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Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P v. Noorullah Ghazanffurullah

Allahabad High Court
Feb 10, 1969
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Noorullah Ghazanffurullah (Assessee) v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. (Reference under Section 11(3) U.P. Sales Tax Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., through the Additional Revising Authority, Varanasi Range, submitted a reference under Section 11(3) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act asking whether the disputed item was a pure works contract (non-taxable) or a supply and sale of railway coaches (taxable).

The assessee, M/s. Noorullah Ghazanffurullah (a firm of contractors at Allahabad), executed a contract in assessment year 1958-59 to build 14 railway coaches (8 first-third class coaches and 6 janata tourist cars) for the North Eastern Railway on underframes supplied by the railway. The work was to be done according to specifications and drawings annexed to the agreement, on a siding within the railway yard (rent Re.1 per month), and completed within a stipulated time. The contract price per coach was a lump sum (e.g., Rs. 62,300 for first-third class coaches plus Rs. 800 for certain fittings; Rs. 57,900 for C.T.T. coach plus Rs. 800 for fittings), expressly stated to be inclusive of all material and labour charges for building, furnishing, finishing and polishing.

In that assessment year the assessee received Rs. 5,87,265. The Sales Tax Officer levied sales tax at the rate of 3 pies per rupee, rejecting the assessee's contention that the transaction was a works contract not involving any sale of goods. The assessee appealed to the Judge (Appeals) and lost. On revision the Judge (Revisions) accepted the assessee's plea and held the contract to be a pure works contract, relying on this Court's prior decision in Kays Construction Co. v. The Judge (Appeals) Sales Tax, Allahabad [1962] 13 S.T.C. 302.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the disputed transaction was a pure works contract (and therefore not liable to sales tax)?
  2. Alternatively, whether it amounted to a supply and sale of railway coaches by the assessee to the railway authorities (and therefore liable to sales tax)?

Arguments of the Parties

Standing Counsel / Department

  • Contended that the decision in Kays Construction Co. [1962] 13 S.T.C. 302 (on which the revising authority relied) was not correctly decided.
  • Relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Patnaik & Co. v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1655, and this Court's decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Haji Abdul Majid and Sons [1963] 14 S.T.C. 435 (approved by the Supreme Court in Patnaik) to support the contention that such contracts can amount to a sale of completed bodies and thus be taxable.
  • Highlighted Patnaik & Co.'s majority reasoning that the real intention of the parties, as gathered from the contract as a whole, led to a finding that the contract was for sale of completed bus bodies.

Assessee's Counsel

  • Relied upon the more recent Supreme Court decision in State of Gujarat v. Kailash Engineering Co., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 547, which dealt with building railway coaches on underframes supplied by the railways and concluded the contract was a works contract (property in finished coaches either passed automatically to railways or never vested in contractor).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kays Construction Co. v. The Judge (Appeals) Sales Tax, Allahabad [1962] 13 S.T.C. 302 Held a contract of building railway coaches to be a works contract (relied on earlier Supreme Court decisions). The revising authority relied on this decision and found the instant case to be completely covered by Kays; the Court acknowledged Kays as key background authority considered by the revising authority.
State Of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. [1998] 9 S.T.C. 353 One of the Supreme Court authorities relied upon in Kays (authority addressing characterisation of building contracts). Referenced as an authority relied upon by Kays Construction Co.; the present opinion notes Kays had relied upon this decision.
Carl Still G.m.b.H. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1961] 12 S.T.C. 449 Another Supreme Court decision relied on in Kays addressing similar issues concerning works contracts and sales tax. Noted as an authority which had been relied upon in Kays Construction Co.; the present Court records that Kays relied on Carl Still.
Patnaik & Co. v. State Of Orissa, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1655 Held (majority) that contract to build bus bodies on government-supplied chassis was a contract of sale of bus bodies (analysis based on contract terms and parties' intention). Standing counsel relied on this Supreme Court decision to contend Kays was wrongly decided; the Court summarised the majority reasoning (paragraph 18 of Sikri, J.) and considered Patnaik when comparing authorities.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Haji Abdul Majid and Sons [1963] 14 S.T.C. 435 Decision holding a contract for building bus bodies to be a contract of sale (court considered terms of contract). Noted as a decision of this Court which was approved by the Supreme Court in Patnaik; standing counsel relied on it in support of the revenue's position.
State of Gujarat v. Kailash Engineering Co., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 547 Supreme Court held a contract for building railway coaches on railway underframes to be a works contract; property in coaches either passed automatically to railway or never vested in contractor. Assessee relied on this decision; the Court found the instant contract more akin to Kailash Engineering Co. and applied similar reasoning in concluding the contract was a works contract.
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Guntur Tobaccos Ltd. [1965] 16 S.T.C. 240 States general principle: for a sale to exist as part of a works contract, there must be an independent term in the contract for sale of the particular goods for a money consideration. The opinion expressly cites this principle and uses it as part of the general legal test applied to determine whether the contract contained an independent term of sale (quoted in the judgment).
Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore v. M.P. Electricity Board (C.A. Nos. 1153–1168 of 1968), reported [1970] 25 S.T.C. 188 Restated the principle that a contract of sale's main object is the transfer of property in a chattel as a chattel; if the main object of the payee's work is not transfer of a chattel, the contract is one for work and labour. The Court cited this restatement to reinforce the legal standard applied in distinguishing works contracts from sales transactions.
Government of Madras v. Simpson & Co. Ltd. [1968] 21 S.T.C. 21 Held sale of diesel engines even though they were fitted into customers' vehicles and the bill specified supply and fitting separately (illustrative of situations where a supply may constitute sale). The Court noted this case as distinguishable on its facts from the instant case and explained why it did not alter the conclusion here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by examining the contract terms in detail and applying established principles distinguishing a works contract from a contract of sale. The Court emphasized that the question turns on the intention of the parties as gathered from the contract as a whole and on whether there is an independent term of sale of the specific goods for a monetary consideration.

Key steps in the Court's reasoning (as stated in the opinion):

  • Contract characterization: The contract described the transaction as "to build for the North Eastern Railway ... in accordance with the specifications and drawings ... on IRS underframes to be supplied by the railways." The contract repeatedly described the arrangement as work to be carried out rather than as a sale.
  • Payment and inclusiveness: Clause 3 provided lump-sum amounts per coach inclusive of cost of all materials and labour, indicating a comprehensive payment for the work rather than a term of sale of the completed coach as a separate chattel.
  • Sales-tax clause: The contract expressly stated that, if after submission of the tender sales tax on finished coaches were imposed, the railway would bear that liability; the Court interpreted this as reflecting the parties' understanding that the contract did not involve a sale by the contractor (otherwise sales tax liability would typically fall on the seller).
  • Interim (on-account) payments: Clause 4 allowed on-account payments when progress exceeded 50% or 75%, showing that payments were contemplated while coaches were still in the course of manufacture—consistent with a works contract and inconsistent with the seller/buyer relationship where property in goods is transferred only on sale/delivery.
  • Control and variability: Clause 5 empowered the Chief Mechanical Engineer to vary specifications and adjust payments accordingly; this level of supervisory control and provision for variation was held to be inconsistent with a simple contract of sale and more characteristic of a works contract.
  • Indemnity/responsibility provisions: Clause 11 required the contractor to indemnify the railway against damage to railway property entrusted to the contractor and made the contractor responsible for employee claims under labour statutes; the Court considered these provisions inconsistent with a mere sale of goods.
  • Contract determination on insolvency: Clause 12 made solvency and the contractor's continuing capacity to execute the contract material, allowing termination on insolvency—again consistent with a works contract where continuity and capability of performance matter.
  • Burden on taxing authorities: The Court reiterated that the taxing authority bore the burden of proving a taxable sale existed; mere transfer of title in materials used does not suffice to show a separate contract of sale of the completed coaches. The Court found no material demonstrating an independent contract of sale of the coaches to the railway.
  • Analogous authorities: The Court compared the contract with precedent. It found the instant contract more akin to the Supreme Court's decision in Kailash Engineering Co. (works contract for coaches) than to Patnaik & Co. (bus bodies held to be sale), and applied the general principles from Guntur Tobaccos and the M.P. Electricity Board cases regarding the necessity of an independent term of sale.

On these grounds the Court concluded that the contract was a pure works contract and did not involve any sale of the completed coaches to the railway.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: THE DISPUTED ITEM WAS A PURE WORKS CONTRACT — NOT LIABLE TO SALES TAX.

Direct consequences and orders recorded in the opinion:

  • The Court answered the referred question in favour of the assessee, holding the contract to be a works contract not liable to sales tax.
  • The assessee was awarded costs in the sum of Rs. 100. The fee of the learned counsel for the department was also assessed at Rs. 100.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies and follows established principles about distinguishing between works contracts and contracts of sale as reflected in prior authorities (quoted and discussed in the judgment). The opinion itself does not purport to establish any new precedent beyond applying those principles to the facts; its immediate effect is to relieve the assessee of the sales tax liability previously levied in respect of the payments for constructing the railway coaches.


Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No facts or inferences beyond those explicitly contained in the opinion have been introduced.

Show all summary ...

1. At the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, the Additional Revising Authority, Sales Tax, Varanasi Range, Varanasi, has submitted this reference Under Section 11 (3) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act for the opinion of this court on the following question of law :

Whether upon the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the disputed item was a pure works contract and, therefore, non-taxable ; or whether it amounted to supply and sale of railway coaches by the assessee to the railway authorities and, therefore, taxable ?

2. The assessee, M/s. Noorullah Ghazanffurullah is a firm of contractors which carries on business at Allahabad. In the assessment year 1958-59, the assessee executed a contract of building railway coaches for the North Eastern Railway on the underframes supplied by the railway. The coaches were to be built according to the specifications and drawings annexed to the agreement on a siding within the railway yard for which the assessee had to pay a nominal rent of Re. 1 per month. The assessee was required to build altogether 14 coaches-eight first-third class coaches and 6 janata tourist cars. The assessee was to receive payment at the rate of Rs. 62,300 for each first-third class coach plus a sum of Rs. 800 for fixing dynamo, suspension, gear etc. and Rs. 57,900 for each C.T.T. coach plus Rs. 800 for fixing dynamo, suspension, gear etc. This was inclusive of the cost of all materials and labour charges for building, furnishing, finishing and polishing. The contract was to be completed within a stipulated time.

3. In the assessment year in question, the assessee received a total payment of Rs. 5,87,265 upon which the Sales Tax Officer levied sales tax at the rate of 3 pies per rupee rejecting the assessee's plea that no sales tax was payable as the payment pertained to a contract of work and labour not involving any sale of goods. The assessee appealed to the Judge (Appeals) but did not succeed. The appellate authority also held the amount in question to be liable to sales tax. The assessee then applied in revision to the Judge (Revisions) who accepted the assessee's plea and held that the contract executed by the assessee did not involve sale of goods but was purely a works contract. The revising authority relied upon the decision of this court in Kays Construction Co. v. The Judge (Appeals) Sales Tax, Allahabad [1962] 13 S.T.C. 302. That was also a case of a contract of building, of railway coaches for the Northern Railway. The revising authority found that the agreements in the two cases were worded identical. In fact the revising authority found that originally it was one contract a part of which was executed by Kays Construction Co. and the other part was executed by the assessee. In Kays Construction Co. [1962] 13 S.T.C. 302, this court held the contract to be of works relying upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in the State Of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd. [1998] 9 S.T.C. 353 and in Carl Still G.m.b.H. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1961] 12 S.T.C. 449.

4. The instant case is completely covered by the decision of this court in Kays Construction Co. [1962] 13 S.T.C. 302. But the learned standing counsel contends that the case of Kays Construction Co. [1962] 13 S.T.C. 302 is not correctly decided. For this submission, he has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Patnaik & Co. v. State Of Orissa. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1655 and a decision of this court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Haji Abdul Majid and Sons [1963] 14 S.T.C. 435 which has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Patnaik & Co. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1655. In the case of Patnaik & Co. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1655, the contract was for building bus bodies on chassis supplied by the Government of Orissa. On a consideration of the terms of the contract, the Supreme Court by a majority of two to one held the contract to be a contract of sale of bus bodies and not a contract of work or service. In that case the Supreme Court observed that the answer to the question must depend on a consideration of the contract and the real intention of the parties, which must be gathered by looking at the contract as a whole. Their Lordships then set out extensively the various terms of the contract and after analysing them, expressed the opinion that the contract was a contract for sale of completed bodies. The main reason behind this conclusion of the Supreme Court is contained in paragraph 18 of the judgment of Sikri, J., who delivered the majority judgment and the same may, with advantage, be reproduced :

The next point to be noticed is that under the contract the property in the bus body does not pass to the Government till the chassis with the bus body is delivered at the destination or destinations to be named by the controller except in the case contemplated in Clause 6 of the agreement. That clause provides that if some work is not satisfactorily done and the body builder on receipt of a written order does not dismantle or replace such defective work or material at his own cost within seven days, the controller would be entitled to get the balance of the work done by another agency and recover the difference in cost from the body builder. The controller is entitled for this purpose to take delivery of the unfinished body. But even in this case the property in the unfinished body would not pass to the Government till the unfinished body is seized.

5. The case of Haji Abdul Majid [1963] 14 S.T.C. 435 is also a case relating to the contract of building bus bodies and there also this court after taking into considera-tion the terms of the contract held the contract to be a contract of sale of bodies.

6. The learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, has placed reliance upon a more recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Kailash Engineering Co. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 547. That was also a case dealing with the contract of building railway coaches. In that case the Supreme Court after considering a large number of clauses of the contract came to the conclusion that the contract was a works contract involving building, erecting and furnishing of railway coaches on the underframes belonging to the railways. The main consideration which prevailed with their Lordships was that the property in the finished coaches passed to the railway administration automatically without any transfer on the part of the contractor. In fact, their Lordships came to the conclusion that the property in the coaches never vested in the assessee at all and continued to vest in the railway even when the coaches were in the process of manufacture. The case of Patnaik & Co. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1655 was distinguished by their Lordships on the ground that in that case the property in the bus bodies remained vested in the assessee at all stages until it passed to the Government after paying the price thereof to the contractor.

7. Whether the contract in the instant case is a contract of works or a contract of sale of goods, would depend upon the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract. After having a close look at the contract I am of the opinion that the same is more akin to the contract in the case of Kailash Engineering Co. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 547.

8. To begin with, I might reproduce the preamble of the agreement:

Whereas the contractors have agreed to build for the North Eastern Railway 8 bogies first and third class coaches and 6 bogies janata tourist cars, in accordance with the specifications and drawings annexed hereto and marked as annexure A on IRS underframes to be supplied by the railways and the railways have agreed to give the work to the contractors on terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned and accepted by both the parties.

9. It is significant to note that the contract of building coaches has been described as work and does not mention or envisage any contract of sale of coaches. The amount payable in respect of each coach as mentioned in Clause 3 of the agreement shows that it is a lump sum amount for the entire work involving the cost of material, cost of construction, fittings, erection and polishing etc. There occurs in that clause the following paragraph which, to my mind, is material:

If after the date of submission of the tender, the Central or State Government imposes any sales tax on finished coaches (as distinct from the sales tax on its component parts) the said tax on finished coaches will be the responsibility of the railway. The sales tax actually payable at the time of the tender, i.e. on 18th December, 1956, will be the responsibility of the contractors and the railway will not be responsible to refund it to the contractors.

10. This recital shows that according to the understanding of the parties no sales tax was leviable on the finished coaches presumably because the contract did not involve the sale of coaches. The provision that if, after the date of the contract, sales tax on finished coaches came to be levied, the same would be paid by the railway and not by the assessee, shows that the property in the coaches vested automatically in the railway and not as a result of any sale ; otherwise there appears to be no rational reason why the railway should have undertaken to accept the liability for sales tax which falls primarily upon the seller under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act.

11. Clause 4 contains another significant provision. It provides that

"when the progress of work on any coach exceeds 50 per cent, or 75 per cent., an 'on account' payment will be made on the completion of each coach."
This condition shows that the property in the coaches was to vest in the railway even while they were in the process of being built, otherwise there is no reason why the railway should have agreed to make payments to the contractor in respect of the unfinished coaches. Then there is Clause No. 5 under which the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the railway has a right to vary or alter the specifications at any time and the contractor would be bound to carry out the order of the Chief Mechanical Engineer. If the variation or alteration entailed more expenditure on the part of the contractor, the Chief Mechanical Engineer was to sanction payment of such additional expenditure on application of the contractor as he might determine in his sole discretion. Likewise if the alteration involved reduction in expenditure, the Chief Mechanical Engineer in his discretion would reduce the amount payable to the contractor under the agreement. A term like this, in my opinion, would be inconsistent with a contract of sale and would be more apposite in a contract of works. Clause 11 is another significant clause which provides that the contractor shall indemnify the railway against damage deterioration, loss or destruction of the railway property entrused to the contractor or used by him under the contract, while such property remained in his charge. This shows that the property in all the materials employed in the execution of the contract whether supplied by the railway or procured by the assessee was to vest at all times in the railway. The same clause goes on to say that the contractor shall be responsible for claims which may be made by his employees under the labour laws like the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Payment of Wages Act or Factories Act etc. These clauses, in my opinion, are not consistent with a contract of sale. Had it been a contract of sale, there was no occasion for the provisions like these under which the contractor has been made responsible for the claims of his employees. The railway really would have nothing to do with the contractor's workmen. Then there is a clause under which the Chief Mechanical Engineer can suspend the work for such period as he thinks fit. In a contract of sale a provision like this would be entirely out of place. Clause No. 12 relates to the determination of the contract. It provides that the contract would be liable to determination if the contractor becomes bankrupt or insolvent or suspends payment or compounds with its creditors. A provision like this is consistent only with a contract of work and of service and is wholly irrelevant to a contract of sale under which the railway would be unconcerned with the contractor's bankruptcy or insolvency.

12. After having considered the terms of the contract in the instant case I might as well state the general principle involved in such cases which is now well settled. The principle is that,

"in order that there should be a sale of goods which is liable to sales tax as part of a contract for work under a statute enacted by the Provincial or State Legislature, there must be a contract in which there is not merely transfer of title to goods as an incident of the contract, but there must be a contract, express or implied, for sale of the very goods which the parties intended should be sold for a money consideration, i.e., there must be in the contract for work an independent term for sale of goods by one party to the other for a money consideration"
: (see Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Guntur Tobaccos Ltd. [1965] 16 S.T.C. 240). The same principle has been restated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore v. M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur Since reported at [ 1970] 25 S.T.C. 188, (C.A. Nos. 1153 to 1168 of 1968) decided on 26th November, 1968, in the following terms :

A contract of sale is a contract whose main object is the transfer of the property in and the delivery of possession of, a chattel as a chattel to the buyer. Where the main object of work undertaken by the payee of the price is not the transfer of a chattel qua chattel, the contract is one for work and labour.

13. In the instant case, it is not the case of the department that there was a contract of sale between the parties of the material utilised in the construction of the railway coaches. Sales tax has been levied upon the entire payment received by the assessee for building coaches as if there was a contract of sale of coaches as such. ft is also well settled that in a case like this the burden lies upon the taxing authorities to show that there was taxable sale and that burden is not discharged by merely showing that the property in the goods which belonged to the party performing service or executing contract stood transferred to the other party. In the case before as, that burden has not been discharged by the taxing authorities. No material has been placed before us to show that the assessee had entered into a contract, of sale of coaches to the railway. Indeed such a contract would be most unusual. While it may be possible to infer such a contract with regard to bus bodies, it is not possible in the absence of express terms in the contract to infer such a contract in regard to the building of railway coaches. Railway coaches are not sold in the market nor it is usual to come across persons dealing in the construction and sale of railway coaches.

14. I am, therefore, of the opinion that having regard to the terms of the contract and other attendant circumstances, the contract handled by the assessee was a contract of work and labour not involving any sale of goods.

15. The case of Government of Madras v. Simpson & Co. Ltd. [1968] 21 S.T.C. 21, another recent case decided by the Supreme Court need not detain us long. That was a case where a dealer in motor-cars, motor parts and accessories fitted Perkins engines to the vehicles of the customers. The bill that he made specified separately the cost of the supply and fitting of Perkins engines. On these facts the Supreme Court held that the transaction involved the sale of diesel engines even though the same had been fitted by the assessee to the cars of his customers. This case is clearly distinguishable.

16. I, therefore, answer the question by saying that the disputed item was a pure works contract not liable to sales tax.

17. The assessee is entitled to his costs which I assess at Rs. 100. The fee of the learned counsel for the department is also assessed at the same figure.

R.S. Pathak, J.

18. I agree that the contract before us does not envisage the sale of coaches by the assessee to the railway. We are here concerned with what is essentially a works contract. I would answer the question referred accordingly.

19. The cases on the point have been discussed by my brother Gulati, J., but I may mention the reasons which have prevailed with me.

20. The contract between the assessee and the North Eastern Railway required the assessee to build railway coaches. The underframes were to be supplied by the railway and on those underframes the assessee was to do "the entire job of body construction including painting etc." This is not a case where what is supplied by the assessee is a composite unit distinct from the underframes. There is in the contract before us reference to a completed coach only and it is a completed coach which the assessee delivers to the railway. Significantly, the underframes remain throughout the property of the railway. The contract provides that when underframes are supplied to the assessee they will be supplied only after the assessee executes an indemnity bond for their safe custody. The property in the underframes does not pass to the assessee and it cannot be said, therefore, that when the assessee completes the coach what it delivers to the railway is an article in which it held the entire property. What it delivers to the railway is a coach, an essential part of which has always been railway property. It cannot, therefore, be said to sell the coach to the railway.

21. Then, there is the stipulation that the contracted amount paid to the assessee for constructing the coaches will not, except in the case of war, be increased on account of the increase in the price of materials or wages of labour. Clearly, the contract does not take into account the price of materials only which go into the completion of the coach but additionally mentions the wages of labour as a distinct factor of reference.

22. Some of the other terms of the contract afford further indication that this is a works contract. The solvency of the assessee throughout the period of execution of the contract has been considered as a material factor and the contract can be determined if the assessee becomes bankrupt or insolvent or goes into liquidation. Such a term is unusual where the contract is merely for the sale of goods. It assumes greater relevance in a works contract where the continued capacity of the contractor while executing the contract is an important consideration. The manner in which the contract is executed is a matter which the railway is entitled to take into account. The contract may be determined if in the opinion of the Chief Mechanical Engineer the assessee becomes unable to execute the contract with efficiency or at a rate of progress so slow that it will be unable to complete the work in time. Ordinarily, if it were a contract for the sale of goods, the date of delivery of the goods is alone relevant and not the efficiency or rate of progress shown during the execution of the work. Where the contract is determined in such circumstances the railway is entitled to entrust its completion to and get the work done by, another at the risk and expense of the assessee or itself employ labour and supervise the work at the expense of the assessee and supply materials necessary for completing the work or any part of it and debit the assessee with the cost of labour and the price of materials so used.

23. Throughout, the contract speaks of the execution and completion of work under it. There is specific reference in it to the quality of the work, where it will be carried out, how executed and to what degree it will afford the basis of interim payments to the assessee. When the railway decides to rescind the contract on account of a default by the assessee while executing it, the contract provides for measuring up the work of the assessee completed so far before entrusting the unexecuted part of the work to another agency for completion.