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Gangadhar And Others v. Raghubar Dayal And Others

Allahabad High Court
Jul 24, 1974
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Factual and Procedural Background

This dispute concerns three plots (Nos. 874, 875 and 878) in village Dambirpur, Pargana Atrauli, district Aligarh. Proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. were initiated on 26 July 1960 by Shyam Lal (servant of respondents 7–10); the Magistrate on 29 October 1951 passed an order under Section 146 Cr.P.C. directing attachment and appointment of a supurdar to hold possession.

The appellants (plaintiffs) filed civil suit No. 377 of 1953 for a declaration that they were sirdars; the suit was decreed ex parte on 14 July 1954 and, on that basis, the appellants took possession from the criminal court on 8 October 1954. The ex parte decree was later set aside on 6 October 1956 after an application to set aside was allowed.

Respondents were subsequently impleaded (respondents 7–10 added on 2 April 1957). The suit was dismissed on merits on 22 May 1958, an appeal by the appellants allowed on 17 August 1959 remanding the suit, and on remand the suit was again dismissed on 30 January 1960. Respondents applied for restitution under Section 144 C.P.C. (applications of 4 June 1959 and 5 February 1960); one such application was allowed by the Munsif but dismissed on appeal to the Civil Judge on 18 August 1960. Second appeal No. 5185 of 1960 was filed.

Meanwhile, consolidation operations took place. The consolidation authorities accepted the appellants' claim of sirdari rights by adverse possession, but respondents 1–10 challenged that decision by writ (Civil Misc. Writ No. 428 of 1967). A Single Judge allowed the writ on 8 December 1967, directing that respondents 1–10 be recorded over the land as claimed by them, holding that time during attachment (custodia legis) could not be tacked to mature title.

The appellants filed the present special appeal against the Single Judge's order; the appeal was referred to a Full Bench (order dated 24 January 1974). The Full Bench heard the matter, considered parties' submissions and authorities, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subsequent restitution applications filed by respondents (4 June 1959 and 5 February 1960) were barred by res judicata because an earlier application dated 4 June 1957 had been dismissed.
  2. Whether, by virtue of the appellants' ex parte declaratory decree (14 July 1954) and the possession taken from the criminal court (8 October 1954), the appellants acquired sirdari rights by adverse possession, or whether respondents were required to file a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
  3. Whether proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are proceedings for restitution within the meaning of Section 144(2) C.P.C. (i.e., whether a suit for the relief obtainable under Section 144(1) is barred because the consolidation proceedings adjudicate title).
  4. Whether respondents 7–10 (who were not parties to the suit when the ex parte decree was passed) had a right to claim restitution — interpretation of the words “party” and “parties” in Section 144 C.P.C. and whether non-parties could seek restitution under Section 144 or under inherent powers (Section 151 C.P.C.).
  5. Whether limitation (and related statutory changes) operated to extinguish respondents' rights before consolidation operations concluded (whether the enlargement of limitation applied).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The dismissal of respondents' application dated 4 June 1957 was final; therefore subsequent applications (4 June 1959 and 5 February 1960) were barred by res judicata and respondents had lost the right to claim restitution.
  • When the appellants obtained an ex parte declaratory decree on 14 July 1954 and took possession on 8 October 1954, respondents 7–10 should have filed a suit for possession under Section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act within the then-prescribed limitation (three years from the next July). Failing that, the appellants acquired sirdari rights under Section 210 of that Act; accordingly respondents' claims were time-barred by the consolidation notification of 1961.
  • It was also urged that respondents' claim was barred by Section 144(2) C.P.C. because a suit cannot be instituted for restitution relief obtainable under Section 144(1).

Respondents' Arguments

  • It was urged (as recorded) that the words “party” or “parties” in Section 144 C.P.C. should be interpreted as referring to parties to the application for restitution (i.e., potentially broader than parties to the original decree), thus supporting respondents' eligibility to seek restitution.
  • Respondents relied on the position that consolidation proceedings are adjudicatory proceedings determining title and are not merely proceedings for restitution under Section 144(1) C.P.C.; therefore Section 144(2) does not bar consolidation adjudications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.K. Barot v. P.M. Gokalbhai (1965 A.L.J. 625) Held that restitution proceedings are execution proceedings and that Article 182 of the old Limitation Act prescribed the limitation for such proceedings. The Court relied on this to hold that the claim of respondents 1–6 was not barred by limitation; enlargement of limitation by the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act and relevant notifications made their claims capable of being decided afresh by consolidation authorities.
Allahabad Theatres v. Ram Sajiwan (A.I.R. 1949 All. 730) Authority for the proposition that a right to claim restitution arises on an ex parte decree being set aside (i.e., setting aside gives a right to be placed in pre-decree position). Used to explain the general rule that setting aside an ex parte decree can give rise to a restitution claim, while the Court then examined applicability in the particular factual matrix.
Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 948) Authority for the rule that restitution rights arise when an ex parte decree is set aside. The Court acknowledged this rule but limited its application to the factual context of this case (i.e., where possession was custodia legis and a declaratory decree alone did not immediately confer restitutionary entitlement).
Venkatratnam v. Venkatanrasayamma (A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 109) Illustrates that where property is in custodia legis a declaratory decree may suffice for taking possession from the supurdar and Sections/Articles like Section 28 or Article 47 of the old Limitation Act may not apply. The Court cited this to support the proposition that in custodia legis situations a declaratory decree can be the proper vehicle for entitlement to possession from a supurdar (i.e., possession was governed by the custodia legis regime).
Mohd. Ashraf Khan v. Abdul Rehman (A.I.R. 1942 Peshawar 11) Establishes that after a criminal court, pursuant to Section 146 Cr.P.C., puts a person in possession following a civil declaration, the criminal court becomes functus officio. The Court invoked this to explain that once the criminal court delivered possession under Section 146 Cr.P.C. on a civil declaratory decree, the remedy for dispossessed persons lay in the civil courts (restitution), since the criminal court was functus officio.
Surya Datt v. Jumna Datt (Second Appeal No. 2134 of 1956; decided 1-2-1971) Shows that the remedy of a person dispossessed in consequence of a decree is to apply for restitution in the civil court. The Court relied on this line of authority to state that dispossessed parties must proceed by restitution in civil courts rather than by actions in the criminal forum.
Arya Pratinidhi Sabha v. Chhotey Lal (1937 A.L.J. 1107) Part of the authorities cited for the remedy of restitution in civil courts after dispossession by a decree. Reinforced the Court's conclusion that restitution applications in civil courts are the proper remedy for those dispossessed by civil decrees executed through criminal process.
Md. Hanif v. Khairat Ali (A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 577) Another authority cited for the principle that restitution in civil courts is the proper remedy for the dispossessed. Used to support the proposition concerning the appropriate forum and remedy (civil restitution) for parties dispossessed by execution of civil decrees.
Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath (A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 269) Privy Council authority holding that an auction-purchaser not a party to the suit could seek restitution; affirms the duty of courts under Section 144 and also recognition of inherent jurisdiction to prevent injury by the act of the court. The Court invoked this to support the proposition that non-parties (e.g., those deprived of property by court orders) may seek restitution and that Section 144 does not exhaust the court's powers to do justice; this supported granting restitution under Section 151 when Section 144 is inapplicable.
Roger v. The Comptoir a' Escompte de Paris (1871) 3 P.C. 465 (quoted) Pronouncement (quoted) that courts must ensure the act of the court does not injure any suitor; supports inherent jurisdiction to protect parties from wrongful orders. Quoted to demonstrate the general equitable duty of courts and to underpin the conclusion that inherent powers allow restitution where necessary to prevent injustice.
Prag Narain v. Kamlakhia Singh (I.L.R. 31 All. 551) Privy Council authority indicating that Section 144 C.P.C. is not exhaustive and that courts have inherent jurisdiction to grant restitution. Relied upon to support the Court's view that even if Section 144 is inapplicable, the court may grant restitution under inherent powers (e.g., Section 151 C.P.C.).
Sohnun v. Mast Ram (A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 657) Authority following the principle that courts have inherent jurisdiction to grant restitution beyond the strict terms of Section 144. Used as part of the judicial line-up confirming the court's inherent power to restore parties injured by court acts.
S. Chokaligan v. N.S. Krishna (A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 404) Consistent authority holding that Section 144 is not exhaustive and inherent jurisdiction exists. Included among cases validating the Court's inherent power to grant restitution when required by justice.
Jotindra Nath v. Jugal Chandra (A.I.R. 1966 Cal. 637) Case cited for the same principle regarding inherent jurisdiction and restitution. Counted among authorities supporting the conclusion that restitution may be granted under inherent powers where Section 144 is inapplicable.
Subhash Chander v. Bodh Raj (A.I.R. 1969 J. & K. 8) Authority aligning with the principle that courts have inherent jurisdiction to restore parties harmed by erroneous court orders. Relied upon in the compilation of authorities supporting inherent restitutionary power.
J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1173) Principle that if the exercise of a power can be traced to a legitimate source, its being purportedly exercised under a different power does not vitiate it. Applied to hold that substance prevails over form: an application may be sustained on a legitimate legal source even if framed under a different provision (relevant to Sec. 144/151 interplay).
P. Balakotiah v. Union of India (1958 S.C.R. 1052 ; A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 232) Authority cited for the general proposition that the validity of an action is not defeated by its being said to arise under a wrong provision if a legitimate source exists. Used as supporting authority for the principle that form should not defeat a substantive entitlement to relief.
Afzal Ullah v. State of U.P. (1964 S.C.R. 991 ; A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 264) Similar authority cited for the proposition that substance controls over form in procedural provisions. Reinforced the Court's view that relief may be sustained on proper legal foundations despite the procedural label used.
N.B. Sanjana v. N.S.W. Mills (1971 1 SCC 337) Held that a notice referring to a specific (but perhaps inapplicable) rule will not be invalid merely for that reason. Invoked to support the proposition that procedural mislabelling does not invalidate the substance of rightful relief seeking (relying on legitimate legal source).
Raja Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan (1971 R.D. 197 S.C.) Rule that substance, not form, is decisive in procedural matters. Cited to justify sustaining applications on their substantive merit notwithstanding procedural descriptions.
Narayan Patil v. Puttabai (A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 5) Privy Council observations that institution of a suit can prevent the running of limitation and that a suit can never be said to be futile if it prevents limitation running. The Court distinguished this authority: it held Narayan Patil to be materially different because there the party had not been dispossessed in consequence of a decree; here respondents were dispossessed and restitution proceedings were appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a fact-sensitive analysis and applied the relevant legal principles as follows:

  1. Res judicata point: the Division Bench and Full Bench rejected the appellants' res judicata contention because the necessary material (including the order dismissing the 4 June 1957 application) had not been placed on record; thus, it was not possible to conclude that later applications were barred. Consequently the res judicata submission failed.
  2. Limitation and restitution for respondents 1–6: relying on M.K. Barot (that restitution proceedings are execution proceedings governed by Article 182 of the old Limitation Act) and on the legislative expansion of limitation by the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act (enlarging the period from 3 to 6 years), the Court held that respondents 1–6's claims were not time-barred. The notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act issued in 1961 (and the pendency of appeals when that notification issued) meant consolidation authorities could decide rights afresh.
  3. Nature of consolidation proceedings and Section 144(2) C.P.C.: the Court analysed Section 144(1) and (2) and concluded that consolidation proceedings are adjudications of title and are not equivalent to an application for restitution under Section 144(1). Therefore Section 144(2) (which bars instituting a suit for relief obtainable under Section 144(1)) could not be stretched to prohibit consolidation proceedings or deprive parties of relief available through consolidation adjudication.
  4. Custodia legis and effect of ex parte declaratory decree: the Court emphasised that after the Magistrate's order of 29 October 1951 (under Section 146 Cr.P.C.) the land was in custodia legis and possession was with the supurdar. In that situation a declaratory civil decree is the proper basis for taking possession from the supurdar; neither Section 28 nor Article 47 (old Limitation Act) applied. The Court further explained that setting aside an ex parte declaratory decree does not, by itself, confer a right to possession; the right to restitution accrues only when a subsequent declaratory decree is passed in favour of the dispossessed party.
  5. Function of criminal court and restitution forum: relying on Mohd. Ashraf Khan the Court held that once the criminal court delivered possession in pursuance of a civil declaratory decree, it became functus officio; the remedy of those dispossessed was to apply to the civil court for restitution. Thus respondents could not claim immediate restitution the moment the ex parte decree was set aside; they could claim restitution only after a declaratory decree in their favour was made by the civil court (which occurred on 22 May 1958 and again on 30 January 1960 when suit No. 377 of 1953 was dismissed in favour of the respondents).
  6. Timing of respondents' restitution applications: the Court found that the restitution applications dated 4 June 1959 and 5 February 1960 were within limitation (being made within three years of the dates when declaratory decrees favorable to respondents were rendered). Thus limitation did not bar these applications.
  7. Whether respondents 7–10 (non-parties at the time of ex parte decree) could claim restitution: the Court addressed interpretation of “party/parties” in Section 144. Noting divergence in authority, it ruled that it was unnecessary to resolve that conflict here because the Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant restitution. The Court relied on Privy Council and High Court decisions (e.g., Jai Berham) to hold that non-parties may, in appropriate circumstances, seek restitution (or be protected under inherent powers / Section 151 C.P.C.). Consequently respondents 7–10 could seek restitution even though they were not parties when the ex parte decree was passed; moreover they were impleaded in the suit on 2 April 1957, and their right to restitution accrued after that (on 22 May 1958 and 30 January 1960).
  8. Adverse possession / Section 209/210 U.P. Zamindari Act issue: the Court rejected the submission that respondents 7–10 should have been held to have lost rights because they did not institute a suit under Section 209 within the three-year period from July following appellants' taking possession (i.e., 1 July 1955). The Court noted respondents 7–10 were impleaded on 2 April 1957; under Section 22 of the old Limitation Act the suit would be deemed instituted against them from that date; on that date the appellants had not perfected sirdari rights and the possession post-2 April 1957 could not be tacked to pre-2 April occupation for acquisition of sirdari rights under Section 210. The Court therefore held respondents' rights had not extinguished prior to consolidation notification of 1961.
  9. Distinguishing Narayan Patil: the Court distinguished Narayan Patil v. Puttabai (Privy Council) because in that case the claimant had not been dispossessed in execution of a decree and thus could not obtain restitution; by contrast, respondents here were dispossessed in consequence of an ex parte declaratory decree and thus restitution proceedings were appropriate.
  10. Form v. substance and exercise of power: referencing authorities (J.K. Steel Ltd., N.B. Sanjana, Raja Shatrunji), the Court emphasised that substance prevails over form and that relief should not be defeated by procedural mislabelling; hence restitution could be granted under Section 151 or inherent jurisdiction even where Section 144 might not strictly apply.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED — the special appeal was dismissed with costs (the Full Bench affirmed the conclusions recorded in the referring order and reasons; the Single Judge's grant of relief to respondents remained effective as recorded in the opinion).

Implications / Consequences:

  • The dismissal means that the relief granted to respondents (including the Single Judge's direction that respondents 1–10 be recorded over the land as claimed) stands as the operative result of the writ proceedings described in the opinion.
  • The Court held that respondents' restitution applications were not barred by res judicata or limitation in the circumstances of this case, and that restitution (whether under Section 144, Section 151, or the Court's inherent jurisdiction) is available to parties or, in suitable cases, to non-parties who have been deprived of property by a court order later varied or reversed.
  • The decision resolves the specific disputes between these parties (sirdari/bhumidhar claims and restitution claims) but the opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; the Court relied on established precedents and the ordinary principles concerning custodia legis, restitution, and inherent jurisdiction.

Note: This summary is confined to the statements and materials set forth in the provided opinion. No facts or authorities beyond those explicitly appearing in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

N.D Ojha, J.:— The dispute giving rise to this special appeal was in respect of three plots being No. 874, 875 and 878 situate in village Dambirpur, Pargana Atrauli, district Aligarh. One Shyam Lal, who was the servant of respondents 7 to 10, made an application under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 26th July, 1960, in respect of the aforesaid plots. The appellants were the opposite parties in those proceedings. The Magistrate concerned on 29th October, 1951, passed an order under Sec. 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it stood at that time directing the properties to remain attached till a competent Court determined the rights of the parties. The plots were to remain in possession of a supurdar appointed by the Magistrate in those proceedings during this period. Subsequently, the appellants filed a suit for declaration that they were sirdars of the plots in dispute. This suit was numbered 377 of 1953 and only respondents 1 to 6 were arrayed as defendants to this suit. On 14th July, 1954, the suit was decreed ex-parte and on the basis of the declaration granted by the aforesaid decree in their favour the appellants took possession from the criminal Court over the plots in dispute on 8th October, 1954. Subsequently, an application was made for setting aside the exparte decree which was allowed on 6th October, 1956 and the exparte decree was set aside. The appellants thereafter made an application for impleadment of respondents 7 to 10 as defendants to the suit whereupon these respondents were impleaded in the suit on 2nd April, 1957. Respondents 1 to 10 thereafter made an application on 4th June, 1957 before the Munsif in whose Court the aforesaid suit was pending with a prayer to deliver back possession over the plots in dispute to the supurdar who had been appointed by the criminal Court or in the alternative, to appoint a receiver. This application was however, dismissed on 14th July, 1957. The suit was contested by respondents 1 to 13 and was dismissed on merits on 22nd May, 1958. Respondents 1 to 10 thereafter made an application on 4th June, 1959 under Sec. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution. The appellants had in the mean-time filed an appeal against the decree dated 22nd May, 1958, dismissing their suit which was allowed by the Civil Judge on 17th August, 1959, whereby the decree dated 22nd May, 1958, was set aside and the suit was remanded for being decided afresh. The application under Sec. 1944, C.P.C made on 4th June, 1959, was subsequently dismissed on the ground that the decree dated 22nd May, 1958, on the basis of which the said application had been made had itself been set aside. The Munsif decided the suit afresh after remand and again dismissed it on 30th January, 1960. Respondents 1 to 10 thereupon made an application on 5th February, 1960, for restitution under Sec. 144, C.P.C The prayer made in this application was for delivery of possession to them and for mesne profits. This application was allowed by the Munsif on 28th May, 1960, but was dismissed on appeal by the Civil Judge on 18th August, 1960. Respondents 1 to 10 filed second appeal, No. 5185 of 1960 against the aforesaid order. Before the appeal could finally be decided the village where the plots in dispute are situate was brought under consolidation operations. Before the consolidation authorities respondents 1 to 6 claimed to be bhumidhars of plot No. 878 and respondents 7 to 10 claimed to be sirdars of plots Nos. 871 and 875. The appellants, on the other hand, claimed to be sirdars of all the three plots on the basis of adverse possession. The claim of the appellants found favour with the consolidation authorities and they were held to have acquired sirdari rights by adverse possession. The Deputy Director of Consolidation found that the respondents were in possession in 1356 and 1357 Fasli and that had the plots in dispute not been attached in proceedings under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the respondents would have continued in possession in 1358 and 1359 Fasli and would have matured title under the U.P Tenancy Act. He held that since the respondents 1 to 10 had failed to prove their possession from 1358 Fasli onwards, the appellants had become sirdars. Aggrieved against the orders passed by the consolidation authorities respondents 1 to 10 instituted Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 428 of 1967 in this Court. Second Appeal No. 5185 of 1960 which had been filed by respondents 1 to 10 against the order of the Civil Judge dated 18th August, 1960, dismissing their application under Sec. 144, C.P.C came up for hearing on 30th January, 1967, and was disposed of by the following order:

“This appeal arises out of proceedings under Sec. 144, C.P.C It appears that during the pendency of this appeal the village in suit came under consolidation operations and title to the land has been decided finally between the parties. In view of the final decision by the consolidation authorities no useful purpose will be served in deciding this case on merits. The person who ultimately succeeds in proceedings for consolidation is to get the land in dispute. The rights of the parties are subject to the final decision which may be arrived at in the writ filed by the appellants in this Court. In view of the decision by the consolidation authorities this appeal has become infructuous. Accordingly it is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.”

2. At this very place it may also be pointed out that the appellants have also filed an appeal against the decree passed by the Munsif dismissing their suit No. 377 of 1953 after remand and the said appeal, as would appear from paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit to Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 128 of 1967 was staved under Sec. 5 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood at that time. Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 428 of 1967 came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge who allowed it on 8th December, 1967, and directed that respondents 1 to 10 will be recorded over the land in dispute as claimed by them. He held that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was in error in tacking on the period of 1358 and 1359 Fasli in favour of the respondents. After the commencement of the proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C the plots were in custodia legis. That possession would not automatically enure for the benefit of the person who was in possession prior to the attachment. The respondents could not mature any title by tacking on to their pre-existing period of possession the time during which the land was under attachment. Since the attachment the land was under litigation. The respondents could not validity acquire any title as sirdars. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge the present special appeal has been filed by the persons who were plaintiffs in suit No. 377 of 1953 and in whose favour the matter had been decided by the consolidation authorities. This special appeal was referred to a Full Bench by an order dated 24th January, 1974, passed by a Bench of this Court and it is thus that this special appeal has come up before us.

3. When the special appeal came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court learned counsel for the appellants made two submissions in its support (1) that the application made by respondents 1 to 10 on 4th June, 1957, was really an application for restitution under Sec. 144, C.P.C and it having been dismissed by the Munsif the subsequent applications dated 4th June, 1959, and 5th February, 1960, were not maintainable, being barred by the general doctrine of res judicata and the right of respondents 1 to 10 claim restitution had been permanently lost; and (2) that at all events, when suit No. 377 of 1953 was decree exparte on 14-7-1954 and possession was taken by the appellants on 8-10-1954 from the criminal court it was incumbent upon respondents 1 to 10 to have filed a suit for possession under Sec. 209 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and since no such suit was filed the appellants acquired sirdari rights under Sec. 210 of the said Act on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit under Sec. 209 which was at that time three years from the next of July following the date of occupation.

4. In regard to the ground on which the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition, as would appear from the referring order dated 24th January, 1974, the learned counsels for both the parties were agreed before the Division Bench that the fact of possession anterior to the proceedings under Sec. 145. Cr. P.C will have no bearing on the question whether the appellants perfected their title to the plots in dispute by adverse possession and that the learned counsel for the appellants did not dispute the view of the learned single Judge on the said aspect of the matter namely that the fact that during 1356 and 1357 Fasli the appellants were in possession did not in any manner help them in the instant proceedings.

5. In regard to the first submission made by learned counsel for the appellants namely that as a result of the dismissal of the application filed by respondents 1 to 10 on 4th June, 1957, their subsequent implications were barred by the general doctrine of res judicata the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench took the view that the said submission had no substance in as much as the necessary material including the order dismissing the application dated 4th June, 1957, had not been placed on the record and it was not possible to know about the nature of the said order. Consequently, it was held that the contention of that learned counsel for the appellants in this behalf had to be rejected.

6. In regard to the claim of respondents 1 to 6 the learned Judges took the view that since in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in M.K Barot v. P.M Gokalbhai 1965 A.L.J 625. wherein it was held that restitution proceedings are execution proceedings and Art. 182 of the old Limitation Act, 1908, prescribed the period of limitation for the said proceedings the claim of those respondents was in no way barred even if the limitation to make an application for restitution started on 6th October, 1956, when the exparte decree was set aside. It was held that since by U.P Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1954, the period of limitation prescribed under Art. 182 was enlarged from 3 years to 6 years and since admittedly the relevant notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act had been issued in the year 1961 and second appeal No. 5185 of 1960 filed by respondents 1 to 10 against the order dismissing their application for restitution was pending when the notification under Sec. 4(2) was issued, the rights of respondents 1 to 6 could be decided afresh by the consolidation authorities. The learned Judges, however, were of the view that the case of respondents 7 to 10 who were claiming sirdari rights in plots Nos. 874 and 875 was not free from difficulty in as much as they were not parties to suit No. 377 of 1953 on the dates when the ex parte decree was passed and possession delivered to the appellants by the criminal court in pursuance of the said ex parte decree, whether or not respondents 7 to 10 were entitled to make an application under Sec. 144, C.P.C in these circumstances and what was the effect of no suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act being filed by respondents 7 to 10 were the main questions which according to the learned Judges required consideration by a larger Bench.

7. When the special appeal came up for hearing before us learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the sub-missions made by him before the Division Bench. For the reasons recorded by the Division Bench is its referring order dated 24th January, 1974, we are of the opinion that the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants in regard to the subsequent applications for restitution dated 4th June, 1959, and 5th February, 1960, being barred by the general doctrine of res judicata on account of the dismissal of their earlier application dated 4th June, 1957, have no substance and must be rejected. We are also in respectful agreement with the finding recorded by the learned Judges that in so far as the claim of respondents 1 to 6 that they were bhumidhars of plot No. 878 is concerned, it was not barred by time and the consolidation authorities were competent to adjudicate upon their rights in respect of the said plot. Even though the appellants had been put in possession by the criminal Court on 8-10-1954 the said possession being in pursuance of a declaration of title granted by the civil Court could not be otherwise than in accordance with law for the time being in force at any rate till the ex parte decree was set aside on 6-10-1966 and if limitation to file a suit under Sec. 209 was counted from 6-10-1966, it has not expired when the notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued, it having been enlarged from 3 years to 6 years by notification dated 27th March, 1959.

8. Before dealing with the claim of respondents 1 to 10 it is necessary to dispose of one more argument made by learned counsel for the appellants before us namely that the claim of respondents 1 to 10 was barred by Sec. 144(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since much of the argument of learned counsel for the appellants on this point as also in regard to the claim of respondents 7 to 10 will depend on the interpretation of Sec. 144, C.P.C, it would be useful to refer to the said section which runs as under:

“144. (1) Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in appeal, revision or otherwise, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal.

(2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under Sub-sec. (1).”

9. It would be seen that Sub-sec. (2) bars the institution of a suit for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under Sub-sec. (1). By no stretch of imagination can proceedings under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act be equated with a suit of the nature contemplated by Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 144, C.P.C In fact the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act on an objection in regard to title being filed contemplates really an adjudication of title. This cannot be done in application u/s 144, C.P.C After an adjudication in regard to title has been made, it is the duty of the consolidation authorities to carve out chaks. In that process possession may be delivered but it cannot be said that the proceedings under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act are proceedings for restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 144, C.P.C

10. Coming now to the claim of respondents 7 to 10 of being sirdars of plots Nos. 874 and 875 it is to be seen that it has not been asserted by either party that these respondents were not bound by the order passed on 29th October, 1951, under Sec. 146, Cr. P.C In fact, as already pointed out above, the proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C had been initiated by Shyam Lal who was the servant of respondents 7 to 10. It has also not been disputed that the appellants too were bound by the order dated 29th October, 1951. The position in law, therefore, was that since the property in dispute including plots Nos. 874 and 875 was in custodia legis, it was not necessary for either party to file a suit for possession and a decree for declaration of rights was all that was needed for taking possession over the property from the supurdar. In such a case neither Sec. 28 nor Art. 47 of the Old Limitation Act applied. See Venkatratnam v. Venkatanrasayamma A.I.R 1964 A.P 109..

11. It was also not necessary that both the parties should file separate suits for declaration of their rights. Even if one of the parties filed such a suit impleading the other as a defendant, the necessary declaration would be available in the decree to be passed in the suit, particularly when no person other than the parties to the suit was claiming, or was being alleged to be entitled to, any right in the property in dispute. Such a suit was filed by the appellant being suit No. 377 of 1953. It is true that this suit was initially filed only against respondents 1 to 6 but on 2nd April, 1957, respondents 7 to 10 were also impleaded as defendants to the suit. As such at any rate on 2nd April 1957, a suit for declaration of title filed by the appellants even as against respondents 7 to 10 became pending. The rights of the parties including respondents 7 to 10 were to be decided in this suit and if the effect of the appellants being put in possession on 8th October, 1954 by the criminal in pursuance of the ex parte decree passed in this suit on 14th July, 1954, is ignored, there can be no manner of doubt that if ultimately this declaratory suit was decided in favour of respondents 7 to 10 they would have been entitled to take possession from the supurdar appointed in proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C in view of the order passed under Sec. 146, Cr. P.C on 29th October, 1951. What is the effect of the ex-parte decree and delivery of possession to the appellants on the rights of respondents 7 to 10 is, therefore, the crucial question. In resolving this question it would, inter alia, be necessary to find out the stage when the right to claim restitution accrued and whether respondents 7 to 10 had a right to claim restitution.

12. The legal position no doubt is that a right to claim restitution arises, as urged by learned counsel for the appellants, even on an ex parte decree being set aside see Allahabad Theatres v. Ram Sajiwan A.I.R 1949 All. 730. and Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra A.I.R 1966 S.C 948.. But this legal position, in our opinion, is not of a universal application. Its applicability will have to be judged in the circumstances of each case. What is restitution? Broadly speaking, it is the right of a party to being placed in the same position which he occupied before the decree or order which has subsequently been varied or reversed was executed. Suppose a landlord files a suit for ejectment against his tenant. The suit is decreed ex parte and in execution of this ex parte decree the tenant is ejected and the landlord is put in possession. Subsequently the ex parte decree is set aside. The tenant can certainly without waiting for the final decision in the suit apply for being put back in possession, i.e being placed in the same position which he occupied before he was ejected in execution of the ex parte decree which has subsequently been set aside. It is so because the very setting aside of the ex parte decree entitles the tenant to be, put back in possession. Similar was the situation in the cases referred to above, even though in different circumstances. Will the same situation, however, obtain if as in the instant case the mere setting aside of the ex parte decree does not entitle the defendants to the suit to claim possession? In view of the order dated 29th October, 1951, passed under Sec. 146, Cr. P.C only such person was entitled to be put in possession in whose favour a declaration of title was made. Suit No. 377 of 1953 was not a suit for possession nor was the ex parte decree passed in this suit of such a nature in execution of which the appellants could be put in possession. They had in fact not been put in possession by the Court passing the ex parte decree in execution of the said decree so that a prayer could be made by the respondents on this decree being set aside to be put back in possession. Here in consequence of the ex parte declaratory decree the appellants were put in possession by the criminal court in pursuance of the order dated 29th October, 1951, passed under Sec. 146, Cr. P.C The position in law is that after the criminal Court puts such person in possession in whose favour subsequent to the order passed under Sec. 146, Cr. P.C a declaration of title had been made, it becomes functus officio. See Mohd. Ashraf Khan v. Abdul Rehman A.I.R 1942 Peshawar 11.. The remedy of the person who has been dispossessed in consequence of a decree passed by the civil court either by the criminal Court or even otherwise on such decree being varied or reversed is to apply for restitution in the civil Court, see Second Appeal No. 2134 of 1956 decided on 1-2-1971; Surya Datt v. Jumna Datt 18 A.L.J 729. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha v. Chhotey Lal 1937 A.L.J 1107. and Md. Hanif v. Khairat Ali A.I.R 1941 Pat. 577..

13. For the aforesaid reasons, even though the respondents had been actually dispossessed by the criminal court they could make an application only in the civil Court for being put in possession on the ex parte decree in consequence of which they were dispossessed being varied or reversed. In our opinion, however, such an application could not be made at the stage when the ex parte decree was set aside in the instant case but could be made only after a decree about declaration of title was passed in their favour. The only effect of the ex parte decree being set aside was that the declaration of title granted in favour of the appellants was wiped out and the position as it obtained before the said decree was passed was restored. It, however, did not result in the grant of a declaration of title in favour of the respondents which alone could entitle them to possession over the property in dispute in view of the order dated 29th October, 1951, passed under Sec. 146, Cr. P.C Neither on the date when the ex parte decree was passed nor on the date when the appellants took possession over the plots in dispute in consequence of such decree were the respondents in possession over the said plots. Possession over the plots was with the supurdar appointed in proceedings under Sec. 146, Cr. P.C It is no doubt true that the possession of the supurdar was to enure for the benefit of the person in whom title to the plots vested, but a declaration about title was yet to be made in the suit. How could then the respondents claim to be put back in possession just because the ex parte decree had been set aside. They could do so only when a declaration contrary to or in variance of that which had been granted by the ex parte decree in favour of the appellants was subsequently granted in their favour. This situation occurred only on 22nd May, 1958, and subsequently after remand on 30th January, 1960, when suit No. 337 of 1953 was dismissed on merits holding that the title did not vest in the appellants. The claimants to the plots in dispute being only those persons who were parties to suit No. 337 of 1953 and the dispute in the suit being whether title to the plots vested in the plaintiffs or the defendants. It is this stage when a declaration of title in favour of the respondents came into being and consequently it is this stage when a right accrued in their favour to make a prayer in the civil Court for being put in possession over the plots in dispute in restitution proceedings, Before this stage no application could be made by the respondents for restitution. On the setting aside of the ex parte decree they had made an application on 4th June, 1957, as already pointed above, with the prayer to put back the supurdar appointed in proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C in possession or, in the alternative, to appoint a receiver. This was in fact all which they could do at that stage. The Munsif, however dismissed this application on 14th July, 1957. The respondents certainly cannot be blamed for the dismissal of the application nor can they be put to suffer on this count.

14. Whether the proceedings instituted by the respondents consequent upon the decree dated 22nd May, 1958, and 30th January, 1960, are taken to be proceedings under Sec. 144, C.P.C or 151, C.P.C makes no difference for the necessary applications for restitution dated 4th June, 1959, and 5th February, 1960, were both made even within three years of 22nd May, 1958, and 30th January, 1960 respectively. The controversy raised for the appellants that even though the limitation for making an application for restitution under Sec. 144. C.P.C was six years, it was only three years if such an application is fled under Sec. 151, C.P.C therefore, loses its significance.

15. Whether respondents 7 to 10 had a right to claim restitution is the next point which falls for determination. It was urged for the appellants that since respondents 7 to 10 were not parties to the ex parte decree dated 14th July, 1954, they were not entitled to restitution and should have filed a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act within three years, the period of limitation prescribed for such a, suit at that time, and since no such suit was filed by them their claim had become barred by time in 1961 when the relevant notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued and the appellants had acquired sirdari rights under Sec. 210 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.

16. The argument raised in this behalf involves interpretation of the words “party” and “parties” occurring in Sec. 144, C.P.C According to learned counsel for the appellants, these words refer to party or parties to the decree or order on a variation or reversal of which the right to restitution accrued. On the other hand, it was urged by the respondents that the said words refer to the party or parties to the application for restitution.

17. There is a divergence of judicial opinion on this point but, in our opinion, it is not necessary to resolve that conflict in the instant case in view of the fact that it is settled law that Sec. 144, C.P.C is not exhaustive and the Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant restitution. In Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath A.I.R 1922 P.C 269. the Privy Council was dealing with an execution sale of immovable property which took place in 1904. The Sale and the certificate of sale were set aside by the Privy Council in 1913 reversing the decree of the High Court at Calcutta. The auction purchasers had been in possession since February, 1905, and the price paid by them into Court had been distributed to the holders of the decree against the judgment-debtor. The purchasers had paid off the two bonds secured on the property and mentioned as encumbrances in the certificate. Proceeding on restitution were thereafter started. It was held:

“It is the duty of the Court under Sec. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to ‘place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed’.

18. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved. As was said by Cairns, L.C in Roger v. The Comptoir a' Escompte de Paris (1871) 3 P.C 465.

‘One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression ‘the act of the Court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of law, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case.”

19. The auction-purchasers have parted with their purchase-money which they paid into Court on the faith of the order of confirmation and certificate of sale already referred to. This money has been distributed amongst creditors of the judgment-debtor who had attached the unencumbered property in question and could have realised their judgment debts by sale of this property in execution and it would be inequitable and contrary to justice that the judgment-debtor should be restored to this property without making good to the auction-purchasers the moneys which have been applied for his benefit.

20. It was argued that the remedy of the auction-purchasers was either to apply for a certificate of sale of the unencumbered property or to obtain from the judgment-creditors repayment of the sums paid out to them under the orders of the Court. Their Lordships cannot agree with either of these suggestions, and for the reasons stated by the Judges of the High Court.”

21. It would thus be seen that an auction-purchaser who was not a party to the suit or decree was held entitled to apply for restitution and it was pointed out that even if Sec. 144, C.P.C was not applicable, relief could be granted to him under Sec. 151, C.P.C

22. That the provisions of Sec. 144, C.P.C were not exhaustive and that the Court has inherent power to restore any party which has suffered any injury by virtue of any order passed by the Court to the position which it would have occupied if the wrong order had not originally been passed by the Court was the view taken by the Privy Council in an earlier judgment in Prag Narain v. Kamlakhia Singh I.L.R 31 All. 551. and was followed by the Lahore High Court in Sohnun v. Mast Ram A.I.R 1929 Lah. 657.. The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in S. Chokaligan v. N.S Krishna A.I.R 1964 Mad. 404. the Calcutta High Court in Jotindra Nath v. Jugal Chandra A.I.R 1966 Cal. 637. and the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Subhash Chander v. Bodh Raj A.I.R 1969 J. & K. 8..

23. On the authority of these cases and on the principle contained in the maxim act us curiae neminem gravabit it is really the duty of the court to grant restitution under its inherent powers when a person has been deprived of his property due to an order of Court which has subsequently been varied or reversed as being erroneous. In our opinion, on the facts of the instant case, even if respondents 7 to 10 could not invoke the powers of the Court to grant restitution under Sec. 144, C.P.C, they could certainly do so under Sec. 151, C.P.C

24. Since, as already observed above, the applications for restitution made on 4th June, 1959, and 5th February, 1960, were within limitation, even if the period for making an application for restitution under Sec. 151, C.P.C, as held in some eases, is taken to be only three years as prescribed by Art. 181 of the old Limitation Act, they were clearly maintainable notwithstanding the fact that Sec. 144, C.P.C may be inapplicable. Even if the applications purported to have been made under Sec. 144, C.P.C it would make, no difference. In J.K Steel Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R 1970 S.C 1173. it was held:

“If the exercise of a power can be traced to a legitimate source, the fact that the same was purported to have been exercised under a different power does not vitiate the exercise of the power in question. This is a well-settled proposition of law. In this connection reference may usefully be made to the decisions of this Court in P. Balakotiah v. The Union of India, 1958 S.C.R 1052 : A.I.R 1958 S.C 232 and Afzal Ullah v. State of U.P 1964 S.C.R 991 : A.I.R 1964 S.C 264.

25. In N.B Sanjana v. N.S.W Mills 1971 1 SCC 337 it was held that the fact that the notice refers specifically to a particular rule which may not be applicable will not make the notice invalid on that ground.

26. In Raja Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan 1971 R.D 197 S.C. it was held that the substance and not the form of the application will be decisive.

27. It was next contended by learned counsel for the appellants that since respondents 7 to 10 were not parties to the ex parte decree dated 14-7-1954 the possession of the appellants as against them was otherwise than in accordance with the law for the time being in force with effect from 8th October, 1954, itself when they took possession from the criminal Court and limitation to file a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act started running from July following the said date, i.e from 1st July, 1955.

28. It was urged that once limitation had started running it could not be arrested and the consequences of not filing a suit under Sec. 209 inevitably followed so that the rights of respondents 7 to 10 stood extinguished when the relevant notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued in 1961.

29. This argument too, in our opinion, cannot help the appellants on the facts of the present case. Here before the limitation to file a suit under Sec. 209 could expire on 1st July, 1958, the same being three years at that time, respondents 7 to 10 were impleaded as defendants in suit No. 377 of 1953 on 2nd April, 1957. The right to claim restitution, as observed above, accrued after these respondents had been impleaded namely on 22nd May, 1958, when the suit was dismissed initially and on 30th January, 1960, when it was dismissed after remand. These respondents had applied for restitution on both the occasions and second appeal No. 5185 of 1960 filed by them against the order dismissing the subsequent application for restitution was pending when the relevant notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued. So was pending the appeal filed by the appellants against the decree dismissing suit No. 377 of 1953. The former was disposed of by the order quoted above and the latter stayed under Sec. 5 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act as it then stood. But for the intervention of consolidation proceedings the rights of respondents 7 to 10 would have been finally decided in suit No. 377 of 1953. In view of Sec. 22 of the old Limitation Act suit No. 377 of 1953 would be deemed to have been instituted against respondents 7 to 10 on 2nd April, 1957, when they were impleaded as defendants. Even though the appellants may be treated to have been in possession otherwise than in accordance with law for the time being in force and without the consent of respondents 7 to 10 with effect from 8th October, 1954, they had not perfected their title as sirdars by 2nd April, 1957. The rights of the parties in suit No. 377 of 1953 would have been determined as they existed on the date of suit, the possession of the appellants after 2nd April, 1957, could not be tacked on to their possession prior to that date for purposes of acquisition of sirdari rights under Sec. 210 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It is thus clear that neither the rights of respondents 7 to 10 had extinguished nor had sirdari rights accrued in favour of the appellants on 2nd April, 1957, and respondents 7 to 10 were bound to succeed in suit No. 377 of 1953. On getting a declaration of title in their favour these respondents would have succeeded in taking back possession in restitution proceedings. Since, as already pointed out above, the applications made by them in this behalf had been made well within three years from the date on which the right to claim restitution accrued, and since respondents 7 to 10 had admittedly been dispossessed in consequence of the ex parte decree which was subsequently varied on merits on the finding that title to the plots in dispute did not vest in the appellants, the application for restitution was also bound to succeed. Even if Sec. 144, C.P.C was not directly applicable on the facts of the instant case, restitution could have been granted under the inherent powers of the court. If on 2nd April, 1957, when respondents 7 to 10 were impleaded in suit No. 377 of 1953, two remedies were available to these respondents for getting back possession over the plots in dispute, one by filing a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the other by defending suit No. 377 of 1953 and getting a declaration of title in their favour and thereafter instituting restitution proceedings, and they chose to avail of one of these two remedies even though the remedy chosen by them involved more risk than the other, it cannot be said that their rights, on the peculiar facts of this case, stood extinguished when the notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued in 1961.

30. Lastly, it was urged for the appellants that when respondents 7 to 10 were not in possession on 2nd April, 1957, namely on the date on which they were impleaded in suit No. 377 of 1953, they should have filed a suit for ejectment against the appellants irrespective of the pendency of suit No. 377 of 1953 which had been filed by the appellants for declaration of title. Reliance was placed on Narayan Patil v. Puttabai A.I.R 1945 P.C 5.. In that case one Gurunath was handed over the properties in dispute on 24th February, 1920, by one Tungawa purporting to act under the terms of an award. Gurunath filed a suit on 25th November, 1920, against Narayan Patil and others for a declaration that he was in possession and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from dispossessing him and receiving rents from the tenants. On the same date he made an application for and obtained a temporary injunction to the same effect as the permanent injunction applied for by him. The order for temporary injunction was confirmed by the subordinate Judge on 6th February, 1922, and by the High Court in appeal on 22nd January, 1924. The declaration of title made in the suit in favour of Gurunath was subsequently set aside by the Privy Council and the order in Council giving effect to the judgment was made on 10th November, 1932. The title of Narayan Patil to the lands in question was thus established. Thereupon Narayan Patil instituted a suit on 25th November, 1952, claiming possession of the suit properties on the strength of title established in his favour by the judgment of the Privy Council. The suit having been filed more than 12 years after 24th February, 1920, when Gurunath was put in possession, Narayan Patil claimed the benefit of Sec. 15 of the old Limitation Act. He also made an application for restitution. The suit was dismissed as barred by time and his application for restitution was also held to be not maintainable.

31. The matter was then taken up to the Privy Council by Narayan Patil and it was in this context that the Privy Council made the following observations relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants:

“Sir Thomas Strongman contended strongly that since the title of the contending parties was involved in the suit, it would be quite futile to institute a suit for possession. Their Lordships are unable to appreciate this point for the institution of a suit can never be said to be futile, if it would thereby prevent the running of limitation.”

32. From the facts stated above it would be clear that Narayan Patil's case is clearly distinguishable. Keeping in view the nature of the relief claimed and the decree passed in Gurunath's suit, Narayan Patil, who had not been dispossessed in execution or in consequence of the decree passed in that suit, was not entitled to get back possession in restitution proceedings on the case being ultimately decided in his favour by the Privy Council and he had, therefore, to file a suit for possession within limitation. In the instant case, however, suit No. 377 of 1953 being decided in their favour, respondents 7 to 10 who had been dispossessed in consequence of the ex parte decree passed in that suit would have, as already pointed out above, succeeded in getting possession in restitution proceedings and in these circumstances their non-institution of a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would not be fatal for them.

33. The grounds on which the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition not having been assailed, as already observed above, and the various submissions made in support of the appeal having failed, the appeal, in our opinion, deserves to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.

34. Appeal dismissed.