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Lallan Ram v. Gobri Ram
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit filed by the plaintiff seeking a declaration that defendant No. 1 was not the plaintiff's adopted son and that certain property listed in the plaint was the plaintiff's exclusive property. The trial Court partly decreed and partly dismissed the suit, holding that defendant No. 1 was the adopted son and declaring both parties as co-owners of the property. On appeal, the Lower Appellate Court declared the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the property but dismissed the claim that defendant No. 1 was not adopted, holding that this claim was barred by limitation. The defendant filed this second appeal challenging these findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Lower Appellate Court's finding that defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff is supported by the evidence.
- Whether the doctrine of factum valet applies to the facts of this case to validate the adoption despite procedural deficiencies.
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of exclusive ownership of the disputed property despite the limitation bar on the adoption claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The finding that defendant No. 1 was not adopted is not supported by the evidence on record.
- The doctrine of factum valet should apply, validating the adoption despite any procedural irregularities.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- Not explicitly detailed in the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lakshman Singh v. Rup Kanwar, AIR 1961 SC 1378 | Mandatory nature of the ceremony of giving and taking in Hindu adoption law. | Used to hold that since the mandatory ceremony was not proved, the adoption was invalid and factum valet did not apply. |
| Priyanath v. Indumati, AIR 1971 Orissa 211 | Application of the doctrine of factum valet in adoption cases. | Considered but noted that the proposition of law was too widely stated and not fully applicable here. |
| Balusu v. Balusu, (1899) ILR 21 All 460 (PC) | Application of factum valet in cases where breach is of directory requirements. | Referenced to distinguish cases where factum valet applies and where it does not. |
| Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328 | Limitation law bars remedy but not the right; exceptions in some categories. | Supported the view that limitation does not bar incidental determination of adoption status when deciding property ownership. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court upheld the Lower Appellate Court's finding that the defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff, emphasizing that this finding was based on evidence appraisal which cannot be re-examined in a second appeal. The Court explained that the doctrine of factum valet—which validates completed acts despite contravention of directory provisions—does not apply here because the mandatory ceremony of giving and taking in adoption was not proved. The Court distinguished between mandatory and directory requirements, citing precedent to clarify that the mandatory nature of the adoption ceremony precludes application of factum valet. Regarding property ownership, the Court reasoned that even if the adoption claim was barred by limitation, the issue of adoption was incidental and necessary for deciding ownership. Limitation bars the remedy but not the right, and thus the plaintiff could rely on the adoption status incidentally to establish exclusive ownership. Given the finding that defendant No. 1 was not adopted, the Court concluded that the property belongs exclusively to the plaintiff and declined to interfere with the factual finding of the Lower Appellate Court.
Holding and Implications
The Court dismissed the appeal with costs, thereby upholding the Lower Appellate Court's decision that defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the disputed property. The direct effect is that the plaintiff retains exclusive ownership, and the defendant's appeal challenging adoption status and property rights fails. The opinion does not establish any new legal precedent beyond affirming established principles regarding mandatory adoption ceremonies and the scope of limitation law in incidental issues.
1. This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for declaration that defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff and that the property shown in list Kha and Da of the plaint was the exclusive property of the plaintiff. The suit was contested by the defendant No. 1 on various grounds and was partly decreed and partly dismissed by the trial Court. The trial Court found that the defendant No. 1 was the adopted son of the plaintiff and consequently it dismissed the suit so far as relief of declaration that defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff is concerned. In regard to the relief about ownership of the property in dispute a decree was granted by the trial Court declaring the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 to be co-owners of the said property. On appeal by the plaintiff the Lower Appellate Court has decreed the suit for declaration that the plaintiff was the exclusive owner of the property in dispute. It has, however, dismissed the suit for the second relief, viz., that the defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff. Even though the Lower Appellate Court on appraisal of evidence has recorded a finding that the defendant No. 1 had not been proved to have been adopted by the plaintiff, it dismissed the suit so far as this relief is concerned on the ground that the suit qua this relief was barred by time. Aggrieved the defendant has filed this second appeal.
2. In the second appeal the finding of the Lower Appellate Court that the defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff has been challenged mainly on two grounds: (1) that the said finding is not borne out from the evidence on record and' (2) that in any case the principle of factum valet was applicable to the facts of the case. So far as the first point is concerned the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court being based on appraisal of evidence it is not open to this Court to reappraise the said evidence and record a contrary finding in second appeal. The plea of factum valet is also not sustainable. The meaning of this doctrine is that where a fact is accomplished or an act is done and finally completed, though it may be in contravention of a hundred directory texts, the fact will stand, and the act will be deemed to be legal and binding. This doctrine will not apply where an act is done in contravention of texts which are in their nature mandatory. In the instant case the Lower Appellate Court has recorded a categorial finding that the ceremonies of adoption including that of giving and taking were not proved to have been performed. Under the Hindu Law performance of the ceremony of giving and taking is a mandatory requirement for a valid adoption. See Lakshman Singh v. Rup Kanwar, AIR 1961 SC 1378. Once this mandatory requirement is lacking the fact of adoption cannot be said to have been accomplished and there is consequently no scope of applying the doctrine of factum valet,
3. The learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of Priyanath v. Indumati, AIR 1971 Orissa 211. This case does support the respondent but the proposition of law seems to have been too widely stated in it. Doctrine of factum valet has been applied in cases of adoption also where the breach was of a requirement which was only directory in nature see Balusu v. Balusu, (1899) ILR 21 All 460 (PC).
4. The finding that the plaintiff was the exclusive owner of the property in suit was challenged on the ground that once the suit in regard to the declaration that defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff had been dismissed the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration that he was the exclusive owner of the property in suit. So far as this question is concerned I am of the opinion that even if the suit was not for a declaration in regard to the relief of adoption and was only restricted to the relief of declaration in regard to the property the question as to whether the defendant No. 1 was the adopted son of the plaintiff or not would even then have been incidentally necessary to be decided for arriving at a conclusion 'as to whether the plaintiff was the exclusive owner or defendant No. 1 was also entitled to an interest in the property being the adopted son of the plaintiff. For recording a finding on an incidental issue the plea of limitation loses significance. The law of limitation does not extinguish the right but only bars the remedy except in cases falling under certain categories for example cases regarding possession over immovable property vide Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Bombay, (AIR 1958 SC 328 paragraph 14) consequently even though the suit of the plaintiff may have become barred by time for getting the relief in regard to the declaration that defendant No, 1 was not his adopted son it would still be open to the plaintiff to raise this plea incidentally for getting a determination in regard to the title of the property in dispute. On the finding recorded by the Lower Appellate Court that defendant No. 1 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff there is no escape from the conclusion that the property in dispute belongs exclusively to the plaintiff and the finding of the Lower Appellate Court in this behalf being essentially one of fact does not call for any interference in the second appeal.
5. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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