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Raja Shatrunji v. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan And Others Opposite Parties.
Factual and Procedural Background
This application was brought by Raja Shatrunji under Article 133 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1)(a), (b) and (c).
Background facts (as stated in the opinion):
- Sardar Mujibur Rahman Khan (the judgment-debtor) was the subject of prior proceedings under Section 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act in which a predecessor of the applicant obtained a decree under Section 14 of that Act for Rs. 1,31,040-1-0 (with costs and interest). The judgment-debtor died on 27 April 1949.
- The deceased's sons (opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2) applied under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act (Act XV of 1953) for reduction of the decretal amount; the Special Judge, Kheri, rejected that application on 18 February 1957, inter alia because the decree did not show or indicate the property mortgaged.
- An appeal/revision (First Appeal No. 27 of 1957 heard as Revision No. 157 of 1958) was dismissed by a Full Bench of the High Court on 27 November 1962.
- The U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act was amended by Act XX of 1962 (received Presidential assent 27 November 1962; published and brought into force on 4 December 1962).
- Opposite party No. 1 filed a review application on 20 February 1963 against the Full Bench order dated 27 November 1962; a Full Bench granted the review by order dated 30 April 1963.
- The present application (by Raja Shatrunji) sought a certificate under Article 133(1)(a), (b) and (c) to enable an appeal to the Supreme Court from the Full Bench order of 30 April 1963. Opposite parties raised a preliminary objection that the Full Bench order was not a final order but a remand to the Special Judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the order dated 30 April 1963 (granting the review application) is a "judgment, decree or final order" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
- Whether facts exist entitling the applicant to a certificate under Article 133(1)(a), (b) or (c) (i.e., whether the conditions of those clauses are met).
- Whether, and to what extent, the High Court itself must decide (before issuing a certificate) whether what is proposed to be appealed from is a judgment, decree or final order — i.e., the proper role of the High Court in assessing finality and the prerequisites in the opening portion of Article 133(1).
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The applicant contended that the order dated 30 April 1963 was a final order within Article 133(1) and that the High Court should grant a certificate on the basis of the statutory ingredients in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) without being required to determine separately whether the order was a "judgment, decree or final order" for the purposes of the opening words of Article 133(1).
Opposite Parties' Arguments
- The opposite parties raised a preliminary objection that the Full Bench order of 30 April 1963 was not a final order but merely an order remanding the matter to the Special Judge to pass the final decree in accordance with the Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act; on that basis they argued no certificate under Article 133 could properly be given.
- They also argued that the High Court should take into account the opening words of Article 133(1) (i.e., that an appeal lies only from "any judgment, decree or final order") when deciding whether to grant a certificate.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Rosen-blatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 15 L.Ed. (2nd) 39 | It is the duty of the court whose jurisdiction is invoked (here the Supreme Court in the cited case) to decide whether an order appealed from is a final order, even if parties have not raised the question. | Referred to by N.U. Beg, J. to support the proposition that the question of jurisdiction (whether an appeal lies) is for the court whose jurisdiction is invoked to decide, and cannot be conclusively determined by another court. |
| Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 253 | The Supreme Court held that an appeal may be incompetent under Article 132 even though a certificate was given; a certificate does not alter the Supreme Court's duty to consider its own jurisdiction. | Used to confirm that the Supreme Court must consider whether it has jurisdiction despite a High Court certificate, and to show that a High Court's grant of a certificate does not conclusively establish the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. |
| Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Mrs. Penzy Fernandas, 1963 All LJ 863 (AIR 1964 All 66) (FB) | (Referred to by Beg J.) Earlier treatment by Beg on similar questions and adherence to that earlier statement. | Beg, J. stated he had previously dealt with the matter in that case and adhered to his earlier observations; the present opinion follows that earlier position (as cited by Beg, J.). |
| Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Dey Singh, AIR 1955 SC 576 | A remand order may nonetheless be a final order if the High Court has finally determined the substantive rights of the parties (three points decided by High Court finally determining rights). | L. Prasad J. relied on this Supreme Court decision to support the conclusion that an order of remand can be final if the substantive rights of the parties have been finally decided by the High Court. |
| Savitri Devi v. Rajul Devi, AIR 1961 All 245 (Full Bench) | Explains that it is not necessary for the suit to terminate completely for an order to be final; if all substantive rights and liabilities have been finally decided by the High Court the order may be final. Beg, J. there laid down three tests for finality. | Applied by L. Prasad J. and cited in support of treating the Full Bench order dated 30-4-1963 as final; the three tests (terminate proceedings in High Court; determine rights and liabilities; determination on merits and final/conclusive) were invoked and applied. |
| Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika v. Narain Das Haribansh, AIR 1964 All 25 | Decision of High Court upholding an award and directing decree to be prepared in terms of the award can constitute final determination of rights for purposes of appeal even though formal decree remains to be drawn. | Referred to by L. Prasad J. to reinforce the principle that implementation steps (like preparing a decree) do not prevent an order from being final if substantive rights have been finally determined. |
| A.V. Subramania Ayyar v. Sellamal, ILR 39 Mad 843 (AIR 1916 Mad 985) | Interpreted Clause (2) of Section 110 (and by analogy Clause (b) of Article 133(1)) to mean that Clause (b) may be concerned with property other than the subject-matter of the suit; the word "directly" and collocation of clauses suggest a narrow reading for Clause (b). | Cited in the discussion of the contested meaning of Clause (b); the opinion recounts this as the leading case embodying the view that Clause (b) contemplates property other than the subject-matter in dispute. |
| Kartar Singh v. Ramkumar Bhagat, AIR 1953 Pat 377 | Held that Clause (b) of Article 133(1) (and corresponding provisions) applies only if the decision complained of affects some claim or question respecting property other than the subject-matter of the suit. | Cited to support the narrower construction of Clause (b) that requires a claim or question regarding property other than the primary subject-matter in dispute. |
| Ishwari Prasad Singh v. Kameshwar Singh Bahadur, AIR 1941 Pat 288 | Referenced in the context of historical authorities dealing with the ambit of clauses corresponding to Article 133(1)(b) / Section 110. | Mentioned in the opinion's survey of conflicting High Court views on Clause (b); included as one of the earlier authorities referenced by the High Courts. |
| Nadir Hussain v. Municipal Board, Agra, AIR 1937 All 169 | Referenced among earlier authorities discussing scope of provisions corresponding to Clause (b). | Used in the opinion's historical account of jurisprudence on the meaning of "property" for Clause (b). |
| Amarsingh v. Karnail Kaur, AIR 1956 Raj 169 | Expressed a particular view on Clause (b) consistent with the narrower interpretation (that it relates to property other than the subject-matter). | Cited by the court as another decision following the view that Clause (b) is not intended to cover purely the subject-matter in dispute. |
| Bhawar Lal v. Lachmandas, AIR 1929 Nag 75 | Another authority aligned with the narrower interpretation of Clause (b). | Referred to in the summary of authorities taking the narrower position on Clause (b). |
| Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit, AIR 1961 Cal 537 | Bench decision holding that to attract Clause (b) the decision must affect property other than the property in dispute; otherwise Clause (a) would be rendered nugatory. | Quoted in support of the interpretation that Clause (b) requires the decision to affect property other than the claim in suit. |
| Chittarmal v. Shan Pannalal Chandulal, AIR 1965 SC 1440 | Supreme Court ruling that clarified and settled the controversy: Clause (b) applies only where the judgment involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute; if no such additional property/claim is involved, Clause (a) applies. | Relied upon by L. Prasad J. (and by the court) to resolve earlier conflict of opinion and to conclude that Clause (a) — not Clause (b) — applies to the present case. |
| Abdul Rahman's case, AIR 1933 PC 58 | Privy Council propositions referenced in the context of finality of High Court decisions (as discussed in Savitri Devi). | Mentioned (via Savitri Devi) as part of the jurisprudential background on when an order may be final even if the suit remains alive for formal implementation. |
| Kesho Prasad Singh v. Shiva Saran Lal, AIR 1918 Pat 566 | Referenced in the context of authorities interpreting the corresponding clause in Section 110 and Article 133(1)(b). | Appears among earlier authorities cited in the historical survey of the clause's meaning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion contains multiple separate judgments and an ultimate collective decision. The reasoning addressed three interrelated questions: (1) whether the Full Bench order of 30 April 1963 is a "judgment, decree or final order"; (2) whether facts exist to justify a certificate under Article 133(1)(a), (b) or (c); and (3) whether the High Court must, before issuing a certificate, itself decide the finality issue in the opening portion of Article 133(1).
Key analytic steps taken by the court and individual judges
-
N.U. Beg, J. (separate opinion):
- Beg, J. disagreed with the view that the High Court should decide whether an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 133 — he emphasized that Article 133 addresses the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and the Supreme Court itself must decide whether it has jurisdiction. He relied on Rosen-blatt (U.S. case) and Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb to show that the question of jurisdiction is for the court whose jurisdiction is invoked.
- He argued the words "any judgment, decree or final order" are addressed to the Supreme Court and that the High Court's role in certification is to state that certain facts (as set out in the clauses) exist, not to certify that its decision is a judgment/decree/final order.
- Beg, J. held that there is no law prescribing when a High Court must grant a certificate if the facts exist; because a certificate confers a right of appeal it must be issued when the facts exist and cannot be arbitrarily withheld.
- He accepted that once a High Court has given a certificate and its decision amounts to a judgment/decree/final order, the Supreme Court should ordinarily entertain the appeal and not go into the merits of the certificate; the certificate is to be treated as binding on that question.
- On the particular facts, Beg, J. agreed the Full Bench order amended the decree and resulted in a reduction exceeding Rs. 20,000; therefore he concurred that a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) should be granted and the applicant should receive costs.
-
L. Prasad, J. (separate opinion):
- L. Prasad, J. proceeded to examine the preliminary objection that the 30 April 1963 order was not a final order, addressing the opening portion of Article 133(1) and materials on finality.
- He held that the High Court should apply its mind, at the time of granting a certificate, to whether the conditions specified in the opening part of Article 133(1) are satisfied; in his view the opening words constitute conditions precedent to the grant of a certificate. He rejected the argument that the High Court should disregard the opening clause and consider only Clauses (a), (b) and (c).
- Applying Supreme Court authority (Shiromani Gurdwara) and Full Bench and Division Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court (Savitri Devi; Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika), he concluded that the Full Bench order dated 30 April 1963 was a final order because the High Court had finally decided the substantive question (applicability of the Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act) that determined the parties' rights. The fact that arithmetical calculation and formal decree remain to be done did not prevent finality.
- On the applicability of Clauses (a) vs (b), L. Prasad J. reviewed the conflicting High Court authorities and the underlying linguistic and doctrinal debate. He recorded the Supreme Court's authoritative clarification in Chittarmal v. Shan Pannalal Chandulal (AIR 1965 SC 1440) which held Clause (b) applies only where the judgment involves a claim or question respecting property other than the subject-matter of the dispute.
- Applying Chittarmal, L. Prasad J. concluded that Clause (a) — not Clause (b) — applied in the present case because the Full Bench decision related to the same subject-matter in dispute (the amount by which the decretal amount is to be reduced). As the expected reduction exceeded Rs. 20,000, Clause (a)'s valuation requirement was satisfied and the applicant was entitled to a certificate as of right under Article 133(1)(a). He also observed that Clause (c) is discretionary and not necessary to invoke since Clause (a) already entitled the applicant to a certificate.
-
Beg, J. (another separate opinion noted in the text) and the collective disposition:
- Another judge (referred to as Beg, J. in the later part of the opinion) expressly agreed with the conclusion that facts exist for issuance of a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) and concurred in allowing the application with costs. This opinion emphasized that a party opposing a certificate is entitled to press the point that what is proposed to be appealed from is not a judgment, decree or final order, but concluded that here the certificate should be granted.
Synthesizing these separate reasoned judgments: the High Court majority concluded the Full Bench order dated 30 April 1963 is a final order for the purposes of Article 133(1); the appropriate clause is Article 133(1)(a) because the matter decided relates to the subject-matter in dispute and the reduction exceedes the monetary threshold; therefore a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) should be issued. There is an identified judicial division on whether the High Court must itself conclusively determine finality before granting a certificate (some judges taking the view it should apply its mind to the opening clause, others emphasizing that the Supreme Court must decide its own jurisdiction), but the practical outcome here is that the certificate was granted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application is allowed and a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is to be issued in favour of the applicant. The applicant shall be entitled to his costs from the opposite parties.
Implications (as stated or evident from the opinion)
- Direct effect on the parties: The applicant (Raja Shatrunji) is granted a certificate under Article 133(1)(a), enabling him to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court; the applicant is awarded costs of the application against the opposite parties.
- On judicial practice: The opinion applies and discusses existing authorities on (a) what constitutes a "judgment, decree or final order" (including when an order of remand may nonetheless be final) and (b) the proper construction of Article 133(1)(b) (with reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Chittarmal to resolve prior conflict). The court articulated that where the High Court has finally determined the substantive rights (even though formal implementation remains), an order may be final for Article 133(1) purposes.
- About precedent: The opinion extensively cites and applies prior authorities to resolve the issues presented. The opinion does not, on its face, state that it is laying down an entirely novel proposition of law beyond application and clarification of existing authorities; its operative outcome is the grant of the Article 133(1)(a) certificate and costs to the applicant.
This summary is extracted and synthesized strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information not expressly contained in the opinion has been added.
1. With great respect to my brother Beg I regret I am unable to agree with his view that it is for us to decide whether an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution or not. The Article occurs in the Chapter headed as "The Union Judiciary" and deals with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and not with the jurisdiction of a High Court in respect of any matter. The opening words "an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order" are addressed to the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court must entertain an appeal from any judgment, decree or final order if the condition precedent mentioned in the Article, viz. the possession by the appellant of one of the four certificates mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) granted by the High Court is fulfilled. It is elementary that the question of jurisdiction is for the Court, the jurisdiction of which is invoked and not for any other court. In Rosen-blatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 15 LE (2nd) 39 the Supreme Court of the United States held that it was its duty to decide whether the order from which an appeal was preferred to it was a final order and the appeal was competent, even though no question of its jurisdiction was raised by the parties. Goldberg, J. said at page 42 that "although neither of the parties has mooted the question, it goes to the jurisdiction of this Court and must be considered."
I find myself unable to agree with my learned brother that the words "any judgment, decree or final order" govern the word "certifies"; they cannot be divorced from the preceding word "from", are to be read with the words "an appeal shall lie" and cannot possibly be read with the word "certifies". What the High Court can certify is stated in the Article; it is that the amount or value of the subject-matter is of a certain amount or that the judgment, decree or final order involves some claim or question respecting property of a certain value or that the case is a fit one for appeal or that the appeal involves a substantial question of law. It is not at all required to certify that it is a judgment, decree or final order from which the appeal is sought. Even in respect of the certificate mentioned in Clause (b) the essence of it is that some claim or question respecting property of certain valuation is involved in its decision and not that its decision amounts to a judgment, decree or final order. What is to be certified is the amount of the property involved and not the decision being a judgment, decree or final order. There would have been no sense in requiring a certificate about the decision being a judgment, decree or final order under Clause (b) when it was not required under Clause (a). The distinction between the circumstances mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) does not justify the necessity of a certificate regarding the decision being a judgment, decree or final order In one case and not in the other. In a certificate the High Court has not to state at all that its decision is a judgment, decree or final order.
2. There is no law laid down in the Constitution or in any Act or Rules as to when a High Court can grant a certificate or cannot grant it. Of course a certificate can be granted Only if the facts to be certified exist and cannot be granted if they do not. No law supplies the answer to the question whether when the facts exist the High Court must grant the certificate or may refuse to grant for some reason. The Article may be interpreted as entrusting a High Court with the duty of granting a certificate and it may be said that if the facts exist the certificate must be issued.
Since it is a matter of a right to appeal and it cannot be denied arbitrarily the certificate must be issued if the facts exist and cannot be withheld. So regardless of the question whether there is a judgment, decree or final order or not the certificate must be issued. If a certificate under Clause (b) is issued it may contain the recital that its judgment, decree or final order "involves directly .... ... value"
but it is not bound to certify that it is a judgment or is a decree or is a final order and the certificate can be that its decision "involves directly ..... value".
3. The Supreme Court derives the jurisdiction over an appeal from Article 133 and not from the certificate issued by the High Court; the High Court cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court simply by issuing a certificate. The existence of a certificate is nothing more than a condition precedent to the maintainability of an appeal in the Supreme Court; no appeal lies unless there is a certificate. A High Court does not certify that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction; it certifies only the existence of certain facts and it is for the Supreme Court to decide whether an appeal lies to it or not. Whether an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or not is a question of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and must be answered by it and cannot be answered for it by the High Court or any other court. If a High Court cannot decide whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a certain appeal it means that it cannot decide that its decision is or is not a judgment, decree or final order. I have already referred to the case of Rosenblatt, 15 Law Ed (2nd) 39 in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that it is its own duty to consider whether the decision from which an appeal is preferred to it is a final order and the appeal is competent or not. Nothing to the contrary is laid down in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State Of Bombay ., AIR 1958 SC 253. Chagla C. J. and Bhagwati J. decided a preliminary issue about the retrospective operation of a statute and then granted certificates under Articles 132 and 133. The Supreme Court held that
"the appeal is not competent under Article 132 and the fact that a certificate has been given does not alter the position"(p. 255). This confirms that it is for the Supreme Court itself to consider whether it has jurisdiction over the appeal preferred to it or not. As both the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot have jurisdiction over the same matter it follows that the High Court has not the jurisdiction.
It was argued before the Supreme Court that the certificate was also under Article 133 and the Supreme Court observed:
....... .but under that article also, an appeal lies only against judgment, decrees o| final orders, and no certificate could be granted in respect of an interlocutory finding.
The Supreme Court did not intend to lay down that a High Court has no jurisdiction to grant a certificate unless it finds that an appeal lies from its decision to the Supreme Court. It was considering its own jurisdiction and not the High Court's jurisdiction of granting a certificate. Though it used the words 'no certificate could be granted" what it meant was that no appeal lay even though a certificate was granted. There is nothing in the judgment to suggest that a High Court is required to consider before granting a certificate that an appeal lies from its decision. The fact that there is no law stating in what circumstances a High Court can or ought to or cannot grant a certificate leads to the conclusion that it is not concerned with the utility of the certificate to be granted by it; it grants the certificate because without it an appeal cannot lie, the facts to be certified exist and it cannot or should not deprive the appellant of the right of appeal if he has any.
4. No appeal lies from an order of a High Court granting or refusing a certificate. Once there is a decision amounting to a judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in a civil proceeding and the High Court has given one of the certificates there is an absolute right of appeal to the Supreme Court; the words are "an appeal shall lie". Consequently if the Supreme Court finds that the High Court's decision was a judgment, decree or final order and the appellant possesses any of the certificates it cannot refuse to entertain the appeal. It follows that it cannot go into the merits of the certificate; the certificate is binding upon it. In some cases the Supreme Court has cancelled a certificate granted by a High Court but done so without going into the question of its jurisdiction to do so. It has not discussed the matter at all and has not laid down in so many words that it has jurisdiction over the contents of a certificate.
The whole object behind the rule that an appeal lies if a certain certificate is granted by the High Court is to prevent the Supreme Court's spending its own time and labour in deciding whether leave should be granted for an appeal or not. If it had the jurisdiction to go into the merits of a certificate the object behind the provision would be defeated. If it was intended that the Supreme Court could go into the merits of a certificate no useful purpose was to be served by the High Court's granting a certificate; no useful purpose was to be served by the Supreme Court's and the High Court's going into the same matter. If the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to go into the merits of a certificate it should also have the jurisdiction to go into the merits of refusal to grant a certificate but admittedly no such jurisdiction is vested in it. It is because of this fact that there is a provision for special leave in Article 136; if a High Court refuses a certificate the prospective appellant can approach the Supreme Court for its special leave.
5. I had an occasion to deal with this matter in Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Mrs. Penzy Fernandas. 1963 All LJ 863 (869): (AIR 1964 All 66 (71) (FB) and adhere to all that I said there.
6. Article 132(1) gives a right to an appeal to the Supreme Court from "any judgment, decree or final order" in any proceeding if the High Court certifies that the case involves substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Here also the certificate is only about there being a substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution. Sub-Article (2) lays down that if the High Court refuses the certificate the Supreme Court may, on being satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, grant special leave to appeal.
Now if the High Court had the power to refuse a certificate on the ground of the absence of such a question of law as well as on the ground that its decision is not a judgment, decree or final order, Sub-article (2) will apply even when the refusal is on the ground that the decision is not a judgment etc. and it will be open to the Supreme Court to grant special leave. This would be anomalous. It is obvious that the Supreme Court's power to grant special leave is when the decision is a judgment, decree or final order. An appeal lies only if there is a judgment, decree or final order; the sub-article is not meant to grant a further right of appeal in the absence of a judgment, decree or final order. The jurisdiction to grant special leave is not confined to the refusal of a certificate by the High Court on the ground that the case does not involve a substantial question of law. As it is clear that special leave cannot be granted if there is no judgment, decree or final order and special leave can be granted whenever a High Court has refused a certificate it follows that the High Court cannot refuse a certificate on the ground that there is no judgment, decree or final order. What holds good in respect of a right of appeal under Article 132 holds good also in respect of a right of appeal under Article 133
7. I would, therefore, refuse to enter into the question whether this Court's decision is a judgment, decree or final order.
8. The order sought to be appealed from is reviewing the Court's earlier judgment dated 27-11-1962 and allowing amendment of a decree in accordance with the provisions of the Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. Earlier this Court had refused to amend the decree but by the order under appeal it amended the decree by granting the review. What is challenged in the appeal is the act of reviewing the earlier order and not the amendment of the decree in accordance with the provisions of the Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. The dispute which ended with the order under appeal was about the jurisdiction of this Court to grant the review on the ground of a subsequent change in the law with retrospective effect. It was not disputed that if the Court could review the earlier order the latter order passed by it was the correct order. The impugned order, however, is allowing amendment of the decree. The decree is for money and the effect of the amendment is to reduce the decretal amount by more than Rs. 20,000. Accordingly I agree with my learned brother that the certificate referred to in Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution be granted to the applicant. Since the application had been seriously contested by the opposite parties the applicant should get his costs of this application.
N.U. Beg, J.
9. : This is an application by Raja Shatrunji under Article 133 of the Constitution of India read with Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1), (a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India and Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The facts which have given rise to the present application may be briefly stated as follows :--
10. The father of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, Sardar Mujibur Batman Khan, filed an application under Section 4 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act for the liquidation of his debts. In the said proceedings the predecessor of the applicant in the present case obtained a decree against Sardar Mujibur Rahman Khan under Section 14 of the U. P. Encumbered Eastates Act for Rs. 1,31,040-1-0 with costs and future interest at 3 1/2 per cent on the basis of a secured debt. Sardar Mujibur Rahman Khan, the judgment-debtor, died on the 27th April, 1949.
Thereafter opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, the sons of Sardar Mujibur Rahman Khan made an application in the Court of the Special Judge; Kheri, under Section 4 of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act (Act XV of 1953) for reduction of the decretal amount. This application was rejected by the Special Judge, Kheri, on the 18th February, 1957, on the finding, inter alia, that unless and until the decree shows or indicates the property mortgaged
"no reduction of debt could be ordered under the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act (Act XV of 1953)."
11. The opposite party No. 1 filed First Appeal No. 27 of 1957 against the said order. This first appeal was eventually heard as Revision No. 157 of 1958: (AIR 1963 All 280) and decided by a Full Bench of this Court. The Full Bench upheld the order of the Special Judge and dismissed the said revision on the 27th November, 1962. The U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act was, however, subsequently amended by the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction (Amendment) Act (Act XX of 1962). The Amendment Act No. XX of 1962 received the assent of the President on the 27th November, 1962. It was published in the Gazette on the 4th December, 1962 and came into force on that date. Thereafter the opposite party No. 1 filed Review Application No. 2 of 1963 on the 20th February 1963, against the order of the Full Bench dated the 27th of November, 1962: (AIR 1963 All 230). This review application was also heard by a Full Bench which, in accordance with the majority opinion, granted the review application by its order dated the 30th April, 1963: (AIR 19.63 All 541) (FB). Aggrieved by the said order the applicant filed the present application for a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1)(a), (b) and (e) of the Constitution of India and Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
12. At the very outset, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the order dated the 30th April, 1963, granting the review application is not a final order. Learned Counsel submitted that the said order is merely an order remanding the case to the Special judge, who will pass the final decree reducing the amount of debt under the U. P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act.
In reply, on behalf of the applicant it was argued that the question as to whether the said order is a final order is not a matter which is to be determined by due High Court, and, in any case, the order in question is a final order within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India. Having considered the matter, I am of opinion that the High Court should at the time of granting the certificate, apply its mind to the question as to whether the conditions specified in the opening part of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India are satisfied in the case before it. No doubt, the opening words of Article 138 appear to be addressed to the Supreme Court, but, they are a condition precedent to the issue of a certificate.
According to the learned Counsel for the applicant, the High Court should apply its mind only to the ingredients of Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 183(1), as they are the only factors in respect of which the certificate is to be given by tie High Court. In this connection it is argued that as the conditions specified in the opening portion do not form part of the certificate granted by the High Court, they should be disregarded altogether at this stage. I find it difficult to accept this argument. It appears to me that the words in the opening portion occupy a governing position so as to constitute conditions precedent to the grant of a certificate. If the said conditions are not fulfilled, the question of granting a certificate does not arise. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court is not bound by the expression of the opinion of the High Court on this aspect of the matter. From mat, however, it does not follow that at the stage of the determination of the question whether the certificate should be granted or not, the High Court should shut its eyes to the question whether the conditions precedent to the grant of a certificate are satisfied in the easel before it or not.
A contrary view may lead to very absurd consequences. The High Court would not certainly grant a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution in a Criminal Appeal because the proceeding in respect of which the certificate is sought is not a civil proceeding but a criminal one and is, therefore, not covered by the opening portion of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India. In fact the words "judgment, decree or final order" are explicitly mentioned in Clause (b) and the existence of a "judgment, decree or final order" is implicit in the grant of a certificate under other clauses as well. This view would also be supported by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 253. Dealing with the nature of a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India, their Lordships remarked as follows:
"It is said that the certificate is also under Article 133, but under that article also, an appeal lies only against judgments, decrees or final orders, and no certificate could be granted in respect of an interlocutory finding."
13. The above observation would clearly indicate that in their Lordships' view it would not be open to the High Court to grant a certificate unless it was of the view that the decision against which the application under that Article is directed constitutes a judgment, decree or final order.
14. On merits, however, I am of the opinion that the order dated the 30th April, 1963: (AIR 1963 All 541) (FB), passed by the Full Bench in the review application is a final order and the preliminary objection should therefore, fail on that ground. Strictly speaking, the order dated the 30th April, 1963: (AIR 1963 All 541) (FB), does not contain any express direction as to remand. The said order is reproduced below:
"By Court.
In accordance with the order of the majority this review application is granted. No order about costs."
The effect of the above order, therefore, is to grant the prayer in Review Appeal No. 2 of 1963 dated 20th February, 1963. The prayer in the said review application is as follows :--
"Wherefore it is prayed that the judgment dated 27-11-1962 be reviewed and Revision No. 157 of 1958 be allowed with costs throughput."
Turning to the revision application, we find that the prayer in the said application is as follows:
"It is therefore prayed that the order under appeal may kindly be set aside and the amendment of decree be allowed in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of Act XV of 1953.
15. It is, therefore, obvious that neither in the review application nor in the revision application is there any prayer for remand. The effect of the order of the Full Bench dated 30-4-1963: (AIR 1963 All 541) being merely to allow the prayers made in the review and the revision application, no remand order can be said to be passed by the Full Bench either expressly or by implication. Technically, therefore, it is not correct to say that the order of this Court dated the 30th April, 1963:(AIR 1963 AH 541) (FB), is an order of remand. There is no express direction of remand in this order nor can any such direction be incorporated in the said order by a reference to the prayers in the review or the revision application.
16. Even if the order dated the 30th April, 1963: (AIR 1963 All 541) (FB), be interpreted to be an order of remand of the case to the Special Judge, I am of opinion that the said order is a final order. The sole question that was the subject-matter of contest between the parties was whether the provisions of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act (Act XV of 1953) would be applicable to the present case. That question having been finally decided by the High Court, the principle on which the substantive rights of the parties are to be decided has been finally determined by the High Court. On behalf of the opposite party No. 1, no counter-affidavit has been filed indicating that any other question remains to be determined.
Further, the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 did not point out anything In the contents of his application under Section 4 of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act (XV of 1953) or in the pleadings of the case before the Special Judge or in his counter-affidavit which would indicate that any other question, except the applicability of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act (XV of 1953) to the present case, was raised on behalf of the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2. No doubt, the actual work of calculation of the amount by which the decree passed under Section 14 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act is to be reduced would be done by the Court of the Special Judge. That, however, is merely a matter of arithmetical calculation according to the formula laid down in Section 4 of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. According to the provisions of Section 4(2) of the said Act all that the Special Judge would have to do is to calculate the amount due on the 1st day of July, 1952. and then reduce it "in accordance with the formula given in the schedule". The decree passed under Section 14 of the Encumbered Estates Act gives the principal amount as well as the interest. The calculation of the amount due on the first day of July, 1952. has to be in accordance with the said decree and is merely a matter of arithmetical calculation.
Similarly, its reduction, according to the formula given in the schedule is also done by a mere mechanical process. It would, therefore, appear that the principle finally determining the substantive rights of the parties has been laid down in the order of the High Court, and the mere fact that its implementation is to be done by the Special Judge in a routine fashion does not militate against the finality of the order passed by this Court.
17. The above view would be supported by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Dey Singh. AIR 1955 SC 576. in this case also the appeal before the Supreme Court was directed against an order of remand. It appears that in the said case three points relating to the substantive rights of the parties were determined by the High Court and the case was thereafter remanded to the trial Court. Dealing with the preliminary objection that the order of remand was not a final order, their Lordships observed as follows: --
"The decision on these three points finally determines the rights of the parties in regard to the ownership of the property.
"If it is private property, as it has been held by this Court, then a declaration must be given as prayed for by the plaintiff and as a consequence the injunction will follow."
Their Lordships, accordingly, repelled the preliminary objection holding that the order in question was a final order.
18. This case was interpreted in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Savitri Devi v. Rajul Devi, AIR 1961 All 245. In the said Full Bench case after referring to the facts of Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee AIR 1955 SC 576 (supra), it was observed as follows:
"All that can be said is that, according to this ease it is not strictly necessary that the suit should terminate altogether. It is enough if all the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties have been finally decided by the High Court. This principle is not in conflict with any of the four propositions of law laid down by the Privy Council in Abdul Rahmans' case AIR 1933 PC 58. Even if the suit was left alive, there were no rights and liabilities to be determined by the trial court, as all the substantive rights and liabilities were already determined by the High Court.
The suit remained alive not for the purpose of determining any rights and liabilities left undetermined by the High Court, but only for the purpose of implementing the rights and liabilities already determined by the High Court by doing the formal act of making a declaration to the effect and granting the consequential relief of injunction which necessarily followed from their adjudication by the High Court."
19. In this connection reference may also be made to a Division Bench ease of this Court in Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika v. Narain Das Haribansh, AIR 1964 All 25. In this case during the pendency of a suit, the matter in dispute was referred to an arbitrator who gave an award in favour of the plaintiff. The trial Court allowed the objection of the defendant and holding that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation, dismissed the same. In appeal the High Court set aside that order of the trial Court and rejected the defendant's objection to the award. After making the award a rule of the Court, the High Court directed that a decree should be prepare in accordance with the award. Following Full Bench case of this Court mentioned above, the Division Bench held that the decision of the" High Court to the effect that the dispute between the parties should be finally disposed of in terms of the award constituted a final determination of the rights of the parties, notwithstanding the fact that a decree had yet to be passed in terms of the award.
The relevant portion of the judgment in the Division Bench case runs as follows :--
"In Savitri Devi's case, 1960 AH LJ 8971 AIR 1961 All 245 (FB) Beg, J. laid down the following three tests for deciding:--
1. It should terminate the proceedings in the High Court.
2. It should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties;
3. The determination of the rights and liabilities as is envisaged in condition No. 2 should be on merits, and should further be final and conclusive so as to cover the entire range of substantive rights and liabilities which from the subject-matter of real controversy in the suit or proceedings which initially gave rise to the dispute. The impugned order in the present case satisfies the three tests laid down by Beg, J. There is a final determination of the rights of the parties. It is true that a decree had to be passed in terms of the award. But in substance me rights of the parties were finally disposed of by the decision of the High Court upholding the award. There is, therefore, no difficulty in treating the decision as a judgment or final order.
"The learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent relied upon Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. He pointed put that Section 17 of the Arbitration Act requires that, the Court has to pass a judgment in terms of the award. He, therefore, contended that the mere order upholding the award cannot amount to a judgment. We, however, find no serious difficulty in contemplating two judgments in the course of the same case.
"We are of the opinion that, the decision of the High Court, dated 3-5-1962 upholding the award amounts to a judgment or final order within the meaning of Clause (a) of Section 109, C. P. C "
20. Applying the principles laid down in the case of the Supreme Court cited above and the two cases of the Allahabad High Court thereafter to the present case, I am of opinion that the order dated the 30th April, 1963: (AIR 1.963 All 541) (FB), is a final order and, therefore, fulfils the requirement in that regard in the opening portion of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India.
21 The next question relates to the grant of certificate. The applicant has prayed for a certificate under Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India. Under Clauses (a), and (b), the applicant would be entitled to a certificate as a matter of right. Under Clause (o) the matter is not one of right of a party but is one of discretion of the High Court to be exercised bearing in mind the importance of the matter. The first question, there-lore, that arises is whether the applicant is entitled to a certificate as a matter of right under Clause (a) or (b) or both. The question as to whether Clause (b) would apply to the present case was not free from difficulty till the recent judgment of their Lordships in Chittarmal v. Shan Pannalal Chandulal, AIR 1965 SC 1440.
Prior to this judgment there was a conflict of opinion on this point in the High Courts in India. One view was that Clause (b) was wide enough to embrace the subject-matter in dispute. The second view was that the difference in the phraseology of the two clauses pointed to the conclusion that Clause (b) contemplated not the property which was the subject-matter of dispute but some property in addition to or different from the property which was the subject-matter of dispute. The collocation of the words in the two clauses, the presence of the words "in dispute" along with the word "subject-matter" used in Clause (a) and the absence of the words "in dispute" or "in suit" in reference to the word "property" used in Clause (b) suggests that the property envisaged in Clause (b) is not the property which is the subject-matter of the dispute but some property other than that. The conflict of views in regard to Clause (b) is brought out in a Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in Haramani Devi v. Balaram Panda, AIR 1957 Orissa 109 while discussing the ambit of Clause (2) of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment refers to this conflict of views as follows:
"Though there is a conflict of views on the question whether 'property' in this clause includes property which is in dispute in the suit or relates to property other than that in dispute in suit, the Patna and the Allahabad High Courts have taken the view that this clause is applicable to cases involving properties in dispute in the case".
The judgment then goes on to refer to the view expressed in Ishwari Prasad Singh v. Kameshwar Singh Bahadur, AIR 1941 Pat 288 and Nadir Hussain v. Municipal Board, Agra, AIR 1937 All 1.69. Alter discussing the same it concludes as follows:
"I respectfully agree with the view of the Patna and the Allahabad High Courts that Clause (2) of Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code may apply also to properly which is in dispute in the suit."
22. It may be mentioned that the reasoning in regard to Clause (2) of Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code is also applicable to Clause (b) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India, which presents the same features.
23. The leading case in which the second view was expounded is that of A.V. Subramania Ayyar v. Sellamal, ILR 39 Mad 843: (AIR 1916 Mad 985). In this case it was held by Wallis, C. J. that the use of the word "directly" in Clause (2) of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure is consistent with this construction and, in any case, the words "involve directly" used in this clause cannot be read as including cases which involve nothing but the actual subject matter in dispute in the appeal. Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. in his judgment in the said case observed as follows:
"If the second clause stood by itself (see Wheeler's Privy Council Practice, page 694) it would be legitimate to construe it in the manner suggested, as the word "involves" is sufficiently wide to cover direct adjudication in respect of the subject-matter in dispute. In this case we have to take both the clauses together so as to give a meaning to both. In my judgment the first clause applies to cases where the decree awards a particular sum, or property of a particular value or refuses that relief (i.e.) to cases where the object-matter in dispute is of a particular value. In fact the words "objects in dispute" are used in the provisions relating to appeals from Guernsey. If the operation of the decision is confined only to the particular object matter, Clause (2) does not apply, and unless the case satisfies the conditions in Clause (1) there is no right of appeal. If the decision beyond awarding relief in respect of the particular object matter of the suit affects rights in other properties, Clause (2) would apply; also if matter in dispute is one which is incapable of valuation as in the case of easements, Clause (2) may apply."
24. In Kartar Singh v. Ramkumar Bhagat, AIR 1953 Pat 377 which is a Bench Decision of the Patna High Court, while discussing the ambit of Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution and the second paragraph of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was observed as follows:
"There are however authorities to the effect that second paragraph of Section 110, Civil P. C., which corresponds to Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution is meant to apply only to cases involving some claim or question to or respecting property other than that in respect to which the claim is brought and which may be taken into account therewith in making up the appealable value, or that it may possibly also apply to cases involving claims incapable of a money valuation such as claims to easements and the like. This is the principle laid down in AIR 1916 Mad 985 which has been followed by the Patna High Courts in Kesho Prasad Singh v. Shiva Saran Lal, AIR 1918 Pat 566"
25. The same view was taken in Amarsingh v. Karnail Kaur, AIR 1956 Raj 169 and Bhawar Lal v. Lachmandas, AIR 1929 Nag 75.
26. In Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit, AIR 1961 Cal 537 which is a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court headnote (a) which summarises the view taken in that case runs as follows:
"In order to come under Clause (b) it is necessary for the petitioner to prove that the decision complained of affects directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property which is not the subject-matter of the suit. Unless the decision affects a claim or property other than the claim or property in dispute, Clause (b) does not come into operation. Otherwise, the provisions of Clause (a) of Article 133(1) would be rendered altogether nugatory. AIR 1916 Mad 985 and 50 Cal WN 255 and AIR 1925 PC 159, Relied on."
The above controversy, however, has been set at rest by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their decision in AIR 1965 SC 1440. The relevant passage in their judgment runs as follows:
"To attract the application of Article 133(1)(b) it is essential that there must be omitting from consideration other conditions not material a Judgment involving directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of an amount or value not less than Rs. 20,000. The variation in the language used in Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 133 pointedly highlights the conditions which attract the application of the two clauses. Under Clause (a) what is decisive is the amount or value of the subject-matter in the Court of first instance and "still in dispute" in appeal to the Supreme Court; under Clause (b) it is the amount or value of the property respecting which a claim or question is involved in the judgment gought to be appealed from. The expression "property" is not defined in the Code, but having regard to the use of the expression "amount It would apparently include money. But the property respecting which the claim or question arises must be property in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute. If in a proposed appeal there is no claim or question raised respecting property other than the subject-matter Clause (a) will apply; if there is involved in the appeal a claim or question respecting property of an amount of value not less than Rs. 20,000 in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute Clause (b) will apply."
27. Applying the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case it appears to me that the proper clause applicable to the present case would be not Clause (b) but Clause (a). It is no doubt true that the order itself does not finally decide the amount of actual reduction that would be made as a result of the application of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. That determination will be made as a result of the application of the principle laid down by this Court.
This consideration, however, is not enough to bring the case under Clause (b) because the decision of this matter by the High Court would still relate to a matter which is the subject-matter in dispute, and not to any matter other than the subject-matter in dispute. The subject-matter of dispute in the present case is the amount by which the decretal amount is to be reduced and the decision of the High Court also relates to the same matter. In the present case therefore, in my opinion, the clause that should be attracted is Clause (a) and not Clause (b).
28. If Clause (a) is applied to the present case then the condition relating to the valuation of the subject-matter of dispute in the Court of first instance as well as in appeal is admittedly fulfilled in the present case. In fact it is conceded by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties that the amount by which the reduction will be made would be far in excess of Rs. 20,000 being in the region of about Rs. 60,000 or so. Further it is also obvious that the order sought to be appealed against is not an order of affirmance but one of reversal. In this situation it must be held that all the conditions prescribed by Clause (a) of Article 133(1) are fulfilled in the case and the applicant is entitled to a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) as a matter of right.
29. So far as Clause (c) is concerned, it lays down that the case should be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Certificate under this clause cannot be claimed by a party as a matter of right. The grant of certificate under Clause (c) is a matter of discretion, and in exercising its discretion the Court takes into consideration the nature of the questions involved in the ease. There is no doubt that the present case involves a question of great importance, as the principle laid down therein is likely to affect ft large number of cases. The question arising in the present case is a question that is bound to arise frequently. The question, therefore, is one of public importance and the present case would appear to be a fit one for a certificate under Clause (c) as well. In view, however, of the fact that I am of the opinion that the applicant is entitled to a certificate as a matter of right under Clause (a) it is not necessary to further grant the certificate under Clause (c).
30. For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that this application should be allowed and the applicant should be granted a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
L. Prasad J.
31. I have had the advantage of going through the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Beg. Two points arise for decision. Firstly, whether or not what is proposed to appeal from is a "judgment, decree or final order" within the meaning of that expression as used in Article 133 of the Constitution. Secondly, whether or not facts exist on the basis of which it is possible to issue a certificate under any of the three clauses of Article 133(1), Hon'ble the Chief Justice and my learned brother Beg are agreed that facts exist justifying the issue of a certificate under Clause (a) of Article 133(1). I am in respectful agreement with them and have nothing to add.
32. On the other point there has arisen a difference of opinion between Hon'ble Chief Justice and Beg J. The view taken by Hon'ble Chief Justice is that it is not for the High Court to enter into the question whether or not what is proposed to appeal from is a judgment, decree or final order. The view taken by Beg J. is that having regard to the opening clause of Article 133(1) the High Court has to decide for itself whether or not what is proposed to be appealed from is a judgment, decree or final order. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken by Beg J.
It is true that the determination of a controversy whether or not what is proposed to appeal from is a judgment, decree or final order is not condition pre-requisite to the issue of a certificate the grant of which depends on the existence of the facts envisaged by Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 133(1). It is equally true that it is not for another Court but for the Court called upon to exercise jurisdiction to decide whether or not it possesses jurisdiction. That being so the decision of the controversy if or not what is proposed to appeal from is a judgment, decree or final order by this Court cannot stand in the way of the Supreme Court in deciding that controversy for itself if raised before it. All the same having regard to the opening clause of Article 133(1) it seems obvious that there arises no occasion for the High Court to ascertain the existence or otherwise of the facts on which depends the issue of a certificate unless it has first found, in case there arises a controversy on that question, that what is pro-
posed to appeal from is a judgment, decree or final order.
On a plain reading of the language employed by Article 133(1) it seems impossible to hold that the party opposing a petition for the grant of a certificate thereunder is not entitled to press its rejection on the ground that what is proposed to appeal from is not a judgment, decree or final order. It is unnecessary for me to dilate on this point any further since it has been discussed threadbare by my learned brother Beg.
33. I accordingly agree that the application be allowed with costs and a certificate be granted under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Beg, J.
34. For the reasons given in our separate judgment, we are of opinion that the applicant is entitled to a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
We, accordingly, allow the application and direct that a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India be issued in favour of the applicant. The applicant shall be entitled to get his costs from the opposite parties.
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