Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Deoki Nandan v. M.L Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah

Allahabad High Court
Oct 16, 1968
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions arise from actions taken by the Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, Sri M. L. Gupta, against Sri Deoki Nandan (the petitioner), a dealer carrying on sarrafa and pawning business in Lakhna, Etawah, under the name Hulas Rai Raghunandan Lal. On 30 January 1966 Sri M. L. Gupta conducted a raid at the petitioner's business premises to search and seize books of account and related documents. Accounts of what occurred differ: the petitioner says all books (including pawning books) were seized; the Sales Tax Officer says only certain books for assessment years 1961-62 to 1965-66 containing suspicious entries were seized but were then snatched away by persons at the petitioner's instigation. The police were informed and criminal proceedings are pending, but the court considered that issue unnecessary for deciding these writ petitions.

The primary controversy in these writ petitions concerns the validity of notices dated 5 March 1966 issued by the Sales Tax Officer under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (reassessment for escaped turnover) for various assessment years. Original assessments for the years in question had been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Sri J. C. Sinha; the reassessment notices were issued by Sri M. L. Gupta. The petitioner challenged (a) the jurisdiction of Sri M. L. Gupta to initiate reassessment where original assessment had been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, and (b) that the notices were issued without any bona fide reason to believe that turnover had escaped assessment (alleging malice and ulterior motives).

The jurisdiction point was referred by a Single Judge (Pathak, J.) to a Division Bench (the Chief Justice and Pathak, J.) asking whether Sri M. L. Gupta could initiate proceedings under Section 21 when the original assessment had been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer. The Division Bench answered in the affirmative. In light of that answer the court rejected the petitioner's first contention and proceeded to examine the second contention (absence of reason to believe).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon the facts of the case, Sri M. L. Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, could initiate and take proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act where the original assessment for the relevant years had been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer (Sri J. C. Sinha).
  2. Whether the notices under Section 21 dated 5 March 1966 were validly issued — specifically, whether the Sales Tax Officer had "reason to believe" that turnover for the assessment years had escaped assessment, or whether the notices were issued without material and motivated by malice or extraneous considerations.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Sales Tax Officer, Sri M. L. Gupta, lacked jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 21 for years where the original assessments had been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Sri J. C. Sinha.
  • The notices under Section 21 were issued without any reason to believe that turnover had escaped assessment; they were founded on malice and issued with ulterior motives (including harassment and to obtain material for criminal prosecution instigated by the Sales Tax Officer).
  • The petitioner specifically alleged in the writ petition that "there was no reason at all or reason to believe for issuing a notice under Section 21, No. 2326, dated 5th March, 1966." Paragraphs of the petition aver that there was no escapement of turnover and that the notices were founded on malice.

Respondent / Sales Tax Officer's Arguments

  • On jurisdiction: it was (as subsequently held by a Division Bench on the referred question) open to Sri M. L. Gupta to initiate and take proceedings under Section 21 despite the original assessment being made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer.
  • On material and belief: Sri Gupta asserted he had reason to believe turnover had escaped assessment based on (a) a survey on 30 January 1966 in which he estimated the shop stock at about Rs. 50,000 while the petitioner had estimated it at Rs. 27,000–30,000, and (b) "suspicious entries" in the books for the assessment years (initially stated as 1960-61 to 1965-66). He asserted he was not allowed to bring the books for detailed examination and that those factors gave him reason to believe part of the turnover had escaped assessment.
  • The respondent's counsel additionally argued that it was not necessary to point to specific material because the Sales Tax Officer's belief was subjective and his statement that he formed the belief must be accepted unless disproved, relying on observations of Desai, C.J., in the Allahabad Milling Co. case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Calcutta Discount Company v. Income-tax Officer, Companies Circle I, Calcutta and Anr. [1961] 41 I.T.R. 191 Illustrates that, where the Income-tax Officer had no material of non-disclosure before him, he could have no basis to believe an under-assessment had occurred; conditions precedent for jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act were absent. The court cited the case to show that an assessing officer must have material to form a belief; it was used to support the proposition that absence of material defeats jurisdiction to issue reassessment notices.
S. Narayanappa and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore [1967] 63 I.T.R. 219 Explains two conditions precedent for jurisdiction under Section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act: (i) the officer must have reason to believe there has been under-assessment; (ii) the officer must have reason to believe this resulted from omission/failure to make return or to disclose material facts. Also holds the belief must be in good faith and that courts may examine whether reasons have a rational connection to the belief. The court relied on these observations to equate Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act with Section 34 of the Income-tax Act and to state that 'reason to believe' is not purely subjective; it must be based on relevant material and is open to limited judicial scrutiny.
Banwari Lal v. The Judge (Revisions) Saks Tax, U.P. (Writ Petition No. 1966 of 1962 decided on 31st January, 1965) Used as authority for the proposition that the considerations applicable under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act apply to Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (i.e., requirement of material to support belief of escapement). The opinion cited this Division Bench decision to support the proposition that Section 21 requires material-based belief like Section 34 and that the Income-tax jurisprudence applies to sales tax reassessment proceedings.
Allahabad Milling Co. Private Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer [1965] 16 S.T.C. 888; affirmed on appeal [1966] 17 S.T.C. 211 Holds that for proceedings under Section 21 the assessing authority must have material on which it bona fide and honestly believed turnover had escaped assessment; considerations applied to Income-tax Section 34 apply fully to Section 21. Contains Desai, C.J.'s observations that belief must be based on facts and that the officer's statement of belief is to be accepted unless disproved (in context where materials were set out). The court examined this case closely: it noted that in Allahabad Milling the Sales Tax Officer had enumerated specific materials justifying belief (detailed examples are recorded in that judgment), and contrasted that with the instant case where no such specific material was shown. The court declined to read Desai, C.J.'s remarks as displacing the need for material-based belief.
Division Bench decision in the present proceedings (Hon'ble Chief Justice & Pathak, J.) — answer to the referred question (para 7–9) Decided that it was open to Sri M. L. Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, to initiate and take proceedings under Section 21 notwithstanding the original assessments having been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer. The court treated the Division Bench's answer as dispositive on the jurisdiction point and therefore rejected the petitioner's contention that Sri Gupta lacked jurisdiction to issue the impugned Section 21 notices.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main steps: (A) jurisdiction to issue Section 21 notices, and (B) validity of the notices in light of the requirement that the assessing authority have "reason to believe" that turnover has escaped assessment.

A. Jurisdiction: The court noted that the Single Judge had referred the question of whether Sri M. L. Gupta could initiate proceedings under Section 21 when the original assessment had been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer. A Division Bench (the Chief Justice and Pathak, J.) answered that it was open to Sri Gupta to do so. In view of that authoritative answer the court rejected the petitioner's first ground (lack of jurisdiction).

B. "Reason to believe" and sufficiency of material: The court examined whether Sri Gupta had any material on record to support a bona fide belief that turnover for the assessment years had escaped assessment. The court observed:

  • Section 21(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act requires the assessing authority to have "reason to believe" that turnover has escaped assessment before reassessment can be initiated. The court treated Section 21 as in pari materia with Section 34 of the Income-tax Act and applied the established income-tax jurisprudence on "reason to believe."
  • It is settled (by Supreme Court authorities cited) that existence of "reason to believe" is a condition precedent to jurisdiction and that the belief must be based on relevant material (howsoever meagre), not be purely subjective, and must have a rational connection to the material relied upon.
  • The court examined the material on record: Sri Gupta did not keep a record of reasons for issuing the notices; although the law does not require recording such reasons under Section 21 (unlike Section 34 of the Income-tax Act), the court considered it advisable and pointed out practical difficulties in the absence of a record (transfer of officer, judicial scrutiny).
  • The two counter-affidavits filed by Sri Gupta were considered: the first affidavit asserted (in general terms) that the stock appeared to be worth about Rs. 50,000 while the petitioner estimated Rs. 27,000–30,000, and that entries in the books were "suspicious." The court observed there was no inventory prepared, so the Rs. 50,000 estimate lacked demonstrated basis, and the value of stock on 30 January 1966 was not shown to have relevance to escapement of turnover for earlier years. Sri Gupta did not specify which entries were suspicious or give any example.
  • The second affidavit reiterated the statements but still did not disclose definite material. A survey diary was summoned and inspected; it contained nothing more than what was in the counter-affidavits.
  • The respondent relied on an articulation by Desai, C.J., in the Allahabad Milling case suggesting that the Sales Tax Officer's statement of belief must be accepted unless disproved. The court cautioned that Desai, C.J.'s observations must be read in context: in that case the Sales Tax Officer had enumerated concrete materials justifying his belief (the court listed those specifics from the Allahabad Milling judgment). By contrast, the present respondent produced no specific or concrete material.
  • On this factual record the court concluded that the Sales Tax Officer had not put forward definite material to show that he had reason to believe turnover had escaped assessment; therefore the statutory condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 21 was absent in substance on the available record.

Based on that analysis the court held the impugned notices were invalid and quashed them.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the impugned notices under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act dated 5th March, 1966, relating to the assessment years 1960-61 to 1964-65 (para 29 of the opinion).

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The respondent, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah (Sri M. L. Gupta), is prohibited from taking any action in pursuance of the impugned notices dated 5th March, 1966.
  • The petitioner (Sri Deoki Nandan) is entitled to his costs.

Broader implications: The court reiterated and applied the established principle — drawn from Income-tax Act jurisprudence — that an assessing authority must have a bona fide "reason to believe" based on relevant material before it can exercise power to reassess under Section 21. The decision stresses that while an assessing officer's belief is not to be interfered with lightly, the belief cannot be a mere pretence and must have a rational connection to material in the record. The opinion did not purport to lay down a new legal doctrine beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

This summary has been prepared exclusively from the information contained in the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions not present in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

1. This and the connected writ petitions are being disposed of by this common order as they are of the same petitioner and raise identical questions. The petitioner in all these writ petitions is one Sri Deoki Nandan, who carries on business of sarrafa and pawning at Lakhna in the district Etawah under the name and style of Hulas Rai Raghunandan Lal.

2. On 30th January, 1966, Sri M. L. Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, made a raid at the business premises of the petitioner to search and seize the books of accounts and other documents connected with the business activities of the petitioner. There is considerable controversy as to what exactly happened at the time of the search and seizure. According to the petitioner, all books of accounts including those pertaining to the business of pawning were indiscriminately seized and carried away by the raiding party which included Sri M. L. Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, Servasri K. C. Saxena and A. H. Rizvi, Assistant Sales Tax Officers and a peon. According to the Sales Tax Officer, certain books of accounts relating to the assessment, years 1961-62 to 1965-66 were seized as they were found to contain some suspicious entries, but they were snatched away from the hands of the peon by some persons at the instigation of the petitioner. The incident was reported to the police and the matter is now sub judice in certain criminal proceedings. It is, however, not necessary to go into that part of the case for the purpose of deciding this and the connected writ, petitions.

3. The main controversy raised in these petitions relates to the initiation by the Sales Tax Officer of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") relating to the assessment years 1961-62, 1962-63, 1963-64 and 1964-65. Section 21 of the Act is meant to bring to tax the turnover of an assessment year which has escaped assessment either in whole or in part.

4. All the notices under Section 21 of the Act are dated 5th March, 1966. The present writ petition relates to assessment year 1961-62 and the notice under Section 21 relating to that year is annexure 'I' to the writ petition. For all these years assessments under Section 7 of the Act had already been made by Sri J. C. Sinha, Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Etawah. The reassessment notices under Section 21 were, however, issued by the opposite party Sri M. L. Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah. The validity of these notices under Section 21 has been assailed in this and the connected writ petitions.

5. The first ground of attack is that the original assessments having been made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, the proceedings for reassessment under Section 21 in respect of the same years could not have been taken by Sri M. L. Gupta, who, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, had no jurisdiction to take the impugned proceedings.

6. It appears that this bunch of writ petitions came up for hearing earlier before the Honourable Pathak, J., who considered that the question jurisdiction raised by the petitioner was of considerable importance and difficulty and he accordingly formulated and referred the following question for decision by a larger Bench :

Whether upon the facts and circumstances of the instant case, when the original assessment was made by Sri J. C. Sinha, Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, against the petitioner, it is open to Sri M. L. Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, to initiate and take proceedings against the petitioner for the same assessment year under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act ?

7. The reference so made by the Honourable Pathak, J., came up for decision before a Division Bench of this Court comprised of the Honourable the Chief Justice and the Honourable Pathak, J. The Bench answered the question as below :

It was open to Sri M. L. Gupta, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, to initiate and take proceedings against the petitioner under Section 21, U.P. Sales Tax Act, in spite of the fact that original assessment of the petitioner had been done by Sri J. C. Sinha, Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Etawah.

8. In view of the answer returned by the Bench to the question referred by the learned Single Judge, the first contention of the learned counsel has got to be rejected.

9. The other ground upon which the validity of the notice under Section 21 of the Act has been assailed is that the Sales Tax Officer had no reason to believe that any taxable turnover relating to the assessment years in question had escaped assessment. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned notices had been issued out of malice and in order to harass the petitioner and to hunt out material for the criminal case pending against the petitioner instituted at the instance of the Sales Tax Officer. In other words, the contention is that there was really no material before the Sales Tax Officer upon which he could form a bona fide belief that any turnover had escaped assessment and that the notices under Section 21 had been issued out of extraneous considerations.

10. Section 21(1) of the Act under which the impugned notices have been issued, reads thus :

21. (1) If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of the dealer has, for any reason, escaped assessment to tax for any year, the assessing authority may, after issuing notice to the dealer, and making such enquiry as may be necessary, assess or reassess him to tax :

Provided that the tax shall be charged at the rate at which it would have been charged had the turnover not escaped assessment, or full assessment, as the case may be.

11. Section 21(1) of the Act corresponds to Section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, which also stipulates that if the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, etc., the Income-tax Officer may issue a notice and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits or gains.

12. In Calcutta Discount Company v. Income-tax Officer, Companies Circle I, Calcutta, and Anr. [1961] 41 I.T.R. 191, the Supreme Court after perusing the facts as disclosed in the affidavits filed on behalf of the parties, recorded its conclusion in the following words at page 206:

It must, therefore, be held that the Income-tax Officer who issued the notices had not before him any non-disclosure of a material fact and so he could have no material before him for believing that there had been any material non-disclosure by reason of which an under-assessment had taken place.

We are, therefore, bound to hold that the conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act did not exist and the Income-tax Officer had therefore no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices under Section 34 in respect of the years 1942-43, 1943-44 and 1944-45 after the expiry of four years.

13. In S. Narayanappa and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore [1967] 63 I.T.R. 219, the Supreme Court once again had to construe Section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act and at page 221 of the report made the following observations :

It is true that two conditions must be satisfied in order to confer jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to issue the notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act... first condition is that the Income-tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income, profits or gains chargeable to income,-tax had been under-assessed. The second condition is that he must have reason to believe that such 'under-assessment' had occurred by reason of either, (i) omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22, or (ii) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Both these conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Income-tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to issue a notice under the section.

14. It was further held in that case that sufficiency of the grounds which induced the Income-tax Officer to act is not a justiciable issue, but it is of course open for the assessee to contend that the Income-tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non-disclosure. In other words, the existence of the belief can be challenged by the assessee but not the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief. As to what constitutes "reason to believe" and to what extent that question may be examined by the Court can best be stated in the words of the Supreme Court occurring at page 222 of the report in S. Narayanappa's case [1967] 63 I.T.R. 219 :

The expression 'reason to believe' in Section 34 of the Income-tax Act does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The belief must be held in good faith : it cannot be merely a pretence. To put it differently, it is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. To this limited extent, the action of the Income-tax Officer in starting proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is open to challenge in a court of law.

15. Observations to the same effect are to be found in some other later cases of the Supreme Court, but it is not necessary to multiply such cases. It is now well settled that the existence of reason to believe on the part of the Income-tax Officer that certain income has escaped assessment is a condition precedent to his jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act and further that the belief of the Income-tax Officer is not purely subjective but has to be based upon relevant material, howsoever meagre.

16. To this extent Section 34 of the Income-tax Act is in pari materia with Section 21 of the Act inasmuch as Section 21 of the Act also requires the Sales Tax Officer to have reason to believe that the turnover of a particular assessment year has escaped assessment before he can proceed to assess or reassess such escaped turnover. No authority for this proposition is needed, but if one is needed, the same is to be found in the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Banwari Lal v. The Judge (Revisions) Saks Tax, U.P. (Writ Petition No. 1966 of 1962 decided on 31st January, 1965).

17. In Allahabad Milling Co. Private Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer [1965] 16 S.T.C. 888, one of us sitting single (Honourable Pathak, J.) also expressed the same opinion. It was held there that what was essential for the purpose of deciding the validity of the proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was that the assessing authority must have material on the basis of which it bona fide and honestly believed that the turnover had escaped assessment and further that the considerations which apply to the law of income-tax relating to Section 34 of the Income-tax Act apply fully to the proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. This case was later affirmed on appeal in Allahabad Milling Co. Private Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer II, Allahabad [1966] 17 S.T.C. 211. It is also well settled that an Income-tax Officer cannot initiate proceedings under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act with a view to launching a fishing and roving enquiry on the off-chance of finding some escapement of tax. He must have in his possession some material pointing towards the escapement of income before he can entertain a belief about the escapement and can assume jurisdiction under Section 34. The same considerations will apply to proceedings under Section 21 of the Act.

18. Learned counsel for the opposite party urged that the petitioner in the instant case did not challenge the existence of the belief on the part of the Sales Tax Officer or the want of material for such a belief. We are unable to accept this submission. There is ground No. 7 in the writ petition which reads as under :

Because there was no reason at all or reason to believe for issuing a notice under Section 21, No. 2326, dated 5th March, 1966, for the assessment.

19. This ground is backed by averments made in paragraphs 19, 22 and 25 of the writ petition wherein the petitioner has clearly stated that there was no escapement of any turnover and there was no reason at all for any such belief with the opposite party

"and the letters and notices of the petitioner Nos. 2321 to 2326 dated 5th March, 1966, are founded on malice and have been issued with ulterior motives."
There is thus a clear challenge to the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer and it is open to this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to scrutinise the material on the record to ascertain as to the truth or otherwise of the challenge.

20. To begin with we do not find that Sri M.L. Gupta kept any record of the reasons which led him to issue the impugned notices. The Act, of (1) course, does not require the Sales Tax Officer to record such reasons as is the case under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act, but since such reasons are open to scrutiny by the Court on a challenge from an assessee, it would have been advisable for the Sales Tax Officer to have kept some record of the reasons. There is another reason why we consider that the record of reasons is essential. The Sales Tax Officer may be transferred or the case of the petitioner may be transferred to another officer. In either case, the successor-in-office would like to know the reasons behind the initiation of proceedings under Section 21. In the absence of any record of reasons, he .would find it difficult to proceed with the case and to disclose such reasons to the court, if called upon to do so. We then turned to the counter-affidavits filed by Sri Gupta to find out the reasons for the issuance of the impugned notices. Sri Gupta has filed two counter-affidavits, one is dated 31st March, 1966, filed on 1st April, 1966, and the other is dated 15th April, 1966, filed on 18th April, 1966. In neither of these affidavits could we find any relevant material. In the first counter-affidavit Sri Gupta has stated that on 30th January, 1966, he visited the shop of the petitioner and found that the stock in his shop was worth about Rs. 50,000, while the petitioner had estimated the same at about Rs. 27,000 to 30,000. He has further stated that the entries in the books which related to the assessment years 1960-61 to 1965-66 were also found to be suspicious. The reasons for his belief of the escapement of the turnover have been stated by Sri Gupta in the following words :

From the suspicious entries in the books which the deponent was not allowed to bring for detailed examination and the gross underestimation of the stocks by the petitioner at the time of survey on 30th January, 1966, the deponent had the reason to believe that the petitioner was not disclosing his correct sales and that a part of his turnover for the years 1960-61 to 1964-65 had escaped assessment to tax.

21. These averments have been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. It is admitted that no inventory of the stock was prepared at the time of the survey on 30th January, 1966. It is difficult to understand as to how Mr. Gupta was able to estimate the stocks at Rs. 50,000 without preparing an inventory. Moreover, the value of the stock on 30th January, 1966, can have no relevancy to the escapement of turnover for the years 1960-61 to 1964-65. Had it been the case of the Sales Tax Officer that the actual stock position was different from that entered in the petitioner's books of accounts, it might have been possible for him to infer that undervaluation of the stocks in the books of accounts was being practised by the petitioner with a view to suppressing sales, but that is not the position here. Similarly Sri Gupta has not indicated as to what entries in the books of accounts had been noticed by him at the time of survey and how they were found to be suspicious. He has not given even one instance of the so-called suspicious entries.

22. The second affidavit of Mr. Gupta is more specific inasmuch as it contains parawise replies to the petitioner's writ petition. In paragraph 16 of his counter-affidavit which is in reply to paragraph 19 of the writ petition, Sri Gupta has averred :

It is denied that these notices and letters were issued out of malice or to harass and to hunt out material for the prosecution of the petitioner. From the suspicious entries in the books which the deponent was not allowed to bring for detailed examination and gross underestimation of the stocks by the petitioner at the time of survey on 30th January, 1966, the deponent had the reason to believe, that the petitioner was not disclosing his correct sales and that a part of his turnover for the years 1960-61 to 1964-65 had escaped assessment to tax.

23. In paragraph 20 of this counter-affidavit Sri Gupta has merely denied the allegations in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the writ petition and has asserted that the notices issued against the petitioner were in accordance with the law. As already observed, these averments of Mr. Gupta do not disclose any definite material in support of his belief that any part of the turnover of the petitioner liable to assessment for the assessment years 1960-61 to 1964-65 had escaped assessment.

24. Mr. Vijay K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the opposite party then invited our attention to the statement of Mr. Gupta contained in paragraph 6 of his second affidavit dated 15th April, 1966, wherein Mr. Gupta had referred to some survey notes recorded by him in his survey diary. In order to find out any material which might be contained in the survey diary, we summoned the same and perused it along with Mr. Mehrotra, but unfortunately the survey diary also contained nothing more than what has been stated by Mr. Gupta in his counter-affidavits.

25. Mr. Vijay K. Mehrotra then urged that it was not necessary to point out any material to support the belief of the Sales Tax Officer, as, according to him, such a belief was subjective. In support of this argument he relied strongly upon the following observations of Desai, C. J., in the case of Allahabad Milling Co. Private Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer [1966] 17S.T.C. 211:

'Has reason to believe' means that there is belief and that it is not arbitrary or capricious but based on, or justified by, facts. Belief is a subjective and not objective fact and the Sales Tax Officer's statement in his counter-affidavit that he formed the belief must be accepted unless it is disproved.

26. These observations have to be read in the context of the case. It must be remembered that the observations of the learned Chief Justice relied upon by Mr. Mehrotra occur in the appellate order of the Bench passed on appeal against the judgment of brother Pathak in the case reported in Allahabad Milling Co. Private Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer [1965] 16 S.T.C. 888. In his judgment brother Pathak had enumerated the materials on which the Sales Tax Officer had based his belief. Those materials were as under :

(i) Dealer's stock of pledges with the bank did not tally with the stocks shown in the production and issue register. The entries also did not tally with the delivery memos. and for certain sales no delivery memos. were issued.

(ii) Some goods sold by the dealer and transported by M/s. Bharat Transport Co. were not found incorporated in the dealer's account books and thus the turnover was suppressed.

(iii) The production ratio of bran, as shown by the dealer was found to be high ; thus the production of costly and taxable wheat products like atta, maida and suji was understated.

27. The Sales Tax Officer in that case in paragraph 10 of his counter-affidavit had stated :

In view of the aforementioned modes of suppression of turnover practised by the petitioner in the accounting year 1957 and his tax evading tendency in the said year, the deponent honestly believed that the same mode of suppressing the turnover must have been followed by the petitioner in the subsequent years also and in these circumstances the deponent had reasons to believe that a part of the turnover of the dealer had escaped assessment for the year 1959-60. Consequently, the deponent issued the notice under Section 21 to the petitioner.

28. The material relied upon by the Sales Tax Officer in the Allahabad Milling Co.'s case [1965-1966] 16 S.T.C. 888 was undoubtedly relevant and justified the belief of the Sales Tax Officer. In the instant case there is no such definite material. We are, therefore, not prepared to hold that Desai, C.J., laid down a proposition different from the one laid down by the Supreme Court in S. Narayanappa's case [1967] 63 I.T.R. 219, namely, that the reason to believe does not mean purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer.

29. For these reasons we allow this and the connected writ petitions. The impugned notices under Section 21 of the Act dated 5th March, 1966, relating to the assessment years 1960-61 to 1964-65 are quashed. The respondent, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, is prohibited from taking any action in pursuance of the impugned notices. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.