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M/S. Punjab Lime And Lime-Stone Co., Dehradun v. Cantonment Board, Dehradun And Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
These are two connected writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners had taken a lease of a limestone quarry at Bhitarli, Dehradun. Limestone extracted was transported by trucks to Dehradun railway station. In transit the trucks passed over a road within the limits of the Cantonment Board, Dehradun. The Cantonment Board erected barriers and commenced realisation of a toll on trucks passing through the cantonment.
The petitioners challenged the validity of the toll and sought relief by multiple routes: an appeal to the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Dehradun (which was dismissed), and a suit for an injunction restraining the Cantonment Board (also dismissed). They then filed the present writ petitions praying for certiorari quashing Notification No. S.R.O. 369 dated 1 November 1963 (sanctioning levy of toll under section 60 of the Cantonments Act) and for a mandamus directing the Board not to realise toll from the petitioners on goods and laden vehicles in transit.
The petitioners' pleaded factual point included that the trucks merely passed through the Cantonment on an "M.E.S. Road" and were not loaded or unloaded within the Cantonment limits. The Cantonment Board in its counter-affidavit admitted that some limestone trucks pass through the cantonment but denied the remainder of that paragraph, asserting the M.E.S. Road is within the Cantonment limits.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the levy by the Cantonment Board of a "toll" on trucks merely passing through its limits is a valid toll (i.e., whether "toll" presupposes rendering of some service or benefit by the taxing authority).
- Whether section 60 of the Cantonments Act permits a Cantonment Board to levy the same taxes as a municipality and whether limitations applicable to municipal levies (such as restrictions under transit rules or municipal statutes) apply equally to Cantonment Boards.
- Whether the word "entering" (in the context of a toll on vehicles entering a municipality) excludes vehicles merely passing through without engaging in any activity within the taxing area.
- Whether the pre-constitutional existence of section 60 of the Cantonments Act is saved by Article 372 (and related constitutional provisions) so as to permit Cantonment Boards to exercise the delegated taxing power despite changes in legislative competence under the Constitution.
- Whether the imposition of the toll contravenes Article 301 (freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse) of the Constitution, and if so, whether any saving or procedure under Article 306/304 affects that challenge.
- Whether the sanction of the Central (or State) government to the levy was obtained by misrepresentation of facts (and if such an allegation can be examined in a writ petition).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The word "toll" presupposes the rendering of some service by the authority collecting it; since the Cantonment Board renders no such service (according to petitioners' contention), the levy is not a valid toll.
- The petitioners' trucks merely pass through the Cantonment (on what is described in the petition as "M.E.S. Road") and are neither loaded nor unloaded within the Cantonment; therefore a toll on vehicles "entering" cannot be levied on mere transit.
- By reference to municipal transit pass rules and municipal practice, vehicles merely in transit should attract only nominal transit fees and not tolls; hence the Cantonment Board cannot levy a full toll on passing vehicles.
- On constitutional grounds, because the Seventh Schedule (legislative lists) now allocates "toils" (tolls) to the State List, the Central Legislature (which originally delegated the power in 1924) no longer has competence and its earlier delegation cannot be effective post-Constitution.
- The levy contravenes Article 301 as it interferes with freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse.
- The sanction for the toll was obtained by misrepresentation of facts to the sanctioning authority.
Respondent / Cantonment Board's Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The counter-affidavit disputed parts of the petition: it admitted that some limestone trucks pass through the cantonment but denied the rest, and specifically asserted that the road described as "M.E.S. Road" is within the Cantonment limits.
- The Cantonment Board relied on the powers conferred by section 60 of the Cantonments Act (to impose taxes that may be imposed in a municipality, with prior Central Government sanction) and the statutory procedure in sections 60–63 to impose the tax.
- Implicitly, the Board's position (as taken by the court from the statutory framework) is that Cantonment Boards have duties and powers under the Cantonments Act (including those relating to streets), and that the levy is therefore a toll authorised by statute and valid if the statutory procedure was followed.
- The Board denied the allegation that sanction was obtained by misrepresentation (as stated in the counter-affidavit).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Ghaziabad, AIR 1962 All 25 | Judicial authority that some sort of consideration/quid pro quo is ordinarily necessary to support a toll; but where a statute authorises a municipal body to levy tolls generally, specific services need not be pleaded—general amenities and statutory duties may constitute sufficient consideration. | The court relied on this decision to hold that a toll may be validly levied when the empowering statute (here, the Cantonments Act) contemplates general amenities and duties (section 116) that justify the levy. The court concluded it would not accept petitioners' contention that the tax was not a toll. |
| Central India Spinning & Weaving & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, Wardha, AIR 1958 SC 341 | Held that a statutory "terminal tax on goods imported into or exported from the limits of the municipality" did not authorise levy on goods merely in transit carried across the limits (a distinction between "import" and mere passage). | The court found this authority inapplicable to the present case because the statutory language of the municipal provision at issue here (section 128(1)(vii)) contemplates mere "entry" even for passage through, unlike the terminal tax language construed in Wardha. |
| Ram Krishna Ram Nath v. Janpad Sabha, AIR 1962 SC 1073 | Observation that local bodies can only be authorised to raise taxes which the Province itself could raise; Provincial Legislature cannot empower local bodies to impose taxes it could not directly levy for provincial purposes. | The court considered these observations but deemed them not directly applicable; instead it relied on Article 372 (saving pre-constitutional laws) to uphold the validity of section 60 of the Cantonments Act as an existing law saved at the commencement of the Constitution. |
| Bangalore Woollen Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, AIR 1962 SC 562 | Addressed an argument that taxes imposed after the Constitution could not be sustained on pre-constitutional delegations; the argument was rejected. | The court cited this decision to support the rejection of the petitioners' contention that because the specific tax was first imposed after the Constitution, it could not be validly imposed under a pre-constitutional empowering statute. |
| Venkata Ramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 416 | Authority in support of the proposition that a tax imposed after the Constitution may still be valid if the enabling law was an existing law saved by constitutional provisions. | The court cited this case alongside others to reject the petitioners' similar argument in the present petitions. |
| Surajmal Raj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1954 Raj 260 | Another authority cited for the same proposition rejecting the contention that only taxes existing pre-Constitution could be sustained. | The court relied on this authority to reinforce its view that the power to impose taxes conferred by an existing law is saved and may support subsequent impositions if the statutory power exists. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds in a series of focused legal steps based on the pleadings and authorities cited in the record:
- Allegations and admissions: The petitioners did not expressly allege that the Cantonment Board renders no service; the petition stated trucks merely pass through and are not loaded/unloaded, and identified the road as "M.E.S. Road." The counter-affidavit specifically admitted only that some trucks pass through and asserted the M.E.S. Road lies within the cantonment. Given these pleadings, there was no uncontested factual assertion that the Board rendered no service.
- Nature of toll and statutory context: The court examined the legal requisites of a toll, drawing on Hindustan Vanaspati. That decision accepts that consideration or benefit is ordinarily necessary for a toll, but where statutory authority exists and a municipal body is charged with providing general amenities, specific proof of a discrete service need not always be required. The court applied this principle to the Cantonments Act context.
- Duties of Cantonment Boards: The court reproduced section 116 of the Cantonments Act (duties of Boards) and the statutory definition of "street" to show that Cantonment Boards are charged with duties relating to roads and public ways. On that basis the court concluded the statute casts duties on the Board in relation to the road over which the petitioners' trucks passed; therefore it was not prepared to accept the contention that the tax was not a toll.
- Statutory power under section 60 and procedural safeguards: Section 60 authorises a Board to impose taxes that a municipality may impose, subject to prior Central Government sanction. The court noted the required procedure in sections 60–63 (notice, objections, final proposals, submission to Central Government, sanction) and observed there was no allegation that the Cantonment Board failed to follow this procedure. Therefore, even if municipal limitations exist, they do not automatically transfer; if the Cantonment statutory procedure was followed, the tax would be valid.
- Meaning of "entering": The court addressed the semantic contention that "entering" requires more than mere passage. It held that the ordinary dictionary meaning of "enter" — "to go or come into a place" — supports treating mere entry (including passage through) as covered; the Wardha municipal decision on terminal tax was distinguished because its language addressed "import" and "export" (terminal taxes) and not a provision expressly contemplating entry.
- Constitutional competence and saving of pre-existing law: The court rejected the petitioners' contention that changes in the legislative lists post-Constitution invalidated section 60. It relied on Article 372 (and related articles defining "law in force"/"existing law") to hold that section 60, being an existing law at the commencement of the Constitution, is saved unless invalid under Article 13. Therefore the mere fact that the Central Legislature could no longer legislate on some subjects post-Constitution does not void a valid pre-existing delegation.
- Article 301 challenge: The court treated the contention that the toll contravened Article 301 (freedom of trade and commerce) but noted Article 306 preserves existing laws except as the President may direct. The court was not persuaded that Article 301 invalidated the levy in light of the statutory saving and the existence of the empowering enactment.
- Allegation of misrepresentation in obtaining sanction: The allegation that sanction was obtained by misrepresentation was denied in the counter-affidavit. The court observed that it could not resolve disputed questions of fact in the course of entertaining a writ petition and therefore did not accept that contention on the material before it.
- Conclusion on merits: For these reasons — statutory power, duties under the Cantonments Act, the saving of pre-constitutional laws, no pleaded failure of the procedures in sections 60–63, and inability to try disputed factual allegations — the court found no force in the petitions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petitions dismissed.
Implications and direct effect:
- The court declined to quash Notification No. S.R.O. 369 dated 1 November 1963 sanctioning the levy of toll under section 60 of the Cantonments Act; the petitions challenging the toll were dismissed with costs.
- The court's reasoning affirms that:
- a statutory power to levy tolls may be validly exercised where the empowering statute contemplates general amenities and duties (and where the statutory procedure for imposing the tax has been followed);
- the word "entering" in the municipal taxing provision at issue can include mere passage through the taxing area under the statutory language relied upon (section 128(1)(vii));
- pre-constitutional statutory powers to levy taxes (such as section 60 of the Cantonments Act) are saved by Article 372 and related constitutional provisions, preventing invalidation solely on the basis of post-Constitutional allocation of legislative subjects.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or broader precedent beyond application of existing authorities and constitutional saving provisions to the facts before the court. It refused to decide disputed factual allegations (e.g., alleged misrepresentation) in the writ proceeding and resolved the petitions against the petitioners on the legal and procedural record presented.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: Petitions dismissed with costs.
1. These are two connected writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners in the two cases have taken a lease of lime-stone quarry situate at Bhitarli in the District of Dehradun. The time which is taken out of the quarry is taken to the railway station of Dehradun in trucks. While going from the quarry to the railway station the trucks have to pass over a road within the limits of the Cantonment Board of Dehradun. The Cantonment Board has erected barriers for the purpose of realising toll on the trucks passing through the Cantonment Area. The petitioners challenged the validity of the toll levied on their vehicles. They filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Dehradun. They thereupon filed a suit for an injunction restraining the Cantonment Board from realising the toll but the suit was also dismissed. They have, therefore, filed these petitions. They pray that a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari be issued, quashing the notification No. S.R.O 369 dated 1st of November, 1963, sanctioning the levy of toll tax under section 60 of the Cantonments Act. The further prayer is that a writ or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the respondent Board not to realise toll tax from the petitioners on goods and laden vehicles in transit. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the word ‘toll’ presupposes the rendering of some service by the authority realising the toll and as the Cantonment Board renders no service, what has been levied by it is not toll. There is no allegation in the petition to the effect that the Cantonment Board renders no service. The relevant paragraph is number ‘3’ which reads thus:
“3. That as such while transporting the lime-stone from the quarry of the petitioner the Trucks have to pass through the limits of Cantonment Board Dehradun. But they are never loaded or unloaded within the Cantonment Board limits. They merely pass through the Cantonment Board to their destinations outside it that too on M.E.S Road and not on any road of the Cantonment Board”
2. All that has been alleged is that the road is ‘M.E.S, Road’ and not a road of the Cantonment Board The reply to paragraph ‘3’ of the petition is to be found in paragraph five of the counter affidavit Paragraph five of the counter affidavit reads as follows:
“That in paragraph 3 of the writ-petition it is only admitted that some limestone trucks do pass through the limits of cantonment Board Dehradun Rest of the paragraph is not admitted. The road referred to as the M.E.S Road is within the Cantonment Board limits”
3. It will thus be seen that there is no assertion by the petitioners to the effect that the Cantonment Board renders no service. This question arose in Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Ghaziabad, AIR 1962 All 25. The facts were that the appellant Company's premises at Gazia-bad were situate within the limits of the Ghazia-bad Municipal Board. The Board claimed that it was entitled to levy a toll under section 128 of the U.P Municipalities Act, 1916, on the railway wagons bringing supplies to the appellant company's factory and to collect the amount thereof from the appellant company. The latter disputed its liability to pay. There were certain criminal proceedings started against the appellant company and eventually a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed in this Court. Mootham, C.J, was of the opinion that the tax in question was not a toll. Raghubar Dayal. J., took a different view and the matter was eventually laid before A.P Srivastava, J., to whom the following question was referred for answer:
“Whether the tax which the respondent-Board is seeking to impose on the appellant is a toll”
4. The argument was that there must be some quid pro quo or consideration to support the levy. A.P Srivastava, J., agreed with Raghubar Dayal J., and held that the levy in question was ‘toll’ He said this:
“The contention that some sort of consideration is necessary to support the levy of tolls is correct Judicial authority on this point is so overwhelming that it is not possible to dispute this proposition. The right to levy a toll is based either on a grant or has been acquired by prescription Ordinarily in order to justify a toll it is necessary to aver and prove the existence of some consideration. If, however, the right had been exercised from time immemorial its legal origin as well as consideration may be presumed. Similarly if the right has been granted by statute the consideration may be mentioned in the statute itself and can even be presumed even if it is not so mentioned because the Legislature would not have granted the right unless there was some consideration to justify the grant
5. Usually the consideration is some amenity, service, benefit or advantage which the person entitled to the toll undertakes to provide for the public in general or the persons liable to pay the toll Sometimes the consideration may be traced to ownership or jus dominii Permission by the owner of the land for the use of his land for any purpose may therefore, be sufficient consideration if the person charging the toll is the owner. If the benefit or advanage which is the consideration is made available it is not necessary for incurring the liability to pay the toll that the benefit or advantage should actually be utilized.
— — — — — — — — — —
— — — — — — — — — —
— — — — — — — — — —
— — — — — — — — — —
— — — — — — — — — —
“In respect of a toll of a particular kind, certainly, it can be said that it can be imposed only if the particular benefit or service for which it was authorised was provided. Thus, In respect of a market toll it can be said that it can be payable only if the facilities of a market are provided. In respect of a stallage toll it can be urged that it is payable only by the person who sets up a stall. A fair toll can in the same manner be realized from a person who attends the fair.
But when the statute authorises a municipal corporation to levy tolls without specifying that it is to be levied in respect of a particular service rendered or benefit provided it cannot in my opinion be said that for every toll sought to be levied some specific benefit or advantages must be provided. Under the Municipalities Act the Municipal Board was enjoined to provide all sorts of advantages, conveniences and facilities. These duties have been enumerated in section 7 of the Act. Its discretionary functions are mentioned in S. 8
All these duties and functions could not be performed without funds. It was therefore, necessary to authorise the Board to impose taxes of different kinds, including tolls. That was the purpose with which section 128 of the Act was enacted. Some of the taxes were to be imposed for specific services rendered and in respect of such taxes restrictions on the power of imposition were provided in sections 129 and 130 There was nothing either in the Government of India Act or in the Constitution which required the State Legislature if it was imposing a toll itself or was authorising the municipal boards to impose a toll to prescribe that the imposition could be made only for specific services rendered or advantages provided.
There appears to be nothing which could debar the Legislature from empowering the boards to levy general tolls in consideration of the advantages, services and benefits which were to be provided to every one under the provisions of the Municipalities Act Had it been the intention that tolls could be levied only for specific services or benefits to be provided, there would have been some provision to that effect in Municipalities Act. Such a provision cannot be held to exist by implication simply because of the use of the word “toll” In the absence of any restrictions, therefore, it appears to have been open to the respondents to levy tolls under section 128 even in consideration of the general amenities provided in the city”
6. It may be that the Cantonment Board of Dehradun does not repair or maintain that bit of road within its limits over which the petitioners' trucks pass on their way to the railway station though there is no such allegation in the petitions.
7. Chapter VIII of the Cantonments Act (II of 1924) contains the duties and discretionary functions of Cantonment Boards The relevant portion of section 116 of the Cantonments Act is reproduced below.
“It shall be the duty of every Board, so far as the funds at its disposal permit to make reasonable provision within the cantonment for:
(a) lighting streets and other public places;
(b) watering streets, and other public places;
(c) cleansing streets, public places and drains, abating nuisances and removing noxious vegetation;
(d) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(e) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(f) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(g) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(h) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(i) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(j) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(k) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(l) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(m) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(n) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(o) rendering assistance in extinguishing fires, and protecting life and property when fires occur:”
8. “Street” has been defined as including any way, road, lane, square, Court, alley or passage in a cantonment, whether a thoroughfare or not and whether built upon or not, over which the public have a right-of-way and also the road-way or foot-way over any bridge or cause-way.
9. It is thus obvious that the statute casts a duty upon the Cantonment Boards to render certain services in relation to the road upon which the petitioners' trucks pass on their way to the railway station I am, therefore, not prepared to accept the petitioners' contention that the tax in question is not toll.
10. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is based on section 60 of the Cantonments Act and section 128 of the U.P Municipalities Act. section 60 of the Cantonments Act reads as follows:
“The Board may with the previous sanction of the Central Government, impose in any cantonment any tax which, under any enactment for the time being in force, may be imposed in any municipality in the State wherein such Cantonment is situated:”
11. The relevant portion of section 128 of the U.P Municipalities Act reads as follows:
“128 Taxes which may he imposed. — (1) Subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government in this behalf, the taxes which a Board may impose in the way or any part of a Municipality are—
(i) — — — — — — — — —
(ii) — — — — — — — — —
(iii) — — — — — — — — —
(iv) — — — — — — — — —
(v) — — — — — — — — —
(vi) — — — — — — — — —
(vii) a toll on vehicles and other conveyances, animals, and laden coolies entering the Muni cipality:
(viii to xiv) — — — — — — —”
(2) Provided that taxes under clauses (iii) and (ix) of sub-section (1) shall not be levied at the same time, nor shall an octroi on goods under clause (viii) of sub-section (1) and a tax under clause (xiii) of sub-section (1) be levied at the same time. Provided also that no tax under clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be levied in respect of any motor vehicle.”
“(3) Nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any tax which the State Legislature has no power to impose in the State under the Constitution:
Provided that a Board which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was lawfully levying any such tax under this section as then in force, may continue to levy that tax until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament”
12. I have also been referred to the Transit Pass Rules 1955 for Municipalities levying toll and octroi-According to these Transit Pass Rules, the Municipalities are entitled to levy only nominal transit-fee on vehicles which do not indulge in any activity within the limits of the Municipal Board but merely pass through. The argument advanced before me is that as the City Board of Dehradun could not levy toll on vehicles which are merely in transit, the Cantonment Board cannot do so either.
13. section 60 of the Cantonments Act nowhere says that Cantonment Boards can levy taxes which can be levied by municipalities subject to the same limitations. It simply provides that the taxes which are realisable by Municipal Boards are also realisable by Cantonment Boards. This does not mean that the limitations on the powers of Municipal Boards to levy their taxes must also be applied to taxes levied by Cantonment Boards. The procedure for realising taxes is laid down in Sections 60, 61, 62 and 63 of the Cantonments Act. The Board is required to publish a notice specifying the tax which it proposes to impose, the persons or classes of persons to be made liable and the description of the properh or other taxable thing or circumstance in respect of which they are to be made liable, and the rate at which the tax is to be levied. Thereafter, objections have to be invited and they have to be disposed of. The Board may modify its proposals or may not. If it modifies the proposals they have to be republished. When the proposals have been finally settled they are to be submitted to the Central Government through the Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Command. If the Central Government sanctions the imposition of the proposed tax the Board can levy it. The said four sections therefore, prescribe the entire procedure for the valid imposition of the tax in question. If this procedure is followed the tax would be perfectly valid notwithstanding the fact that Municipal Boards can levy the same tax with certain limitations I should like to add that there is no allegation to the effect that the procedure laid down in sections 60 to 63 of the Cantonments Act was not followed I do not find any force in the second argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
14. The next contention on behalf of the petitioners is that what can be levied is not simply “toll” but “toll on vehicles entering the municipality” II has been argued that the word “entering” does not mean simply “passing through” but it implies that some activity is to be indulged in within the territory of the authority realising the tax. In short, the contention is that as the petitioners' trucks are neither loaded nor unloaded within the limits of the Cantonment Board Dehradun, the latter cannot levy toll on the vehicles which are merely in transit. The dictionary meaning of the word “enter” is “to go or come into a place.” “to pierce” or “to penetrate”. I fail to see how the word “entering” is to be taken to mean that one must not only enter but must indulge in some activity within the territory entered into.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Committee. Wardha; AIR 1958 SC 341. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court were construing the provisions of section 66(1)(o) of the C.P and Berar Municipalities Act (2 of 1922) That section authorises a Municipal Board to impose “a terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of the municipality” It was held that the section did not authorise the levy of a terminal tax on goods which were in Iran-sit and are only carried across the limits of the Municipality The word “import” cannot possibly have the same meaning as the word “entering” The decision relied upon has, in my opinion, no application to the facts of the present petitions. If we examine the pro visions of section 128(1)(iv), (v), (vi) and (viii) and contrast it with the language of section 128(1)(vii) it will be clear that the latter provision contemplates mere entry even though for the purpose of only passing through, when as the other provisions referred to above deal with cases where some activity is indulged in within the limits of the Municipal Board.
16. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is based upon the Legislative Lists contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. I have been referred to item No. 59 of List II (State List) which contains only one word, namely, “toils”. It has been argued that the Central Legislature in 1924 delegated certain powers of taxation to the Cantonment Board Today the delegator, that is the Central Legislature, has no power to legislate imposing tolls and that, therefore, its delegates, the Cantonment Boards, can have no such powers.
17. Reliance has been placed upon the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Krishna Ram Nath v. Janpad Sabha AIR 1962 SC 1073.
“It must however to observed that merely because the legislature is empowered under this entry to constitute local authorities and vest them with powers and jurisdiction it would not follow that these local bodies could be vested with authority to levy any and every tax for the purpose of raising revenue for the purpose of local administration. They could be validly authorised to raise only those taxes which the province could raise under and by virtue of the relevant entries in the Provincial Legislative List. This is on the principle that the province could not authorise local bodies created by it to impose taxes which it itself could not directly levy for the purposes of the Provincial Government. Now comes the Question whether the Provincial Legislature was competent, by legislation, to discontinue the levy of the tax by effecting a repeal of the taxing provision contained in the Local Self-Government Act of 1920.”
18. These observations were made in answer to the argument that local bodies could be vested with unlimited authority to levy any tax and their Lordships held that the Provincial Legislature could not authorise local bodies to impose taxes which it itself could not directly levy for the purposes of the Provincial Government I do not consider this decision to be all relevant. The provision of law really in point is Article 372 of the Constitution the relevant portion of it is reproduced below:
“372(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 396 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other comptent authority.
(2) — — — — — — — — — — —
(3) — — — — — — — — — — —
“Explanation I.: The expression “law in force” in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, nothwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas”
19. Reference may also be made to Articles 13(3)(b) and 366(10) of the Constitution which read thus.
““laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, nothwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.”
Article 366(10) of the Constitution reads as follows:
“existing law” means any law, Ordinance, Order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, Ordinance, order, bye-law rule or regulation:”
20. Now a Statute conferring a power is as much as “a law in force” as a Statute defining rights I fail to see how it can be argued that section 60 of the Cantonments Act was not “a law in force” in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Legislative Lists cannot invalidate and make void an enactment which has been in existence from before. The lists merely deal with Legislative competence. To my mind the only conditions under which an existing law could become void are to be found in Article 13 of the Constitution. In my opinion section 60 of the Cantonments Act was “a law in force” at the time of the commencement of the Constitution and it is saved by Article 372. The mere fact that now the Central Legislature cannot legislate on some subjects cannot have the effect of depriving it of the power to do something which has been conferred upon it by a valid enactment.
21. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is based upon Article 301 of the Constitution. It has been contended that the toll in question contravenes the provisions of this Article as it interferes with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Article 306 saves the provisions of any existing law except in so far as the President may by order otherwise direct. I am, therefore, not prepared to accept the contention that unless the procedure laid down in Article 304 is followed no tax can be imposed by any authority even though the power to impose taxes was already there under a valid existing law.
22. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that what was in existence was the power to impose a particular tax, but as the tax in question was not imposed before the coming into force of the Constitution but after it the tax is invalid. In other words what is argued is that “existing law” would be the tax itself and not the law conferring power to impose it. A similar argument was advanced in Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd. Bangalore v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, AIR 1962 SC 562, but it was rejected. The same view was also taken in Venkata Ramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 416 and Surajmal Raj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1954 Raj 260.
23. The next and the last argument advanced was that the sanction of the State Government was obtained on a misrepresentation of facts. This allegation is denied in the counter-affidavit. It is not possible for me, while entertaining a writ petition, to enter into disputed questions of fact. I find no force in these petitions and they hip dismissed with costs.
EJ/VGW/D.V.C
24. Petitions dismissed.
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