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Smt. Annapurna And Another Defts.- v. Munshi And Others Pltffs.-
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arises from a dispute concerning the validity and effect of transfers of land rights under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the Transfer of Property Act. The defendants-appellants challenged the plaintiffs-respondents' rights to land transferred to them, contending that the benefit of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable to transfers made in contravention of Section 153 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The plaintiffs-respondents relied on subsequent acquisition of Bhumidhar rights by the transferors and the applicability of Section 43 to assert their title. The appeal was heard after dismissal by the lower appellate court, which had found the plaintiffs in possession of the land at the time of the defendants' subsequent transfer.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the benefit of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to transfers made in contravention of Section 153 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
- Whether the defendants-appellants, as subsequent transferees for consideration and in good faith without notice, are protected against the plaintiffs-respondents' title acquired under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants-Appellants' Arguments
- The benefit of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to transfers made in contravention of Section 153 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, as such transfers are declared void under Section 166 of that Act.
- The Supreme Court decision concerning transfers not permitted by Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to transfers prohibited under Section 153 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
- Even if Section 43 applies, the defendants-appellants claim protection as transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the plaintiffs-respondents' title.
Plaintiffs-Respondents' Arguments
- The plaintiffs-respondents rely on the Supreme Court decision in Jama Nasjid Marcara v. K. Deviah and its application in Jagat Narain v. Lal Ji, which supports the applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act to such transfers.
- The transferors' subsequent acquisition of Bhumidhar rights means that the transfer operated as a transfer of those rights in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents.
- The plaintiffs-respondents held possession of the land at the time of the defendants-appellants' transfer, negating the defendants' claim of lack of notice under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jama Nasjid Marcara v. K. Deviah, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 847 | Establishes the applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act to transfers subsequently validated by acquisition of rights. | Followed by the court to hold that transfers in contravention of Section 153 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act still benefit from Section 43 upon subsequent acquisition of Bhumidhar rights. |
| Jagat Narain v. Lal Ji, A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 504 | Supports the principle in Jama Nasjid Marcara regarding the operation of Section 43. | Applied by the court to reinforce the untenability of defendants' contention against the applicability of Section 43. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the relationship between the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the Transfer of Property Act. It observed that transfers prohibited under Section 153 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are void under Section 166 of the same Act, which embodies the legal position that such transfers are also void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. The court noted that Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act similarly renders certain transfers void, and there is no conflict between these provisions and Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to the benefit of Section 43, which allows a transferee to acquire rights upon subsequent acquisition of title by the transferor. Regarding the defendants-appellants' claim of protection as bona fide transferees without notice, the court referred to the definition of 'notice' in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and the fact that the plaintiffs-respondents were in possession at the time of the defendants' transfer, negating the defendants' claim of lack of notice. The court found no other points urged and concluded that the appeal lacked merit.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to the benefit of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act despite the initial transfer being in contravention of Section 153 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The defendants-appellants were not protected as bona fide transferees without notice because the plaintiffs were in possession. The decision directly affects the parties by upholding the plaintiffs' title and does not establish any new precedent beyond applying established principles.
Gangeshwar Prasad, J.:— The main contention raised in this appeal on behalf of the defendants-appellants is that the benefit of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available in respect of a transfer made in contravention of Sec. 153 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and the plaintiffs-respondents who are transferees under such a transfer got no rights in the land covered by the transfer even upon the subsequent acquisition by the transferors of the rights of a Bhumidhar in the said land, which was held by them only as Sirdars at the time of its transfer. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jama Nasjid Marcara v. K. Deviah A.I.R 1962 S.C 847. which was followed by me in Jagat Narain v. Lal Ji A.I.R 1965 Alld. 504. this contention is plainly untenable. It was urged by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants that a transfer in contravention of Sec. 153 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been declared to be void by Sec. 166 of the said Act and the Supreme Court decision which dealt with a transfer not permitted by Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to a transfer of the former kind. The argument overlooks the fact that transfers of all properties which have been made non-transferable by Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act are void under Sec. 23 of the Contract Act just as all transfers which are void under Sec. 23 of the Contract Act have been prohibited by Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, and it does not, therefore, make any difference that the transfer which was involved in the Supreme Court decision related to a property which was not transferable because of Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. A transfer in contravention of Sec. 153 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would be void under Sec. 23 of the Contract Act also, and Sec. 166 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act only embodies in the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act itself what would be the legal position even in the absence of the latter provision. Sec. 166 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is, therefore, not in conflict with Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act just as Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act is not in conflict with it. The result clearly is that the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to the benefit of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and the transfers in their favour operated as a transfer of the rights of a Bhumidhar upon the acquisition of the rights of a Bhumidhar by the transferors.
2. The next contention on behalf of the defendants-appellants is that even if Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable the defendants-appellants are protected because they are transferees in good faith for consideration without notice. The transfer in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents is by a registered deed and the lower appellate court has found that the plaintiffs-respondents were in possession of the land in suit when the defendants-appellants obtained the subsequent deed in respect of it. Having regard to the definition of ‘notice’, in Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act the appellants cannot, therefore, be said to be transferees without notice of the title which, at the time of the transfer in their favour the plaintiffs-respondents had acquired by operation of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.
3. No other point has been urged.
4. The appeal has no force and it is accordingly dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, I.P.C
Appeal dismissed.
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