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Premiser Motors (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow

Allahabad High Court
Feb 19, 1970
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gulati, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, M/s. Premier Motors (Pvt.) Ltd., Lucknow, a motor-vehicle dealer, in respect of the assessment year 1958–59 disclosed a gross turnover of Rs. 35,79,753 and excluded Rs. 6,66,418.36 as sale proceeds of 28 vehicles said to have been sold at Solan (outside U.P.). The assessing authority concluded that 24 of those vehicles (valued at Rs. 5,84,252.35) were sold within Uttar Pradesh and enhanced the assessee's net turnover accordingly.

The Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) had carried out an investigation and recorded statements of, inter alia, the manager of K.T. Financiers and some purchasers; on the basis of the S.I.B.'s report the assessing authority relied upon those statements and rejected documentary evidence produced by the assessee.

During assessment proceedings the assessee requested (a) a copy of the S.I.B. report and (b) that the witnesses examined by the S.I.B. be summoned and examined in the assessee's presence so the assessee could cross-examine them. The assessing authority rejected those requests.

The assessee appealed; the appellate authority allowed the grievance, set aside the assessment and remanded the case with directions including that certain witnesses be summoned in the presence of the assessee and that the assessee be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. The Commissioner of Sales Tax (revenue) sought revision; the revising authority held the appellate authority unjustified in remanding because the assessee was not entitled to cross-examine those witnesses. The revising authority (Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax) referred the legal question to this Court under section 11(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case (as discussed in the revising authority's order dated 23rd May 1968 and the appellate order dated 23rd April 1965), the applicant (assessee) was entitled to have the witnesses relied upon by the assessing authority examined in his presence and whether he was entitled to cross-examine them.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee sought a copy of the S.I.B. report and requested that witnesses examined by the S.I.B. be summoned and examined in its presence to permit cross-examination.
  • The assessee relied upon documentary evidence (goods account showing transfer to Solan branch; temporary transit insurance from Bombay to Solan; export/transport vouchers; octroi receipts at Solan; cash memos on Solan branch forms; delivery challans signed by purchasers at Solan) to show deliveries occurred at Solan.
  • The assessee asserted that witnesses had been examined by the S.I.B. behind its back and alleged that some statements recorded before the S.I.B. were made under duress or undue pressure.
  • The assessee maintained that it needed the witnesses confronted with the documentary delivery challans so their oral statements could be tested and reconciled with documentary evidence.

Revenue / Assessing Authority / Revising Authority's Position

  • The assessing authority rejected the assessee's documentary evidence and relied on the S.I.B. report, which recorded statements that the deliveries were taken at Lucknow, not Solan.
  • The assessing authority refused to summon the witnesses for cross-examination, stating that witnesses were liable to be influenced and their examination would not serve a useful purpose given the department's evidence.
  • The revising authority held that the appellate authority was not justified in remanding and that the assessee was not entitled to cross-examine witnesses examined by the S.I.B.; it also noted that the assessee could have produced affidavits or subsequent statements to counter alleged incorrect statements but had not done so.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. A.V. Visuanatha Sastri, [1954] 26 I.T.R. 1 (S.C.) Principle that proceedings of an Income-tax officer are quasi-judicial; in assessments on escaped income the assessee ordinarily has the fullest right to inspect records and documents used against him. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that similar principles of natural justice apply to Sales Tax assessment proceedings and that relevant materials used against an assessee should be disclosed and afford opportunity to rebut.
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, W.B., [1954] 26 I.T.R. 775 (S.C.) Set aside an assessment order where fundamental principles of natural justice were violated in Income-tax proceedings. The court treated this decision as establishing that natural justice applies to quasi-judicial tax assessments and used it to bolster the view that the assessee should be given opportunity to meet materials relied upon by the department.
Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar, [1957] 8 S.T.C. 770 (S.C.) Observed that provisions of the Income-tax Act were in pari materia with provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act; principles of Suraj Mall Mohta and Dhakeswari Cotton Mills apply to sales-tax assessment proceedings. The court cited it to confirm that sales-tax assessment proceedings must be conducted in accordance with natural justice and that an assessee should have a fair opportunity to rebut departmental materials.
Bhagwandas Khandelwal v. The State of Orissa Authority relied upon by the revising authority (facts concerned extracts of accounts furnished by dealers, extracts were placed before assessee and the assessee had not asked for summoning dealers). The court distinguished this decision: in that case the material was placed before the assessee and no request to summon witnesses had been made; in the present case the assessee had continuously requested summons of the witnesses for cogent reasons.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India Defines and explains the thin dividing line between administrative and quasi-judicial power and emphasizes that quasi-judicial exercise requires fair, just procedures; acting judicially means acting justly and fairly to ensure a just decision. The court relied on this authority to reject the argument that because the Sales Tax Officer is not a court and not bound by technical rules of evidence, the assessee can be denied the opportunity to have witnesses examined in his presence where statements recorded behind his back are to be used against him.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first rejecting the revising authority's premise that in U.P. Sales Tax Act proceedings an assessing authority may conduct private enquiries and use materials arising therefrom against an assessee without disclosure or opportunity to rebut. The Court acknowledged that the Indian Evidence Act does not directly apply to sales-tax proceedings and that assessing authorities may use materials which would not be admissible in a court of law; however, it emphasized that this does not permit using private enquiry material against an assessee without disclosure and without affording a reasonable opportunity to meet the case.

The Court held that it cannot be laid down as a matter of law that a witness examined by the Sales Tax Officer can never be summoned for cross-examination; whether a witness should be summoned depends on the circumstances of each case.

The Court reviewed the specific facts: the assessee had produced a set of documentary proofs (goods account showing transfer to Solan branch; transit insurance; transport/export vouchers; octroi receipts at Solan; cash memos on Solan branch forms; delivery challans signed by purchasers) supporting its claim of sales at Solan. The assessing authority rejected this documentary evidence and instead relied upon the S.I.B. report based on statements by K.T. Financiers' manager and some purchasers asserting deliveries at Lucknow.

Given this factual divergence between documentary evidence in the possession of the assessee and oral statements recorded by the S.I.B., the Court found it necessary (in the interest of justice) that the witnesses be confronted with the delivery challans and other documentary material so they could clarify or reconcile their statements. The Court noted the assessee's allegation that the S.I.B. statements were made under duress or undue pressure—an allegation that could not be tested or resolved without allowing confrontation and cross-examination.

The Court observed that assessing authorities perform quasi-judicial functions and must conform to rules of natural justice. It cited authorities on Income-tax assessment proceedings (Suraj Mall Mohta; Dhakeswari Cotton Mills) and held that corresponding principles apply to the U.P. Sales Tax Act; rule 75 of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules (which vests the Sales Tax Officer with powers akin to a civil court for enforcing attendance, examining on oath, compelling production of documents, issuing commissions) further supported this position.

The Court found the revising authority's reliance on Bhagwandas Khandelwal misplaced because that case's circumstances (materials placed before the assessee and no request to summon witnesses) differed materially from the instant facts where the assessee had persistently sought summons of the witnesses.

The Supreme Court's decision in A.K. Kraipak was invoked to underline that administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers must act fairly and justly; the fact that the Sales Tax Officer is not a court and not bound by formal rules of evidence does not justify denying an assessee the opportunity to test statements recorded behind his back, especially when those statements conflict with documentary evidence held by the assessee.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellate authority had approached the matter correctly in remanding the case to permit the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements were to be used against it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department: the assessee was entitled to have the witnesses relied upon by the assessing authority examined in his presence and to cross-examine them.

Direct consequences and orders imposed:

  • The appellate authority's remand to the assessing officer to summon the witnesses and afford the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine them was upheld as correct.
  • The assessee was awarded costs assessed at Rs. 100; counsel fee was also assessed at Rs. 100.

Implications beyond the parties: The Court applied and reiterated established principles that assessment proceedings under the U.P. Sales Tax Act are quasi-judicial in character and must accord with principles of natural justice (including the right to test materials used against an assessee). The opinion did not purport to lay down a universal rule prohibiting use of materials from private enquiries, but held that whether witnesses examined during departmental enquiries must be summoned for cross-examination depends on the circumstances; the decision affirmed the need for disclosure and an opportunity to rebut where departmental evidence conflicts with an assessee's documentary proofs.

Note: The opinion does not state that it has created a new legal precedent; it applies and relies upon earlier Supreme Court decisions and statutory/regulatory provisions to reach its conclusion.

Reference Answered.

Show all summary ...

Gulati, J.:— Under section 11(1) of the U.P Sales Tax Act, the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax U.P Lucknow, has submitted this statement of the case with the question of law for the opinion of this court:

“Whether ion the facts and circumstances of this case as discussed in my order dated 23rd May 1968, and in the order of the appellate court dated 23rd April, 1965, the applicant was entitled to get the witnesses relied upon by the assessing authority examined in his presence and further whether he was entitled to cross examine them.”

2. The assessee M/s. Premier motors (Pvt.) Ltd. Lucknow, is a dealer an motor vehicles. In respect of the assessment year 1958–59 the assessee disclosed a gross turnover of Rs. 35,79,753 and turnover the assessee had excluded a sum of Rs. 6,66,418.36 being the sale proceeds of 28 vehicles sold at Solan and not at Lucknow. The assessing authority came to the conclusion that out of 28 vehicles, 24 vehicles valued at Rs. 5,84,252.35 had been sold within U.P and he, therefore, enhanced the assessee's net turnover to that extent.

3. It appears that the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) carried out certain investigation to find out if the vehicles alleged to have been sold by the assessee at Solan were really sold at Solan or were sold inside U.P In the course of such investigation statement on oath of the manager of K.T Financiers, Hazratganj, Lucknow, who had financed certain purchasers of the vehicles, was taken and likewise statements of some purchasers were also recorded. The Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) submitted a report to the assessing authority on the basis of which the Sales Tax Officer held that out of 28 vehicles, 24 vehicles alleged to have been sold at Solan were in fact sold inside Uttar Pradesh. The assessee during the course of assessment proceedings had applied for a copy of the report of the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B), and had also requested that the witnesses, who were examined by the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) behind the back of the assessee, should be summoned and be examined in its presence so as to enable the assessee to cross-examine them. Both these requests of the assessee were rejected by the assessing authority. The assessee appealed against the assessment order and one of the grievances put forward before the appellate authority was that the Sales Tax Officer was not justified in rejecting the request of the assessee for a copy of the report of the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) and for summoning the witnesses who had been examined behind its back.

4. The appellate authority after examining the rival contentions of the parties came to the conclusion that the grievance of the assessee was justified. He accordingly set aside the assessment order and remanded the case to the assessing officer with three directions including the direction that certain witnesses should be summoned in the presence of the assessee who should be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. The Commissioner of Sales Tax felt aggrieved and went up in revision. The revising authority came to the conclusion that the appellate authority was not justified in remanding the matter inasmuch as the assessee was not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses who had been examined by the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B). At the instance of the assessee, however, the revising authority has made this reference to this court.

5. At the outset we might mention that the Judge (Revisions) appears to have entertained the view that in proceedings under the U.P Sales Tax Act an assessing authority is free to conduct such enquiries as it likes and if in the course of enquiries certain witnesses are examined, the assessee is not entitled to ask the Sales Tax Officer to examine those witnesses in his presence so as to enable him to cross-examine them. This view of the revising authority, in our opinion, is erroneous.

6. It is true that the Evidence Act as such does not apply to the proceedings under the Act and it is also true that the assessing authority may use certain materials which strictly speaking may not be admissible evidence in a court of law. But that does not mean that any material or information gathered by the Sales Tax Officer as a result of a private enquiry can be used against an assessee without disclosing to him the material and without affording him adequate opportunity to rebut the same. The question that would arise in such a case would be as to whether in the circumstances of the case the assessee can be said to have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the case against him. It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that a witness examined by the Sales Tax Officer can never be summoned for cross-examination. The question would always depend upon the circumstances of each case.

7. In the instant case we find from the assessment order that the assessee in support of its claim had produced the following documentary evidence:

(a) In the goods account the vehicles were shown to have been transferred to Solan branch.

(b) Temporary transit insurance was also obtained for sending the vehicles to Solan from Bombay.

(c) Export charges for transporting vehicles to Solan were also debited and necessary vouchers were also obtained.

(d) Octroi receipt for vehicles were obtained at Solan octroi post for the entry of each vehicle.

(e) Cash memos were issued on the printed forms of Solan branch.

(f) On delivery chalans of Solan branch, signatures were obtained from the purchasers in support of their plea that the customers had actually gone to Solan and took the delivery of the vehicles there.

8. The assessing authority rejected all this evidence and has relied upon the report of the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) which in turn is based upon the statements of the manager of the firm M/s. K.T Financiers and some purchasers who had stated before the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) that they had taken the delivery of the vehicles at Lucknow and not at Solan. In such circumstances it became necessary for the assessee to have the statements of the witnesses tested by confronting them with the delivery chalans signed by them according to which the delivery of the vehicles was taken by them at Solan. It is possible that the witnesses may not have disclosed the full facts in their statements made before the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B). It is further possible that the witnesses may have given wrong information to the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B). In any case it was necessary in the interest of justice in the instant case to confront the witnesses with the documentary evidence in the shape of delivery chalans so that they could clarify or reconcile their statements with the documentary evidence which was clearly at variance with their oral evidence. It was all the more necessary to follow this procedure because the assessee had alleged that the witnesses had made the statement before the Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B) under duress and undue pressure. There can be no manner of doubt that the assessing authority while taking proceeding for assessment under the Act performs quasi-judicial function and should be governed by judicial considerations and must conform to the rules of natural justice. The Supreme Court while dealing with a similar function of an Income-tax officer under the Income-tax Act in Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. A.V Visuanatha Sastri [1954] 26 I.T.R 1 S.C. observed at page 13.

9. When an assessment on escaped or evaded income is made under the provisions of section 34 of the India Income-tax Act in all the provisions for arriving at the assessment provided under section 23(3) come into operation and the assessment has to be made on all relevant materials and on evidence and the assessee ordinarily has the fullest right to inspect the record and all documents and materials that are to be used against him Under the Provisions of section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act the proceedings before the Income-tax officer are judicial proceeding and all the incidents of such judicial proceedings have to be observed before the result is arrived at. In other words, the assessee would have a right to inspect the record and all relevant documents before he is called upon to lead evidence in rebuttal.

10. In Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal [1954] 26 I.T.R 775S.C. the Supreme Court set aside an assessment order where this fundamental principle of natural justice was violated. We are of opinion that the same principle would apply to the proceeding under the U.P Sales Tax Act. The provisions relating to the assessment contained in section read with rule 41 are in pari materia with the corresponding provisions of assessment under section 23(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Under section 37 of the Income —tax Act an income-tax Officer has all the power of a civil court for purposes of enforoing the attendance of any witness etc. and similar power have been conferred on the Sales Tax Officer under rule 75 of the U.P Sales Tax Rules which provides that the Sales Tax Officer shall have the same power as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the following, namely

(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation

(b) compelling the production of documents, and

(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and any proceeding before any of the officers shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding with in the meaning of section 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code.

11. In Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar [1957] 8 S.T.C 770S.C. the Supreme Court observed that the provision of the India Income-tax Act were in pari materia with the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act and reiterated That the principles enunciated in Suraj Mall Mohta & Co.'s case and in the case of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. were applicable to the proceedings of assessment under the Act must be conducted in accordanc with the principles of natural justice and the assessee should be afforded a fail opportunity to rebut the materials sought to be used against him.

12. Now, turning to the facts of the instant case, we find that such an opportunity was not afforded to the assessee as is evident from the following extracts of paragraph 7 of the assessment order:

“All these facts were made known to the dealer and several opportunities were given to him for filing the written statements which he failed to do so.

(a) However, it was argued that the statements and the proceedings of the S.T.O (S.I.B) were carried on at their back in view of which this should not be accepted as a useful evidence. For this an application was also moved that some witnesses be summoned so that they may be cross-examined by them. During the course of proceedings they had influenced many witnesses which is clear from the report of the S.T.O (S.I.B). For instance one Sri B.S Sayal, Joint Director, Education, U.P, 45, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, was successfully persuaded by the firm to change his earlier version. Similarly this Jullundur firm as mentioned earlier was also persuaded.”

13. Considering these facts I thought it unnecessary to summon the witnesses because they were also liable to be influenced by them now and their examination would not have served the useful purpose in view of the overwhelming evidence with the department. The application was, there fore, rejected.

14. To ask the assessee to file a written statement is not the same thing as to given him an opportunity of leading evidence in rebuttal. The fact that certain witnesses had changed their original statement or other witnesses were likely to do so is no ground for refusing to summon them for cross-examination. In fact this State of affairs shows very clearly that the testimony of those witnesses required to be testes by cross examination before it could be used against the assessee has observed in its revisional order:

It was argued on behalf of the opposite party that certain witnesses gave wrong statements behind the back of the opposite If that was so, it was open to the opposite party to produce their affidavits or subsequent statements in order to controvert the testimony before the assessing officer. This was not done. I am of opinion that full opportunity was given to the opposite party to meet the against him and he is not entitled to cross-examine any witness.

15. The approach of the revising authority is again wrong. Evidently the assessee wanted the witnesses to be examined in its presence to show that the statements made by them before the State Tax Officer (S.I.B) were incomplete, incorrect or untrue. This could not be achieved by asking the assessee to file affidavit or unsworn statements of those witnesses. The witnesses who had deposed against the assessee could not be under the control of the assessee. In the circumstances the only course open to the assessee was to approach the assessing authority to summon those witnesses in exercise of its power under rule 75 so that they could be confronted with the documentary evidence in the possession of the assessee.

16. The case of Bhagwandas Khandelwal v. The State of Orissa relied upon by the revising authority is clearly distinguishable because there the material sought to be relied upon by the assessing officer was the extract of accounts obtained from two dealers which extracts were placed before the assessee and secondly, the assessee had made no request to the assessing authority to summon the dealers who had supplied the extracts of the accounts and one of whom had also made an oral statement. In the instant case the assessee had been pressing its demand for summoning the witnesses from the very beginning and, in our opinion, for very cogent and substantial reasons.

17. Before parting with this case we might refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in A.K Kraipak v. Union of India, where their Lordships observed:

“The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like India which is regulated and controlled by the rule of law, it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision.”

18. In view of this authority it is futile to contend for the revenue that because the Sales Tax Officer is not a court and is not bound by the rules of evidence, therefore, the assessee is not entitled to have a witness examined in his presence where the statement of such a witness recorded at the back of the assessee is sought to be used against him and particularly where the statements of the witnesses concerned in this case are at variance with the documentary evidence in possession of the assessee.

19. We are, of opinion that the view taken by the Judge (Revisions) is not correct and the appellate authority approached the matter from a right angle when it remanded the matter to the assessing authority to afford an opportunity to the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. The counsel fee is assessed at the same figure.

20. Reference answered accordingly.