Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ
 

Shyam Lal v. State

Allahabad High Court
Feb 8, 1968
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Uniyal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant operated a tea stall and stored milk used to prepare tea for customers. A Food Inspector purchased a sample of the applicant's milk which the Public Analyst found to be adulterated. The applicant was prosecuted under Section 7(i) read with Section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Act XXXVII of 1954) (the "principal Act").

Because the offence was treated as a second offence, under the principal Act the applicant was liable to imprisonment up to two years and with fine, and, by proviso, such imprisonment could not be less than one year and fine not less than Rs. 2,000.

The offence was committed on 28 September 1964. The applicant was convicted and on 4 August 1965 was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 (with a default term of six months' further rigorous imprisonment). The Sessions Judge affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal.

The applicant filed a revision in this Court. The principal contention before the learned Single Judge was that the Legislature had by an Amending Act of 1965 (effective 1 March 1965) substituted Section 16(1) of the principal Act, thereby introducing discretion for the court to impose a lesser punishment than the minima previously prescribed; the applicant argued this amendment applied during the pendency of his trial and therefore the magistrate should have imposed sentence under the amended provision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the effect on pending criminal proceedings when an amending Act, which reduces the statutory rigour of punishment (and grants judicial discretion to impose less than previously mandated minima), comes into force before judgment?
  2. Specifically, does the amended Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (as substituted by the Amending Act of 1965) apply to an accused whose offence was committed before the amendment but whose conviction and sentence were rendered after the amendment came into force?
  3. Was the magistrate's imposition of sentence under the original (pre-amendment) Section 16(1) lawful where the substituted/amended Section had come into force prior to the date of judgment?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Amending Act of 1965, which substituted Section 16(1) and came into force on 1 March 1965, conferred discretion on the sentencing court to impose imprisonment for less than six months or a fine of less than Rs. 1,000 (in specified circumstances) and abolished rigid minima tied to first/second/third offence distinctions.
  • Because the amending statute was in force when the judgment was rendered, the amended provision ought to govern sentencing; therefore the magistrate acted illegally in passing sentence in accordance with the original statute (which imposed higher mandatory minima).

The opinion does not set out specific adversarial or respondent arguments in detail; only the applicant's principal contention is described in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Calder v. Bull (United States Supreme Court) (cited as I.L. Ed. 648) Asserting that laws are ex post facto only if they create or aggravate crime, increase punishment, or change rules of evidence to convict; implying ameliorative changes to punishment do not violate ex post facto principles. The Court relied on this principle to support the proposition that where a statutory change reduces punishment (is favourable to the accused), the accused cannot complain of retroactive application of that change; thus the amended, more lenient sentencing regime could be applied to pending proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by comparing the language of Section 16(1) as it originally read and as substituted by the Amending Act of 1965. Under the original provision, a second offence attracted imprisonment which was not less than one year and a fine not less than Rs. 2,000 (subject to a proviso requiring special reasons to reduce). The substituted provision (amending Section 16(1)) prescribed a broader maximum (up to six years) and minima (not less than six months and fine not less than Rs. 1,000), but crucially introduced a specific proviso permitting the court, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in judgment, to impose imprisonment for less than six months or fine of less than Rs. 1,000.

The Court observed that the amending statute also removed the rigid distinction between first, second or third offences in determining punishment, thereby fundamentally altering the statutory sentencing framework.

Turning to principles of statutory construction, the Court cited authorities (Crawford's treatise and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes) to explain that when an amendment is enacted, both the original and the amendment must be construed together, harmonising provisions where possible; however, where irreconcilable conflict exists, the amendment—the last expression of legislative will—prevails. The Court also relied upon the general rule that repeal or amendment of a statute divests inchoate rights and that pending proceedings not concluded by final judgment must be decided in accordance with the law as it exists when the final judgment is pronounced.

The Court then applied the Calder v. Bull principle that laws are only ex post facto if they aggravate offences or increase punishment. Where the amendment is ameliorative (favouring the accused), there is no constitutional impediment to its retrospective application to pending proceedings. The Court emphasised the need to construe penal statutes so as to favour personal liberty and to give effect to legislative intent to reduce rigour where the legislature has so indicated.

On this basis the Court concluded that since the Amending Act came into force on 1 March 1965 and the magistrate's judgment was rendered after that date, the applicant was entitled to the benefit of the amended Section 16(1). The Court examined the record and found the sentence originally imposed to be disproportionate to the nature of the offence.

Accordingly, while upholding the conviction under Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Court set aside the original sentence and substituted a lesser sentence consistent with the amended statute and the Court's discretionary power under it.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision is allowed in part. The conviction is maintained but the sentence imposed by the magistrate is set aside and substituted.

Direct disposition imposed by the Court: The applicant's sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000 (with default six months' imprisonment) was set aside. The Court instead sentenced the applicant to a fine of Rs. 200, in default two months' rigorous imprisonment.

Legal implication articulated by the Court: Where a legislative amendment to a penal statute reduces the rigour of punishment (or creates a discretionary power to impose a lesser punishment) and comes into force before a final judgment is pronounced, the court must apply the law as it exists on the date of judgment. An accused whose prosecution has not concluded by final judgment is entitled to the benefit of such ameliorative amendments. This application was grounded in authorities and the principle that penal statutes should be construed in favour of personal liberty.

The Court's decision therefore directly affected the parties by reducing the applicant's sentence and affirming the applicability of the amended Section 16(1) to pending proceedings; the opinion expressly articulated the controlling principle that ameliorative statutory changes apply to pending, unconcluded prosecutions.

Revision allowed.
Show all summary ...

Uniyal, J.:— This case has been referred to a larger Bench by a learned Single Judge. The question involved is one relating to the effect on pending proceeding of an amending Act which gives discretion to the Court in imposing a lesser punishment than that prescribed in the original Act.

2. The applicant had a tea stall and he used to store milk for the purpose of making tea which he served to his customers. The Food Inspector purchased a sample of milk from him which was found to be adulterated by the public Analyst. He was prosecuted under Sec. 7(i) read with Sec. 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Act XXXVII of 1954), hereinafter referred to as the ‘principal Act’. Since the offence alleged to have been committed by him was a second offence, he rendered himself liable to imprisonment for a term extending to two years and with fine but which punishment could not be less than one year together with fine of not less than Rs. 2,000/- as laid down in Sec. 16(1)(ii) of the principal Act.

3. The offence charged had been committed on 28-9-1964 and the applicant was convicted and sentenced on 4-8-1965 to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo further regorous imprisonment for six months. The learned Sessions Judge affirmed the said conviction and sentence in appeal. The applicant filed an application in revision in this Court and the main contention raised on behalf of the applicant before the learned single Judge was that the Legislature had amended Sec. 16(i) of the principal Act by the amending Act of 1965 which came into force on 1st March, 1965 and that by reason of the said amendment, it was open to the Magistrate, in exercise of his discretion, to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than Rs. 1,000/- if in his opinion, the circumstances of the case did not require the imposition of a higher punishment.

4. In order to appreciate the point under consideration, it is necessary to set out the provisions of Sec. 16, of the principal Act as also the provisions of the said Section as substituted by the amending Act. Sec. 16, as it originally stood, was in these terms:—

“16. (1) If any person—

(a) Whether by himself or by any person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes, any article of food in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder, or

(b) …………………………

(c) …………………………

(d) …………………………

(e) …………………………

(f) …………………………

(g) …………………………

(i) for the first offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both;

(ii) for a second offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine;

Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court, such imprisonment shall not be less than one year and such fine shall not be less than two thousand rupees.”

5. Sec. 16(1), as substituted by the amending Act of 1965, is as follows:—

“16. (1) Any person—

(a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food—

(i) which is adulterated…………

(ii) …………………………

(b) …………………………

(c) …………………………

(d) …………………………

(e) …………………………

(f) …………………..

He shall in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of Sec. 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years, and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees;

Provided that—

(i) if the offence is under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) and is with respect to an article of food which is adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of Sec. 2………………….

(ii) …………………… (a) the court may for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees”.

6. It will be noticed that by the amending Act, a person who commits breach of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) in respect of an article of food which is adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of Sec. 2, renders himself liable to imprisonment extending to six years and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. At the same time, the Legislature has given a wide discretion to the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or a fine of less than Rs. 1,000/-, if the Court for adequate and special reasons considers if proper to do so. The amending Act has abolished the distinction between the first, second or third offence in the matter of punishment. Under the principal Act, on the other hand, a second offence in breach of the provisions of the Act rendered a person liable to a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year and of fine of not less than two thousand rupees. It was contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the Magistrate acted illegally in passing the sentence on the applicant in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act inasmuch as on the date on which the judgment was rendered, the principal Act had ceased to exist and the amending Act had come into force and substituted in its place. It was said that the amending Act had come into force during the pendency of the trial of the accused and, therefore, the new Section superseded the original Section of the principal Act and became part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there.

7. It is well established that the repeal of a statute has the effect of saving all transactions past and closed. Whether a right has been created or liability incurred under the original statute, its repeal cannot effect a vested right accrued or liability incurred thereunder. Crawford, in his treatise ‘The construction of Statutes (1940 Edition), states as follows:—

“Since an amendment becomes a part of the original statute, both must be construed together as if they constituted one enactment, even if the amendment occurs merely by implication. Their provisions should be harmonized, if possible, but where there is irreconciliable conflict, the provisions of the amendment must prevail over those of the original statute on the theory that the former constitutes the last expression of the will of the Legislature (page 617).

8. Dealing with the problem of repealing statutes, the learned author goes on to say:

“A repeal will generally, therefore, divest all inchoate rights which have arisen under the repealed statute, and destroy all accrued causes of action based thereon. As a result, such a repeal, without a saving clause, will destroy any proceeding, whether not yet begun, or whether pending at the time of the enactment of the repealing Act, and not already prosecuted to a final judgment so as to create a vested right. (at page 599)”.

9. The above rule of construction is based on the principle that until the proceedings have reached final judgment in the Court of last resort, that Court, when it comes to announce its decision, must conform to the law then existing. Dealing with the question of criminal offences and punishment, the learned author, at page 574 of his treatise, cites the decision of the United States' Supreme Court Calder v. Bull I.L Ed. 648.. The Supreme Court, in that case said:

“But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition that mollifies the regour of the criminal law; but only those that create or aggravate the crime, or increase the punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction”.

10. The learned author goes on to say:

“Where the punishment is altered, and, consequently, in the light of human experience and morality, favours the defendant, he cannot complain of the retroactive ??? of the law which changes the punishment. Obviously, since the condemnation ex post facto legislation is founded on inherent harshness, the basis of the condemnation disappears where the alteration ??? in favour of the accused or condemned persons”.

11. Maxwell on ‘Interpretation of Statutes (Eleventh Edition)’ at page 275 states the rule of construction regarding penal statutes as follows:—

“All statutes are now construed with a more attentive regard to the language and criminal statutes with a more rational regard to the aim and intention of the legislature, than formerly. It is unquestionably right that the distinction should not be altogether erased from the judicial mind, for it is required by the spirit of our free institutions that the interpretation of all statutes should be favourable to personal liberty”.

12. It seems to us clear that the true rule of construction of a penal statute is that where the legislature evinces its intention to modify the law, in favour of the accused, so as to reduce the rigour of the law in the light of past experience and changed social conditions, so long as prosecution of the accused has not concluded by a judgment of conviction, the proceedings against him are regarded as inchoate and the law applicable to him would be the law as amended by the legislature. The court trying an accused person has to take into consideration the law as it exists on the date of the judgment. It seems reasonable that an accused person cannot render himself liable to a higher punishment under a statute which has ceased to exist and has been substituted by a new law which favours him. Where the question as to the interpretation of a penal statute is concerned, the Court must construe its provisions beneficially in regard to their applicability to the accused. It would be violating the spirit of the law and the will of the Legislature as expressed in the amending statute to sentence an accused person on the basis of the original Act which has been considered by the Legislature to be harmful and harsh against public interest.

13. We are of the opinion that inasmuch as the amending Act had come into force on the date when the judgment came to be passed by the Magistrate in this case, the applicant was entitled to invoke the aid of Sec. 16, as amended. We have examined the record of this case and it seems to us that the punishment awarded to the accused was disproportionate to the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed by him. While, therefore, upholding the conviction of the applicant under Sec. 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, we set aside his sentence of imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/-. Instead we sentence him to a fine of Rs. 200/- in default to undergo two months' regorous imprisonment.

14. We accordingly allow this revision in part subject to the directions contained in our order.

Revision allowed.