G.C Mathur, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of the Distt. Judge, Saharanpur, acting as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, awarding a sum of Rs. 10,400/- as compensation to Sukhbir Singh, respondent No. 1, against the appellants.

2. Appellant No. 1 Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. Deoband, owns a jeep No. USV-5511. On the night of 5-3-1968, this Jeep was sent to P.S Deoband at the request of the S.O It was being driven by Lal Singh driver, appellant No. 3. At about 9-30 p.m the driver found that his way was blocked by a Bar at party, some of the members of which were dancing on the road to the tune of the band which was accompanying the Barat. The driver got down from the jeep leaving the ignition keys in the jeep and went to the Police Station. While the driver had gone to the Police Station, someone drove the jeep and caused an accident whereby Sukhbir Singh's left hand was severed from the forearm. Sukhbir Singh was standing at that time watching the Barat near an electric pole. His left arm was crushed between the jeep and the electric pole. Sukhbir Singh was taken to the Hospital where he remained from 6-3-1968 to 15-4-1968. On 3-5-1968, Sukhbir Singh lodged his claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Saharanpur (Distt. Judge, Saharanpur), claiming a sum of Rs. 51,000/- as compensation. To his claim Sukhbir Singh impleaded four parties. The first party was the Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. Deoband, the owner of the jeep. The second party was the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Delhi with which the jeep was insured. The third party was Mr. S.N Sharma, the Factory Manager of the Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. According to the claimant, Mr. S.N Sharma was in the jeep at the time it was being driven to the Police Station and that it was he who drove the jeep after the driver left and caused the accident. The fourth party was Lal Singh, the driver of jeep. The Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. filed a written statement denying its liability for payment of any compensation to the claimant. It also challenged the amount of compensation claimed. It, further, set up a case that Mr. S.N Sharma, the Factory Manager, was not in the jeep, that he was not driving the jeep when the accident occurred and that it was some member of the marriage party who unauthorisedly drove the jeep in the driver's absence and caused the accident. According to the Corporation's written statement the S.O had telephoned the Asstt. Manager of the Corporation to send the jeep for some urgent Government work at 9-30 P.M and accordingly the jeep was sent to the police station with driver Lal Singh and that there was no one else with him in the jeep. Driver Lal Singh filed a written statement substantially on the same lines as the written statement of the Corporation. Mr. Sharma also filed a written statement on the same lines. He further added that he did not know driving at all, that he was not in the jeep on that night and that between 8 and 10 P.M on the night of occurrence he was at the house of Mr. G.D Saluja, Controller of Accounts of the Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd., who had invited him for dinner. The insurance company also filed a written statement disclaiming all liability for the compensation on the ground that at the time of the accident the jeep was being driven by an unauthorised person. On the pleadings of the parties the Tribunal framed the following issues:—

“1. Whether the respondent No. 3. Mr. S.N Sharma was driving the jeep at the time of the accident? If not, what is its effect?

2. Whether at the time of the accident the jeep was being driven by a miscreant?

3. To what amount of compensation, if any, is the claimant entitled?”

3. In support of his case the claimant examined himself as A.W 1. Kunwar Sen as AW 2, Jai Prakash as AW 3 and Dr. B.G Mathur as AW 4. The appellants also examined four witnesses, namely, Lal Singh driver (DW 1), Mr. S.N Sharma (DW 2), Bal Kishan (DW 3) and Mr. Saluja (DW 4).

4. Upon a consideration of the evidence the Tribunal came to conclusion that at the time of the accident Mr. S.N Sharma was driving the jeep. It then held that the claimant was entitled only to a sum of Rs. 10,400/- as compensation. The Tribunal further held that the insurance company was not liable, as at the time when the accident occurred the jeep was not being driven by a licenced driver. The Tribunal further held that Lal Singh driver was negligent in leaving the ignition key in the jeep, with the result that Mr. S.N Sharma was enabled to drive the jeep and to cause the accident and, therefore, Lal Singh driver was liable for the compensation. Mr. S.N Sharma, who was found to have caused the accident, was also held liable to pay the compensation. The Tribunal further held that the Corporation being the master of Lal Singh, driver of the jeep, on account of whose negligence the accident occurred when he was working in the course of employment was also liable to pay the compensation. The Tribunal accordingly ordered that the appellants shall pay Rs. 10,400/- by way of compensation to the claimant together with pending and future interest at 6% p.a and costs commensurate with the amount determined in favour of the claimant. Against the order of the Tribunal the appellants have preferred this appeal. The claimant Sukhbir Singh has preferred cross-objections claiming that higher amount should have been awarded as compensation.

5. The first question which arises for consideration is whether Mr. S.N Sharma was driving the jeep at the time of the accident or whether it was some other person who was doing so.

(His Lordship then considered the evidence and circumstances and concluded:—)

6. Considering the evidence and circumstances as a whole I have come to the conclusion that it has not been established that Mr. Sharma was driving the jeep at the time when the accident occurred. It is likely that some member of the Barat party got into the jeep and drove it causing the accident.

7. The next question which requires consideration is whether Lal Singh driver was guilty of any negligence and was liable for payment of compensation to Sukhbir Singh. Lal Singh has admitted that he left the ignition keys of the jeep when he left the jeep on the road and went to the Police Station. He has pleaded that he was beaten and dragged out of the jeep by the Baraties who were drunk and that he had no opportunity of taking out the keys. In other words he has pleaded that it was not on account of any negligence of his that he left the keys in the jeep, but that it was due to the action of the Baraties in forcibly dragging him out of the jeep that the keys were left in the jeep.

8. (His Lordship then considered the evidence and concluded:—)

9. Having considered the evidence of these two witnesses, I am unable to accept Lal Singh's version that he was forcibly taken down from the jeep and was prevented from taking out the keys. It appears to me that Lal Singh negligently left the keys in the jeep.

10. It was then urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the negligence of Lal Singh in leaving the keys in the jeep itself was not the cause of the accident, that the real cause of the accident was the driving of the jeep by a third person and, therefore, neither the driver nor the Ganga Sugar Corporation is liable for the injuries caused to Sukhbir Singh.

11. In Englehart v. Farrant & Co. . 1897 1 Q.B 240. it was laid down by the Court of Appeal that a master is liable for negligence of his servant whereby opportunity was given for a third person to commit a wrongful or negligent act immediately producing the damage complained of. The negligence of the servant must be the effective cause of the damage. The servant's carelessness in not anticipating what might not unreasonably happen can be the real and effective cause of the mischief. In this case defendant employed a man to drive his cart with instructions not to leave it, and a lad, who had nothing to do with the driving, to go in the cart and deliver parcels to the customer of the defendant. The driver left the cart and while he was absent, the lad drove it and caused a collision with the plaintiff's carriage. It was held that the negligence of the driver in so leaving the cart was the effective cause of the damage and the defendant was liable.

12. In Latham v. R. Johnson & Nephew Ltd. . 1913 1 K.B.D 398. Hamilton, J. observed as follows:—

“…………a person who, in neglect of ordinary care, places or leaves his property in a condition which may be dangerous to another may be answerable for the resulting injury, even though but for the intervening act of a third person or the plaintiff himself that injury would not have occurred. Children acting in the wantonness of infancy and adults acting on the impulse of personal peril may be and often are only links in a chain of causation extending from such initial negligence to the subsequent injury No doubt such intervener is a causa sine qua non, but unless the intervention is a fresh, independent cause, the person guilty of the original negligence will still be the effective cause, if he ought reasonably to have anticipated such intervention and to have foreseen that if they occurred the result would be that his negligence would lead to mischief.”

13. In Rouff v. Long and Co. . 1916 1 K.B 148. it was laid down that:—

“A person lawfully leaving his property unattended in a highway must take reasonable means to prevent such mischief as he ought to contemplate as likely to arise from his user of the highway. He is not liable for damage caused by his property through such interference of third persons as he is not bound to anticipate.”

14. In this case the defendants' servants momentarily left stationary but unattended in a highway a steam motor lorry. In order to start the lorry, it was necessary to with-draw a hand-pin from the gear lever and to move that and two other levers. Two soldiers seeing the lorry mounted it. One tried but failed to set it in motion, but the other succeeded in starting it backwards so that it ran into the plaintiff's shop front and caused damage. It was held that the defendants' servants were not guilty of any negligence in leaving the lorry unattended.

Avory, J. observed—

“To determine whether this negligence (if any) was an effective or proximate cause of damage the question to be answered is this: Admitting that the accident would not have occurred but for the intervention of a third person, was such an intervention a thing which the defendants as reasonable men ought to have anticipated? If it was then of course it is no answer to say that it was not their original negligence which caused the accident; the intervention is one link in chain of causation and they are responsible.”

Lush, J. observed:—

“We need not go so far as to hold that a person lawfully leaving a vehicle standing unattended in a highway can in no circumstances be held responsible for damage through the intervening act of a third party. The circumstances might be such that he ought to recognise that he was offering a temptation or invitation to another to set the vehicle in motion and that danger might result to third persons. The chain of casualty may be complete although a link in the chain is the intervening act of a third person. But the act which causes the mischief must be one which he would properly anticipate.”

15. The law relating to the liability of drivers and of their masters in cases drivers leaving vehicles on the highway appears to be that:

(1) it is not correct that in every case where the damage is caused by the intervention of a third party the driver and the master are not liable, (2) the driver and consequently the master in such cases is liable if the driver was guilty of initial negligence and if, as a reasonable man, he could have anticipated the intervention of a third party; and (3) the driver and consequently the master will not be responsible if the damage is caused by a fresh independent cause which, in the circumstances, the driver, as a reasonable man, could not have anticipated.

16. Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear that Lal Singh driver was guilty of negligence in leaving the keys in the jeep and he should have reasonably anticipated that someone would get into the jeep and try to drive it. In fact, Lal Singh has admitted in his statement that he knew that to leave the keys in the switch of a motor vehicle, which was left at a place where there was a crowd, was dangerous. He further admitted that where there were drunken people it would be dangerous to leave a motor vehicle with the keys in the switch. In this case it is obvious that Lal Singh driver, as a reasonable man, could have anticipated that some one from amongst the Baraties or from amongst the people using the road may get into the jeep and drive it. That being so, the negligence of Lal Singh driver was the effective and proximate cause of the accident. He was liable for the damages for the injuries caused to Sukhbir Singh. Since the driver was acting in the course of his employment, his master the Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. was also liable for the same.

17. The last point urged by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. had offered to give suitable employment to Sukhbir Singh which he refused to accept and that on account of this refusal he was disentitled to any compensation. The Tribunal has held that the offer of employment was not sincere but was made to circumvent the claim. The offer of employment was made at the fag end of the arguments and the offer was only to employ Sukhbir Singh on the temporary job of Chaukidar. I agree with the Tribunal that the offer was not a bonafide offer and the refusal of the offer did not disentitle Sukhbir Singh from claiming compensation.

18. Having disposed of all the questions arising in the appeal, I now come to the cross-objection. Sukhbir Singh claiming that his income before the accident was Rs. 275/- per month.

(His Lordship then examined the basis on which the Tribunal had calculated the compensation payable and concluded:—)

19. There was, thus no error in fixing the average monthly income of the claimant and determinining the amount of compensation. The cross-objection is without force. The appeal is, accordingly dismissed with costs with this modification that appellant no. 2 Mr. S.N Sharma is not personally liable for the payment of the amount of compensation. The cross-objection is dismissed but without costs.

20. Appeal and cross-objection dismissed.