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Sarjoo Prasad v. Second Additional District Judge
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals arise from seven separate ejectment suits concerning portions of Building No. 51/10, Naugarha, Kanpur, owned by respondents Nos. 3 to 5. The various appellants were tenants of different parts of that building. On 21 January 1965 the landlords applied under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to sue for eviction. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted permission after hearing the parties; tenants' revisions to the Commissioner and to the State Government were dismissed.
On 9 February 1971 the landlords filed seven separate suits in the Court of the City Munsif, Kanpur, for ejectment of the appellants. Before evidence was recorded, the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act No. 37 of 1972) came into force on 20 September 1972. By virtue of Sec. 9 of that Act, all seven suits were transferred to the Court of the Judge, Small Causes, Kanpur. After recording evidence and hearing the parties the Judge, Small Causes, repelled the defendants' defence and decreed the seven suits.
The tenants pursued revision to the District Judge, Kanpur, who dismissed the revisions by a common judgment dated 2 May 1973. They then sought writ relief under Article 226 in this Court; the Single Judge dismissed those petitions. The present appeals challenge the dismissal and raise, principally, the constitutionality of Sec. 9 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 9 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act No. 37 of 1972) infringes Article 14 of the Constitution by classifying pending suits for transfer to Small Cause Courts on the basis that recording of oral evidence had not commenced.
- Whether the permission granted to landlords under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 was vitiated by alleged fraud on the Rent Control authorities.
- Whether Small Cause Courts have jurisdiction to pass decrees for possession of immovable property and whether such decrees are executable (i.e., whether provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution against immovable property being excluded from Small Cause Courts renders such decrees void).
- Supplementary interpretative issue raised: whether the phrase "this Act" in Clause (r) of Sec. 43 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 can be read to include subsequently enacted connected statutes (specifically the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972), so as to prevent transfer of pending suits.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Sec. 9 of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 effects an unconstitutional classification in violation of Article 14 by transferring only those pending suits in which recording of evidence had not commenced to Small Cause Courts, thereby denying full trials and appeal rights to otherwise similarly situated litigants.
- The permission under Sec. 3 (U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act) was obtained by fraud because the landlords allegedly acquired a bungalow (35, Cariappa Road) during the proceedings, and this acquisition was concealed from the Rent Control authorities; therefore permission was vitiated.
- Small Cause Courts cannot execute decrees against immovable property because provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution against immovable property are excluded from Small Cause Courts; consequently, a decree for ejectment by a Small Cause Court would be void for being inexecutable, and the Small Cause Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to pass such decrees.
- It was further argued that the legislative scheme discriminates invidiously between landlord-tenant ejectment suits and other possession suits (e.g., ejectment of trespassers), and that such discrimination lacks justification.
- Regarding Clause (r) of Sec. 43 of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972, appellants contended that "this Act" should be interpreted to include all connected Acts so that pending suits instituted with permission under the old Sec. 3 should continue in the courts where they were instituted and not be transferable.
Respondents' Arguments
- The landlords' need for the premises (necessitating ejectment) and the grounds on which permission was sought (predominantly reconstruction due to dilapidation) were bona fide; the bungalow allegedly acquired during proceedings was bought by the landlords' mother and aunt and not by the landlords themselves.
- The Small Cause Court could validly pass decrees for possession and could send those decrees for execution to a court competent to execute decrees against immovable property under the procedural provisions of the Code (Secs. 38–42), especially given amendment to Sec. 42 by the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970.
- The legislative classification (transfer based on whether recording of oral evidence had begun) is rationally related to the object of expediting landlord-tenant disputes and avoiding multiplicity of appeals, as indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to related enactments.
- The phrase "this Act" in Clause (r) of Sec. 43 must refer to the Act in which it appears (the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972) and cannot be stretched to include later statutes which were not on the statute book when that Act commenced.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Lochan v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh, A.I.R. 1970 All. 544 | Interpreting Sec. 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as originally worded): held by a Full Bench that a decree passed by a Small Cause Court could not be executed against immovable property even by regular courts because transferee courts had only the powers of the transferor court. | The Court explained that Parliament subsequently amended Sec. 42 (Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 14 of 1970) so that a court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself; this amendment removes the Ram Lochan problem and permits execution of Small Cause Court decrees by regular courts. |
| Jalan Trading Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 691 | Held that Sec. 33 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 violated Article 14 of the Constitution (in that case because retrospective operation depended on a year having no connection with the commencement date). | The Court considered this authority but concluded it was inapplicable to the present case because the offending feature in Jalan — dependence on an unrelated accounting year for retrospective operation — is not present in Sec. 9 of the Act under challenge. |
| Jain Bros. v. Union of India, 1969 3 SCC 311 | Consideration of Jalan and the retrospective operation of Sec. 33 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; held that the special retrospective feature rendered the provision violative of Article 14. | Court relied on the Supreme Court's consideration to distinguish the present provision (Sec. 9): the special feature that rendered the Payment of Bonus provision bad (the unrelated retrospective year) is absent here, so Jain Bros. does not support invalidating Sec. 9. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the points in sequence, disposing first of subsidiary contentions and then the principal constitutional challenge.
On the allegation of fraud in the permission under Sec. 3: the Court found that the bungalow said to have been acquired during proceedings was purchased by the landlords' mother and aunt, not by the landlords themselves. Therefore the landlords had not acquired any accommodation and had not committed fraud on the Rent Control authorities. Moreover, the lower authorities had accepted the landlords' predominant ground that the building was highly dilapidated and required reconstruction, and there was no evidence that the landlords failed to act in accordance with their stated intentions after reconstruction. The fraud plea lacked substance.
On the contention that Small Cause Courts cannot pass decrees for possession because they cannot execute decrees against immovable property: the Court analysed the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections 7 and Order 50, Rule 1 exclude certain provisions relating to execution against immovable property from Small Cause Courts, but Sections 38–42 belong to Part II (general provisions) and apply to Small Cause Courts. Sec. 39 enables a court which passed a decree to send it for execution to another court. Although a Small Cause Court may not itself execute a decree for possession of immovable property under the Code's execution provisions, it can send such a decree for execution to a regular court. The Court further explained that Sec. 42 had originally been construed in Ram Lochan to prevent execution by transferee courts, but the Legislature amended Sec. 42 by the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 14 of 1970 so that the court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself; this amendment cures the earlier difficulty and enables transferee regular courts to execute Small Cause Court decrees against immovable property.
On the principal question under Article 14: the Court applied the settled two-step test for classification under Article 14: (1) whether there is an intelligible differentia distinguishing those grouped from others; and (2) whether the differentia bears a rational relation to the legislative objective. The statutory classification in Sec. 9 transfers pending landlord-tenant suits to Small Cause Courts only when recording of oral evidence had not commenced.
The Court accepted that procedures in Small Cause Courts are summary: exclusions in Order 80 and Order 18 mean oral evidence is summarized (memorandum by the judge rather than verbatim narration) and judgments need not contain more than points and decision. Consequently, litigants whose suits are transferred lose the "full-fledged trial" procedure and the ordinary right of appeal (Small Cause Court decisions are subject to revision on questions of law only).
Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that recording of evidence furnishes an intelligible differentia. If evidence had already begun to be recorded in the regular civil court, transferring the suit mid-way would impose two conflicting modes of recording evidence (full narrative from the civil court and summary method in the Small Cause Court), causing impracticability and potential complications. Therefore it was reasonable to exclude suits in which oral evidence recording had already commenced. The object of the legislative change—to expedite landlord-tenant suits and avoid multiplicity of appeals—was identified in Sec. 20(6) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 and its Statement of Objects and Reasons. The transitory provision in Sec. 9 of the Civil Laws Amendment Act sought to achieve that object; the chosen differentia reasonably related to achieving speedier resolution and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.
The Court considered Jalan Trading Co. (and the subsequent Supreme Court consideration in Jain Bros.) but found those authorities distinguishable: the vice in the Payment of Bonus Act cases was a special retrospective feature unrelated to the Act's commencement date (linking to the year 1962), a feature absent in Sec. 9. Hence Jalan did not apply.
On the contention that the legislative scheme discriminates against other possession suits (e.g., ejectment of trespassers), the Court reasoned that suits between lessor and lessee after determination of lease typically do not raise title questions and can, if title disputes arise, be transferred back to regular civil courts under Sec. 23 of the Small Cause Courts Act. By contrast, ejectment of trespassers often raises title issues; moreover, remedies for dispossession without title dispute exist under the Specific Relief Act. Thus, the differentiation did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination in the context of the new Article 4 conferring jurisdiction on Small Cause Courts for landlord-tenant evictions after determination of lease.
On interpretation of Clause (r) of Sec. 43 of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 (that pending proceedings may be continued and concluded "as if this Act has not been passed"): the Court rejected the argument that "this Act" could refer to later statutes (such as the Civil Laws Amendment Act enacted on 20 September 1972), because that clause must be read as referring to the Act in which it occurs and could not possibly refer to a statute not yet on the books when the Act came into force (15 July 1972).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEALS DISMISSED.
The Court dismissed the various points urged by the appellants and held that:
- There was no established fraud in the obtaining of permission under Sec. 3 by the landlords.
- Small Cause Courts can validly pass decrees for possession of immovable property and such decrees are not inexecutable; they can be sent for execution to regular courts, and the amendment to Sec. 42 of the Code cures earlier difficulties.
- Section 9 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, which transfers pending landlord-tenant suits to Small Cause Courts where recording of oral evidence had not commenced, does not violate Article 14; the classification is based on an intelligible differentia and is reasonably related to the legislative object of expediting such suits and avoiding multiplicity of appeals.
- The phrase "this Act" in Clause (r) of Sec. 43 of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 refers to that Act itself and does not preclude later enactments from operating as they do.
Implications:
The direct practical effect is that the decrees entered by the Judge, Small Causes, Kanpur stand, the appellants' challenges fail, and the appeals are dismissed with costs. The opinion upholds the validity of Sec. 9 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 insofar as Article 14 is concerned. The Court distinguished prior authorities relied upon by the appellants and found the legislative classification reasonable; the judgment disposes of the appeals but does not, in the text of the opinion, purport to establish broader new principles beyond the application of existing classification doctrine and the statutory amendments discussed.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Satish Chandra, J.:— These seven appeals raise common questions and “can conveniently be decided by a common judgment.
2. Building No. 51/10, Naugarha, in the city of Kanpur, was owned by respondents Nos. 3 to 5. The various appeallants in these seven appeals were tenants of different portions of this building. On 21st January, 1965, respondents Nos. 3 to 5, the landlords, applied under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, for permission to sue for the eviction of the tenants. After hearing the parties the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted the requisite permission. The revisions filed by the tenants before the Commissioner as well as before the State Government failed and were dismissed. On 9th February, 1971, the landlords filed seven separate suits in the court of the City Munsif, Kanpur, for the ejectment of the appellants from the accommodations in their respective possession. Before the evidence was recorded in these suits the U.P Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, (Act No. 37 of 1972) came into force on 20th September, 1972. In virtue of Sec. 9 of this Act all the seven suits were transferred to the court of the Judge, Small Causes, Kanpur, who, after recording the evidence and hearing the parties, repelled the defence and decreed the seven suits. The tenants went up in revision before the District Judge, Kanpur. The District Judge, Kanpur dismissed the revisions by a common judgment dated 2nd May, 1973. Aggrieved against these orders, the tenants came to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge did not find substance in any of the submissions raised in support of the writ petitions and dismissed them. Hence the present appeals.
3. Apart from the principal question that Sec. 9 of the Act 37 of 1972 violated Art. 14 of the Constitution, learned counsel for the appellants raised a couple of other points relating to the merits of their case. We may first dispose of these subsidiary points.
4. It was urged that the permission granted to the landlords under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was vitiated by fraud practiced by the landlords upon the authorities. The submission was that the landlords sought permission on the ground that they needed the premises for their personal residence, that during the pendency of the proceedings the landlords acquired a bungalow at 35, Cariappa Road, Cantonment Road, Kanpur, which amply satisfied their need for personal residence, that this fact was concealed from the Rent Control authorities, and that thus the landlords practiced fraud upon the authorities.
5. From the evidence it is apparent that the bungalow in question was purchased by the mother and aunt of the respondents-landlords. The landlords not having bought any accommodation, it cannot be said that they practiced fraud upon the authorities by not bringing this fact to their notice. Further, a perusal of the orders passed by the authorities below shows that the predominant ground upon which permission was granted was that the building in dispute was in a highly dilapidated condition and the landlords' case that it required reconstruction was true. The landlords' case that they would, after reconstruction of the building, utilise its first floor for residence and the ground floor for shops for business was accepted. There is no evidence that the landlords had not made good this assurance or that after reconstruction the premises in dispute have not been utilised as mentioned in the application for permission. There is hence no substance in the plea that the landlords obtained the requisite permission by practicing fraud.
6. In the next place it was urged that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution of decrees against immovable property are not applicable to Small Cause Courts, that in the present suit the plaintiffs prayed for a decree for ejectment from immovable property, that such a decree would be against immovable property and as suit could not be executed by the Small Cause Courts and since the decree was not executable, it was a void decree; and so the Small Cause Courts had no jurisdiction to pass such a decree. The submission is based upon a mis-apprehension of the true legal position.
7. Sec. 7 and Order 50, Rule 1, C.P.C exclude certain specified provisions from the Small Cause Courts. Under Sec. 7(a)(iii) and Clause (a)(ii) of Order 50, Rule 1, provisions relating to the execution of decrees against immovable property are excluded. In other words, the Small Cause Courts do not have the power to execute decrees against immovable properties in accordance with the provisions of the Code and its Schedule.
8. Secs. 38 to 42 of the Code are in Part II, of which the sub-heading is “General”. They do not deal with execution of decrees against immovable property, but with general matters, like transfer of decrees, powers of transferee courts irrespective of the nature of the decree. They will apply to Small Cause Courts.
9. Sec. 38 of the Code provides that a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution. Sec. 39 of the Code provides that the court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree-holder, send it for execution to another court. The Small Cause Court possesses this power. It can send a decree passed by it for execution to the regular courts. A decree for possession of immovable property being a decree against immovable property may not be executable by the Small Cause Court itself, but, nonetheless, under Sec. 39 it has the power to send such a decree for execution to a court which can execute it. It cannot hence be said that the Small Cause Courts have no power to pass a decree for possession of immovable property.
10. Sec. 42 of the Code, as it originally stood, provided that the transferee court while executing a decree shall have the same powers as were possessed by the transferer court. In Ram Lochan v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh A.I.R 1970 Alld. 544. a Full Bench of this Court held that under this provision a decree passed by a Small Cause Court could not be executed against immovable property even by the regular courts, because in such cases the powers of the regular courts were only such as were possessed by the transferor court, namely, the Small Cause Court. Subsequently the Legislature amended Sec. 42 by the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 14 of 1970. After the amendment this provision provided that the court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decrees as if it had been passed by itself.
11. Thus if a Small Cause Court decree is transferred to a regular civil court, the transferee court having powers to execute decrees against immovable properties will execute the Small Cause Court decree against immovable property. It cannot hence be said that a decree against immovable property passed by the Small Cause Court is inexecutable.
12. The principal question, however, is whether Sec. 9 of the U.P Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution. This Section provides—
“9. Transitory provisions — Any suit of the nature referred to in the proviso to sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, (whether its value exceeds two thousand rupees, or as the case may be, one thousand rupees, or not), or the proviso to sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 15 of the provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, instituted before the date of commencement of this Act in any Court other than a Court of Small Cause or a Court of Civil Judge or Munsif exercising jurisdiction of a Judge of a Court of Small Causes and pending in that Court immediately before the said date, not being a suit in which the recording of oral evidence for any party has commenced or concluded before the said date, shall upon the conferment of jurisdiction or enhanced pecuniary jurisdiction on a Civil Judge, Munsif, District Judge or Additional District Judge or on a Court of Small Causes under the said provisions stand transferred to such Court and shall be decided by that Court.”
13. In substance, this section provides for the transfer of suits pending in the regular courts to the court of Small Causes, if—
(a) it is a suit by the lessor for the eviction of the lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, or for recovery from him of rent or damages, and
(b) it is pending in a regular civil court and recording of oral evidence for any party has not commenced or concluded before the commencement of the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, that is, on 20th September, 1972.
14. It was urged that this provision singles out those pending suits in which recording of evidence has not begun for an adverse and hostile treatment by making them triable by Small Cause Courts, with the result that the trial of such suits would be summary and that the litigants will have no right of appeal but only a revision on a question of law; whereas a suit of a similar kind would continue to be tried by the regular civil court where the litigant will have a full-fledged trial as well as right of appeal and second appeal, if the fortuitous circumstance that the recording of evidence has begun, has taken place. According to the appellants, the recording of evidence affords no basis for classifying pending suits between landlord's and tenants.
15. It is well settled that under Article 14 of the Constitution the State is not to deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India; but this does not preclude the legislature from making a reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. The said classification has to pass two tests, namely, the classification must be founded on an ineligible differentia which distinguishes persons and things left out of the group, and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
16. It is true that the procedure in a court of Small Causes is summary. Sec. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides—
“The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits;……”
17. Order 80, Rule 1, C.P.C by Clause (b) excludes Order 18, Rules 5 to 12, from the Small Cause Courts. These rules provide for the manner of recording oral evidence. Rules 13 to 17 of Order 18 are applicable to Small Cause Courts. Rule 13 porides that in cases in which an appeal is not allowed, it shall not be necessary to take down the evidence of the witnesses in writing at length; but the Judge, as the examination of each witness proceeds, shall make a memorandum of the substance of what he deposes, and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Judge, and shall form part of the record. In small cause cases no appeal is allowed. The Small Cause Court Judge is, therefore, required to make only a memorandum of the substance of the deposition of a witness. He need not record his deposition in extence.
18. Order 20, Rule 4, C.P.C provides that judgments of Small Cause Courts need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereon.
19. Thus the trial of a suit in a Small Cause Court is summary in the sense that the oral evidence is not recorded in the usual complete narrative form and that the judgments need not contain the reason for the decision. Sec. 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act provides for a revision against the decision of a Court of Small Causes. No appeal or second appeal lies against such a decision. The learned counsel is, therefore, justified in pointing out that when a suit is transferred from the regular civil court to the Court of Small Causes, the litigants are affected adversely in the sense that they are not entitled to a full-fledged trial nor do they have a right of appeal or second appeal.
20. The legislature, however, has classified pending suits between lessors and lessee on the basis of the recording of evidence. If the recording of evidence has not commenced, a suit is liable to be transferred to the Small Cause Court, otherwise not.
21. As already seen, the manner of recording the evidence is one of the principal differences in the procedures applicable to an ordinary civil court and the Court of Small Causes. The transfer of a pending case, after the recording of oral evidence in it has begun, will mean that in the same case two different procedures will become applicable part of the evidence would have been recorded by the civil court in the form of a complete narrative, but after transfer the remaining evidence would be liable to be recorded in a summary manner by the Judge, Small Cause Court. That would have been neither feasible nor proper. The recording of evidence thus furnishes an intelligible differentia to classify pending cases for purposes of transfer.
22. The next test is whether the differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.
23. Suits for possession of immovable property, including these by a landlord, were outside the purview of Small Cause Courts. The U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, No. 13 of 1972, which came into force on 15th July, 1972, by Sec. 20(6) makes suits by a landlord for eviction of a tenant (after the determination of his tenancy) from a building cognizable by the Small Cause Courts. The statement of objects and reasons appended to that Act provided—
“Suits for eviction on the grounds specified in Sec. 3 of the old Act which lay in the Court of Munsif or Civil Judge, shall now lie in the Courts of Small Causes. This will do away with the multiplicity of appeals, as only a revision will lie against the decision of the Small Cause Court as in other small cause cases.”
24. Thus the object of transferring such suits to the Court of Small Causes was to avoid multiplicity of appeals and to have a speedy trial and decision.
25. The U.P Civil Laws Amendment Act repealed Sec. 20(6) of the U.P Act 13 of 1972, and re-enacted Art. 4 of the Second Schedule of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The new Article 4 conferred jurisdiction upon the Small Cause Courts to try suits by lessors for the eviction of lessees from a building after the determination of their lease and for the recovery from them of rent and compensation for use and occupation after such determination of lease. The transitory provision contained in Sec. 9 of the U.P Civil Laws Amendment Act for transferring pending suits only sought to achieve the proclaimed object, namely, that suits of the mentioned kind should be speedily decided and multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided. The differentia that only those suits were to be transferred to the Small Cause Court in which record sting of evidence had not begun is, in our opinion, reasonably related to the object sought to be achieved, because transfer of suits in which evidence has already been recorded partly by the civil court would delay the trial by requiring the Small Cause Court to record evidence afresh. In case the existing evidence was permitted to remain on the record as such and further evidence was to be recorded in a summary manner by the Judge, Small Cause Court, the position would have become complicated. To avoid any complications, suits in which recording of oral evidence had begun were left out. Evidently, the classification was reasonable, theoretically as well as from a practical point of view.
26. For the appellants, reliance was placed upon Jalan Trading Company Private Ltd v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha A.I.R 1967 S.C 691.. In that case Sec. 33 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, was held violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. That decision was considered by the Supreme Court in Jain Bros. v. The Union of India 1969 3 SCC 311 and it was held that the retrospective operation of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, which came into force on May 29, 1965, was made by Sec. 33, the provisions of which were held to be violative of Article 14, to depend on the pendency on that date of any dispute regarding payment of bonus relating to any accounting year from 1962 onwards. The year 1962 had apparently no connection with the date on which the Act came into operation which was May 29, 1965. It was this special feature that randered the provision bad. The case has, in our opinion, no application to the present one.
27. One of the learned counsel appearing for the tenant-appellants submitted that the Act makes invidious distinction between suits relating to landlords and tenants on the one hand and other kinds of suits for possession in respect of immovable property on the other—for instance, suit for the ejectment of a trespasser. The argument was that there was no justification for leaving out suits for the ejectment of trespassers from the purview of Small Cause Courts. This argument has no relevance to the vires of Sec. 9, which only provides for pending suits of the nature which are made cognizable by the Small Cause Courts Act by another provision of the Act. Sec. 4 of the Civil Laws Amendment Act repealed and re-enacted Article (4) of the Second Schedule of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Under it suits for possession of immovable property by a lessor against a lessee after the determination of his lease alone were made small causes.
28. The argument may be considered in regard to the constitutional validity of the new Art. (4) aforesaid. Suits between landlords and tenants after the determination of lease are not expected to raise any question of title. Even if a question of title is raised, the suit is liable to be transferred back to the regular civil court in view of Sec. 23 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Suits for ejectment of tresspassers are, on the other hand, likely to raise issues relating to title. If the plaintiff in a suit for ejectment of a trespasser relies merely upon his prior possession and dispossession by the defendant, he would sue under the Specific Relief Act, rather than incur the expense and time consumed by a regular trial in the civil courts. Since for relief against trespassers in cases where title was not sought to be established or disputed a provision was already there in the Specific Relief Act (Sec. 9 of the old Act and Sec. 6 of the new one). It was hence unnecessary for the legislature to have provided for suits for ejectment against trespassers to be tried by Small Cause Courts. Sec. 4 of the Civil Laws Amendment Act does not suffer from the vice of discrimination.
29. In one of the appeals it was pointed out that Clause (r) of Sec. 43 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Eviction and Rent) Act, 1972, provided that suits for eviction of tenant instituted with the permission referred to in Sec. 3 of the old Act or any proceeding arising out of such suit pending immediately before the commencement of “this Act” may be continued and concluded as if this Act has not been passed.
30. It was urged that the phrase “this Act” in Clause (r) means not only the Act of 1972, but also all connected Acts, that is to say, all other Acts which dealt with the same matter, and, therefore, pending suits filed on the basis of permission granted under Sec. 3 of the old Act were to continue and be concluded in the courts where they were instituted and could not be transferred.
31. The argument has only to be stated to be rejected. The phrase “this Act” occurring in Clause (r) cannot but refer to the Act of 1972 itself. By no stretch of imagination could it refer to an Act which was not even on the statute book on 15th July, 1972, when the Act of 1972 came into force. The Civil Laws Amendment Act came into force later on, namely, on 20th September, 1972. The phrase “this Act” occurring in Clause (r) could not possibly refer to such future legislative enactments.
32. The various points urged in support of these appeals having no substance, the appeals are dismissed with costs.
33. Appeals dismissed.
Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972,Alert