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Islam Shah v. Wali Mohammad Khan .

Allahabad High Court
Feb 11, 1971
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit claiming arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 252/-, alleged due from the defendant for the period 1 October 1949 to 30 September 1952 in respect of a disputed shop. The plaintiff alleged ownership of the shop and that the defendant was a month-to-month tenant paying Rs. 7 per month; the defendant denied the plaintiff's title and maintained that the shop was Waqf property and that the suit was barred by limitation.

Procedural history (as stated in the opinion): The plaint was originally filed on 3 October 1952 in the Court of Judge Small Causes. On 9 April 1954 the Judge held the suit not cognizable and ordered the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper court. The plaintiff preferred a revision in the High Court, which was dismissed on 11 August 1960. The plaint/record was received back in the court below from the High Court; the plaintiff learned of receipt on 4 August 1961 and applied that same day for return of the plaint. The plaint was returned with an endorsement on 7 August 1961 and presented to the Munsif on that same day.

The trial court found for the plaintiff (holding plaintiff owner, defendant tenant, and that the suit was not barred; the trial court applied Section 14 of the Limitation Act) and decreed the suit. On appeal, the appellate court held that the suit was barred by limitation because the appellate court limited the exclusion of time under Section 14 to the period 4 August 1961 to 7 August 1961 and refused to exclude the period 11 August 1960 to 3 August 1961. Other issues were left undecided by the appellate court. The plaintiff brought a second appeal to this court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the time during which the plaint remained with the court office pending the requisite endorsement under Order 7, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act (i.e., whether the period until the court's endorsement is treated as part of the pending proceedings for limitation purposes).
  2. Whether the plaintiff prosecuted the proceedings before the Judge, Small Causes, with due diligence so as to be entitled to exclusion of time under Section 14.
  3. Whether the appellate court correctly limited the exclusion to the period 4 August 1961 to 7 August 1961 and rejected exclusion of the period from 11 August 1960 to 3 August 1961.
  4. Whether Rule 39 of the General Rules (Civil), which permits a court, when returning a plaint, to order the plaintiff to file a copy of the plaint to be put on record, imposes a mandatory precondition on the return of the plaint (and thereby on when the endorsement/return can be treated as complete for limitation calculation).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (for the plaintiff)

  • The endorsement on the plaint required by Order 7, Rule 10(2) of the CPC is an act of the court (an office duty). Until that endorsement is made the proceedings cannot be said to have ended; consequently, the plaintiff is entitled to exclude the entire time up to the date of actual endorsement (here, endorsement was made on 7 August 1961 and the plaint was presented the same day).
  • Because the endorsement and return occurred on 7 August 1961 and the plaintiff presented the plaint that same day, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Respondent's Arguments (for the defendant)

  • The plaintiff knew when his revision was dismissed by the High Court and should have promptly applied for the return of the plaint; his failure to do so shows lack of diligence and disentitles him to the exclusion of the period between 11 August 1960 and 3 August 1961.
  • Reliance on Rule 39 of the General Rules (Civil): since the court may order the plaintiff to file a copy of the plaint to be put on record when returning a plaint, the defendant's counsel argued that the plaint could not be returned unless the plaintiff supplied a copy, and thus the plaintiff had the duty to approach the trial court for return only after supplying such a copy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bisheshwar Singh v. Ram Daur Singh, 1887 All WN 302 That time during which court officers are engaged in preparation of copy of the plaint and order should not be treated as a period when the plaintiff was not prosecuting proceedings with due diligence. Cited to support the proposition that time spent by court officers in processing return/endorsement should be excluded from limitation calculation.
Muslim Bank v. Hasan Shiraja, AIR 1951 Hyd 57 Where a plaint is returned, endorsement of dates of presentation and return are imperative; until endorsement is made the proceedings cannot be said to have come to an end; delay by court in making endorsement entitles exclusion till the date the actual endorsement was made. Relied on as authority that endorsement is a court duty and delay by court in endorsing justifies excluding the period until endorsement for limitation purposes.
Neerendra Bhooshan Lahiri v. Berhampur Oil Mills Ltd., AIR 1933 Cal 914 Return of plaint with endorsement is part of court duty; time from order to date when plaint is ready for return should be deducted in computing limitation. Used to support conclusion that the proceedings end only when endorsement is made and plaint is ready for return; thus that interval is excluded.
Subbu Naidu v. Varadarajulu Naidu, AIR 1948 Mad 26 Plaintiff entitled to claim exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act until endorsement on plaint under Order 7, Rule 10(c) has been made. Cited to reinforce that exclusion continues until the court has made the endorsement required by Order 7, Rule 10.
Ram Lakhan Tewari v. Mst. Tulsha, 1953 All WR (HC) 634 : (AIR 1954 All 199) Support for the view that the date on which the plaint was tendered back to the plaintiff is the date on which the proceedings ended for the purpose of Section 14. Adopted as additional support for the conclusion that the date of actual return/endorsement is the relevant terminal date for exclusion under Section 14.
Hamida Bibi's case, AIR 1918 All 180 Decision dealing with exclusion under Section 14 in different factual circumstances (plaintiff delayed after dismissal before seeking return); used by respondent but distinguished by the court. The court distinguished this decision because Order 7, Rule 10(2) was not considered in that case and because there the plaintiff actually delayed three months after dismissal before applying for return; thus the court found it not applicable to the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the statutory text of Order 7, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that on returning a plaint the Judge shall endorse the date of its presentation and return, the name of the party presenting it and a brief statement of reasons for returning it. The court treated those words as imperative and concluded that the endorsement is part of the court's duty.

The court reviewed precedents from multiple High Courts and a learned Single Judge which consistently held that the return of the plaint with the required endorsement is an act of the court and that until such endorsement is made the proceedings cannot be said to have ended. Those authorities were invoked to support the proposition that the period during which the court office is engaged in making the endorsement (or preparing the plaint for return) should be excluded from computation of limitation under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

The court analyzed the appellant's factual timeline: the plaintiff learned on 4 August 1961 that the record had been received back; he applied on that same day for return of the plaint; the endorsement was made and the plaint was returned on 7 August 1961 and presented the same day. There was no finding against the plaintiff that he had not prosecuted the proceedings bona fide or with due diligence before the Judge, Small Causes.

The appellate court's approach — that the plaintiff had not explained why he did not apply for return immediately after the High Court dismissal and therefore could not exclude the period 11 August 1960 to 3 August 1961 — was examined. The court observed that if the plaintiff did apply promptly after he learned the record had been received back by the lower court, then the period until the court made its endorsement must be excluded. The court distinguished Hamida Bibi's case because in that case the plaintiff had delayed three months after dismissal before applying for return, whereas in the instant case the plaintiff applied on the same day he learned the record had been received.

The court also considered Rule 39 of the General Rules (Civil), relied upon by the respondent, which permits a court, when returning a plaint, to order the plaintiff to file a copy of the plaint to be put on record. The court rejected the respondent's contention that this provision creates a mandatory precondition (i.e., that the plaint cannot be returned until the plaintiff supplies a copy). The court held that the second part of Rule 39 is permissive ("may") and not mandatory; the endorsement required by Order 7, Rule 10 must be performed by the court office independently of the plaintiff's presence or provision of a copy.

On these bases the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the time taken by the court office in making the endorsement up to the date of actual return and presentation (7 August 1961) and that the appellate court's contrary conclusion was incorrect.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the second appeal and held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act because the period during which the court office was required to make the endorsement under Order 7, Rule 10(2) of the CPC must be treated as part of proceedings pending and excluded for limitation purposes. Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by time.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside.
  • The case is remitted to the appellate court with directions that the appeal before that court be re-numbered to its original number and that the appellate court decide the other points involved in the appeal (which it had not previously decided) in accordance with law after hearing the parties.
  • The second appeal is allowed (the opinion ends with "Appeal allowed").

Broader implication: The court applied and reaffirmed existing authorities construing Order 7, Rule 10(2) and Section 14; the opinion did not purport to establish a novel principle beyond the application and reconciliation of those authorities to the facts before it.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a plaintiff's appeal, arising out of a suit, for arrears of rent, amounting to Rs. 252/-, alleged to have been due from the defendant, from 1st October, 1949 till 30th September, 1952. The arrears of rent, claimed by the plaintiff, were in respect of the shop in dispute.

2. The plaintiff's case was that he was the owner of the shop in dispute and that the defendant was his tenant and was paying Rs. 7/- per month as rent. The defendant's tenancy was from month to month beginning from the 1st of each month and that the rent in respect of the shop in dispute was due from 1st October, 1949 till 30th September, 1952 and that the defendant failed to pay the rent for that period in spite of several demands and hence the suit.

3. The plaintiff filed the suit on 3rd October, 1952 in the Court of Judge Small Causes. On 9th April, 1954, the learned Judge held that the suit was not cognizable by him and ordered the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. Against that order, the plaintiff preferred a revision in the High Court, which was dismissed on 11th August, 1960. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to the benefit of Sections 14 and 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The plaintiff's case further was that Bachchu Shah and his predecessors were not Mutwalli of the shops in dispute, but were the owners of the same and that Bachchu Shah made a gift of his entire property to his grandson, Karim Shah, and after the death of Karim Shah, his brother Hamid Shah became the owner of the property. The plaintiff alleged that he was brought up by Hamid Shah, who had orally gifted the property, including the shop in dispute, to the plaintiff, who is the owner of the same. The defence was that the shop in dispute was the property of Baritala and Bachchu Shah, Karim Shah and Hamid Shah were the Mutwallis of the Waqf. According to the defence, the shop in dispute was the Waqf property, in which the plaintiff had no right or title. It was also denied that the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff or that the shop in dispute was orally gifted to the defendant by Hamid Shah. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation.

4. For a proper understanding of the facts of the case, it is necessary to mention a few more dates. The plaintiff learnt that the record of the case had been received, in the court below from the High Court on 4th August, 1961 and the same day the plaintiff filed an application for the return of the plaint to him. On 7th August, 1961, the plaint was returned to the plaintiff and the same day it was presented in the court of the learned Munsif, Azamgarh.

5. The trial court held that the plaintiff was the owner of the shop in dispute and that the defendant was the plaintiff's tenant. According to the trial court, the suit was not barred by limitation and plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On these findings the trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit.

6. In appeal, it was urged before the appellate court by the defendant that the plaintiff's suit was barred by time and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act.

7. The appellate court observed that from the record of the trial court it was not clear as to when the plaintiff preferred a revision against the order passed by the Judge, Small Causes, ordering the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before the proper court. The appellate court further observed that there was no evidence to show that there was delay in the transmission of the record from the High Court to the Court of the Judge Small Causes, Azamgarh, but the record shows that the plaintiff applied for the return of plaint on 4th August, 1961 and that the plaint was actually returned to the plaintiff on 7th August, 1961, on which date the plaint was presented before the trial court. According to the appellate court, the plaintiff has not explained as to why he did not apply for return of the plaint the moment the record was received from the High Court. The lower appellate court observed that if the plaintiff wanted to take the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, it was incumbent upon him to prove that he was litigating before the Judge Small Causes with due diligence. The following observations of the appellate court are relevant in this connection:—

“The plaintiff had not explained as to why he did not apply for the return of the plaint after his revision was dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court. Had he applied for the return of the plaint, and, the office had delayed in returning the plaint to him, in that case, it could have been said that default was not that of the plaintiff.”

8. The plaintiff has not explained as to why he did not apply for return of the plaint immediately after his revision was dismissed. According to the appellate Court, the plaintiff was entitled to the exclusion of the period only between 4th August, 1961 and 7th August, 1961 and that the period between 11th August, 1960 and 3rd August, 1961 could not be excluded, and, hence the appellate court held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by time.

9. The appellate court did not decide the other questions involved in the appeal before it and allowed the appeal of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's suit was barred by time.

10. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the plaintiff has come up in second appeal to this court.

11. I have heard Sri A.N Verma, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant and Sri Sadiq Ali, learned counsel appearing for the defendant-respondent.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that till the record of the case was received back from the High Court and an endorsement was made on the plaint as required by Order 7, Rule 10(2) of the CPC, the plaintiff could not have been entitled to receive back the plaint. According to the learned counsel, the act of endorsement on the plaint was an act of the Court and since the endorsement on the plaint was actually made on the 7th August, 1961 and since the plaintiff presented the plaint in the court of the learned Munsif, the same day, the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. Shri Syed Sadiq Ali, on the other hand, submitted that the plaintiff knew when his revision was dismissed by the High Court and he should have been more diligent in asking for the return of the plaint, and since he did not do so, the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14.

13. Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the return of the plaint and reads as follows:—

(1) The plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to court in which the suit should have been instituted.

(2) On returning a plaint the Judge shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return, the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the reasons for returning it”

14. It was held by a learned Single Judge of this court in Bisheshwar Singh v. Ram Daur Singh, 1887 All WN 302 that the period of time during which the officers of the court are engaged with the preparation of the copy of the plaint and the order thereon, should not be treated as a period of time during which he was not prosecuting his proceedings with due diligence.

15. It was held by a Division Bench of Hyderabad High Court in the Muslim Bank v. Hasan Shiraja, AIR 1951 Hyd 57 as follows:—

“Where a plaint is returned, the endorsement of the dates of presentation and return are imperative under the law. This endorsement is a part of the Court's duty; therefore, until the endorsement is made, the proceedings cannot be said to have come to an end. Where, therefore, there has been a delay on the part of the court in making the endorsement as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, he is entitled to an exclusion of the period till the date the actual endorsement was made.”

16. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Neerendra Bhooshan Lahiri v. Berhampur Oil Mills Ltd., AIR 1933 Cal 914. It was observed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, as follows:—

“Where a plaint is ordered to be returned to be presented in the proper court, the return of the plaint with an endorsement on it is a part of the court a duty, and until at all events, an endorsement is made and the plaint is ready for return, the proceedings cannot be considered to be at an end. Hence, the time between the date of the order and the date when the plaint is ready for return should be deducted in computing limitation.”

17. The words of Order 7, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure are imperative. The return of the plaint, with an endorsement on it is a part of the Court's duty and until an endorsement is made and the plaint is ready for return, the proceedings cannot be considered to be at end. This means that the proceedings for return of the plaint came to an end only when an endorsement was actually made or the plaint. Then only can the plaint be said to be ready for being returned for presentation to the proper court.

18. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Subbu Naidu v. Varadarajulu Naidu, AIR 1948 Mad 26 held that the plaintiff is entitled to claim exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act till an endorsement on the plaint under Order 7, Rule 10(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made.

19. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceedings bona fide taken in court without jurisdiction and Explanation (a) to Section 14 reads as follows:—

“(a) In excluding the time during which a formal civil proceedings were pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended, shall both be counted.”

20. In view of the authorities quoted above and in view of the wordings of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, it must be held that the date on which the plaint was tendered to the plaintiff will be the date on which proceedings ended. I am supported in my view by a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ram Lakhan Tewari v. Mst. Tulsha, 1953 All WR (HC) 634 : (AIR 1954 All 199).

21. Syed Sadiq Ali placed reliance upon a decision of a Division Bench of this court in Hamida Bibi's case, AIR 1918 All 180, but in Hamida Bibi's case, the Division Bench did not consider Order 7, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence that decision is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Moreover, in Hamida Bibi's case, the plaintiff had actually refused to take back the plaint and had lodged a revision in the High Court, on 19th February, 1914 and the revision was dismissed on 16th March, 1915 and it was only on 15th June, 1915 that she applied for the return of the plaint which was returned to her on 30th June, 1915, on which date she presented the plaint in the court of the Munsif and it was under these circumstances that the Division Bench of this Court held that even if it were assumed that the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the period from 20th May, 1913 to 16th March, 1915, she could not, in any case, be allowed to exclude the period between 16th March and 30th June under Section 14, inasmuch as she did not prosecute her suit with the diligence in view of the fact that she waited for three months after the dismissal of her application for revision before she asked for the return of the plaint and, hence, the suit was barred by time.

22. In the instant case before me, it was on 4th August, 1961 that the plaintiff learnt that the record of the case had been received in the court below from the High Court and the same day he filed an application for the return of the plaint for presentation before the proper court and it was on 7th August, 1961 that the plaint was returned to the plaintiff after an endorsement, as required by Order 7, Rule 10 of the CPC and the same day the plaint was presented before the learned Munsif. There is no finding in the case before me that the plaintiff was not prosecuting the case in the court of the Judge, Small Causes, Azamgarh bona fide and under these circumstances, it must be held that the view taken by the appellate court that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not correct.

23. Syed Sadiq Ali drew my attention to Rule 39 of the General Rules (Civil) for Civil Courts. Rule 39 of the General Rules (Civil) deals with return of Vakalatnama with plaint and reads as follows:—

“When a plaint is returned to a pleader or recognised agent of the plaintiff, the authority executed in his favour shall also be returned to him. When returning a plaint for presentation to proper court, a court may order the plaintiff to file a copy of the plaint to be put on record in place of the plaint.”

24. Sri Sadiq Ali, relying upon the above Rule 39 of the General Rules (Civil) urged that since the plaintiff was required to file a copy of the plaint in order that it may be put on record, the plaint could not be returned to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff supplied a copy of the plaint, and hence, it was the duty of the plaintiff to approach the trial court for the return of the plaint after supplying a copy of the same. I see no force in this contention. The second part of Rule 39 of General Rules (Civil) is not mandatory. I do not agree with Sri Sadiq Ali that the word “may” occurring in the second part of Rule 39 should be read as “shall”. The endorsement on the plaint, as required by Order 7, Rule 10 of the CPC, has to be made by the office of the Court, which is required to return the plaint to the plaintiff and for that endorsement the presence of the plaintiff is not at all incumbent.

25. The task of making the endorsement is an imperative duty cast on the office of the court which is required to return the plaint for presentation before the proper court. The plaintiff does not come into the picture at all while an endorsement is made on the plaint and the plaintiff is entitled to exclude the entire time taken in making the endorsement uptil the date when the plaint is actually returned to the plaintiff after an endorsement, as required by Order 7, Rule 10 of the CPC

26. For the reasons mentioned above, I allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and hold that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by time. The case will be sent back to the appellate court with the direction that the appeal before the appellate court should be re-numbered to its original number and the other points involved in the appeal should be decided by the appellate court in accordance with the law, after hearing the parties.

27. Appeal allowed.