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Maiyadin And Others v. State
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed by the II Temporary Sessions Judge, Hamirpur. Nine appellants (named in the trial court's order) were convicted on various counts arising from a violent incident on 13-9-1967 in which Babu Lal died and two others (Khushali and Maiyadin) sustained injuries. The trial court convicted several appellants under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC and imposed life sentences on those convicted for murder; others were convicted under related provisions (Sections 147, 148, 324, 325 IPC etc.). Two persons tried with the appellants (Surajpal and Darbari) were acquitted at trial.
The underlying facts, as recorded in the opinion, are that Khushali and others had purchased and were cultivating a 6 bigha portion of land (originally belonging to Chhitwa Kewat). On 13-9-1967, when Khushali and his uncle Gaiju were cutting the ripe Sawan crop, the appellants together with Surajpal and Darbari arrived, allegedly to interfere with possession. A confrontation ensued; Khushali and Gaiju fled, were chased, and Khushali was beaten. Babu Lal (a relative who came to intervene) and Maiyadin ran to help and were also assaulted. Babu Lal died of head injuries. A report was lodged and the police investigated: they recovered the dead body, blood-stained clothes and earth, and medically examined the injured. The prosecution led oral and medical evidence; the appellants denied the charges, claiming in part a right of private defence or a property-related cause for their actions. On appeal the Sessions Court examined evidentiary and legal issues and modified several convictions and sentences (detailed below).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the occurrence took place as alleged by the prosecution (time, date, place and sequence of events).
- Whether the appellants had a valid right of private defence that would justify or excuse their acts.
- Whether Section 149 IPC (liability of members of an unlawful assembly) could be invoked to fasten liability on all members for the murder of Babu Lal and for the assaults on Maiyadin and Khushali.
- If Section 149 IPC did not apply, which accused persons, if any, were individually liable under Section 34 IPC (common intention) for the murder and for the grievous injuries.
- What convictions and sentences should be maintained, set aside or converted in light of the findings on the above questions.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants generally denied the charges and pleaded not guilty.
- Gopali, Sahdi and Sukhdeo specifically stated that the crop standing in the field was raised by them, and that when Khushali, Babu Lal and others began reaping it wrongfully they went to stop them — asserting they were assaulted and in the exercise of a right of private defence they caused injuries.
- No evidence was led by the appellants in support of their claimed right of private defence, according to the opinion.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The prosecution led eyewitness and medical evidence to show that Khushali, Maiyadin (injured) and Babu Lal (deceased) received injuries in the same occurrence and that Babu Lal died of injuries to the head.
- The Deputy Government Advocate argued that the deceased and Maiyadin were also cutting the crop from that plot, implying they might have a conflicting right — an argument the court considered and rejected on the evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Queen v. Sabed Ali (1873) 20 Suth WR (Cri) 5 | Illustrates that mere carrying of a deadly weapon by members does not automatically make all members liable under Section 149 IPC for an act individually committed by one member if that act was not in prosecution of the common object. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that an isolated act by one member (even if others knew he was armed) does not attract Section 149 unless the act was in prosecution of the assembly's common object. |
| Charan Singh v. State, AIR 1959 All 255 : 1959 Cri LJ 419 | Explains that for the second part of Section 149 IPC there must be positive knowledge by members that the particular offence was likely (probable) to be committed — mere possibility is insufficient. | The Court used this principle to conclude that evidence fell short of showing that members knew murder or grievous assault was likely to happen; hence Section 149 could not be invoked to fasten murder liability on all members. |
| Hukum Singh v. State, AIR 1959 All 690 : 1959 Cri LJ 1258 | Discusses the test when common object is not murder: whether members were determined to go to any length (including murder) in achieving the object; if not, an isolated act causing death makes only that actor liable. | The Court applied this test to hold that because the unlawful assembly's object was not murder and there was no evidence they were prepared to go to the length of murder, the death caused by an isolated act could not be attributed to all under Section 149. |
| Hanif v. State, AIR 1962 All 272 : 1962-1 Cri LJ 698 | Interprets the first part of Section 149 IPC: members are liable for offences committed in prosecution of the common object only when such offences were in the contemplation (directly or impliedly) of the assembly. | The Court relied on this reasoning to find that the murder of Babu Lal was not in the contemplation of the assembly as a whole, so the first part of Section 149 did not apply to make all members liable for murder. |
| Kshudiram Majhi v. State of W. Bengal, (1972) 3 SCC 479 : AIR 1972 SC 1221 | Affirms similar principles regarding limits on applying Section 149 to make all members liable when death results but murder was not part of the common object. | The Court cited this Supreme Court authority to reinforce its conclusion that Section 149 could not be stretched to cover the murder or assault of peaceful interveners unless supported by clear evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court followed a structured approach in resolving the appeal:
- Establishment of occurrence and injuries: The court found the time, date and place were not disputed and accepted the prosecution's account that the incident occurred as alleged. Medical reports were accepted: Babu Lal's post-mortem showed a large incised wound causing death by shock and hemorrhage; Maiyadin and Khushali sustained multiple injuries, one of Maiyadin's being grievous.
- Possession and right of private defence: Evidence established that the 6 bighas of land and the Sawan crop belonged to Khushali and had been raised by him. Given that three persons on the complainant's side suffered serious injuries and none of the appellants were injured, the court rejected the appellants' claim to the right of private defence. The court reasoned that if Khushali's group had been the aggressors, they would not have sustained the injuries they did.
- Analysis of Section 149 IPC (unlawful assembly): The court examined whether the unlawful assembly's common object extended to assaulting Babu Lal and Maiyadin (who intervened). It concluded that the assembly's object was to stop Khushali from reaping the crop and, after chasing him, to assault him; that object did not, on the evidence, extend to attacking peaceful interveners who came to rescue Khushali. The court emphasised the distinction between (a) offences committed in prosecution of the common object (first part of s.149) and (b) offences that might be "likely" to be committed (second part) — applying authorities which require positive proof that members contemplated the specific offence.
- Status of Babu Lal and Maiyadin as interveners: The court carefully considered whether those who came to assist Khushali were peaceful interveners or were themselves trying to obstruct the unlawful assembly. The court found them to be peaceful interveners: Maiyadin was shown to be empty-handed and only warded off blows; Babu Lal, though in possession of a lathi, did not engage aggressively according to consistent witness testimony. That fact tended to show that those who assaulted them did so through individual acts formed then and there (not as part of an antecedent common object to kill or grievously harm interveners).
- Application of Section 34 IPC (common intention): Having ruled that Section 149 could not be broadly applied to make all members liable for the murder or the assaults on interveners, the court examined the evidence for individual and joint actions. It found specific evidence that Gopali used a pharsa on Babu Lal and that Vishwanath (Bishuntha) struck Babu Lal with a lathi; the court concluded these two shared a common intention to cause the injuries which resulted in death, making them liable under Section 34 IPC for murder (converted conviction).
- Findings on other injuries: The court found that Maiyadin suffered a grievous injury and that Ram Dayal, Maiyadin (accused), Bhagwati, Gopali and Sukhdeo assaulted him; because the last two were armed with pharsas and evidence showed a meeting of minds, Section 34 IPC applied to convict these persons under the relevant provision for causing grievous hurt.
- Offences against Khushali: The court concluded Khushali was assaulted in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly; therefore the appellants were liable under Section 324 read with Section 149 IPC. Because some members were armed with pharsas (Gopali and Sukhdeo) Section 148 IPC applied to them; the rest, being armed with lathis, were liable under Section 147 IPC.
- Sentences and concurrent operation: Based on the above analysis, the court set aside, converted or maintained convictions and sentences as appropriate (detailed in the holding). All sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The court also directed custody: Gopali, who was in jail, was to serve out sentences; the other appellants on bail were to be taken into custody forthwith.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal succeeded in part. The court modified convictions and sentences in light of the findings about the limits of Section 149 IPC and the identification of individual culpability under Section 34 IPC and other sections.
Core rulings (direct effects on the parties):
- The convictions and sentences of Sukhdeo (alias Sukhdeon), Maiyadin, Ram Dayal, Jagat Pal, Ramnath, Sahdi and Bhagwati under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC were set aside.
- The conviction of Gopali under Section 302 IPC and of Bishuntha (alias Vishwanath) under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC was converted into convictions under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC; their life sentences for the murder of Babu Lal were maintained.
- The convictions and sentences of all appellants under Section 325 IPC read with Section 149 IPC were set aside. Ram Dayal, Maiyadin (accused), Bhagwati, Gopali and Sukhdeo were convicted under Section 325 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment each for causing grievous injury to Maiyadin (injured).
- Convictions and sentences under Section 324 IPC read with Section 149 IPC were maintained for the appellants in respect of injuries to Khushali.
- Convictions under Section 147 IPC imposed on certain appellants (Jagatpal, Ramnath, Sahdi, Bishuntha (Vishwanath), Ram Dayal, Maiyadin, Bhagwati) were maintained.
- Convictions and sentences under Section 148 IPC for Gopali and Sukhdeo were upheld.
- All sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Gopali, who was in jail, was directed to serve out his sentences; the other appellants on bail were ordered to be taken into custody to serve their sentences.
Implications: The decision narrows the application of Section 149 IPC on these facts: the court declined to fasten collective liability for murder or grievous injury on all members of the unlawful assembly where the assault on peaceful interveners was not within the assembly's common object and there was insufficient evidence that members knew such offences were likely. Instead, the court imposed individual liability under Section 34 IPC where the evidence showed a meeting of minds and individual acts causing death or grievous hurt. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle of law; it applies existing authorities to the facts and therefore the practical effect is the reallocation of criminal responsibility among the appellants as set out above.
Srivastava, J.:— This is an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the II Temporary Sessions Judge. Hamirpur convicting Sukhdeo alias Sukhdeon. Maiyadin. Ram Dayal, Jagat Pal. Ramnath. Sahdi. Bhagwati and Bishuntha alias Vishwanath appellants under Section 302. I.P.C read with Section 149, I.P.C and sentencing each of them to imprisonment for life. All the above appellants except Sukhdeo were convicted under Section 147. I.P.C and were sentenced to one year's R.I each. Gopali appellant was convicted under Section 302. I.P.C simpliciter and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Gopali and Sukhdeo appellants were convicted under Section 148. I.P.C and each was sentenced to two years' R.I All the nine appellants were further convicted under S. 325. I.P.C read with S. 149, I.P.C and each was sentenced to four years' R.I under the first count and to two years' R.I under the second count. All the sentences of all the appellants were ordered to run concurrently. Surajpal and Darbari were also tried along with the appellants, but they were acquitted by the trial Court.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows:—
Khushali (P.W 2). Jagdeo and Maiyadin (P.W 3) had purchased certain land from Chhitwa Kewat. They had sown Jundhri and Sawan crops in this land. Surajpal son of Chhitwa filed an objection in the mutation proceedings. Khushali and his brother Jagdeo were vendees of 6 Bighas of land out of the total area of 24 Bighas, referred to above. At the time of sale gram crop was standing in this area. It was agreed that after reaping the gram crop, they will hand over the gram to Chhitwa. Later on. Jundhri and Sawara crops were sown in this area. Surajpal son of Chhitwa started interfering in the possession of the land of the vendees. A panchayat was called. To the Panchayat. Chhitwa told them that he had sold the land and the vendees had a right to cultivate the land.
3. In the afternoon of 13-9-1969 Khushali and his uncle Gaiju went to cut the Sawan crop from the plot which had by then become ripe. When they started cutting the Sawan crop, the appellants along with Suraipal and Darbari reached there. Suraipal instigated his companions to beat Khushali and Gaiiu. Khushali and Gajju ran towards the village. The appellants as well as Suraipal and Darbari chased them. They surrounded them near the Khaliyan of Rajwa Gadariya. Suraipal and Darbari were armed with spears. Gopali and Sukhdeo were armed with Pharsas, while rest of the appellants were armed, with lathis. All these persons started beating Khushali who fell down after receiving the iniuries. Gaiiu was all along shouting for help. On the alarm raised by Gaiiu and Khushali Maiyadin and his sister's son Babu Lal (deceased), who were then reaping their own crop in the radioing field, ran to save Khushali. They tried to intervene. The appellants also assaulted Babu Lal and Maiyadin. Certain other witnesses also reached there. Thay challenged the assailants. Then the assailants ran away.
4. A bullock cart was arranged and the three injured persons Khushali, Maiyadin and Babu Lal were taken in it to village Kaithi where they resided. At Kaithi. Babu Lal died. A report of the occurrence was then lodged at than Sumerpur by Khushali at 3-30 A.M on 14-9-1967. On the basis of this report the police registered a case against the appellants as well as Surajipal and Darbari under Section 302, I.P.C and various other sections of the Indian Penal Code. The police started the investigation. The Investigating Officer reached the spot took the dead body of Babu Lal in his custody, and sent it for post nortem examination. The blood stained clothes of the deceased were taken into his custody by the Investigating Officer. The blood-stained earth and ordinary earth were also taken from the place of occurrence by the Investigating Officer, in the presence of the witnesses. Recovery memos were prepared. The injuries of Maiyadin and Khushali were medically examined at 7-45 A.M and 8-00 A.M respectively on 14-9-1967. The Investigating Officer examined a number of witnesses and after completing the investigation challaned the appellants as well as Suraipal and Darbari. As one of the witnesses is also named as Maiyadin, therefore, the accused will be referred to as Maiyadin accused and Maiyadin witness will be referred to as Maiyadin injured. After the trial, the appellants were convicted and sentenced, as stated above while Suraipal and Darbari were given the benefit of doubt by the trial Court and were acquitted.
5. In support of its case, the prosecution examined Khushali (P.W 2), Maiyadin (P.W 3), Chunubad (P.W 4). and Nathu (P.W 5). besides certain other witnesses whose statements are more or less formal in nature.
6. The appellants denied the charge and pleaded not guilty. Gopali, Sahdi and Sukhdeo appellants stated that the crop standing in the field was raised by them, and when Babu Lal, Maiyadin injured. Khushali and others started reaping it wrongfully they went to stop them from taking unlawful possession of the crop, they were assaulted, and in their right of private defence they also caused injuries to Maiyadin injured. Khushali and Babu Lai. They did not lead any evidence in support of their defence.
7. The post-mortem examination on the dead body of Babu Lal was conducted by Dr. R. Chandra at 5-00 P.M on 15-9-1967. In the opinion of Dr. Chandra, the deceased was about 25 years of age and the probable time since death was about two days. He found the following ante-mortem injuries on the dead body of Babu Lal:—
1. Incised wound 10″×2″× brain deep with pulpy brain tissues coming out obliquely on posterior aspect of head starting from 2-½″ above right ear and terminating at 2″ behind left ear. Bones underneath cut through and through.
2. Bruise 3″ × 1″ over forehead, 1-½″ above left eve brow.
8. In the opinion of Dr. Chandra, Babu Lal died due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from the injuries.
9. There is therefore no room for doubt that Babu Lal died as a result of the injuries which he received.
10. The time, date, and place of the occurrence have not been disputed. We therefore, hold that the occurrence took place at the time date, and place, as alleged by the prosecution.
11. The injuries of Maiyadin injured were medically examined at 7-45 A.M on 14-9-1967 by Dr. M.A Kabir. He found the following injuries on the person of Maiyadin injured.
1. Contused wound 2″ ×¼″ × scalp deep, vertically along the right side of front of head. 5″ above right ear and 3″ above the right eve brow.
2. Incised wound ¾″× 1/6″× skin deep, transversely across the bridge of the nose, left side and its lower end touching the inner angle of left eye.
3. Incised wound ½″× ⅛″× skin deep, obliquely across the upper part of left side of face. ½″ below left eye.
4. Contusion 2-¼″× ½″ obliquely across the middle of inner margin of left forearm.
5. Contusion 6-½″× ¾″ obliquely across the middle of back of right forearm with fracture of the right ulna bone at its middle underneath.
6. Incised wound 1″× ⅛″× skin deep obliquely across the outer aspect of upper margin of right half of chest, its upper end was touching outer end of right clavicle (collar) bone.
7. Incised wound ½″× 1/6″× skin deep vertically along the lower part of middle line of front of left leg.
8. Contusion 3-½″× 1-¼″ obliquely across the upper part of back of right arm.
9. Contusion 4-¼″× 1″ obliquely across the middle of right half of back.
10. Incised wound 1-¼″× 1/6″× skin deep, transversely across the middle of right side of face just in front of right ear.
12. In the opinion of the doctor, injury No. 5 was a grievous injury.
13. The same doctor examined the injuries of Khushali the same day at 8-00 A.M Khushali had the following injuries:
1. Contused wound 2″× ⅓″× scalp deep vertically along the middle of back of head.
2. Contusion 1-¾″× ½” obliquely across the upper lid of right eye, right corner of forehead.
3. Abrasion 1″×¾″ obliquely across the back of left shoulder.
4. Incised wound 2″×¾″× skin deep obliquely across the lower part of back of inner margin of left forearm.
5. Contusion 9″× ½″ obliquely across the middle of back.
6. Contusion 3″× ½” obliquely across the upper part of right half of back.
14. The medical evidence, therefore, leaves no room for doubt that Khushali. Maiyadin injured, and Babu Lal (deceased) received injuries in the same occurrence.
15. The first point which has to be considered in this case is as to whether the occurrence took place as alleged by the prosecution or as contended by the defence.
16. No one from the side of the appellants received any injury. On the other hand, as many as three persons from the side of the complainant received serious injuries which had been caused with lathis and some sharp cutting weapon.
17. So far as the possession of land is concerned, from the prosecution Section evidence it is proved to the hilt that 6 Bighas land, which was in possession of Khushali originally belonged to Chhitwa who had sold it to Khushali. We are also satisfied from the evidence on the record that the Sawan crop which was standing in this plot had been sown by Khushali. After holding that the land belonged to Khushali and the crop had been raised by him it would not be possible to hold that the appellants or any of them had a right of private defence. Had Khushali and his companions been the aggressors, they would not have received all these injuries and the appellants, who pleaded the right of private defence, would not have escaped even without a scratch. After screening the entire prosecution evidence in the light of the above facts and circumstances, we have no room for doubt that the occurrence took place as alleged by the prosecution.
18. Khushali and Maiyadin injured were the two persons who had received injuries in the occurrence. Their presence at the spot, therefore, cannot be doubted. We have not come across anything in the statements of Chunubad (P.W 4) and Nathu (P.W 5) on account of which their statements could be rejected. Both these witnesses were named in the first information report which was lodged at the thana without any delay. They are natural and trustworthy witnesses. Nothing has been shown to us in their statements on account of which their statements could be rejected. Believing their evidence in the light of the above facts and circumstances we have not the least doubt in our minds that Khushali and his uncle Gajju were reaping the crop when the appellants went there armed with lathis and pharsas and stopped them from reaping the crop. We have also no doubt in our minds that when Khushali was running away, Maiyadin injured and Babu Lal came for their rescue and they were assaulted by the appellants.
19. The only question which now remains to be decided is as to what offence was committed by the appellants.
20. It was argued that the common object of the appellants was to stop Khushali from cutting the crop and to assault him and those who interfered in the achievement of the aforesaid common object, and therefore, all the appellants were equally guilty for the murder of Babu Lal with the and of Section 149. I.P.C and for causing injuries to Maiyadin injured and Khushali with the and of the same section. It would be stretching the object of Section 149, I.P.C beyond its scope by giving such a wide interpretation to it. The main question would arise as to whether Maiyadin injured and Babu Lal (deceased) joined Khushali in interfering with the common object of the unlawful assembly in achieving its object regarding the assault on Khushali. It is true that after Khushali left reaping the crop and ran away for saving his life, the object of the unlawful assembly in stopping Khushali from reaping the crop was achieved, but because the unlawful assembly chased Khushali up-to the Khaliyan and started assaulting him it can be safely presumed that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to assault Khushali as well. But could this common object be stretched further by saying that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to assault Babu Lal (deceased) and Maiyadin injured as well.
21. In order to find out the proper reply to the above question it has to be seen as to what was the purpose of Babu Lal (deceased) and Maiyadin injured in coming running from their field to intervene in the assault. Learned Deputy Government Advocate argued that the deceased and Maiyadin injured were also cutting the crop from that plot about which they claimed their right as vendees and Surajpal claimed his right as son of Chhitwa. This argument loses its force for the simple reason that Maiyadin injured and Babu Lal (deceased) were cutting the crop in their field simultaneously, but none of the appellants. Surajpal or Darbari went to that field to stop Maiyadin injured and Babu Lal to stop them from reaping the field. Therefore, it can be safely presumed that the common object of the unlawful assembly was not to stop these two persons from cutting their crop and therefore, if they went to save Khushali it would be presumed that the common object of the unlawful assembly was not to assault them as well.
22. In this very connection it has also to be seen as to whether Babu Lal (deceased) and Maiyadin injured were peaceful interveners or had gone to Khushali to obstruct the unlawful assembly in achieving their object of assaulting Khushali. It is true that Babu Lal (deceased) was armed with a lathi. But there is consistent evidence of Maiyadin injured. Khushali and two other witnesses that he did not ply his lathi but only warded off the blows of the appellants, when the appellants started assaulting him. It is also proved from the evidence that Maiyadin injured was empty handed and he was only requesting the appellants not to assault Khushali. This evidence, therefore leads to the irresistible conclusion that Both Babu Lal (deceased) and Maiyadin injured were peaceful interveners. This fact that both Babu Lal (deceased) and Maiyadin injured were peaceful interveners clearly indicated that the persons who assaulted them were individually liable for the assault. One could thus infer that they assaulted Maiyadin injured and Babu Lal deceased in furtherance of their common intention which was formed then and there. The view which we have taken is also supported by a series of decisions of this Court and other High Courts.
23. In Queen v. Sabed Ali. (1873) 20 Suth WR (Cri) 5, the case was that an unlawful assembly was formed by a number of persons to take forcible possession over a piece of land. When the members of the unlawful assembly went there, Samad Ali one of the persons who resisted the possession plied his lathi and thereupon Tureeboollah who was armed with a gun fired a shot and killed Samad Ali. The question arose in this case as to whether all the members of the unlawful assembly were guilty of committing the murder of Samad Ali. It should be noted here that Samed Ali in resisting the forcible possession of the land had plied his lathi and then one of the members of the unlawful assembly Tureeboollah fired his gun and killed him. It was held that killing of Samed Ali was the individual act of Tureeboollah and the other members of the unlawful assembly were not liable for it. By the majority judgment it was held that the common object was to achieve a certain object and at the spur of the moment one of he members, though the other members knew was armed with a gun, fired a shot on a member of the other party, the other members were not liable for murder by the operation of Section 149. I.P.C because neither first part nor second part of Section 149, I.P.C would apply as by mere carrying of the gun no inference could be drawn that all the members knew that particular offence was likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object.
24. In Charan Singh v. State, AIR 1959 All 255 : (1959 Cri LJ 419) it was observed as below:—
“Even if the Act is an individual act of one member and it is not actually done in prosecution of the common object all the other members will be liable for it provided they knew and it must be noted here that positive knowledge is necessary, it is not sufficient to show that they ought to have or might have known or that they had reason to believe that it might happen that the act was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. The use of the word ‘Likely’ in the second part of Section 149. I.P.C implies some thing more than a possibility. A thing is likely to happen only when it will probably happen or may very well happen.”
25. In Hukum Singh v. State, AIR 1959 All 690 : (1959 Cri LJ 1258) it was observed as below:
“The difficulty however arises when the common object of the assembly is not murder but some other unlawful object, and death is caused in the course of the achievement of that object. The question that arises, in such a case is whether the evidence, discloses that in achieving the common object which was not the commission of murder, the members of the assembly wees determined to go to any length, even to the length of committing murder. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the commission of murder must be deemed to have been included within the common object of the assembly. On the other hand, if the answer to the question is in the negative and yet on the sudden coming into existence of an unexpected situation, death is caused by the isolated act of one of the an embers of the assembly, that member alone will be liable for the killing, and the and of Section 149. Indian Penal Code, cannot, in such a case be invoked to fasten liability for the murder an the other members of the assembly.”
26. In Hanif v. State, AIR 1962 All 272 : (1962-1 Cri LJ 698). the following observation was made:—
“The plain meaning of the first part of Section 149. I.P.C, in my opinion, is that all the members of an unlawful assembly render themselves liable to punishment for any and every offence committed by any member or more members of that assembly in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly which, as I understand It, means that its commission was in the contemplation of the unlawful assembly directly or impliedly. In the present case, in view of the finding of Mulla J. with which I have respectfully agreed, that the killing of Darshan was not in the contemplation of or intended by any other member of the unlawful assembly except Hanif it cannot be said that his murder was committed in furtherance of the common object of the assembly and so the eleven appellants, whose case is before me, are not liable to punishment under the first part of Section 149. I.P.C”
27. Further, it was held as below:—
“In the circumstances it cannot be held that the eleven accused, who were armed with lathis and who by their conduct gave a positive indication of their mind not to kill Darshan but only to beat him realised or knew that the murder of Darshan was likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object. Therefore, they cannot be held guilty under Section 302. I.P.C even with the application of the second part of Section 149. I.P.C”
28. In Kshudiram Majhi v. State of W. Bengal. (1972) 3 SCC 479 : AIR 1972 SC 1221 : (1972 Cri LJ 756), a similar view was held.
29. A perusal of these cases, therefore, leave no room for doubt that the unlawful assembly was not formed to give a beating to Maiyadin injured or to commit the murder of Babu Lal (deceased). The first part of Section. 149, I.P.C would, therefore, not apply on the facts which we have found in this case. The second part of Section 149. I.P.C too will not apply for the simple reason that the evidence fell short of coming to the conclusion that the murder of Babu Lal or the assault on Maiyadin injured was probably to happen or might have very well happened. The use of the word ‘Likely’ in the second part of the section means some clear evidence that the unlawful assembly had such a knowledge. In the present case, none of the members of the unlawful assembly knew that while they were chasing Khushali. Maiyadin injured and Babu Lal (deceased) would drop in and try to peacefully intervene. Therefore, only those appellants against whom there is clear evidence that they caused injuries to Babu Lal resulting in his death would be guilty of the murder with the and of Section 34. I.P.C Similarly, only those appellants against whom there was clear evidence that they caused injuries to Maiyadin injured would be liable for his injuries.
30. There is evidence on the record that Gopali caused injuries to Babu Lal with his pharsa and Vishwanath caused injuries to him with a lathi. It can be safely presumed that there was a meeting of minds between these two appellants for causing injuries to Babu Lal which resulted in his death. Both these appellants, therefore, will be deemed to have caused injuries to Babu Lal in furtherance of their common intention and as such they alone can be held guilty for the murder of Babu Lal by applying Section 34. I.P.C
31. It is proved from the evidence on the record that one of the injuries of Maiyadin injured was of a grievous nature. It is further proved that he was assaulted by Ram Dayal, Maiyadin accused. Bhagwati. Gopali. and Sukhdeo. The last two were armed with Pharsas and this fact is fully proved from the evidence on the record. In their case also. Section 34. I.P.C would apply. They assaulted Maiyadin injured in furtherance of their common intention and therefore, they are guilty of the offence under Section 325, I.P.C read with Section 34. I.P.C
32. So far as the Causing of injuries to Khushali is concerned there is no room for doubt that Khushali was assaulted in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the appellants were the members. All the appellants are therefore guilty under Section 324. I.P.C read with Section 149, I.P.C because one of the injuries of Khushali was an incised wound. As members of this unlawful assembly. Gopali and Sukhdeo were each armed with a Pharsa. Therefore, they are also guilty under Section 148 I.P.C The rest of the appellants being armed with a lathi each, are guilty of the offence under Section 147 I.P.C
33. In the result, the appeal succeeds in part. The conviction and sentence of Sukhdeo alias Sukhdeon. Maiyadin. Ram Dayal, Jagat Pal. Ramnath. Sahdi and Bhagwati appellants undei Section 302. I.P.C read with Section 149. I.P.C are set aside. The conviction of Gopali appellant under Section 302. I.P.C and of Bishuntha alias Vishwanath appellant under Section 302, I.P.C read with Section 149, I.P.C is converted into one under Section 302, I.P.C read with Section 34. I.P.C and the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to them for committing the murder of Babu Lal is maintained.
34. The conviction and sentence of all the appellants under Section 325, I.P.C read with Section 149. I.P.C are set aside. Ram Dayal. Maiyadin. Bhagwati. Gopali and Sukhdeo appellants are convicted under Section 325. I.P.C read with Section 34 I.P.C and each is sentenced to three years' R.I for causing grievous injury to Maiyadin injured.
35. The conviction and sentence of all the appellants under Section 324, I.P.C read with Section 149. I.P.C are maintained.
36. The order of conviction and sentence passed upon Jagatpal, Ramnath. Sahdi. Bishuntha alias Vishwanath, Ram Dayal, Maiyadin, Bhagwati appellants under Section 147. I.P.C is maintained.
37. The conviction and sentence of Gopali and Sukhdeo appellants under Section 148 are upheld. All the sentences of all the appellants shall run concurrently.
38. Gopali appellant is in jail. He shall serve out the sentences awarded to him. The rest of the appellants are on bail. They shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentences awarded to them.
39. Order accordingly.
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