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Shyam Lal Sharma v. Life Insurance Corporation Of India, Bombay And Another

Allahabad High Court
Jan 12, 1970
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Oak, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Shyam Lal Sharma, an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India ("the Corporation"), filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging Regulation No. 25 framed by the Corporation. Regulation No. 25 prohibited employees from participating in politics, joining political organisations, taking part in political activities, and canvassing or otherwise using influence in connection with elections. The petitioner sought permission to offer himself as a candidate for the U.P. Vidhan Sabha; permission was refused, and he prayed that Regulation No. 25 be declared void insofar as it prohibited him from taking part in normal political activity and seeking nomination and election. The petition was filed on 15-12-1966 and later amended to state that the petitioner wished to join and assist a political party opposed to the Indian National Congress. The respondents opposed the petition and maintained the validity of Regulation No. 25. The court considered the validity of clauses (1) and (4) of Regulation No. 25; clauses (2) and (3) were not necessary to decide the present case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Regulation No. 25 (particularly clause (1) and clause (4)) of the Corporation infringes the petitioner's fundamental rights under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the Life Insurance Corporation of India is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (and thus whether measures by the Corporation fall within Article 13).
  3. Whether Regulation No. 25 has the force of "law" within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a), so that Article 13(2) would render it void to the extent it abridges fundamental rights.
  4. Whether the second part of clause (4) (preventing an employee from taking part in an election to any legislature) is valid in view of Article 191(1)(e) which permits disqualification under law made by Parliament.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Regulation No. 25 violates the petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a), (b) and (c): freedom of speech and expression, freedom to assemble, and freedom to form associations or unions.
  • The petitioner sought to participate in normal political activity, join a political party opposed to the Indian National Congress, and stand for election to the U.P. Vidhan Sabha; Regulation No. 25 prevents these activities.
  • The petitioner relied on Article 13(2) contending that the Corporation is an "authority" under Article 12 and that Regulation No. 25 is a "law" within Article 13(3)(a), so that any law abridging fundamental rights would be void.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Corporation maintained that Regulation No. 25 is valid and within the powers conferred by Section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.
  • Respondents argued, as advanced by Mr. Jagdish Swarup, that if the petitioner disliked the Regulation he could resign, implying that contract/terms of employment limit the application of Article 19 to the petitioner.
  • It was contended that regulations of the Corporation were not necessarily "law" within Article 13 and that regulations of this kind do not have the force of law (relying on authority concerning other statutory corporations and their regulations).
  • Relying on Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh, respondents argued that freedoms under Article 19 do not include the right to exercise them on properties belonging to others, implying limited scope for challenging restrictions applicable to employment or workplace—but the court noted Regulation No. 25 contains no limitation as to time or place.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 Distinction between legislation directly controlling Article 19 freedoms and incidental abridgement arising from other legislation. Used to show that where regulation directly interferes with Article 19 freedoms the saving clauses of Article 19 will arise; court found Regulation No. 25 directly interfered with sub-clauses (b) and (c).
Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1166 There is no fundamental right to resort to strike; rules prohibiting demonstrations by government servants may violate Article 19. Relied upon to support the proposition that restrictions upon certain political/demonstrative activities of public employees can infringe Article 19; helped establish that government servants may claim Article 19 protections.
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 812 Fundamental rights under Article 19 can be claimed by government servants. Applied to conclude that employees of the Corporation can assert Article 19 rights.
P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 59 Article 19 and Article 31 were not intended to prevent wrongful individual acts or to provide protection against private conduct; petitions against private commercial organisations were not maintainable under Article 32. Distinguished: Shamdasani concerned a private commercial organisation; here the petition is against a statutory corporation established by statute, so the distinction limited the precedent's applicability.
Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 222 Argument noted that when operation of law is attracted by reason of a contract, inhibition under Article 19 has uncertain application (court did not decide that question). Cited as authority where the Supreme Court did not pronounce on whether contractual obligations could exclude Article 19; the court noted respondents relied on the "resign" argument but the authority did not settle the issue.
Railway Board, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh, 1969 1 SCC 502 Freedoms under Article 19(1)(a),(b),(c) do not include the right to exercise them on properties belonging to others. Respondents relied on it to argue Corporation could prohibit political activity on its premises or during office hours; court observed Regulation No. 25 had no time/place limitation and therefore the precedent did not validate the Regulation as drafted.
Insurance Corporation Employees' Union, Bombay v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, Misc. Petn. No. 232 of 1963 (Bombay High Court; Division Bench) Bombay High Court: clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 violates sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 19(1); Division Bench specifically held clause (1) infringes sub-clauses (b) and (c). The present court agreed with the Bombay High Court's view that clause (1) infringes Article 19(1)(b) and (c) and relied on that prior decision in reaching a similar conclusion.
University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, A.I.R. 1954 Madras 67 Held by Madras High Court that the University of Madras is not "State" under Article 12. Cited as one example of earlier decisions treating statutory bodies as not State; considered in the Court's analysis of what constitutes "other authorities" under Article 12.
Kartick Chandra v. West Bengal Small Industrial Corporation, A.I.R. 1967 Calcutta 231 Held West Bengal Small Industries Corporation was not "State" under Article 12. Noted as part of contrasting jurisprudence; court examined these decisions but relied on later Supreme Court authority to define Article 12 scope.
Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621 Observation that "other authorities" in Article 12 are of wide amplitude and capable of including every authority created under a statute and functioning within India. Quoted to support a wide interpretation of "other authorities" in Article 12.
Nambooripad v. C.D. Board, A.I.R. 1956 Travancore-Cochin 19 Held that "authority" in Article 12 means a body exercising power to issue rules, bye-laws or regulations having the force of law. Cited in the discussion of what constitutes an "authority" for Article 12 purposes.
Mohan Lal v. The State, A.I.R. 1966 Rajasthan 1 Held the expression "other authorities" includes statutory public authorities with powers to make rules/regulations having the force of law. Referred to as part of the reasoning later upheld by the Supreme Court in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal.
Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1857 Majority held "other authorities" is wide enough to include bodies created by statute with governmental or quasi-governmental powers; such bodies fall within "State" under Article 12. Treated as binding under Article 141; the court relied on the majority decision to hold the Corporation is "State" within Article 12.
Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (citation in text) Interpretation that "other authorities" is wide and includes every authority created under a statute for administrative purposes. Quoted to support a broad reading of Article 12.
K.S. Ramamurthy Reddiar v. The Chief Commissioner Pondicherry, 1964 1 S.C.R. 656 Held that local or other authorities include authorities whether or not under government control and include autonomous authorities. Used to reinforce that constitutional or statutory authorities are within Article 12.
Mohinder Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 171 Held a society registered under the Societies Registration Act can be an "authority" within Article 12. Noted as an additional authority supporting a broad interpretation of Article 12.
Pramodrai v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 337 Bombay High Court held the Life Insurance Corporation of India does not fall within "other authorities" in Article 12 and is not "State" under Article 12. Distinguished and rejected by this court in view of the Supreme Court decision in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal; court found it not possible to accept the Bombay High Court view.
Dwarka Nath v. Bihar State, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 249 Article 182 of Bihar Education Code had no greater sanction than an administrative order; it did not have the force of law. Used to support the proposition that certain statutory regulations or codes may lack the force of law and thus not qualify as "law" under Article 13.
Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, Civil Appeal No. 552 of 1967 (decided 9-9-1969) The Supreme Court observed that regulations made by a Corporation under a statute may lay down terms and conditions of employment but do not necessarily have statutory status or the force of law; breach may result in damages but not necessarily invalidity for want of statutory obligation. Cited to support the view (for respondents) that regulations of statutory corporations may not have the force of law; court accepted for present purposes that Regulation No. 25 may not be "law" under Article 13.
Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board, A.I.R. 1968 Bombay 65 Held the Maharashtra State Electricity Board is "State" within Article 12 and thus subject to Part III fundamental rights; actions of the Board subject to judicial review when challenged as violative of fundamental rights. Reinforced the proposition that statutory boards with governmental functions fall within Article 12 and are amenable to judicial review under Part III.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in distinct analytical steps, each grounded in textual provisions and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the impugned provisions: The court restricted the dispute to clause (1) and clause (4) of Regulation No. 25 (clause (4) having two parts). Clause (1) forbids membership of or association with political parties or organisations that take part in politics and forbids participation in political movement or activity. Clause (4) forbids canvassing, interference or use of influence in connection with elections and also forbids taking part in elections to legislatures or local authorities (subject to a save for voting).
  2. Direct interference with Article 19 rights: Applying the distinction in A.K. Gopalan, the court held clause (1) to be a direct interference with sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Article 19(1) (freedom to assemble peaceably and to form associations). The court explained that clause (1) prevents joining political organisations and attending political meetings and thus directly prevents the enjoyment of those freedoms.
  3. Clause (4) first part and Article 19(1)(a): The court analysed the first part of clause (4) (prohibition on canvassing or using influence in connection with elections). It observed that oral persuasion is the simplest method of canvassing and that a prohibition on canvassing prevents enjoyment of freedom of speech and expression; accordingly this part violates Article 19(1)(a).
  4. Validity of second part of clause (4): The court considered the question whether an employee may be prohibited from taking part in elections to a legislature. It noted Article 191(1)(e) permits disqualification for membership of a State Legislature by or under any law made by Parliament. The Life Insurance Corporation Act is an Act of Parliament and empowers the Corporation to make regulations; therefore the court held the second part of clause (4) (preventing employees taking part in elections to a legislature) to be valid.
  5. Whether Article 13(2) could be invoked: The petitioner relied on Article 13(2) which forbids the State from making any law abridging fundamental rights. To invoke Article 13(2) the petitioner needed to show (a) the Corporation is "the State" under Article 12, and (b) Regulation No. 25 is a "law" within Article 13(3)(a). The court analysed both components.
  6. Whether the Corporation is "the State": The court examined a line of authorities and relied on the Supreme Court's majority decision in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal to adopt a broad meaning of "other authorities" in Article 12. Given the Corporation's statutory origin, appointment/nomination by the Central Government, original capital supplied by the Central Government, its community-oriented function and its power to make regulations, the court held the Corporation falls within "other authorities" and therefore constitutes "the State" for Article 12 purposes.
  7. Whether Regulation No. 25 is "law" under Article 13: The court considered authorities (e.g., Dwarka Nath and the Warehousing Corporation case) and accepted, for the purposes of argument (and apparently with reference to the Warehousing Corporation precedent), that regulations of this kind may not have the force of law. The court therefore assumed Regulation No. 25 did not amount to "law" within Article 13(3)(a). As a consequence, Article 13(2) could not be relied upon to render the regulation void.
  8. Independent Article 226 review: Notwithstanding the shortcoming on Article 13(2), the court proceeded under Article 226. It observed High Courts have very wide powers under Article 226 to grant relief where a State (including statutory authorities) frames regulations that take away or abridge a petitioner's fundamental rights. On the merits under Article 226, the court concluded clause (1) and the phrase "canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or" in clause (4) deprived the petitioner of fundamental rights and should not be enforced against him.
  9. Remedy and limitation: The court directed that respondents be restrained from enforcing clause (1) and the quoted words in clause (4) against the petitioner. The court left the second part of clause (4) (prohibiting taking part in elections to a legislature) intact as valid. The court apportioned no costs to either side (each party to bear its own costs).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was partly allowed. The Court directed the respondents not to enforce against the petitioner:

  • Clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 (the prohibition on membership of or association with political parties/organisations and participation in political activity); and
  • The words in clause (4): "canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or".

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Corporation may not enforce the invalidated parts of Regulation No. 25 against the petitioner; the rest of Regulation No. 25 (notably the prohibition on taking part in elections to a legislature) remains valid and enforceable.
  • The Court reached the conclusion that the Life Insurance Corporation of India is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12, but also accepted (for the purposes of argument) that Regulation No. 25 did not have the force of "law" under Article 13(3)(a); consequently Article 13(2) was not the operative basis for relief. Instead, the Court exercised its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to protect the petitioner's fundamental rights.
  • This decision produced a remedy specific to the petitioner: respondents were restrained from enforcing the identified portions of the Regulation against him. The Court did not purport to create a sweeping new precedent beyond its findings on Article 12 and the specific invalidation of those parts of Regulation No. 25; the opinion limits broader pronouncements and confines the remedy to the matters expressly decided.

Disposition

The petition is partly allowed. Parties are to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

Oak, C.J:— By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, a certain Regulation framed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereafter referred to as the Corporation) has been challenged. Shyam Lal Sharma is the petitioner. The Corporation is respondent No. 1. The Chairman of the Corporation is respondent No. 2.

2. The Corporation was established under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereafter referred to as the Act) with effect from the 1st of September, 1956. The petitioner is an employee of the Corporation. Sec. 49 of the Act has conferred on the Corporation power to make Regulations. By virtue of that authority, the Corporation has made a number of Regulations. Regulation No. 25 prohibits employees of the Corporation from participating in politics and standing for elections. According to the petitioner, Regulation No. 25 violates a number of fundamental rights conferred on him by Article 19 of the Constitution, and is, therefore void. The petitioner applied to respondents for permission to offer himself as a candidate for a seat in the U.P Vidhan Sabha. Permission was refused. The petitioner has, therefore, prayed that Regulation No. 25 be declared void in so far as it prohibits the petitioner from taking part in the normal political activity and seeking nomination and election for membership of U.P Vidhan Sabha. The petition has been opposed by the respondents. According to the respondents, Regulation No. 25 is valid.

3. The petition was filed in this Court on 15-12-1966. In paragraph 14 of the petition it was stated that the petitioner is not a member of any political party. Nor did he wish to offer himself as a candidate representing any political party. The petition was later amended. In clause (m) of paragraph 22 of the petition it was stated that the petitioner wishes to associate himself and be a member of one of the political parties in opposition to the Indian National Congress party, and desires to take part in and subscribe in, aid and assist the political movement and the activities of the party. Initially, clause 1 of the prayer stood thus:—

“To declare that Regulation 25…. in so far as it prohibits the petitioner from seeking nomination and election for membership of the U.P Vidhan Sabha is void.”

4. As a result of the amendment allowed on 19-12-1969, the following words have been added in the first clause of the prayer:

“or taking part in the normal political activity and in the elections.”

5. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it will be convenient to set forth the material provisions of the Act. Preamble of the Act runs thus:—

“An Act to provide for the nationalisation of life insurance business in India by transferring all such business to a Corporation established for the purpose and to provide for the regulation and control of the business of the Corporation and for matters conected therewith or incidental thereto.”

6. Section 4 of the Act provides for constitution of the Corporation. The Corporation shall consist of a number of persons and a Chairman to be appointed by the Central Government. Under Sec. 5 of the Act the original capital of the Corporation amounting to five crores of rupees was provided by the Central Government. Sec. 6 deals with functions of the Corporation. It shall be the general duty of the Corporation to carry on life insurance business in such a manner that life insurance business is developed to the best advantage of the community. Sec. 30 gives the Corporation monopoly of carrying on life insurance business. Sec. 49 of the Act gives the Corporation power to mike Regulations.

7. By virtue of power conferred by Sec. 49 of the Act, the Corporation has framed Regulations. Regulation No. 25 has four clauses. Clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 is in these terms:—

“No employee shall be a member of, or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organisation which takes part in politics, nor shall he take part in, subscribe in aid of or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity.”

8. According to clause (2), an employee must prevent members of his family from taking part in certain activities. According to clause (3), if any question arises whether any activity falls within, the scope of the Regulation, the decision of the Corporation shall be final. Clause (4), of Regulation No. 25 runs thus:—

“No employee shall canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or take part in, an election to any legislature or local authority Provided that—

(1) an employee qualified to vote at such election may exercise his right to vote…”

9. For proposes of the present case, it is not necessary to discuss the validity of clause (2) and (3) of the Regulation. It will be sufficient to discuss the validity of clauses (1) and (4) of Regulation No. 25.

10. According to the petitioner, Regulation No. 25 violates Article 19 of the Constitution. Article 19 of the Constitution is:—

“(1) All citizens shall have the right—

(a) to freedom of speech and expression;

(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;

(c) to form associations or unions…..”

11. The petitioner's contention is that Regulation No. 25 seems to take away fundamental rights conferred on the petitioner by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution. These sub-clauses are subject to certain exceptions mentioned in clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Article 19. Mr. Jagdish Swarup appearing for respondents did not seriously suggest that the Regulation is saved by the exceptions mentioned in clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Article 19.

12. As already mentioned, clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 is in these terms:—

“No employee shall be a member of, or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organisation which takes part in politics, nor shall he take part in, subscribe in aid of assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity.”

It will be seen that clause (1) prevents the petitioner from joining any organisation which takes part in politics. He cannot be a member of any political organisation, association or union. He cannot attend any political meeting. Clause (1) of the Regulation prevents the petitioner from assembling peaceably and without arms and forming associations or unions. Clause (1) of the Regulation does not permit the petitioner to enjoy the fundamental rights conferred on him by sub-clause (b) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution.

13. In A.K Gopalan v. State Of Madras. . A.I.R 1950 S.C 27. Mania, C.J observed on page 35:—

“If there is a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc., the question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of Article 19 will arise. If, however, the legislation is not directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any of these sub-clauses is abridged, the question of the application of Article 19 does not arise.”

14. In the instant case clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 directly interferes with the petitioner's fundamental rights under sub-clause (b) and (c) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution.

15. In Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar . A.I.R 1961 S.C 1166. it was held that there is no fundamental right to resort to strike. A rule prohibiting any form of demonstration for the redress of grievance of Government servants is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. In O.K Ghosh v. E.X Joseph . A.I.R 1963 S.C 812. it was held that fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 can be claimed by Government servants. It follows that fundamental rights can be claimed by employees of the Corporation.

16. In P.D Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India . A.I.R 1952 S.C 59. Shamdasani filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against the Central Bank of India. It was held that the petition was not maintainable. Neither Article 19 nor Article 31 was intended to prevent wrongful individual acts or to provide protection against private conduct. In that case the petition was directed against a private commercial organisation. In the present case the petition is directed against a corporation established by a statute.

17. Mr. Jagdish Swarup contended that if the petitioner does not like Regulation No. 25, he is at liberty to resign. He cannot be heard to say that the Regulation interferes with his fundamental rights. In support of this contention, reliance was placed upon Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab . A.I.R 1963 S.C 222.. On page 235 their Lordships noticed the argument that when operation of law is attracted by reason of a contract, inhibition under Article 19 has no application. Their Lordships did not pronounce on this question.

18. In Railway Board, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh . 1969 1 SCC 502 it was held that contents of the freedoms guaranteed under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 19(1) do not include the right to exercise them in the properties belonging to others. Relying upon that decision, Mr. Jagdish Swarup contended that, it was open to the Corporation to prohibit political activity during office hours and on the premises of the Corporation. It may, however, be pointed out that clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 is not so limited. There is no limitation of time or place in clause (1) of Regulation No. 25.

19. In Insurance Corporation Employees' Union, Bombay v. Life Insurance Corporation of India . Miscellaneous Petition No. 232 of 1963. the petitioner challenge the validity of Regulation No. 25. It was declared by a single Judge of Bombay High Court that clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 violates sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution, and is, therefore, void and inoperative. The Corporation took up the matter in appeal. The appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench on 19-4-1967. The Division Bench agreed with the single Judge that clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 infringes sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. I respectfully agree with the view taken by Bombay High Court.

20. Next we have to examine the validity of clause (4) of Regulation No. 25. Clause (4) of Regulation No. 25 is:—

“No employee shall convass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or take part in an election to any legislature or local authority….”

21. Clause (4) consists of two parts. The first part prohibits an employee from canvassing or using his influence in connection with an election. The simplest method of canvassing or using influence is by oral persuasion. Prohibition against such convassing prevents employees of the Corporation from enjoying freedom of speech and expression. The first part of clause (4) violates the fundamental right conferred on the petitioner by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In paragraph 1 of the petition it is stated that the petitioner is a citizen of India. This position has not been disputed in the counter-affidavit. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to enjoy all the rights conferred on citizens by Article 191 of the Constitution.

22. The second part of clause (4) prevents employees from taking part in an election to any legislature or local authority. Apparently, the petitioner is not seeking election to any local authority. It is not, therefore, necessary to discuss the question whether the petitioner has a right to seek election to a local authority. The present discussion may be confined to election to any legislature.

23. Mr. V.K.S Chaudhry appearing for the petitioner conceded that the right to seek election to legislature is not a fundamental right. Mr. Chaudhry, however, maintained that the petitioner has a right to seek election to U.P Vidhan Sabha.

24. Article 191 of the Constitution contains a list of disqualifications for membership of a State Legislature. According to sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of Article 191, a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as a member of a Legislative Assembly, if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament. Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 is an Act of Parliament. The Act has permitted the Corporation to make Regulations. It was, therefore, open to the Corporation to make a Regulation laying down that employees of the Corporation shall be disqualified for election to a Legislative Assembly. The second part of clause (4) of Regulation No. 25 is valid.

25. According to the petitioner, Regulation No. 25 is void, because it takes away or abridges the petitioner's fundamental rights. He relies on clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution. Article 13(2) states:—

“The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.”

26. The expression “the State” has been defined in Article 12 of the Constitution:—

“In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘the State’ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”

27. According to the petitioner, the Corporation is a body falling within the description “other authorities” within the meaning of Article 12. The term “law” has been defined in sub-clause (a) of clause (3) of Article 13:—

“‘law’ includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law.”

28. In order to bring the present case under Article 13(2) of the Constitution, the petitioner has to establish two points. Firstly, the Corporation is an authority within the meaning of Article 12. Secondly, Regulation No. 25 has the force of law.

29. In University of Madras v. Shantha Bai . A.I.R 1954 Madras 67. it was held by Madras High Court that the University of Madras is not a “State” as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution.

30. In Kartick Chandra v. West Bengal Small Industrial Corporation . A.I.R 1967 Calcutta 231. it was held that the West Bengal Small Industries Corporation was not a “State” within the meaning of Article 12.

31. In Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P . A.I.R 1962 S.C 1621. Ayyangar, J. observed on page 1678 thus:—

“Article 12 winds up the list of authorities falling within the definition by reterring to ‘other authorities’ within the territory of India…. The words are of wide amplitude and capable of preventing every authority created under a statute and functioning within the territory of India.”

32. In Nambooripad v. C.D Board . A.I.R 1956 Travancore-Cochin 19. it was held by a Full Bench of Travancore-Cochin High Court that in its literal sense the word “authority” means a body exercising power, and in the context of Article 12 that power must be considered as the power to issue rules, bye-laws or regulations having the force of law.

33. In Mohan Lal v. The State . A.I.R 1966 Rajasthan 1. it was held by Rajasthan High Court that the expression “other authorities” includes all public authorities, that is, authorities created by a statute and armed with powers and functions in a given field of activity and for the control thereof, and having the power to make their own rules and regulations, having the force of law. Consquently, Rajasthan State Electricity Board is “other authority” within the meaning of Article 12.

34. This decision of Rajasthan High Court was upheld in appeal by the Srupreme Court. The decision is reported in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal . A.I.R 1967 S.C 1857.. The majority judgment was delivered by Bhargava, J. He observed on pages 1862 and 1863 of the report thus:—

“The meaning of the word ‘authority’ given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which can be applicable is ‘a public administrative agency or corporation having quasi-governmental powers and authorised to administer a revenue-producing public enterprise’. This dictionary meaning of the word ‘authority’ is clearly wide enough to include all bodies created by a statute on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions. The expression ‘other authorities’ is wide enough to include within, it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of the Government of India; and we do not see any reason to narrow down this meaning in the context in which the words ‘other authorities’ are used in Article 12 of the Constitution.

35. In Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Ayyanger, J., interpreting the words ‘other authorities’ in Art. 12 held:

‘Again Article 12 winds up the list of authorities falling within the definition by referring to ‘other authorities’ within the territory of India which cannot obviously be read as ejusdem genris with either the Government and the Legislatures or local authorities. The words are of wide amplitude capable of comprehending every authority created under a statute and functioning within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. There is no characterisation of the nature of the ‘authority’ in this residuary clause and consequently it must include every type of authority set up under a statute for the purpose of administering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State including those vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those laws.”

36. In K.S Ramamurthy Reddiar v. The Chief Commissioner Pondicherry . 1964 1 S.C.R 656 this Court, dealing with Article 12, held:

‘Further, all local or other authorities within the territory of India include all authorities within the territory of India whether under the control of the Government of India or the Governments of various States and even autonomous authorities which may not be under the control of the Government at all.’

37. These decisions of the Court support our view that the expression ‘other authorities’ in Article 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business as mentioned in Article 19(1)(g). In Part IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Article 12 and one of the Directive Principles laid down in Article 46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, of the people. The State, as defined in Article 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Article 298 to carry on any trade or business. The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word ‘State’ as used in Article 12. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. In these circumstances, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the cases cited by Mr. Desai to urge before us that the Board cannot be held to be an agent or instrument of the Government. The Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution were applicable.

38. Mr. Justice Shah delivered a separate judgment. In Paragraph 10 he observed:—

“I am unable, however, to agree that every constitutional or statutory authority on whom powers are conferred by law is ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12.”

39. This observation shows that according to tile majority decision, every constitutional or statutory authority on which powers are conferred by law is “other authority” as contemplated by Article 12. Mr. Justice Shah concluded thus:—

“In my judgment, authorities constitutional or statutory invested with power by law not sharing the sovereign power do not fall within the expression ‘State’ as defined in Article 12. Those authorities which are invested with sovereign power, i.e, power to make rules or regulation and to administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and others fall within the definition of ‘State’ in Article 12, and constitutional or statutory bodies which do not share that sovereign power of the State are not, in my judgment, ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.”

40. It will be seen that according to Mr. Justice Shah, a body cannot claim to be “State” under Article 12, unless the body exercises sovereign power. But according to the majority decision, such a body need not exercise sovereign power. It is sufficient that the body should have been created by statute, and should have powers to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the majority decision of the Supreme Court is binding on this Court.

41. In Mohinder Singh v. Union of India . A.I.R 1969 Delhi 171. it was held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is “authority” within the meaning of Article 12.

42. In Pramodrai v. Life Insurance Corporation of India . A.I.R 1969 Bombay 337. it was held that the Life Insurance Corporation of India does not fall within the expression “other authorities” in Article 12, and is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal it is not possible to accept the view taken by Bombay High Court.

43. According to the Supreme Court, the expression “other authorities” is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India. “The State” as defined in Article 12 includes bodies created for the purpose of promoting educational and economic interests of the people. The Life Insurance Corporation of India has been established by the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The Corporation consists of persons nominated by the Central Government. The original capital of the Corporation was supplied by the Central Government. The function of the Corporation is to develop life insurance business to the best advantage of the community. The Corporation has been empowered to make regulations. In view of all these circumstances, it must be held that the Corporation answers the description “other authorities” mentioned in Article 12. The Corporation, therefore, constitutes “the State” as contemplated by Article 12.

44. The next question for consideration is whether Regulation No. 25 has force of law. In Dwarka Nath v. Bihar State . A.I.R 1959 S.C 249. it was held that Article 182 of Bihar Education Code has no greater sanction than an administrative order or rule. It has not the force of law.

45. In Executive Committee of U.P State Warehousing Corporation Limited v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi . Civil Appeal No. 552 of 1967 decided on 9-9-1969. the Supreme Court had to consider the nature of a regulation made by the U.P State Warehousing Corporation. An employee of the Corporation was dismissed from service. He challenged the order of dismissal on the ground that the order of dismissal violated a certain regulation framed by the Corporation under Sec. 54 of the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporation Act, 1956 (Act No. 28 of 1956). This Court was satisfied that the plaintiff's contention was correct. This Court, therefore, granted a declaration that the order of dismissal was null and void. The Warehousing Corporation appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeal was allowed; and the decree of this Court was set aside. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment thus:—

“…. the regulations are made under the power reserved to the Corporation under Sec. 54 of the Act. No doubt they lay down the terms and conditions of relationship between the Corporation and its employees. An order made in breach of the regulations would be contrary to such terms and conditions, but would not be breach of any statutory obligation…. In the instant case, a breach has been committed by the appellant of regulation 16(3) when passing the said order of dismissal, inasmuch as the procedure indicated therein has not been followed. The Act does not guarantee any statutory status to the respondent, nor does it impose any obligation on the appellant in such matters…. It is not in dispute that, in this case, the authority who can pass an order of dismissal has passed the same. Under those circumstances a violation of regulation 16(3) ….can only result in the order of dismissal being held to be wrongful and, in consequence, making the appellant liable for damages.”

46. These observations lend support to Mr. Jagdish Swarup's contention that regulations of this kind have not the force of law.

47. The power conferred on the Life Insurance Corporation of India by Sec. 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 is similar to the power conferred on the Warehousing Corporation by Sec. 54 of Act No. 28 of 1956. We may, therefore, assume with the respondents that Regulation No. 25 made by respondent No. 1 has not got the force of law. It is not, therefore, “law” as defined in sub-clause (a) of clause (3) of Article 13 of the Constitution.

48. On the one hand, the Corporation is “State” as contemplated by Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the impugned Regulation is not “law” within the meaning of Article 13. The result is that the petitioner can derive little assistance from clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution.

49. However, the petition need not fail on the short ground that the petitioner is unable to press Article 13(2) into service. The petitioner has established his case that Regulation No. 25 takes away or abridges certain fundamental rights conferred on him by Article 19 of the Constitution. Article 226 of the Constitution has conferred very wide powers upon High Courts in India. If a petitioner satisfies the Court that the State has framed a regulation which takes away or abridges his fundamental rights, there is a case for intervention by the Court.

50. In Maharashtra State Electricity Board* v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board . A.I.R 1968 Bombay 65. it was held that the Maharashtra State Electricity Board is “State” within the meaning of Article 12, and is bound by the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Actions of the Board can be subjected to judicial review if challenged as violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

51. The petitioner has established the position that the effect of clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 and the first part of clause (4) of the Regulation is to deprive him of a number of fundamental rights. The Corporation should not be permitted to enforce these invalid parts of the Regulation. In my opinion, the petition should be partly allowed. Respondents should be directed not to enforce against the petitioner clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 and the following words appearing in clause (4) of Regulation No. 25:

“canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or.”

52. Since the petition partly succeeds and partly fails, parties may be left to bear their own costs.

53. Mukerjee, J.— I agree.

54. By The Court— The petition is partly allowed. Respondents are directed not to enforce against the petitioner clause (1) of Regulation No. 25 and the following words appearing in clause (4) of Regulation No. 25:—

“canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or.”

55. Petition partly allowed.