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Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State Of U.P.
Structured Summary of the Court Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a petition under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code disposed of together with petition No. 563 of 1964. The corporate respondent is Bindra Chemical Corporation, which manufactures medicines purportedly in accordance with Ayurvedic and Unani systems at Delhi Shahdara. Two partners (Ishwar Singh Bindra and Balbir Singh) and the manager (Harbans Singh) are the applicants in one petition; Harbans Singh Bindra is the applicant in the other.
The corporation manufactured (1) Bindra's Antiphilogistic plaster and (2) Bindra's Yabrooj plaster (Belladona plaster). Regional Inspectors of Drugs took samples from commercial premises in Mathura and Sikandra Rao (District Aligarh). Those samples were submitted to the public analyst.
The public analyst reported that the Antiphilogistic plaster contained boric acid (1.97%), glycerine (17.67%) and "ash 49.55" (as reported in the opinion). The analyst expressed the view that glycerine and boric acid were pharmacopoeial drugs and were not exclusively Unani or Ayurvedic medicines. The Yabrooj (Belladona) plaster sample did not contain any alkaloid, whereas the British Pharmaceutical Codex (B.P.C.) minimum for total alkaloids was 0.23%.
On the basis of these reports, complaints were filed alleging contraventions of provisions of the Drugs Act, 1940 (as amended): one complaint against the petitioners in this petition for contravention of Sections 27(a) and 27(b) of the Drugs Act as amended by the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1960; another complaint (in petition No. 563 of 1964) for contravention of Sections 18(a)-2 and 18(b) of the Drugs Act, 1940 as amended by the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1960 read with Sections 27(a) and 27(b).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the articles (Bindra's Antiphilogistic plaster and Bindra's Yabrooj/Belladona plaster) are "drugs" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Drugs Act, 1940 (the operative question framed by the court).
- How the excepting phrase in Section 3—“other than medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine”—should be interpreted, specifically whether the word “exclusively” governs both “used” and “prepared for use”.
- Whether the complaints filed against the petitioners disclose a prima facie case under the relevant provisions of the Drugs Act (i.e., whether the complaints are sufficient to proceed).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The Antiphilogistic and Yabrooj (Belladona) plasters are not "drugs" within the meaning of the word “Drug” as defined by the Drugs Act, 1940.
- They were prepared in accordance with the Ayurvedic and Unani systems of medicine, and therefore fall within the statutory exception.
- The complaints do not disclose a prima facie case because the complaints did not expressly state that the plasters were medicines or substances “not exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine.”
State's Arguments
- The medicines/substances were not prepared exclusively in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems.
- The Yabrooj (Belladona) plaster lacked the required alkaloid content (no alkaloid detected; B.P.C. minimum 0.23%).
- The Antiphilogistic plaster contained glycerine and boric acid, which were official drugs in the British Pharmaceutical Codex and therefore not exclusively Ayurvedic/Unani substances.
Table of Precedents Cited
Note: the opinion cites one judicial authority and two treatises. The table below records the judicial authority explicitly referenced in the opinion.
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Barnes Jarvis (quoted; Lord Goddard, C.J.) | Emphasizes that construing statutes requires application of common sense, consideration of the object of the Act, and giving effect to clear and unambiguous words in their ordinary and natural sense. | The court relied on this principle to justify construing the excepting clause in Section 3 of the Drugs Act according to the intention expressed by its words and to support the conclusion that "exclusively" governs both "used" and "prepared for use." |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's central analytic task was statutory construction of the excepting language in Section 3 of the Drugs Act, which defined "Drug" but excluded "medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine." The court proceeded step-by-step as follows:
- Identification of the textual problem: the placement of the word "exclusively" before "used" raised the question whether it also governs the subsequent phrase "prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine," or whether it applied only to "used."
- Grammatical and textual analysis: the court observed that the word "exclusively" appears prior to "used" (not after it), and that the words "medicines and substances" are the subject of both "exclusively used" and "prepared for use." These textual facts supported construing "exclusively" as governing both "used" and "prepared for use."
- Consideration of legislative intent and purpose: the court reasoned that if the legislature had intended "exclusively" to govern only "used," it would likely have placed the word after "used." The presence of the word where it is placed, together with the structure of the clause, indicated an intention to have "exclusively" apply to both modes (use and preparation).
- Use of interpretive authorities: the court cited Craies on Statute Law (6th Ed.) and a passage from Barnes Jarvis (Lord Goddard, C.J.) to emphasize the rule that statutes should be construed according to the intention expressed and with common sense; and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes to support the proposition that where literal grammar leads to absurdity or defeats legislative purpose, a court may adopt a modified construction to correct apparent careless language.
- Rejection of petitioners' alternative readings: the petitioners argued the exception was intended to cover only medicines common to Ayurvedic/Unani and other systems, or that the phrase "exclusively prepared for use…" made no sense. The court rejected these contentions, holding that the legislature's inclusion of "exclusively" demonstrates an intention to exclude medicines/substances that are either used exclusively or prepared exclusively in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems.
- Consideration of legislative amendment: the court noted the 1964 amendment (Drugs and Cosmetic (Amendment) Act, 1964) which removed the exception from the definition of "Drug" and created a specific definition for Ayurvedic/Unani drugs processed and manufactured exclusively according to authoritative formulae. The court observed that the amendment was not retrospective and therefore did not assist the State for earlier transactions.
- Facts v. law distinction: after construing the statute, the court held that whether a particular medicine or substance is "used exclusively" or "prepared for use exclusively" in accordance with Ayurvedic/Unani systems is a question of fact requiring expert evidence. Because petitions under Section 561-A ordinarily do not permit the court to decide disputed questions of fact, the court declined to decide that factual question on the petition.
- Prima facie sufficiency of complaints: the court examined the complaints and found that they did state sufficient material facts — e.g., that glycerine and boric acid were official pharmacopoeial drugs and that the claim of Unani/Ayurvedic origin was disputed; similarly, the complaint regarding Yabrooj alleged misbranding and contravention of the Drugs Act. On that basis the court concluded the complaints disclosed a prima facie case.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petitions were dismissed. The opinion concludes: Petitions dismissed with costs.
Implications and immediate effects:
- The court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the excepting clause in Section 3 of the Drugs Act must be read to except medicines and substances which are either (a) used exclusively in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine, or (b) prepared for use exclusively in accordance with those systems. The word "exclusively" was interpreted to govern both "used" and "prepared for use."
- The resolution of whether the specific products (Antiphilogistic plaster and Yabrooj/Belladona plaster) fall within that exception is a question of fact that requires expert evidence; the court did not decide that factual issue on the petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C.
- On the procedural point, the court found that the complaints as framed did disclose a prima facie case and therefore the petitions seeking quashing failed.
- No broader legal change or new precedent beyond the court's statutory construction is announced in the opinion. The direct effect is that the petitions were dismissed and the criminal complaints may proceed; the court explicitly declined to resolve the underlying factual questions requiring expert evidence.
Petitions dismissed.
This summary is limited to the facts, arguments and reasoning contained in the provided opinion text and does not add information beyond that source.
By The Court—This is a petition under Sec. 561-A of Cr. P.C Mutatis mutandis common questions of law and fact arise in this petition and petition No. 563 of 1964 and in order to fecilitate matters, we propose to dispose of the petitions by this order.
2. The Bindra Chemical Corporation carries on the manufacture of medicines and substances in accordance with Ayurvedic and Unani systems at Delhi Shahdara. Ishwar Singh Bindra and Balbir Singh, two of the applicants of this petition are the partners and Harbans Singh, the third applicant is the manager of the aforesaid Corporation. The other petition has been filed by Harbans Singh Bindra. The aforesaid Corporation inter alia manufactures (1) Bindra's Antiphilogistic plaster and (2) Bindra's Yabrooj plaster (Belladona plaster). These articles purport to have been manufactured in accordance with the Ayurvedic and Unani systems of medicines and this fact appears on the printed labels. The Regional Inspector or Drugs, Agra Region took sample of the aforesaid plaster from Messrs. Frontier Gupta Medical Stores, Mathura and the Regional Inspector of Drugs, Aligarh Region took sample of the Yabrooj plaster from Sri Chintamani Vaidya of Messrs. Harish Aushdhalaya, Sikandra Rao, District Aligarh and the same were submitted to the public analyst for examination.
3. The sample of Antiphilogistic plaster was found to contain boric acid 1.97 per cent Glycerine 17.67 per cent, ash 49.55 The public analyst was of the opinion that glycerine and boric acid were pharmacopoecal drugs and were not exclusively Unani or Ayurvedic medicines. The sample of Yabrooj plaster did not contain any alkaloid. The minimum content of total alkaloids as laid down in B.P.C (British Pharmaceutical Cadex) should have been of 0.23 per cent.
4. On the basis of the aforesaid reports, a complaint was filed against the petitioners of this petition for contravention of Secs. 27(a) and 27(b) of the Drugs Act as amended by the Drugs (Amendment) Act 1960 and another complaint was filed against the petitioners of petition No. 563 of 1964 for contravention of Secs. 18(a)-2 and 18(b) of the Drugs Act, 1940 as amended by the Drugs (Amendment) Act 1960 read with Sec. 27(a) and 27(b) of that Act.
5. The main contentions of the petitioners are that the aforesaid medicines are not drugs within the meaning of the word “Drug” as defined in the Drugs Act of 1940; that they were prepared in accordance with the Ayurvedic and Unani systems of medicines and that the complaints did not disclose a prima facie case under the Drugs Act. The petitions have been resisted on behalf of the State on the grounds that the aforesaid medicines and substances were not prepared exclusively in accordance with the Ayurvedic and Unani Systems of medicines, that the sample of Belladona plaster did not contain any alkaloid and that the Antiphilogistic plaster contained glycerine and boric acid which were official drugs in the British Pharmaceutical Cadex.
6. The main question that arises for decision is as to whether the aforesaid articles were drugs in accordance with Sec. 3 of the Drugs Act. The relevant portion of that section as it stood on the relevant date reads as below:—
“Drug includes—
(1) All medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used for or in the diagnosis treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or animals other than medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine.”
7. The portion of the aforesaid section which needs to be interpreted is “other than medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine.”
8. It is significant that the word “exclusively” finds place prior to the word “used” and not after it. It is again significant that the words “medicines and substances” are the subject not only of the expression “exclusively used” but also of the following expression “prepared for use”. Another significant feature is that the words “in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine” govern not only the expression “prepared for use” but also the word “used”. It has not been disputed that one part of the relevant portion of the section would read as below:—
“Other than medicines and substances exclusively used in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine.”
9. Controversy has, however, centred as to whether the other part of the aforesaid clause would read as—
(a) Other than medicines and substances exclusively prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine,
or, as
(b) Other than medicines and substances prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine.”
10. The contention advanced on behalf of the State is that the word “exclusively” governs the expression “prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine,” whereas the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the word “exclusively” does not govern the aforesaid expression. The fact that the word “exclusively” has been placed prior to the word “used” lends support to the contention advanced on behalf of the State. If the intention of the legislature had been that the word “exclusively” would govern the word “used” only, it would have found place after the word “used” and not before it. The further facts that the words “other than medicines and substances” are part of the subsequent expression “prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine” and that the words “in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine” are part of the earlier portion of the excepting clause also restrengthen the conclusion reached above and go a long way to indicate that the word “exclusively” also governs the expression “prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine.”
11. There does not appear to be any good reason for holding that the word “exclusively” does not govern the expression “prepared for use in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine” particularly when the words “medicines and substances” are part and parcel of the subsequent expression “prepared for use … systems of medicine.” At page 66 of the 6th Edition of Craies on Statute Law, the following observations have been made:—
“The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves.
The Tribunal that has to construe an Act of a legislature, or indeed any other document, has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. And in order to understand these words it is natural to inquire what is the subject matter with respect to which they are used and the object in view. In Barnes Jarvis1 Lord Goddard, C.J said “A certain amount of common sense must be applied in construing statutes. The object of the Act has to be considered. If the words of the Statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law-giver.
Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature.”
12. The interpretation placed on the relevant portion of the section is thus in accord with the established canons of interpretation. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the intention of the legislature was to except from the definition of “Drug” medicines and substances which were common to the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine and other systems of medicine. The contention, in our opinion, lacks merits. If the intention of the legislature had been as contended for and on behalf of the petitioners, the legislature would not have used the word “exclusively” in the excepting portion of the section.
13. It has again been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the expression “exclusively prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine” does not make good sense and as such the word “exclusively” should not be placed before the expression “prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine.” The use of the word “exclusively” prior to the word “used” also does not make good sense, for there cannot be exclusive user in accordance with a certain system of medicines. The intention of the legislature appears to have been to exclude from the definition of drug such medicines and substances which are used exclusively in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine, or which are prepared for use exclusively in accordance with the aforesaid systems of medicines and the proper place for the word “exclusively” is after the word “used.” The legislature appears to have placed it before the word “used” so that it may govern the expression “prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine” also and the word may not have to be used twice once after “used” and again after “prepared for use.” While it is not competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his own views as to what is right or reasonable, it is permissible for him to modify the language so that the section to be interpreted makes good sense and does not lead to absurdity or manifest injustice.
14. The following observations find place in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edition page 221:—
“Where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation or by rejecting them altogether, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what words signify and that the modifications that are made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning.”
15. On behalf of the State our attention has been invited to the Drugs and Cosmetic (Amendment Act 1964) Act XIII of 1964 whereby the words “other than medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine” were deleted from the definition of the word “Drug” and Ayurvedic (including Siddha) or Unani Drug was defined to include all medicines intended for internal or external use for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings, mentioned in and processed and manufactured exclusively in accordance with the formulae described in the authoritative books of Ayurvedic (including Siddha) and Unani (Tibb) systems of medicines, specified in the first schedule. It will be noticed that in accordance with the amended Act, Ayurvedic of Unani Drug includes all medicines processed and manufactured exclusively in accordance with the formulae described in the authoritative books of Ayurvedic and Unani systems of medicines and the intention of the legislature in defining the word “Drug” in the Act of 1940, as it stood prior to its amendment, might well have been to except those medicines and substances which were either used exclusively or prepared for use exclusively in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine. Since the provisions of the amendment Act are not retrospective in operation, no inference in favour of the State can be drawn on the basis of the amended provisions.
16. There is no doubt that the intention of the legislature in defining a drug was to except from the definition those medicines and substances which are exclusively used in accordance with Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine, and it is a matter requiring serious consideration as to why would the legislature make a distinction between medicines and substances used in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine and those which are prepared for use in accordance with either of those systems.
17. On a construction of the relevant portion of section 3 of the Drugs Act, 1940, we are satisfied that the intention of the legislature was to except from the definition of Drug all medicines and substances which were either used exclusively or prepared for use exclusively in accordance with the Aurvedic or Unani systems of medicine and we have no hesitation in repelling the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners.
18. The question as to whether a medicine or substance is used exclusively or prepared for use exclusively in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine is a question of fact and its decision would hinge inter alia on expert evidence. Such evidence has not so far been led by the parties. It is not usual for this Court to go into disputed questions of fact in a petition under Sec. 561-A of Cr. P.C We, therefore, do not propose to go into the aforesaid question of fact.
19. It has lastly been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the complaints filed against them did not disclose a prima facie case inasmuch as it was not stated therein that Balladona Plaster and the Antiphlogistic plaster in question were medicines and substances which were not exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine. We have perused the complaints and we find ourselves unable to agree with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. It has been stated in the complaint relating to Antiphilogistic plaster that glycerine and boric acid were drugs official in the Phara copoeias prescribed under the Act and further on that the claim that it was a Unani preparation was false and misleading. It has also been stated in the aforesaid complaint that the accused persons were guilty of the offences under section 18(2) and 18(b) read with Sec. 27-A and 27-B of the Drugs Act and that the Antiphilogistic plaster manufactured by the accused persons was a misbranded drug.
20. Similarly, in the other complaint, the claim that the Yabrooj (Belladona plaster) was an Ayurvedic and Unani preparation has been disputed and it has been averred that the aforesaid preparation was a misbranded drug and the accused persons had contravened the provisions of the Drugs Act, 1940 and had committed the offence punishable under Sec. 27-A and 27-B of that Act. It could not, therefore, be said that the complaints did not disclose a prima facie case.
21. In conclusion, the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with costs.
Petitions dismissed.
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