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Hansraj Chawala v. District Magistrate Allahabad
Judgment Summary — Gyanendra Kumar, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The applicant (accused) was prosecuted under Sec. 21 read with Sec. 4(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 on a complaint dated 13-8-1964 by the District Magistrate of Allahabad. The complaint charged excavation and removal of silica (glass) sand on 26-6-1964 without authority, permission or licence. The case was registered on 7-9-1964 and the accused appeared before the trying Magistrate on 21-10-1964. The accused appeared again on subsequent dates (28-10-1964, 11-11-1964 and 3-12-1964). On multiple dates the complainant (District Magistrate) did not appear and, on some dates, prosecution evidence was not produced or the A.P.P. was absent.
The trial Magistrate repeatedly adjourned hearings instead of dismissing the complaint under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C., or suo moto dispensing with the complainant’s attendance. The accused applied on 3-12-1964 for dismissal under Sec. 247, citing a Division Bench decision (State v. Reva Chand). The Magistrate rejected the accused’s application, misquoted Sec. 247 and adjourned the case to 21-12-1964. The accused filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, which was summarily dismissed. The accused then presented the revision to the High Court where this opinion issues.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, given the repeated absence of the complainant (District Magistrate) and lack of prosecution evidence, the trial Magistrate was bound to dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C.?
- Whether the trial Magistrate correctly interpreted and applied Sec. 247, Cr. P.C., including the permissibility of adjournment and the circumstances in which the Magistrate may suo moto dispense with the personal attendance of a complainant who is a public servant?
- Whether the Sessions Judge erred in summarily dismissing the accused's revision without considering Sec. 247, Cr. P.C. and the Division Bench authority (State v. Reva Chand) cited by the accused?
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant / Accused
- The accused relied on Sec. 247, Cr. P.C. and contended that the complaint should have been dismissed and he should have been acquitted because the complainant (District Magistrate) failed to appear on the dates when the accused attended court.
- The accused specifically cited the Division Bench decision in State v. Reva Chand (1960 A.L.J. 884) in support of dismissal where the complainant (District Magistrate) had not attended and no adequate reason for adjournment existed.
State / Complainant
- The State's counsel relied on observations by Mulla, J. in Lala Dhanpat Rai v. State (A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 425), suggesting that the District Magistrate is a busy public servant and his absence should not necessarily compel dismissal under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C.
- The State also relied on Prem Nath Khanna v. Chief Inspector Factories, Kanpur (1963 A.L.J. 989) to emphasise that in certain cases the complainant's role is formal and the Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance or adjourn rather than acquit, so as not to defeat justice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Reva Chand (1960 A.L.J. 884) | Division Bench held that when the District Magistrate is the complainant his attendance cannot be dispensed with without the court's order; mere appearance of the Public Prosecutor does not substitute for the complainant's attendance; if attendance is not dispensed with, Magistrate must either acquit the accused or adjourn for sufficient reason. | The Court adopted the Division Bench approach and relied on it to hold that the trial Magistrate was wrong in failing to dismiss the complaint where the District Magistrate did not attend and no adequate reason for adjournment existed. |
| Lala Dhanpat Rai v. State (A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 425) | Mulla, J. observed that the District Magistrate is a busy public servant and that the Legislature never contemplated that he should "dance attendance" upon subordinate Magistrates; absence of the District Magistrate should not be treated as absence of the complainant for Sec. 247 purposes. | The Court noted this view as relied upon by the State but expressly recorded that the Division Bench in Reva Chand dissented from that position; the opinion did not follow Lala Dhanpat Rai's reasoning. |
| Prem Nath Khanna v. Chief Inspector Factories, Kanpur (1963 A.L.J. 989) | Held that where the complainant's role is formal, the Magistrate may, in proper cases, dispense with personal attendance and proceed; dismissal merely for non-appearance could defeat justice; the Magistrate has discretion (including suo moto exemption) to avoid unjust results. | The Court distinguished this authority on the facts: in the present case the trial Magistrate did not suo moto exempt the complainant's attendance but advised the complainant to seek exemption; therefore Prem Nath Khanna did not justify the trial Magistrate's conduct in this matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by close reference to the chronology of events, the statutory language of Sec. 247, Cr. P.C., and the cited authorities.
- Chronology and statutory expectation: The accused first appeared on 21-10-1964 and again on subsequent dates (28-10-1964, 11-11-1964 and 3-12-1964). Under Sec. 242, Cr. P.C. the accused should have been questioned forthwith on his first appearance; this was not done. More importantly for the present issue, Sec. 247 requires that where the complainant does not appear on the day appointed for the accused's appearance (or any subsequent adjourned day) the Magistrate shall, subject to limited exceptions, acquit the accused.
- Failure of the trial Magistrate to apply Sec. 247: The Magistrate repeatedly adjourned hearings despite the absence of the complainant and in some instances despite absence of the A.P.P. and absence of prosecution evidence. The Magistrate also misquoted the opening words of Sec. 247 and proceeded to informally advise the District Magistrate to seek exemption from personal attendance rather than exercising the court's power to dispense with attendance suo moto.
- On the legal status of the complainant (District Magistrate): The Court emphasised that the District Magistrate, as a complainant, is not in a privileged position; in a summons case he must either attend or seek exemption. It is open to the Magistrate to dispense with the complainant's attendance suo moto, but in this case the trial Magistrate did not do so. Tendering unsolicited advice to the District Magistrate to obtain exemption and adjourning to convey that advice did not constitute a legally adequate reason to adjourn under Sec. 247.
- Engagement with precedent: The Court considered the State's reliance on Lala Dhanpat Rai and Prem Nath Khanna but noted that a Division Bench in Reva Chand directly addressed and rejected the reasoning in Lala Dhanpat Rai. Reva Chand required that where attendance of the District Magistrate had not been dispensed with the Magistrate must either acquit or only adjourn for sufficient reason; further, the mere appearance of the Public Prosecutor does not substitute for the complainant's presence. Prem Nath Khanna was considered but distinguished because, unlike that case, the trial Magistrate in the instant matter neither dispensed with attendance nor proceeded on the merits; rather he adjourned after misquoting Sec. 247 and inviting the complainant to apply for exemption.
- Procedural fairness and burden on accused: The Court noted that by 3-12-1964 the accused had attended court on four occasions, incurring expense and inconvenience, and that the charge was of a petty nature (removal of silica sand on a single day). This practical context reinforced that the impugned adjournments were unjustified and that the statutory remedy of dismissal under Sec. 247 should have been applied.
- Failure of the Sessions Judge: The Sessions Judge summarily dismissed the accused's revision, stating in effect that "nothing perverse or illegal appears to have been done," despite the trial Magistrate's order containing incorrect facts and a misquotation of Sec. 247. The High Court found this summary dismissal to be erroneous.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Revision allowed. The Court allowed the revision, dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C.
Implications:
- The immediate effect is that the complaint is dismissed and the accused is acquitted under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C.
- The decision enforces the principle that when a complainant (including a District Magistrate acting as complainant) is absent and the attendance has not been dispensed with by the court, the trial Magistrate must either acquit the accused or adjourn only for sufficient and adequate reasons; merely advising a complainant to seek exemption and adjourning to convey that advice is not a legally adequate reason for postponement.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad doctrinal rule beyond the application of existing authorities (it applies and prefers the Division Bench reasoning in State v. Reva Chand over the contrary single-judge observation in Lala Dhanpat Rai and distinguishes Prem Nath Khanna on the facts). No novel legal principle beyond this application is announced in the text.
Revision allowed.
Gyanendra Kumar, J.:— The applicant was prosecuted under Sec. 21 read with Sec. 4(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 on a complaint dated 13-8-1964 filed by the District Magistrate of Allahabad charging the accused of excavating and carrying away silaca (glass) sand from a specified area on 26-6-64 without any authority, permission or licence, in contravention of Sec. 4(1) of the said Act. The case was registered on 7-9-1964 and notice was issued to the accused, who appeared before the trying Magistrate on 21-10-1964. It was admittedly a summons case. Under the provisions of Sec. 242, Cr. P.C the accused should have been questioned forthwith as to why he should not be convicted, when he had appeared on 21-10-1964 before the Magistrate for the first time; but this was not done. The District Magistrate, who was the complainant, was not present. Hence the complaint was liable to be dismissed and the accused acquitted on that very day as provided by Sec. 247, Cr. P.C Nevertheless, the Magistrate for no ostensible reason, adjourned the hearing to 28-10-1964 for recording the statement of the accused without any application on his behalf for postponement of the case for recording his statement on some other date. On 28-10-1964 the complainant, District Magistrate, was again absent but the statement of the accused was recorded and he pleaded not guilty. Therefore, the case was directed to be listed on 11-11-1964 for production of prosecution evidence. On 11-11-1964 also the accused was present, but the complainant or the A.P.P was not present. No application was made by either of them for the adjournment of the case, nor did the accused make any such request. Yet for no rhyme or reason, the Magistrate chose to adjourn the case to 3-12-1964 for leading the prosecution evidence. When the case came up for hearing on 3-12-1964, the complainant (District Magistrate) was again absent though the A.P.P was present. However, he did not adduce any evidence on behalf of the prosecution, nor applied for the adjournment of the case. On the other hand, the accused made an application saying that the complainant had been absent on all the dates, hence the complaint be dismissed, as provided by Sec. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that application the accused had also quoted a Division Bench ruling of this Court in State v. Reva Chand 1960 A.L.J 884. However, the learned Magistrate instead of dismissing the complaint in the absence of the complainant as well as for want of prosecution evidence, dismissed the application of the accused by a curious order dated 3-12-1964 containing incorrect facts and adjourned the hearing to 21-12-1964 without any adequate reason. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Magistrate dated 3-12-1964 the accused went up in revision before the Sessions Judge. But the learned Sessions Judge, by a very cryptic order, dismissed the revision summarily, without considering the provisions of Sec. 247, Cr. P.C or the Division Bench case of Reva Chand which had also been quoted in the order of the trying Magistrate. Hence this revision by the accused.
2. In the first place the Magistrate had wrongly stated in his order that date (3-12-1964) was fixed for appearance of the accused. As a matter of fact the accused had already put in his appearance on 21-10-1964. He again attended the court on 28-10-1964 when his statement was recorded, then on 11-11-1964 when the case was adjourned without any reason whatsoever and lastly on 3-12-1964. But even if 3-12-1964 had been appointed for the appearance of the accused (which is not at all the case here) the Magistrate should have dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused, on the failure of the complainant to put in appearance.
3. In the second place the Magistrate misquoted the opening words of Sec. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when he stated “If the summons have been issued to the complainant, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained acquit the accused, unless for some reasons he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day.” I have italicised the words which have wrongly been quoted by the Magistrate. Sec. 247 does not at all provide for issue of summons or conveyance of information to the complainant regarding the date fixed in the case. Yet the trying Magistrate misreading the opening words of Sec. 247, thought it necessary to inform the complainant regarding the adjourned date because no information of today's hearing had been sent to the complainant and as such before further proceeding with this case I deem it proper to inform the District Magistrate, Allahabad to obtain necessary exemption from personal attendance and may authorise D.G.C (Criminal) or A.P.P whomsoever he desires to appear on his behalf in this case. Therefore, I think it proper to adjourn the hearing of this case on (to) December 21, 1964 and the District Magistrate, Allahabad, will be informed of this date. He can make an application through D.G.C (Criminal) or the A.P.P if he so desire. The application of the accused is rejected.”
4. It is noteworthy that the District Magistrate, who was the complainant, had not sought exemption from his personal attendance, and although under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C the Magistrate was entitled suo moto to dispense with the attendance of the complainant and proceed with the case, yet in this particular case the Magistrate did not consider it fit to do so. Acting as a court, the trial Magistrate had no business to advise the complainant District Magistrate to seek exemption from personal attendance and authorise the D.G.C (Criminal) or A.P.P whomever he considered proper to appear on his behalf. Justice should not only be done, but also appear to be done, according to law, irrespective of personalities. It is the duty of the complainant to prosecute his case deligently without being invited to do so.
5. As a complainant, the District Magistrate is not in any privileged position. In a summons case he has to be present on every date of hearing or else he must seek exemption from personal attendance from the court concerned. It is equally open to the trying Magistrate suo moto to exempt the attendance of the District Magistrate or any other public servant from attending his court in suitable cases. But in the instant case neither the District Magistrate sought exemption of his attendance nor did the trial Magistrate suo moto grant such exemption. Under the circumstances the trial court was bound to dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused, as there was no legal or appropriate reason to adjourn the case.
6. Before me the learned counsel for the State has relied upon the following observations of Mulla, J. in Lala Dhanpat Rai v. State A.I.R 1959 Alld. 425.:
“It cannot be denied that the District Magistrate Lucknow is not only a public servant but a very busy public servant. The Legislature never contemplated that the District Magistrate should dance attendance upon Courts of Magistrate, who are his subordinates, when prosecutions are launched under those offences which he alone under the law is entitled to prosecute. It would lead to absurd and ridiculous results if the absence of the District Magistrate is to be treated as the absence of the complainant within the meaning of Sec. 247, Cr. P.C”
7. The above case was pointedly dissented from by a Division Bench of this Court in State v. Reva Chand, which was cited before the trial Magistrate, but he conveniently omitted to consider the following observations of their Lordships:—
“With great respect to the learned single Judge, we are unable to agree that in cases where the District Magistrate was the complainant he could absent himself without the order of the Court dispensing with his attendance. It may be that in such cases the Magistrate will ordinarily dispense with his attendance, but an application should be made on his behalf by the public Prosecutor and upon the application being presented and then and only then he can remain absent.
When the District Magistrate goes as a complainant, he does not go as a superior of the Magistrate and, therefore, we do not think that his presence in Court can be termed as ‘dancing attendance upon the courts of Magistrate.’ It is either for the Legislature to amend the rule, so that in cases where the complainant is a public officer, he should not be present, or, in our view, he should have applied to the Court. We are unable to see how, when Sec. 247 is read, it can be said that the Legislature never intended the attendance of the District Magistrate complainant or any other public servant complainant.
Under these circumstances we think that, as in the present case, the attendance of the District Magistrate was not dispensed with, the Magistrate had only two alternatives left either to acquit the accused, or to adjourn for sufficient reason. It appeals that there had been no less than ten adjournments of the case on account of the default of the prosecution in producing the witnesses ……..”
8. Their Lordships had further emphasised the fact that the mere appearance of the Public Prosecutor would not be deemed to be the appearance of the District Magistrate or any other Public officer where he is a complainant.
9. In the instant case the District Magistrate (Complainant) had not cared to attend the Court of the trying Magistrate either on 21-10-1964, 28-10-1964, 11-11-1964 or 3-12-1964. On 11-11-1964 even the A.P.P was not present nor was the prosecution evidence ready nor was any application made for adjournment of the case. Similar was the position on 3-12-1964, except that the A.P.P was physically present, but neither the District Magistrate (complainant) had cared to attend the court nor was any prosecution evidence ready even on that date. In view of the fact that the trying Magistrate himself had not deemed it proper to exempt the attendance of the District Magistrate (complainant), the only course open for him was to dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C or else to adjourn the hearing for sufficient and adequate reason. Tendering of unsought for advice by the trying Magistrate to the District Magistrate, who was no better than any other complainant, to instruct the D.G.C or A.P.P to apply for his exemption and to adjourn the case just to convey this information to the District Magistrate could not be considered to be a legal or adequate reason for postponement of the case, within the meaning of Sec. 247, Cr. P.C By 3-12-1964 the accused had already appeared before the trying Magistrate on as many as four hearings, entailing expense, botheration and loss of business. The charge was of a petty nature where he was alleged to have removed some sillica sand on one single day i.e on 26-6-1964. Therefore the impugned order of the Magistrate was wholly unjustified and wrong.
10. The learned counsel for the State has drawn my attention to a single Judge decision of this Court in Prem Nath Khanna v. Chief Inspector Factories, Kanpur 1963 A.L.J 989. where it was laid down by Mr. Justice Misra that where a complainant had been filed by a particular public servant, “as required by law, but his role may be only of a formal nature and even though he signs the complaint he may know nothing personally about the facts of the case. His presence, therefore, on the hearings of the case is wholly unnecessary and would lead to waste of public time and money. In this class of cases the dismissal of the complaint and acquittal of the accused merely on the ground of non-appearance of the complainant would defect the very ends of justice. In order to avoid this unjust result the latter part of Sec. 247, Cr. P.C provides that the Magistrate instead of acquitting the accused may adjourn the case to another date for reason which he thinks proper. The proviso to the section vests in the Magistrate a still wider discretion that in proper cases where he thinks the presence of the complainant to be unnecessary, he may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. In Prem Nath Khanna's case the Magistrate had suo moto exempted (at least impliedly) the personal attendance of the complainant who was the Chief Inspector of Factories, U.P and had chosen to proceed with the case on merits. In the instant case the Magistrate did not consider it proper to exempt the attendance of the District Magistrate suo moto but only advised him to apply for the same through the D.G.C (Criminal) or the A.P.P In other words, the Magistrate had not considered the instant case to be one in which he should have himself taken the initiative to exempt the personal attendance of the complainant but was of the view that if and when an application for such exemption was filed on behalf of the complainant he would consider it on merits.
11. On revision the learned Sessions Judge summarily rejected the same erroneously as he thought “nothing perverse or illegal appears to have been done” although the order of the Magistrate bristles with illegalities and even perversity, inasmuch as it not only contains a wrong narration of fact but also misquotation of Sec. 247, Cr. P.C
12. In the result, I allow the revision, dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused under Sec. 247, Cr. P.C
Revision allowed.
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