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Allahabad Milling Company Private Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer Ii, Allahabad

Allahabad High Court
Aug 31, 1965
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a private limited company operating a flour mill that had been assessed to sales tax for the assessment year 1959-60. A notice under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was served on the petitioner on 28 March 1964 (the petitioner says 30 March 1964). The petitioner applied for inspection of records on 20 March 1965 but no order was passed because the Sales Tax Officer was out of station. On 6 June 1964 the petitioner received a notice requiring production of account books. On 30 June 1964 the petitioner's accountant appeared and raised a preliminary objection that the Section 21 notice was vague and did not disclose the material upon which the Sales Tax Officer had reason to believe turnover had escaped assessment.

The Special Investigation Branch (Sales Tax) was investigating the petitioner and, after various directions to produce account books, a hearing on 17 February 1965 saw production of the account books for the financial year 1959-60. The Sales Tax Officer issued further notice (enclosing detailed material pointing to discrepancies) requiring appearance in March 1965. The petitioner filed written objections on 15 March 1965, including that proceedings were time-barred, and was granted time to file written arguments (appointed 23 March 1965). The present petition for prohibition and certiorari was filed on 25 March 1965.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Sales Tax Officer had "reason to believe" within the meaning of Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act that the whole or part of the petitioner's turnover for the year 1959-60 had escaped assessment.
  2. Whether the Sales Tax Officer could legitimately rely on material and primary facts obtained and communicated by the Income-tax Officer (from examination of earlier accounting years) rather than having personally examined the petitioner's account books before issuing the Section 21 notice.
  3. Whether facts and discrepancies discovered in an earlier accounting year (1957) could reasonably form the basis for a belief that similar suppression had occurred in the subsequent accounting year (1958-59) relevant to assessment year 1959-60.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Sales Tax Officer had no material on which he could legitimately have reason to believe that turnover for 1959-60, or any part of it, had escaped assessment.
  • The information supplied by the Income-tax Officer was incomplete because the Income-tax investigation had not been completed and the Income-tax assessment order was not made until 30 January 1965; therefore no legitimate conclusion could be drawn from that information at the time the Section 21 notice was issued.
  • The Sales Tax Officer was not entitled to proceed solely on the basis of information received from the Income-tax Officer; he should himself have examined the account books and documents and formed his own inferences.
  • Matter found in respect of accounting year 1957 could not legitimately lead to a conclusion that the petitioner adopted the same practices during accounting year 1958-59 (assessment year 1959-60).

Respondent / Sales Tax Officer's Position

  • The Sales Tax Officer (by counter-affidavit) stated that the Income-tax Officer had, from examination of the petitioner's account books for the year 1957, found specific modes of suppression (discrepancies) which justified the belief that turnover had been suppressed.
  • Because the discrepancies showed a pattern of suppression in 1957, the Sales Tax Officer honestly believed the same mode of suppression would have been followed in subsequent years, including the accounting year 1958-59 relevant to assessment year 1959-60, and therefore issued the Section 21 notice.
  • The Sales Tax Officer relied on primary facts reported by the Income-tax Officer (seizure of books, specific mismatches and omissions, abnormal production ratios) as material sufficient to form a bona fide belief under Section 21.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Calcutta Discount Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1961] 41 I.T.R. 191 The expression "reason to believe" requires a bona fide belief based on reasons or material; it is not satisfied by mere suspicion. The assessing authority must have prima facie grounds for thinking there has been non-disclosure. The court applied this principle to hold that the Sales Tax Officer must have material inducing an honest belief that turnover escaped assessment and that mere suspicion would not suffice. The court referred to Calcutta Discount Co. in rejecting the view that the petitioner should be left only to an alternative statutory remedy.
A.N. Lakshmana Shenoy v. Income-tax Officer [1958] 34 I.T.R. 275 (S.C.) Material arising in an earlier or subsequent period may be relied upon to form a reason to believe that turnover/income for the year in question has escaped assessment. The court relied on this authority to hold that it was permissible for the Sales Tax Officer issuing a Section 21 notice to draw upon material from an earlier accounting year (1957) to form a reasonable belief about suppression in the subsequent accounting year 1958-59.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the legal standard under Section 21: before exercising jurisdiction an assessing authority must have "reason to believe" that turnover has escaped assessment. Drawing on authorities in income-tax law (notably Calcutta Discount Co.), the court reiterated that such belief must be bona fide, honest, and founded on material — not on mere suspicion.

The court examined the material on which the Sales Tax Officer issued the Section 21 notice. On 26 March 1964 the Sales Tax Officer (Special Investigation Branch) was informed that the Income-tax Department had seized and impounded the petitioner's account books for 1957–1959 and that, from examination of the 1957 books, the Income-tax Officer had identified specific discrepancies:

  • Dealer's stock of pledges with the bank did not tally with stocks shown in production and issue registers; entries did not tally with delivery memos; for certain sales no delivery memos were issued.
  • Some goods transported by a particular transport company were not incorporated in the dealer's account books.
  • The production ratio of bran was high, suggesting understatement of taxable wheat products (atta, maida, suji).

The Sales Tax Officer, in his counter-affidavit, stated that these discrepancies demonstrated a "tax evading tendency" in 1957 and that he honestly believed the same mode of suppression had likely been followed in subsequent years. The court treated the discrepancies as primary facts gleaned directly from account books and connected material and held that such primary facts could be used by the Sales Tax Officer to draw his own inferences even if the Sales Tax Officer had not personally examined the account books.

Addressing the petitioner's contention that the Income-tax inquiry was incomplete and that the Sales Tax Officer should have awaited the final assessment, the court held that it was not necessary for the Sales Tax Officer to await the conclusion of the Income-tax proceedings or the formal assessment order before acting upon material supplied by the Income-tax Officer. The court observed that all that was required for issuing a Section 21 notice was an honest belief based on material; the completeness or quantum of that material was not open to challenge at that stage.

On whether facts from accounting year 1957 could form the basis for belief about accounting year 1958-59, the court reasoned that the reported discrepancies showed a pattern of activity throughout 1957 designed to suppress sales. Those activities were not confined to transactions unique to 1957 and could reasonably be presumed to have continued into the immediately succeeding year. Because the 1957 facts were proximate in time to the accounting year in question and demonstrated an ongoing pattern, the court found it reasonable for the Sales Tax Officer to infer continuation and therefore to believe that turnover for 1959-60 had, in part, escaped assessment.

The court also noted authority (A.N. Lakshmana Shenoy) supporting the proposition that material from earlier or later periods may legitimately be relied upon when forming a reason to believe for issuing a notice under the relevant assessment provision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court held that the Sales Tax Officer did have reason to believe, based on material disclosed by the Income-tax Officer (primary facts and identified discrepancies), that a part of the petitioner's turnover for the assessment year 1959-60 had escaped assessment. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Section 21 proceedings against the petitioner may continue; the court found no defect in issuing the notice on the material available to the Sales Tax Officer and rejected the petitioner's challenge. The opinion applies existing principles (as cited) to these facts and does not state that it establishes a new legal principle beyond the application of those authorities.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner challenges the legality of proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which are being taken against him for the assessment year 1959-60.

2. The petitioner, which is a private limited company carrying on business as a flour mill, was assessed to sales tax on the turnover of the assessment year 1959-60.

3. Subsequently a notice under Section 21 of the Act was served on the petitioner on 28th March, 1964 (although the petitioner says the service was effected on 30th March, 1964). The petitioner applied for inspection of the records on 20th March, 1965, but as the Sales Tax Officer was out of station no order was passed on the application. On 6th June, 1964, the petitioner received a notice requiring it to produce the relevant account books. On 30th June, 1964, the Accountant of the petitioner appeared before the Sales Tax Officer and raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the notice under Section 21 was vague and did not disclose the material upon which the Sales Tax Officer had reason to believe that any part of the turnover had escaped assessment. According to the counter-affidavit, the material upon which the notice under Section 21 had been issued was disclosed to the Accountant. It appears that the Sales Tax Officer of the Special Investigation Branch, Varanasi, was meanwhile engaged in investigating the affairs of the petitioner for the purposes of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and from time to time directed the petitioner to appear with its account books. One such hearing took place on 17th February, 1965, when the account books for the financial year 1959-60 were produced. The Sales Tax Officer, who had issued the notice under Section 21, served a notice upon the petitioner requiring it to appear on nth March, 1965, before him and with the notice enclosed detailed material pointing to certain discrepancies in the accounts maintained by the petitioner. The petitioner appeared on nth March, 1965, and subsequently filed a written objection on 15th March, 1965, contending that the proceedings were barred by limitation. Various other objections were taken. Upon a request in this behalf by the petitioner, the Sales Tax Officer appointed 23rd March, 1965, for the filing of written arguments. Then on 25th March, 1965, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari was filed.

4. The only ground raised by the petitioner before me is that the Sales Tax Officer had no material upon which he could have reason to believe that the turnover of the petitioner, or any part of it, had escaped assessment for the year 1960-61.

5. Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act reads:

If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer has, for any reason, escaped assessment to tax for any year, the assessing authority may, after issuing notice to the dealer, and making such enquiry as may be necessary, assess or reassess him to tax....

6. Before the assessing authority can exercise his jurisdiction under Section 21, he must have reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of the dealer has escaped assessment to tax. Incases under the Income-tax Act, it is well-settled that when an Income-tax Officer initiates proceedings for the assessment of escaped income on the basis that he has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, he must have material in his possession on the basis of which he comes to that belief. He cannot proceed from mere suspicion. He must bana fide and honestly believe that income has escaped assessment, and the belief must be based upon reasons. He must have, as Das Gupta, J., observed, delivering the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1961] 41 I.T.R.191, some prima facie grounds for thinking that there had been some non-disclosure of material facts.

7. And employing the language of Shah, J., in the same case Ibid. 382:

The expression ' reason to believe ' postulates belief and the existence of reasons for that belief. The belief must be held in good faith: it cannot be merely a pretence.... The expression therefore predicates that the Income-tax Officer holds the belief induced by the existence of reasons for holding such belief. It contemplates existence of reasons on which the belief is founded, and not merely a belief in the existence of reasons inducing the belief.... Such a belief, be it said, may not be based on mere suspicion: it must be founded upon information.

8. The reasons must be such as can lead to that belief, though they may not in themselves be sufficient ultimately to form the basis of an assessment. It may also be that during the course of the assessment proceedings the reasons may be found to proceed from facts which turn out to be incorrect. What is essential is that the assessing authority must have material on the basis of which it bona fide and honestly believes that income has escaped assessment. These considerations, which apply to the law of income-tax, apply equally to proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.

9. What is the material upon which the Sales Tax Officer issued notice under Section 21? On 26th March, 1964, the Sales Tax Officer of the Special Investigation Branch wrote informing him that the account books of the petitioner for the years 1957, 1958 and 1959 along with the challans had been seized and impounded by the Income-tax Department and the case was being investigated by the Special Investigation Circle, Kanpur. He further reported that the Income-tax Officer had, from an examination of the account books for the year 1957, which related to the assessment year 1958-59, found that sales had been suppressed by the petitioner by the adoption of the following methods.

(1) Dealer's stock of pledges with the bank did not tally with the stocks shown in the production and issue register. The entries also did not tally with the delivery memos and for certain sales no delivery memos were issued.

(2) Some goods sold by the dealer and transported by M/s. Bharat Transport Co., were not found incorporated in the dealer's account books and thus the turnover was suppressed.

(3) The production ratio of bran, as shown by the dealer was found to be high, thus the production of costly and taxable wheat products like atta, maida and suji was understated.

10. The Sales Tax Officer, in paragraph 10 of his counter-affidavit,, states:

In view of the afore-mentioned modes of suppression of turnover practised by the petitioner in the accounting year 1957 and his tax evading tendency in the said year, the deponent honestly believed that the same mode of suppressing the turnover must have been followed by the petitioner in the subsequent years also and in these circumstances the deponent had reasons to believe that a part of the turnover of dealer had escaped assessment for the year 1959-60. Consequently the deponent issued the notice under Section 21 to the petitioner.

11. The contention of the petitioner is that the Income-tax Officer had not completed his investigation, and in fact the assessment order was not made by him until 30th January, 1965, and, therefore, the information conveyed by him to the Sales Tax Officer of the Special Investigation Branch was incomplete and no conclusion could legitimately be reached from that information. It is urged moreover that the Sales Tax Officer, who issued the notice under Section 21, was not entitled to proceed on the basis of the information received by the Income-tax Officer, and that he could have reason to believe that turnover had escaped assessment only if he had himself examined the account books and other documents and deduced the inferences which the Income-tax Officer had come to. Finally, it is submitted that whatever may have been found in respect of the accounting year 1957, that could not lead to the conclusion that the petitioner had adopted the same practices during the accounting period 1958-59 pertaining to the assessment year 1959-60.

12. It seems to me that it was not necessary for the Sales Tax Officer to await the final conclusion of the assessment proceedings taken by the Income-tax Officer. The petitioner has not indicated what was the stage at which the assessment proceedings stood. If the Income-tax Officer had completed the examination of the books and of the other material before him, there is no reason why the Sales Tax Officer should have waited to employ the information supplied by the Income-tax Officer until the latter had made the assessment order. Moreover, all that the Sales Tax Officer needed to have was an honest belief upon material before him that the turnover had escaped assessment; the quantum or completeness of that material cannot be agitated here.

13. The Income-tax Officer pointed to certain discrepancies existing in the books of the petitioner. Those discrepancies relate to the realm of pure fact. That the petitioner's stock of pledges with the bank did not tally with the stocks shown in the production and issue register, that the entries did not tally with the delivery memos, that for certain sales no delivery memos were issued, that goods sold by the dealer and transported by M/s. Bharat Transport Co. were not incorporated in the account books, that the production ratio of bran was high, all these are primary facts. They are facts gleaned directly from a perusal of the relevant account books and connected material. What inference can be drawn from these facts is another matter.

14. The facts, being primary facts, could be employed by the Sales Tax Officer for drawing his own conclusions, even though he had not looked into the account books himself.

15. The facts disclosed by the Income-tax Officer related to the accounting year 1957, and the question is whether they could form the basis for the Sales Tax Officer believing that what had been done in that year could also have been done in the year 1958-59. It appears clearly from the facts reported by the Income-tax Officer that a pattern of activity was followed throughout the accounting year 1957 designed for suppressing the sales effected by the petitioner. That pattern was not isolated to particular transactions or classes of transactions which could be confined in their nature and character to the year 1957. The suppression of the turnover from the account books of the petitioner did not relate to transactions, the character and nature of which pertained to that year alone. The activities in which the petitioner was engaged in the year 1957 were not such as could not be continued in the year following it. It must not be forgotten that the facts which had come to light related to a period almost immediately preceding the accounting year 1958-59. The Sales Tax Officer could legitimately presume upon these considerations that the pattern of activities followed by the petitioner, and which was intended for its benefit, would have been continued by it in the year 1958. It is not as if the pattern of activity pertained to a much earlier period far removed from the accounting year 1958-59. In the course of human conduct and having regard to the motives which dominate it, it could be reasonably presumed that the petitioner had continued this pattern of activity. This is probably what the Sales Tax Officer intended to mean when he referred to the petitioner's "tax evading tendency" in the said year. There was thus, in my opinion, good ground for the Sales Tax Officer honestly and reasonably believing that the mode of suppressing the turnover adopted for the year 1957 had been followed by the petitioner in the subsequent year and, therefore, that a part of the turnover liable to assessment for the year 1959-60 had escaped.

16. It may be emphasised that it was not necessary that the Sales Tax Officer should have before him material referring to transactions for the accounting year 1957-58 in order that he may come to the belief that turnover of that year has escaped assessment. That is a consideration which is relevant when he actually proceeds to make the assessment for that year. The notice under Section 21 is issued at a time when he is merely required to have reason to believe that turnover has escaped assessment, and for that, I think, it is possible for him to rely upon material arising in an earlier or subsequent period. See A.N. Lakshmana Shenoy v. Income-tax Officer [1958] 34 I.T.R. 275 (S.C.). Whether that material can legitimately form the basis for so believing must depend upon the nature of the material in its relationship to the belief that the dealer in the accounting year in question has suppressed his turnover.

17. In this view of the matter, I am unable to hold that the Sales Tax Officer had no reason to believe, when he issued the notice under Section 21, that a part of the petitioner's turnover had escaped assessment.

18. On behalf of the respondents it was urged that upon the facts of this case the petitioner should be left to its alternative remedy under the statute and that this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction. But this consideration must be rejected in view of what the Supreme Court said in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. [1931] 41 I.T.R. 191 (S.C.).

19. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs.