellant's business premises, except some ornaments were returned as they were found to be accounted for in its books of account; that the articles so returned were sold by the petitioner-appellant in due course of business and were, therefore, no longer available for being proceeded against; that the said writ petition was allowed by judgement dated 10th Aug. 1971 reported as L. Kashi Nath v. Collector Central Excise in AIR 1972 All 16; that the respondents appealed from that judgement, that was Special Appeal No. 447 of 1971 and was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by judgement dated December 9, 1971 which is reported as Collector Central Excise v. L. Kashi Nath Jewellers in AIR 1972 All 231; that the writ petition giving rise to the present special appeal was filed during the pendency of that special appeal; that it was held by this Court in that special appeal that there was no breach of either Section 55 of the Act or of any rules and only penalty could be levied but no confiscation could be ordered; that the judgement in the earlier writ petition operates as res judicata in the present proceedings; that however, the respondent Collector, Central Excise, did not return the remaining gold ornaments and continued to proceed with the adjudication proceedings on the basis of a show cause notice issued by him; that the petitioner-appellant was entitled to the return of the remaining ornaments seized from the ground floor and the second floor of its business premises, but its applications for the same did not bear any fruit.
3. The surviving relief claimed in the writ petition is for the quashing of the show cause notice which is Annexure-III to the writ petition. This notice is dated 11th Oct. 1971 and has been issued by the respondent Assistant Collector, Central Excise. It requires the petitioner appellant to show cause why the goods mentioned in the annexure to that notice should not be confiscated under Section 71 of the Act and why penalty should not be imposed on it under Ss. 74-75 of the Act. The annexure referred to in the show cause notice contains several appendices. Appendix ‘A’ is a list of the “gold and gold ornaments recovered from the unlicensed premises” of the petitioner-appellant at 20. Jhande Wala Park, Lucknow on April 27, 1971. This list contains 20 items weighing 2599.350 grams. Appendix ‘B’ is the list of the “gold and gold ornaments recovered from the artisan's Section on the second floor and from the safe on the first floor”. The total weight of the “gold and gold ornaments found from the manufacturing Section and from the possession of the artisan” on the second floor is 119.050 grams comprising of several items, while the total weight of the “gold and gold ornaments found from the safe” on the first floor, is 1079.000 grams.
4. The adjudication proceedings which had been commenced by the said show cause notice were sought to be stayed by an application dated 10th January, 1978 and by order passed on the same day we directed that the adjudication proceedings before the respondent Collector, Central Excise, shall continue, but final orders will not be singed until further orders of this Court.
5. By the newly added grounds of appeal, it has been urged that the judgement given in Special Appeal No. 447 of 1971 : (AIR 1972 All 231) operates as res judicata; that it was decided thereby that there was no breach of any of the provisions of the act or the Rules framed thereunder and the search and seizure were illegal; that the respondents were consequently bound to re-deliver to the petitioner-appellant the remaining articles out of those seized on April 27, 1971, which had not been returned yet; that the show cause notice covers even those gold ornaments which had already been returned and even sold away; and that no article can be confiscated unless it is in the custody of the department and the custody proceeds from lawful seizure.
6. In the arguments before us it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner-appellant that the weight of the seized articles as recorded by the respondent Authorities was not correct; that the ornaments were reweighed and the accounts of the petitioner-appellant were checked during the pendency of the earlier writ petition; and that on the result thereof the true position which emerges is as follows:—
Required balance of ornaments as per registers on 27th April, 1971 … 24,722.79 gms. Returned during the pendency of the earlier writ petition … 17,810.665 gms 21581.080 „ Released after the decision of the earlier special appeal (Special Appeal No. 447 of 1971) … 3,770.415 „ Balance still in the custody of the Department … 3,141.715 „ Seized from the safe on the ground floor vide Appendix-‘A’ to the show cause notice … 2,599.350 „ 2,768.450 „ Seized from the first floor Vide Appendix-‘B’ to the show cause notice … 169.100 „ 373.265 gms. Shortage … 349.645 „ 373.625 gms. Discrepancy between the weights recorded by the Department and those recorded by the Dharam Kanta … 23.620 „
7. The main thrust of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been for the return of the aforesaid balance of the ornaments in the custody of the Department and for the quashing of the adjudication proceedings initiated by the show cause notice.
8. On a perusal of the judgement of this Court in Special Appeal No. 447 of 1971: (AIR 1972 All 231) which has become final between the parties, we find that this Court has finally held the seizure in question to be illegal and has directed the return of all the seized ornaments. From the table of the ornaments seized and returned given above it is clear that ornaments weighing 3770.450 grams were returned after the decision of the special appeal. In the recital of the facts given in the judgement in the said special appeal it appears that the Court was concerned in that case with the seizure of 2583 pieces of ornaments weighing in all 22,151.370 grams and that the claim before the Special Appeal Bench in that case was confined to 3770.015 grams of gold ornaments, which alone were said to be under detention with the departmental authorities after the Judgement in the writ petition giving rise to that special appeal. From the chart given above the gold ornaments which are now said to be still in detention are those seized from the safe on the ground floor (Vide Appendix ‘A’ to the show cause notice) and from the first floor (Vide Appendix ‘B’ to the show cause notice). They weigh 2599.350 and 169.100, total 2768.450 grams.
9. It is not disputed that these ornaments which are still said to be in the custody of the department were seized at the same search and seizure which was the subject-matter of the earlier writ petition and the Special Appeal No. 447 of 1971 arising therefrom. From the recital of the facts in the judgement given in the earlier writ petition reported in AIR 1972 All 16, L. Kashi Nath v. Collector, Central Excise it appears that 2583 pieces of ornaments weighing 22,151.370 grams were said to have been taken into custody by the departmental officers, and although it is mentioned that 275 pieces of gold ornaments were found from the ground floor portion of the petitioner's shop which was not a part of his licensed premises and a piece of foreign gold was recovered from the possession of one Shaukat Husain who was working on the second floor of the licensed premises of the petitioner, it is not clear whether the total number of 2583 pieces weighing 22,151.370 grams which were said to have been seized by the departmental officer included the said 275 pieces of gold ornaments recovered from the unlicensed premises on the ground floor and the one piece of foreign gold recovered from the artisan Shaukat Husain who was working on the second floor of the petitioner's licensed premises. From the break up of the figures of the seized articles given before us it does appear that the ornaments seized from the safe on the ground floor and those seized from the first floor which are now in question were not included in the said 2583 pieces weighing 22,151.370 grams, and to which alone the findings and the relief in the earlier writ petition were confined. It may be clarified that according to the case now set up on behalf of the petitioner-appellant before us the correct weight of the said 2583 pieces of gold ornaments was found on re-weighment to he 21,581.080 grams only and was not 22,151.370 grams, and that the whole of this quantity has been returned to it. It may be that the petitioner did not challenge the seizure of 275 pieces of gold ornaments recovered from the ground floor portion of his shop which was not included within the licenced premises, and the one piece of foreign gold recovered from the possession of Shaukat Husain artisan, on account of the fact that the recovery of the 275 pieces was from premises which were not licensed, and the recovery of one piece of foreign gold was in respect of an article which was contraband. The petitioner did not even own the recovery of the contraband to have been made from him. We accordingly find that the gold ornaments to which the earlier writ petition and the special appeal related, have already been returned by the departmental authorities, and the quantity still retained by them and which is now sought to be returned by the present special appeal, was not the subject-matter of the earlier writ petition or the special appeal arising therefrom.
10. The question of res judicata raised by the petitioner-appellant will have to be considered in this context. In Raj Laxmi Dassi v. Banmali Sen (AIR 1953 SC 33) the Supreme Court laid down that the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved. It has been found above that the property involved in the earlier writ petition and the special appeal arising therefrom, and that involved in the present special appeal, is not identical. The search at which the two sets or properties were seized, was however the same. Nevertheless it cannot be said that there was identity of title in the two litigations, for if the grounds an which the seizure of the ornaments involved in the earlier writ petition was challenged were the same as those on which the seizure of the ornaments in the present case is, or could be, challenged, there does not appear to be any explanation for the petitioner's omission to also challenge in the earlier case the seizure of the ornaments involved in the present case. On the other hand, it appears that the seizure of the ornaments recovered from the ground floor having been made from that part of the petitioner's premises which were not licensed, and the one piece of gold seized from the artisan Shaukat Husain being contraband, the petitioner must have thought it wise not to raise any question about them for fear of damaging its case in respect of the bulk of the seized ornaments, the seizure of which was found to be illegal. It cannot, therefore, be said that the seizure of the ornaments which are still detained by the departmental authorities could be held to be illegal by applying the rule of res judicata. Mr. S.C Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant, did not advance any new ground or place any fresh facts to show that the seizure of these articles was illegal. He only relied upon the judgement in the earlier writ petition and the special appeal arising therefrom, and the fact that these ornaments were seized at the same search at which the other ornaments were held to have been illegally seized. That being so, we find ourselves unable, on the material before us, to hold that the seizure of the ornaments weighing 2599.350 grams seized from the safe on the ground floor (vide Appendix ‘A’ to the show 4 cause notice) and 169.100 grams seized; from the first floor (Vide Appendix ‘B’ to the show cause notice) was illegal or unlawful. We are supported in this conclusion by the conduct of they petitioner-appellant in not challenging the seizure of these ornaments and claiming their return in the earlier writ petition. We believe that if the seizure was really wrongful as now contended for on behalf of the petitioner-appellant, it would not have deliberately omitted to put forth that claim in the earlier writ petition. The principle invoked by us for arriving at this conclusion is the one underlying the rule prescribed by O.II, R. 2 of the CPC in the case of civil suits.
11. Mr. V.K Barman, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Authorities contended that the omission of the petitioner-appellant in the earlier writ petition to claim a return of the ornaments now in question amounts to waiver and it must be deemed that it had given up the relief. That is also one of the principles on which the rule prescribed by O.II, R. 2 of the CPC is founded. Mr. Barman, however, also relied on the rule of constructive res judicata. We do not think that the rule of constructive res judicata can be applied to the facts of the case. The proper rule to be applied is the one contained in O.II, R. 2 of the CPC. We are conscious of the Explanation inserted in Section 141 by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976. The effect of that amendment is that the procedure prescribed by the Code does not apply of its own force to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It does not, however, lay down that some of the salutary principles enshrined in the Code of Civil Procedure governing the trial of civil suits may not be applied even where it enshrines a general principle of law, to the trial of civil proceedings other than suits, like a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We need not, however, dilate on this aspect inasmuch as the writ petition in the present case was filed and decided before the amendment of the Code and according to Cl. (p) of Section 97(2) of the Amendment Act, as the special appeal has been pending since before the amendment, it has to be dealt with as if the said amendment in S. 141 of the Code had not come into force. Before the amendment the undisputed position was that the rules of res judicata and the like were applied to writ petitions as general principles of law. With regard to O.II, R. 2 it was, however, observed in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1334 (in para. 12 at p. 1337) that the bar of O.II, R. 2 of the CPC on which the High Court apparently relied upon may not apply to a petition for a high prerogative writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case the appellant had in a suit filed by him omitted to claim salary for the period before the suit and it was in that context that the claim for salary for that period was refused by the High Court on his writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In spite of the aforesaid observation the Supreme Court did not reverse the High Court's order, and observed that “the High Court having disallowed the claim of the appellant for salary prior to the date of the suit we do not think we would be justified in interfering with the exercise of its discretion by the High Court”. The principle that the bar of O.II, R. 2 of the CPC may not apply to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was followed by a Division Bench of this court in Ram Kishore Sharma v. Addl. Dist. J., Saharanpur, 1969 All LJ 225 : (1970 Lab IC 582). In that case the petitioner had challenged the order of the Payment of Wages Authority refusing him arrears of salary on the ground that he had omitted to claim the same in the civil suit filed by him earlier for a declaration that his removal from service was illegal. That case is also distinguishable like Devendra Pratap Narain's case, inasmuch as the earlier proceeding in both the cases was a civil suit, and the latter proceeding in Devendra Pratap Narain's case before the Supreme Court was a writ petition and in Ram Kishore Sharma's case before this Court, it was a proceeding under the Payment of Wages Act. In the present case, however, both the proceedings, the earlier as well as the subsequent, are on writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the principle of O.II, R. 2 of the CPC is not applied to writ petitions as a general principle of law even in such a case as the present one, it may lead to a multiplicity of writ petitions arising from the same cause of action. To permit such a course would not be conducive to justice. We would rather endorse the view of the majority in the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in M.P Ragawan Nair v. State Insurance Officer (AIR 1971 Ker 175) (FB). In that case the petitioner had not claimed the relief which he was claiming in the subsequent writ petition, in an earlier writ petition filed by him. The full Bench, per majority, held (Paras 16 and 17 pp. 179-180) as follows:
16. There is another impediment in the petitioner's way. When he came to Court on the 31st March 1963 with O.P No. 778 of 1963, he had already suffered what he now alleges to be the trespass by respondents 3 and 4 over his right to the superintendents, category - he was still only in the upper division. As we have said more than once, he did not make any complaint of this and was content with asking for the - determination of his seniority in the upper division. Not having then questioned the appointment of respondents 3 and 4 to the superintendents, category, we do not think he can be allowed to question that now in this new petition which he had brought.
17. The principles underlying statutory provisions like the Limitation Act and Section 11 and O. II, R. 2 of the CPC are, we should think applicable to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. These provisions are not to be regarded as embodying technical rules of procedure. They are based upon principles of public policy aiming at justice, the securing of which is the very object of Article 226. The principles are principles of repose and peace. “Long dormant clims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them” said Best C.J In A' Court v. Cross, (1825) 130 ER 540. And so, we might add, has the fighting of the same legal battle over again with the same adversary, or, once a wrong has been suffered, the fighting of the battle for redress piecemeal.”
12. This takes us to the relief claimed by the petitioner-appellant for quashing of the show cause notice (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) and the adjudication proceedings commenced thereby. The main ground on which the legality of the notice and the adjudication proceedings has been challenged is that no article can be confiscated unless it is in the custody of the Department and the custody proceeds from lawful seizure. The notice (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) requires the petitioner-appellant to show cause why the goods mentioned in the annexure thereto should not be confiscated under Section 71 of the Gold (Control) Act and that penalty should not be imposed on the petitioner-appellant and Shaukat Husain under Ss. 74 and 75 of the said Act. The Annexure to the show cause notice specifies not only the gold ornaments still in the custody of the department, but also those which have already been returned to the petitioner-appellant. The annexure to the show cause notice sets out in detail the department's case against the petitioner-appellant against which the latter was required to show cause.
13. In support of his contention Mr. S.C Khare elaborated the point thus. Under Section 71 of the Act only that gold is liable to be confiscated along with its package or covering or receptacle in which it is found, in respect of which any provision of the Act is being, or is attempted to be contravened. He emphasised that the word ‘found’ shows that the provisions apply to only that gold which is found on search and seized. He then referred to Chap. XII of the Act beginning with S. 58, which deals with power of search and seizure conferred by Sections 58 and 66. These provisions precede the provisions relating to confiscation and penalty contained in Chapter XIII beginning with Section 71. Khare contended that the first step to be taken by a Gold Control Officer where he suspects the contravention of any provision of the Act is to make a search of the premises of a dealer under S. 58, and then, under S. 66, if he has reason to believe that any provision of the Act has been, or is being or is attempted to be contravened, seize such gold along with the package, covering or receptacle etc. in which the gold is found. Mr. Khare, further contended that something which was not already in possession of the Departmental Authorities could not be confiscated, and the very provision relating to confiscation showed that the gold or the package, covering or receptacle in which it was found must be in the custody of the authority concerned before an order of confiscation could be passed in respect thereof. The logic of Mr. Khare's argument appears to be sound and on an examination of the scheme of the Act it is not easily possible to say that an article which is not in its custody could be ordered to be confiscated by the adjudicating authority under the Act. Mr. Khare then made the further submission that the custody must be lawful. We do not propose to examine this aspect of the question in view of the fact that the bulk of the ornaments have already been returned to the petitioner-appellant in accordance with the directions of this Court in the earlier writ petition and the special appeal arising therefrom, and the seizure of the small quantity that remains in the custody of the department has not been found by us to be prima facie unlawful. The result is that proceedings for confiscation of the gold ornaments already released in pursuance of the directions issued by this Court in the earlier writ petition must be stopped, but the same proceedings for confiscation of the ornaments which are still in the custody of the department can go on and be concluded after a proper inquiry into the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
14. It has been seen above that a part of the show cause notice relates to imposition of penalty under Ss. 74 and 75 of the Act. Under these Sections penalty can be imposed for contravention of a provision of the Act or of any rule or order made thereunder, or for doing or attempting to do anything in relation to any gold which rendered it liable to confiscation. Since the inquiry for confiscation in respect of the gold still in possession of the department has to go and to be concluded by the authority competent to do so, we do not want to prejudge the issue. It has also to be clarified that in the earlier writ petition, although it was held that the seizure of the gold ornaments which were the subject matter of that writ petition, and have already been returned to the petitioner-appellant, was unlawful, it was not held that the petitioner-appellant was not liable to penalty under the Act. On the other hand, it has been observed by the Special Appeal Bench in that case: (at page 236, para 17 of AIR 1972 All 231) “The failure to maintain accounts in G.S Forms is an offence punishable under Section 87 of the Act. When the vouchers exist but the G.S Forms are not posted the case might fall under Section 87 of the Act and the dealer may be punished for a breach thereof.” It was, on the finding that, on the facts of the case, the provisions of Section 66 of the Act were not attracted, that the seizure was held to be unlawful.
15. There is no finding that the penalty provisions of the Act were also not attracted. Under the circumstances, we are unable to hold that the notice to show cause why penalty should not be imposed, under Section 74 of the Act, in respect of that gold which is still in the custody of the department and may be found liable to be confiscated on inquiry under S. 71; and under S. 75, in respect of the entire gold ornaments etc., which were the subject matter of the search and the seizure including those which have already been returned, if it is found on inquiry that the petitioner appellant has contravened any provisions of the Act or of any rule or any order made thereunder.
16. The result is that the show cause notice (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) and the adjudication proceedings initiated thereby are not liable to be quashed. The respondents authorities shall, however limit the inquiry for the purposes of confiscation, and of penalty under S. 74 to the Gold Ornaments which are still in their custody. With regard to the inquiry for the purposes of imposition of penalty under Section 75 of the Act there is no such limitation.
17. In the result, the appeal fails and the writ petition shall stand dismissed with costs subject to the reservation that the inquiry pursuant to the show cause notice (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) shall be confined for the purposes of confiscation under S. 71 and of imposition of penalty under Section 74 of the Act, to the gold ornaments still in the custody of the respondent authorities. Under the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of the appeal.
18. Writ appeal and petition dismissed.
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