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Man Singh v. Beer Sahai And Others
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns competing claims to a portion of Colonization Plot No. 12 (comprising revenue plots Nos. 101 and 105) originally settled in 1951 with the respondent Bir Sahai by the Administrative Officer, Colonization Department, District Nainital.
Dispute: Man Singh (appellant) claimed hereditary tenancy over approximately 15 bighas of plot No. 105. On 2 November 1957 Bir Sahai (respondent) filed Civil Suit No. 279 of 1957 in the Court of the Munsif, Nainital, seeking an injunction to restrain forcible dispossession from Colonization Plot No. 12; defendants included the Administrative Officer and Man Singh. Man Singh contended that 15 bighas of plot No. 105 were not part of Colonization Plot No. 12 and had been allotted to him by the Administrative Officer on 20 November 1957.
The learned Munsif found that Colonization Plot No. 12 included plots 101 and 105, that the lease in favour of Bir Sahai included the entire area of plot No. 105, and that the Administrative Officer had no power to lease any part of plot No. 105 to Man Singh; the suit was decreed for Bir Sahai. The District Judge affirmed that decision on 8 July 1959, and the appellate decision became final between the parties.
Thereafter, on 27 October 1959, Man Singh filed a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act in the Revenue Court for the ejectment of Bir Sahai in respect of the 15 bigha area. In that revenue proceeding, one defence was that the prior civil decision operated as res judicata.
The Revenue Court held that Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act required civil courts to refer questions of tenancy to the revenue court and thus concluded the Munsif had no jurisdiction to decide the tenancy issue; it treated the civil decree as without jurisdiction and therefore not res judicata. On merits the Revenue Court (Assistant Collector) found the allotment in favour of Man Singh did not include the area claimed by Bir Sahai and decreed the ejectment; that decree was upheld on appeal and second appeal.
Bir Sahai obtained a writ in the High Court. A learned single Judge allowed the writ, held the civil court's decision operated as res judicata, described non-reference under Section 288 as an irregularity not affecting jurisdiction, set aside the Board of Revenue's decree, and remitted the matter to the Board of Revenue for decision in accordance with law. Man Singh appealed to the court that produced the present opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the previous decision of the Civil Court operates as res judicata in the subsequent revenue ejectment suit.
- Whether non-compliance with Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act renders the civil court's decision on tenancy rights void for want of jurisdiction.
- Whether the civil court's adjudication of tenancy was an issue "incidental" within the meaning of Section 11 (res judicata) so as not to operate as a bar.
- Whether the doctrine of constructive res judicata bars the plaintiff (Man Singh) from raising, in the revenue suit, the plea that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to decide tenancy rights.
- Whether the absence of the State Government (landlord) as a party in the prior civil suit prevents the prior decision from operating as res judicata in the present suit in which the Government is a party.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Man Singh)
- The earlier civil decision will not in law operate as res judicata.
- Non-compliance with Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act rendered the civil decision on tenancy without jurisdiction.
- The decision on tenancy rights in the civil suit was merely incidental to that suit (and therefore not binding under res judicata).
- The plaintiff-appellant is not barred by constructive res judicata from raising the plea of lack of jurisdiction of the civil court regarding tenancy rights.
- Because the State Government (landlord) was not a party to the previous civil suit, the prior decision on tenancy rights will not operate as res judicata in the present suit where the State is a party.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments for the respondent beyond the factual and procedural descriptions and the positions taken by the Revenue Court and the learned single Judge as summarized above.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhagwan Dayal v. Mst. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287 | Authority relied upon by appellant regarding res judicata (context not fully recited in the opinion). | The court noted the appellant relied on this case but did not discuss it at length because a Division Bench decision of the High Court (Jodhan v. Board of Revenue) already addressed the point and was treated as controlling. |
| Jodhan v. Board of Revenue, 1967 All LJ 32 = AIR 1967 All 442 | Held that where neither or only one of two proceedings is a civil suit, the doctrine of res judicata (shorn of limitations imposed by Section 11 CPC) is to be applied. | The court treated this Division Bench decision as dispositive on the point and applied it to hold that the decision in the previous civil suit would operate as res judicata in the present revenue suit. |
| Jankirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 633 | One of the Supreme Court authorities considered in the Jodhan decision (specific principle not restated in full in this opinion). | The court recorded that Jodhan had considered this decision among others in reaching its conclusion; the Jodhan precedent informed the court's conclusion on res judicata. |
| Gulab Chand v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 | One of the Supreme Court authorities considered in the Jodhan decision (specific principle not restated in full in this opinion). | Used as part of the body of authority considered by the High Court in Jodhan; the present court relied on Jodhan rather than re-opening the question. |
| Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217 | Where a trial court was not a court of competent jurisdiction or acted without jurisdiction, if an appeal lies and the appellate court affirms the decision, the appellate affirmation cures the jurisdictional defect; such affirmed decisions are not nullities and operate as res judicata. | The court relied on this principle to hold that even if the civil trial court had a jurisdictional defect, the appellate affirmation (District Judge's confirmation) cured any such defect and the decision operated as res judicata. |
| Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355 | Distinguished situations where an earlier decision dismissed an application on pure questions of law (statutory interpretation) without deciding issues on merits; decisions on pure law may not yield the same res judicata effect as factual or mixed issues decided on merits. | The court distinguished Mathura Prasad from the present facts, observing that in Mathura Prasad the earlier decision was on a point of statutory interpretation dismissing the matter without entering the merits, whereas here the issue was decided on merits and so Mathura Prasad did not prevent res judicata applying. |
| Mrs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Khanchand Gorumal, AIR 1966 SC 1939 | Authority referenced in the context of the Mathura Prasad discussion concerning applicability of res judicata to mixed questions and questions of law. | Referred to as part of the chain of authority explaining when res judicata applies to matters of fact, mixed questions, and pure questions of law; used to support the court's distinction between decisions on merits and decisions purely on law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a structured fashion addressing each of the principal contentions raised by the appellant:
- The court declined to re-open the question decided by the Division Bench in Jodhan v. Board of Revenue, which had considered Bhagwan Dayal and other Supreme Court precedents and had held that the doctrine of res judicata (appropriately adjusted where one or neither of the proceedings is a civil suit) applied. The court was not persuaded that the matter required referral to a larger Bench, and treated Jodhan as controlling.
- On Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act (which directs civil courts to frame and refer tenancy issues to the appropriate revenue court), the court noted that subsection (1) contains an Explanation excluding clearly untenable tenancy pleas intended to oust civil jurisdiction. The court concluded that Section 288 confers a discretion on the civil court to decide the tenancy issue itself where appropriate; hence non-compliance with Section 288 amounts at most to an irregularity of procedure and does not render the civil court's decision ipso facto void for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore the submission that non-compliance made the civil decision without jurisdiction was rejected.
- The court rejected the submission that the tenancy issue in the civil suit was merely "incidental" under Section 11 CPC. It observed that the pleadings directly raised the tenancy issue, an issue was framed on the point, and a finding was given; the principal question in the civil suit was which party was tenant of the disputed area. Consequently the tenancy issue was substantive and not incidental.
- Regarding the absence of the State Government as a party in the civil suit, the court observed that the Administrative Officer (who acted in settling land and who had granted leases to both parties) was a party to the civil suit and represented the Government's interest. Further, the Government in the present suit had not raised any contention that the Administrative Officer did not represent the Government. Thus the contention that the Government was unrepresented in the prior suit was not sustained.
- On constructive res judicata and the contention that the plaintiff could raise lack-of-jurisdiction in the revenue suit, the court reiterated its earlier conclusion that the civil court's decision on tenancy could not be held to be without jurisdiction. The court further relied on Janardhan Reddy to explain that an appellate affirmation cures a trial court's jurisdictional defect; an appellate court's affirmation cannot be treated as a nullity and will operate as res judicata. The court distinguished Mathura Prasad (where the earlier dismissal turned on pure statutory interpretation and no issue was decided on the merits) from the present case where the earlier decision involved findings on merits.
- Because the prior civil suit had adjudicated the entirety of the disputed 15.3 bighas of plot No. 105 and that decision was held to operate as res judicata, there remained nothing substantive for the revenue court to decide in the present ejectment proceeding. The court therefore concluded that the learned single Judge was not correct in remitting the matter to the Board of Revenue after quashing the Board of Revenue's judgment.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The appeal is dismissed; the previous civil suit's decision operates as res judicata and, as a consequence, the present suit for ejectment stands dismissed.
Specifically: The court dismissed the appeal with costs and observed that the matter need not be remanded to the Board of Revenue for decision afresh; the suit is to stand dismissed.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that Man Singh's appeal fails and the ejectment suit in the revenue jurisdiction is dismissed, because the prior civil decree, adjudicating the tenancy of the disputed area, binds the parties by res judicata.
- The court treated non-compliance with Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act as procedural irregularity not affecting jurisdiction where the civil court has properly conducted a trial and rendered findings on the merits.
- The opinion does not articulate any broader change in law or a new precedent; it applies existing authorities (including Jodhan and Janardhan Reddy) to the facts and resolves the dispute on those bases.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit for ei'ectment of the respondent Bir Sahai under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act.
2. It appears that the colonization plot No. 12 was settled with Bir Sahai in 1951 by the Administrative Officer. Colonization Department. District Nainital. According to Bir Sahai, plot No. 12 consisted of revenue plots Nos. 101 and 105. Disputes arose between Bir Sahai respondent and Man Singh appellant in regard to a portion of plot No. 105. The appellant claimed to be hereditary tenant of 15 Bighas and odd area of plot No. 105. On 2nd November, 1957. Bir Sahai filed a suit No. 279 of 1957 in the Court of the Munsif. Nainital, for an injunction. He arrayed the Administrative Officer. Colonization Department and the appellant as defendants to the suit. The prayer was that the defendants be restrained from forcibly dispossessing the plaintiff from Colonization Plot No. 12. The appellant contested the suit. According to him, a 15 Bigha area of plot No. 105 was not part of colonization plot No. 12 and on 20th November, 1957, this area of plot No. 105 had been allotted to Mm by the Administrative Officer. Colonization Department, and he was the rightful hereditary tenant of this area.
3. The learned Munsif held that Colonization plot No. 12 included the entire area of plots Nos. 101 and 105. The lease in favour of the plaintiff included the entire area of plot No. 105. The Administrative Officer had no power to lease out any part of plot No. 105 to the defendant Man Singh. The allotment in his favour was invalid. Plaintiff Bir Sahai was found to be in possession of the land in dispute. On these findings the suit was decreed. Man Singh preferred an appeal. The learned District Judge confirmed the findings on merits and dismissed the appeal on 8th July, 1959. The appellate decision became final between the parties.
4. Shortly thereafter on 27th October, 1959 the appellant Man Singh filed the present suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act in the Revenue Court for ejectment of the respondent. One of the Pleas raised in defence was that the previous decision in the civil suit operated as res judicata. The present suit was confined to the 15 Bigha area of plot No. 105 which alone was claimed by the plaintiff as his hereditary tenancy. In defence it was pleaded that the plaintiff had no right in the land as the area in dispute had been allotted to him by the Administrative Officer.
5. The Revenue Court held that Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act provided that when an issue of tenancy right arises in a civil suit, the Civil Court should refer it to the revenue court for findings. The learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to decide that issue himself. The decree passed by him was without jurisdiction and hence did not operate as res judioata. Going into the merits of the case the Assistant Collector held that the allotment in favour of the defendant did not include the area claimed by the plaintiff appellant On these findings the suit for ejectment of Bir Sahai from plot No. 105, measuring 15.3 Bighas was decreed. This decree was maintained in appeal as well as in second appeal. Aggrieved, Bir Sahai instituted a writ petition in this Court. A learned single Judge held that the decision of the Civil Court in the previous suit operated as res judicata under the doctrine of res judicata. It was also observed that since the appellant could raise this point in the previous case but for reasons best known to him he did not raise this point he could not be allowed to raise it in the present case. It was held that the non-reference of the issue to the Revenue Court was merely an irregularity which did not affect the jurisdiction. On these findings the writ petition was allowed and the decree was set aside. The matter was sent back to the Board of Revenue for decision in accordance with law. Aggrieved, the plaintiff Man Singh has come up in appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has made the following submissions :
(1) The previous decision of the Civil Court will not in law, operate as res judicata.
(2) Non-compliance with Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act rendered the civil decision on the issue of tenancy inoperative.
(3) The decision on the issue of tenancy rights in the Civil Court was an issue incidental in that case, as such it will not operate as res iudicata.
(4) The plaintiff-appellant was not barred by constructive res judicata from raising the plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in deciding the issue of tenancy rights.
(5) Since the landlord, namely, the State Government was not a party in the previous suit the decision in that suit on the question of tenancy rights will not operate as res iudicata.
7. In support of the first point, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dayal v. Mst. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287. We need not discuss this point elaborately because this point is covered by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jodhan v. Board of Revenue, 1967 All LJ 32 = (AIR 1967 All 442). In that case after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Daval AIR 1962 SC 287 as well as a subsequent decision in Jankirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 633 as well as the Supreme Court decision in Gulab Chand v. State of Gujarat. AIR 1965 SC 1153, it was held that where neither of the two proceedings or only one of them is a civil suit, the doctrine of res judicata shorn of the limitations imposed by Section 11 is to be applied. Learned counsel pressed upon us that this case requires reconsideration. We are not satisfied that this is a fit case for referring to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the question. In view of this decision, the decision in the previous suit on the question of tenancy right would operate as res judicata in the present revenue suit.
8. Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act provided that if in any suit instituted in the Civil Court any question regarding tenancy right arises, the Civil Court was to frame an issue and submit it for decision to the appropriate revenue court. The finding given by the revenue court was to be binding on the Civil Court and was to be deemed to be part of the finding of the Civil Court for purposes of appeal. The Explanation to Sub-section (1) provided that the plea of tenancy which is clearly untenable and intended to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court shall not be deemed to raise a plea of tenancy. In the previous civil suit the defendant had not raised any plea that either the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as such or that the issue with respect to the tenancy rights raised by the defendant ought to be referred to the revenue court. The Civil Court may well have considered that the plea was frivolous and need not be sent to the revenue court. The enactment of the Explanation to Section 288 (1) confers a discretion upon the Civil Court on the question of reference of issue relating to tenancy rights. It cannot hence be said that Section 288 lays down a complete and rigid bar upon the Civil Court for deciding a plea of tenancy. If in a particular case a plea of tenancy is decided by the Civil Court that decision cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. At the most it may be said that the Civil Court committed an irregularity of procedure in deciding the case. We are hence unable to accept the submission that non-compliance with Section 288 rendered the decision of the suit without jurisdiction.
9. It was then urged that the plea of tenancy right in the civil suit raised an issue incidental to the case within the meaning of Section 11 and it was not a material issue. We are unable to agree. The pleadings directly raised the issue. An issue was framed upon the point. A finding was given upon it. The principal question raised for decision in the suit was whether the plaintiff or the defendant was the tenants of the area in dispute. It cannot hence be said that the issue was incidental to that suit. It was argued that since the scheme of the Tenancy Act was that the issues of tenancy right were to be tried exclusively by the revenue court, the necessary inference was that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try such a suit and therefore whenever such an issue is raised before the Civil Court the issue must be held to be arising incidentally in that suit. Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy. Act provides a discretion to the Civil Court to decide the issue itself instead of referring it to the revenue court. It cannot hence be said that the Civil Courts are absolutely barred from deciding such an issue. Consequently if such an issue is raised and decided it cannot be said that such an issue was incidental to the case. We do not find any merit in the submission.
10. The point that in the civil suit the Government was not a party and so the decision would not operate as res judicata in the present suit to which the State Government is a party does not appear to have been raised at any stage up-till now. Moreover, the Administrative Officer was acting on behalf of the Government in settling land with the parties. The Administrative Officer granted a lease to the plaintiff as well as to the defendant. The Administrative Officer was acting for the Government. He was made a party. It cannot hence be said that the Government which was landlord was not represented in that suit. Moreover, the Government which is a party to the present suit, has not raised any plea that the Administrative Officer could not or did not represent the interest of the Government.
11. It was then urged that the doctrine of constructive res iudicata will not debar the plaintiff from raising the plea that the decision of the Civil Court in the previous suit was without jurisdiction. Even so, as we have held above the decision of the Civil Court on the plea of tenancy cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. Hence this point presents no difficulty. Moreover, in Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad. AIR 1951 SC 217, it was held that where the trial Court is not a court of competent jurisdiction or where it has acted without jurisdiction even then if en appeal lies from its decision and an appeal is filed and disposed of by the appellate Court, the jurisdictional defect in trial Court's decision stands cured. If the appellate Court affirms the decision of the trial Court, it may be that it thereby decided wrongly that the trial Court had jurisdiction to try the case but its order cannot be treated as a nullity. In other words the jurisdictional defect if any in the trial Court's decision stands cured after the appellate decision. It cannot be said that the decision will not operate as res judicata on the around of lack of jurisdiction. In this connection reliance was placed for the appellant upon Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355, in that case the appellant submitted an application in the court of the Civil Judge that the standard rent of the land be determined under Section 11 of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The Civil Judge rejected the application holding that the provisions of that Act were not applicable to open land let for constructing buildings for residence, education etc. etc. On revision the Bombay High Court confirmed this view. In another case the Bombay High Court held that & building lease in respect of an open plot was not excluded from Section 6(1) of the Act. This latter decision of the Bombay High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Khanchand Gorumal, AIR 1966 SC 1939. After the second set of decision by the Bombay High Court, the appellant made a fresh petition in the court of the Small Causes, Bombay for an order to determine the standard rent of the premises. The application was rejected on the ground that the previous decision operated as res judicata. This order was confirmed by the High Court of Bombay. In this context the Supreme Court observed:
"It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata, the court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not for the same reason be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression 'matter in issue' in Section 11. Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the court or a decision of the court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resorting to the rule of res judicata, a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of the order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land."
It will be seen that the Supreme Court was keen to emphasise that the decision of an issue of fact or mixed issue will operate as res judicata but the decision of an issue relating to a pure question of law will not. On the facts of that case it is clear that in the earlier proceeding the trial Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and for that reason dismissed it. No issue arising in the case was decided. This case hence deals with a situation different than that in Janardhan Reddy's case. In Janardhan Reddy's case issues arising on facts and law were determined on merits and it was held that even if it be held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the case. Yet the decision was valid if it was affirmed in appeal. In Mathura Prasad's case the decision was merely on the interpretation of the statute resulting in the dismissal of the application without entering into the merits of the case. Mathura Prasad's case will hence not apply where the issue has been decided on merits. To that situation Janardhan Reddy's case is more appropriately applicable.
12. In our opinion, none of the points raised in support of the appeal have any merit.
13. The present suit was for ejectment relating to 15.3 Bighas area of plot No. 105. This entire area was included in the previous suit. After the decision in the previous civil suit is held to operate as res judicata, there is nothing left for decision in this case. In this view the learned single Judge was not right in remanding the case to the Board of Revenue for decision in accordance with law, after the judgment of the Board of Revenue had been quashed.
14. In the result the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs subject to the observation that the case need not go back to the Board of Revenue for decision afresh. The suit will stand dismissed.
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