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Assistant District Panchayat Officer, Rae Bareli v. Jai Narain, Pradhan Gram Sabha Palhipur

Allahabad High Court
Mar 18, 1966
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Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This special appeal was filed by four appellants — the Assistant District Panchayat Officer, Rai Bareli (appellant No. 1); the Assistant Development Officer, Rahi, Rai Bareli (appellant No. 2); the District Panchayat Officer, Rai Bareli (appellant No. 3); and the State of Uttar Pradesh — challenging a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court.

The Single Judge had allowed a writ petition brought by respondent Jai Narain under Article 226 of the Constitution and quashed an order of appellant No. 1 dated 21 August 1963. That order had directed the holding of a meeting to consider a motion of no-confidence which had been presented by five members of the Gram Sabha before appellant No. 3 and which was signed by more than half the number of members.

At the hearing of the special appeal, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondent that the appeal had not been properly filed because it was signed by the Standing Counsel, who, it was contended, only had authority to appear and plead but not to act on behalf of the appellants. The appellants relied on a notification in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual appointing the Standing Counsel to act for the State Government and for public officers where the defence of those officers was undertaken by the State Government; that notification was issued pursuant to certain rules of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Standing Counsel was competent to act and file the special appeal on behalf of the appellants (i.e., whether the representation notification applied to proceedings under Article 226 and the special appeal arising from them).
  2. Whether, under Rule 33-B(1) and (2) of the Panchayat Raj Rules, the officer before whom a notice of motion of no-confidence is presented (the District Panchayat Officer) must be the same individual who thereafter takes action to convene the meeting under sub‑Rule (2), or whether another prescribed Authority (e.g., the Assistant District Panchayat Officer) may validly take that subsequent action.
  3. Whether any irregularity (if present) in the convening authority for the meeting justified exercise of the Court's writ jurisdiction to quash the meeting and related actions.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appeal was improperly filed because it was signed by the Standing Counsel who had only authority to appear and plead but not to act on behalf of the appellants.
  • The learned Single Judge accepted that, because the notice of motion was presented to the District Panchayat Officer (appellant No. 3), only that officer was competent to take further action under Rule 33-B(2).

Appellants' / Standing Counsel's Arguments

  • The Standing Counsel was authorised by a notification reproduced in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual to act for the State Government and for public officers where the State Government undertook their defence in proceedings before the High Court.
  • Even if the notice of motion was presented to appellant No. 3, the Assistant District Panchayat Officer (appellant No. 1) was a prescribed Authority under the Panchayat Raj Act for the purposes of Rule 33-B and therefore could validly convene the meeting under sub‑Rule (2).
  • Where the defence of public officers has been undertaken by the State Government, the Standing Counsel is entitled to act for those officers; their appearance and filing of the appeal showed that the State had undertaken the defence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwan Das, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1818 That proceedings before a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution which relate to civil rights are civil proceedings. The Court relied on this authority to hold that proceedings under Article 226 relating to civil rights are civil proceedings and that provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to such proceedings under Section 141 of the CPC (subject to limitations). This supported the conclusion that the notification conferring authority on the Standing Counsel (issued under CPC rules) applied to the present proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in two principal parts: first, the competency of the Standing Counsel to act for the appellants; and second, the validity of the action taken under Rule 33-B of the Panchayat Raj Rules.

1. Competency of the Standing Counsel

  • The respondent's preliminary objection challenged the competence of the Standing Counsel to act for the appellants because he was said to have authority only to appear and plead, not to act on their behalf.
  • The appellants relied on a notification in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual (issued pursuant to Rules 2 and 8 and Clause (c) of Rule 8‑B of an Order in the First Schedule to the CPC) appointing the Standing Counsel to act for the State Government and public officers "if the defence of the public officers was undertaken on their behalf by the State Government." The notification makes the Standing Counsel entitled to act in all judicial proceedings to which the CPC provisions are applicable.
  • The Court observed there was no explicit earlier assertion in the record that the State Government had undertaken the defence of appellants Nos. 1–3, but concluded that this specific assertion was unnecessary: the fact that the Standing Counsel was instructed to appear and did appear and subsequently filed the appeal on their behalf indicated that the State Government had undertaken their defence.
  • The Court accepted the Standing Counsel's submission that Article 226 proceedings which relate to civil rights are civil proceedings (citing S.A.L. Narayan Row), and therefore the CPC provisions apply under Section 141 CPC "in so far as the provisions ... can be made applicable." Because there was no specific rule in the Rules of Court or elsewhere governing representation of the State Government and public officers in proceedings under Article 226, the Court held that Order XXVII CPC governs representation in such matters.
  • Accordingly, the Court held that the Standing Counsel was competent to act on behalf of the four appellants in the petition and in the special appeal. The preliminary objection therefore failed.

2. Interpretation and Application of Rule 33-B(1) and (2) — Validity of Convening Authority

  • The learned Single Judge had held that because the notice of motion was presented to the District Panchayat Officer (appellant No. 3), only that individual was competent to take further action under Rule 33-B(2). The appellants challenged that conclusion.
  • The Court examined Rule 33-B(1) and (2) in light of Section 2(q) of the Panchayat Raj Act, under which the State Government is empowered to notify prescribed Authorities "whether generally or for any particular purpose" in respect of provisions of the Act. It was not disputed that, for the purposes of Rule 33-B(1) and (2), both the Assistant District Panchayat Officer and the District Panchayat Officer had been notified as prescribed Authorities.
  • Given that both officers were prescribed Authorities for the sub‑rules in question, the Court concluded that either could competently act under those sub‑rules. The Court emphasized that sub‑Rule (1) concerns presentation of the notice of motion, and once a compliant presentation was made by five members the function under sub‑Rule (1) was complete.
  • Action under sub‑Rule (2) — convening a meeting after receipt of the notice — is an action consequent upon (and taken after) the receipt of the notice; it is not a mere continuation of the earlier act. The Court reasoned that nothing in the language of sub‑Rules (1) and (2) requires that the same individual who received the notice must be the one to take the subsequent action.
  • The Court illustrated the point by noting the practical possibility that the officer before whom the notice was presented might cease to function as a prescribed Authority before convening a meeting; the successor, who is a prescribed Authority, would need to be competent to act. This shows that the Rules focus on the status of the acting person as a prescribed Authority rather than on the individual's identity.
  • Because both the District Panchayat Officer and the Assistant District Panchayat Officer were prescribed Authorities, the Assistant District Panchayat Officer's convening of the meeting was a valid exercise of his powers under sub‑Rule (2). The Court therefore disagreed with the Single Judge's decision that the notice issued by appellant No. 1 was invalid.

3. Discretionary / Equitable Considerations

  • The Court observed that nothing in the record indicated prejudice to the respondent from the Assistant District Panchayat Officer having convened the meeting. The Court considered that any defect, at most, would have been a technical irregularity.
  • The Court stated a general principle that the equitable writ jurisdiction should not be exercised merely to unsettle acts where no injustice or prejudice to any party has been shown. Because no prejudice appeared, the Court found it inappropriate to interfere on writ grounds.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The special appeal is allowed. The Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the petitioner respondent's writ petition.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The order quashing the action taken by appellant No. 1 (dated 21 August 1963) is vacated; the meeting convened by the Assistant District Panchayat Officer is not invalidated by the reasons asserted below.
  • The Standing Counsel was held competent to act for the appellants in the Article 226 petition and in the special appeal because the proceedings were civil in nature for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure and the State Government had undertaken the defence of the officers.
  • The appellants are entitled to their costs of the petition and of the special appeal.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles (including treating Article 226 proceedings relating to civil rights as civil proceedings for certain CPC provisions) to govern representation and to construe the scope of prescribed Authorities under the Panchayat Raj Rules. The Court did not purport to set a novel precedent beyond the legal conclusions explicitly articulated above.

Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

Bhargava, C.J:— This special appeal has been filed by the Assistant District Panchayat Officer, Rai Bareli, Assistant Development Officer, Rahi, Rai Bareli, the District Panchayat Officer, Rai Bareli, and the state of Uttar Pradesh against a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court allowing a petition, filed by respondent Jai Narain under Art. 226 of the Constitution and quashing an order of appellant No. 1 dated 21st August 1963, directing the holding of a meeting to consider a non-confidence motion which was presented by five members of the Gram Sabha before appellant No. 3, having been signed by more than half the number of members. When this special appeal came up for hearing, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that the appeal had not been properly filed as it was filed under the signature of the Standing Counsel, who merely had authority to appear and plead on behalf of the appellants but was not entitled to act on their behalf. It appeals from a notification reproduced in annexure C of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual that the Standing Counsel was appointed to act for the State Government as well as for public officers, in the service of the State Government in all judicial proceedings pending before the High Court if the defence of the public officers was undertaken on their behalf by the State Government. This notification was issued, in pursuance of Rules 2 and 8 and Clause (c) of Rule 8-B of Or. ??? of the first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This notification makes it clear that the Standing Counsel was entitled to act on behalf of the appellants in all judicial proceedings to which the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. We may at this stage take notice of the submission that there is in this case no specific assertion that the defence in the writ petition or in this special appeal was undertaken by the State Government on behalf of the appellants Nos. 1 to 3, but we consider that on this point no specific assertion was needed. The very fact that the Standing Counsel was instructed to appear and did appear on behalf of those three appellants also in the writ petition and has also filed the appeal on their behalf, shows that their defence was also undertaken by the State Government no positive assertion on this point could be made because this ground, which depended party on a question of fact, was not raised at any earlier stage and was raised here for the first time during the course of the hearing of arguments in this special appeal. In the circumstances, we are inclined to accept the submission made by the Standing Counsel that the defence of appellants Nos. 1 to 3 in the writ petition was undertaken by the State Government and, therefore, he is entitled to act on behalf of those three appellants just as he is entitled to act on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The learned counsel, however, urged that this notification authorises the Standing Counsel to act on behalf of the appellants only in proceedings to which the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are applicable; while, to a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and a special appeal arising out of it, the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply. It appears to us that a proceeding started by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, if they relate to a civil right, must be held to be a civil proceeding to which the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure a applicable. That the proceedings ??? a High Court on a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, where they relate to civil rights are civil proceedings has already been decided by the Supreme Court in S.A.L Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwan Das A.I.R 1965 S.C 1818. Being a civil proceeding, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to it under Sec. 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure can be made applicable. This last qualifying clause means that the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution except to the extent to which their applicability may be affected by the Rules of Court or any special law or rule applicable to these proceedings. In the matter of representation of the State Government and public officers in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution, there is no specific rule cither in the Rule of Court or anywhere else and consequently, we must hold that the provisions of Or. XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure will govern such a matter. In these circumstances, it must be held that the learned Standing Counsel was competent to act on behalf of the four appellants. Being competent to act on behalf of the four appellants in the proceedings relating to the petition he is also competent to act on their behalf in the special appeal, which arises out of those proceedings so that the preliminary objection fails.

2. We then come to the main point raised in this case on behalf of the respondent which has been accepted by the learned Single Judge for allowing the petition. It appears that in this case the notice of motion was presented under Rule 33-B(1) of the Panchayat Raj Rules to the District Panchayat. Officer appellant No. 3 and subsequently it was the assistant Panchayat Officer, appellant No. 1 who passed orders under Rule 33-B(2) fixing the date for holding the meeting and appointing appellant No. 2 to preside in that. The point raised was that the notice of motion having been presented to appellant No. 3, the District Panchayat Officer, he was the only officer competent to take further action under Rule 33-B(2) and this submission has been accepted by the earned Single Judge.

3. We are unable to agree with the new taken by the learned Single Judge. We do not think that there is anything specific in Rule 33-B(1) and (2) which requires that the same individual before whom the notice of motion is presented must take the further action under sub-Rule (2). Under Sec. 2(q) of the Panchayat Raj Act, the State Government is empowered) to notify the prescribed Authority whether generally or for any particular purpose in respect of any of the provisions of the Panchayat Raj Act. It is not disputed that for the purposes of Rule 33-B(1) and (2) the prescribed Authorities notified as such were both the Assistant District Panchayat Officer as well as the District Panchayat Officer. Consequently, both appellant No. I as well as appellant No. 3 were prescribed Authorities for the purposes of Sub-Rules (1) and (2) of Rule 33-B. In these circumstances, either of them could competently act under any of these two sub-rules.

4. In the present case the notice of motion was presented before appellant No. 3 in his capacity as the prescribed Authority. Once that presentation was made competently by five members and the motion was otherwise in order, the action which had to be taken under sub-rule (1) of Rule 33-B was complete. Thereafter, under that sub-Rule, no further action was required to be taken by the prescribed Authority. Subsequent to that presentation, action had to be taken for the purpose of holding a meeting under sub-Rule (2) of Rule 33-B. That sub-rule specifically mentions that action has to be taken after the receipt of the notice. When an action has to be taken after the receipt of the notice it cannot be held that subsequent action is in any way in continuation of the previous action. It is only an action consequent upon the earlier act. The earlier act of proper presentation being over, the subsequent act of convening the meeting could be taken by the prescribed Authority competently in exercise of the powers conferred on the Authority by sub-Rule (2) of Rules 33-B. This is exactly what was done in the present case. The Assistant District Panchayat Officer was also a competent authority for the purposes of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 33-B and he, in convening the meeting, only exercised the powers vested in him in his capacity as prescribed Authority. Sub-Rules (1) and (2) of Rule 33-B did not contain any limitation in their language that the particular individual acting as the prescribed Authority under sub-Rule (1) must be the same who must take the further action under sub-Rule (2). In fact, a situation can easily be envisaged where a notice of confidence motion is presented to a particular individual who is a prescribed Authority, but, before he can pass orders convening the meeting under sub-Rule (2), he may the or for any other reason may cease to function as a prescribed Authority. We do not think that in these circumstances the successor, who becomes the prescribed Authority, will not be competent to take action under sub-Rule (2) of Rule 33-B. It appears that Sub-Rules (1) and (2) of Rule 33-B are not concerned with the identity of the individual action as prescribed Authority at all and that is why there is no specific mention of the individuality of that authority. All that is needed is that under each sub-rule, the person acting must be a prescribed Authority under the U.P Panchayat Raj Act for the purpose of this rule, and, since in this case both the District Panchayat Officer and the Assistant District Panchayat Officer were prescribed Authorities, either of them could perform the duties under sub-rules (1) and (2). In performing those duties, either of them could discharge both the duties or in the alternative either one of them could discharge one duty and the other duty. We are unable to agree with the decision of the learned Single Judge that the notice issued by appellant No. 1 on a notice of motion of no confidence presented to appellant No. 3 was invalid.

5. We may further add that in this case nothing has appeared before us which would indicate that, even if there was a slight irregularity in the calling of the meeting inasmuch as the meeting was convened by appellant No. 1 instead of appellant No. 3, any prejudice has been caused to the respondent. While no prejudice was caused, it was not an appropriate case where this Court should have exercised its writ jurisdiction to interfere. It was a mere technical defect and the equitable writ jurisdiction is not to be exercised purely for the purpose of unsettling acts done even though they have not resulted in any injustice to any party.

6. For all these reasons we allow this special appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the petition filed by the respondent. The appellants will be entitled to their costs of the petitioner as well as the special appeal.

Appeal allowed.