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Har Prasad v. Hans Ram
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
On 3 April 1961 the applicant filed a private complaint before a Magistrate First Class at Meerut alleging that he was the Bhumidhar of plots Nos. 836, 837 and 821 in village Shafiabad and that the opposite parties, pursuant to a conspiracy, procured a fictitious sale-deed executed and registered in favour of opposite party No. 1 on 9 January 1961 for an alleged consideration of Rs. 2,000. On the basis of that deed opposite party No. 2 filed an application for mutation of the plots before the Tahsildar, Hapur. The complaint alleged offences under Sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
The learned Magistrate concluded that the alleged offences were committed in relation to a proceeding before the Tahsildar and held the complaint to be barred by Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), dismissing the complaint without framing charges. The applicant's revision to the Sessions Judge was dismissed. The applicant petitioned in revision to the court whose opinion is summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Tahsildar dealing with mutation proceedings is a "revenue court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the CrPC for the purposes of barring private complaints.
- Whether the offence of forgery, having been completed when the fictitious sale-deed was executed and registered before the mutation proceedings, is nonetheless an offence "in relation to" or "in respect of" a proceeding so as to attract the bar in Section 195(1)(b) and/or Section 195(1)(c) of the CrPC.
- Whether the bar under Section 195 applies to persons who were not parties to the mutation proceeding (i.e., whether opposite parties not impleaded in the mutation proceeding are nevertheless precluded from being proceeded against on a private complaint).
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's (Revisionist's) Arguments
- Counsel for the applicant argued that a Tahsildar dealing with a mutation case is not a revenue court within the meaning of Section 195 of the CrPC, and therefore the bar in Section 195 should not apply.
- It was submitted that the offence of forgery was complete when the fictitious sale-deed was executed and registered; consequently the later filing of an application for mutation before the Tahsildar should not render the complaint barred under Section 195.
- Counsel further contended that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were not parties to the mutation proceedings, and therefore the courts below were not correct in holding the complaint barred as regards them. Reliance was placed on Nirman Singh v. Rudra Partap Narain Singh (AIR 1926 PC 100).
Opposite Parties / Respondents
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the opposite parties' legal arguments in response; the record as summarized focuses on the applicant's contentions and the court's analysis.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nirman Singh v. Rudra Partap Narain Singh, AIR 1926 PC 100 | Held that mutation proceedings are more in the nature of fiscal inquiries and not judicial proceedings deciding title; observations indicated mutation proceedings do not finally determine proprietary rights. | The court noted the Privy Council's observations but held they were not deciding the specific question whether a Tahsildar is a revenue court. The court concluded the Nirman Singh observations do not constitute authority that a Tahsildar is not a revenue court under Section 195. |
| Badri v. State, 1963 All LJ 334 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 64) | Explains the purpose of Section 476 CrPC — that if a court has not obtained possession of necessary facts in proceedings, an application may be made to it for enquiry and to make a complaint. | The court relied on this decision to explain that where a mutation case is dismissed summarily and the Tahsildar has not obtained necessary facts, the aggrieved party may bring those facts to the Tahsildar's attention by filing an application under Section 476 rather than initiating a private complaint that circumvents the revenue court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court approached the contested questions in a sequence of legal determinations grounded on statutory provisions and precedent as cited in the record:
-
Nature of mutation proceedings and status of Tahsildar:
- The court considered the Privy Council's characterisation of mutation proceedings as fiscal inquiries but observed that those remarks did not decide the precise question whether a Tahsildar is a "revenue court" for the purposes of Section 195 CrPC.
- It turned to the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901. Section 4(8) expressly defines "Revenue Court" to include Tahsildars. Sections 5 and 234, and a State Government notification classifying mutation proceedings as judicial under the rule-making power, were relied upon to establish that a Tahsildar conducting mutation proceedings forms part of the hierarchy of revenue courts envisaged by Section 195 CrPC.
- The court held that even where an application for mutation had been dismissed without recording evidence, the intrinsic nature of the proceedings did not change; the Tahsildar remained a link in the revenue courts chain under Section 195.
-
Availability of alternate remedy under Section 476 CrPC:
- Relying on Badri v. State, the court explained that Section 476 allows a party to bring facts to the attention of the court (here, the Tahsildar) and request it to make a complaint where the court has not obtained necessary facts in the proceeding itself — for example where the mutation was dismissed summarily.
-
Operation of Section 195(1)(b):
- The court interpreted Section 195(1)(b) as requiring only that there be some relationship between the offence alleged and the proceeding; the phrase “in relation to” does not require the offence to be committed after the commencement of the proceeding — an offence committed earlier may still be “in relation to” the proceeding if the proceeding was undertaken as a consequence of that offence.
- On the facts alleged, the court found a close nexus: the conspiracy among the three opposite parties led to the fabrication and registration of a forged sale-deed on 9 January 1961, and on the same date one of them filed an application for mutation on the basis of that forged document. Those acts formed “various links of the same chain.”
- The court concluded the forged sale-deed was fabricated as false evidence intended for use in a judicial proceeding; therefore the alleged offence was committed in relation to a proceeding in a court, attracting the bar on private complaints under Section 195(1)(b).
-
Operation of Section 195(1)(c) and its scope:
- The court further addressed Section 195(1)(c), which bars cognizance of offences described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, 475 or 476 IPC when alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint of the court concerned.
- The court read the words “in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding” broadly, holding that they include documents prepared before the proceeding started but later produced or used as evidence. Thus, even if the forgery pre-dated the mutation proceeding, the offence could be within the scope of Section 195(1)(c) when the document is relied upon in the proceeding.
- On this basis the court held that the bar under Section 195(1)(c) also applied in the present case, and that the fact that two opposite parties were not impleaded in the mutation proceeding did not prevent the bar from operating.
-
Purpose of Section 195:
- The court emphasized the salutary purpose of Section 195 — to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to prevent a private complainant from pre-empting the court before which a document has been produced from deciding on the genuineness of that document. Allowing private complaints in such circumstances could lead to contradictory findings and anomalous results.
-
Conclusion on correctness of lower courts:
- Having applied the statutory definitions, the legislative scheme of the Land Revenue Act, and the tests articulated in precedent, the court concluded that the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge were correct in holding the complaint barred by Section 195 of the CrPC.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Revision dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The courts below were affirmed — the private complaint alleging forgery and conspiracy in respect of the sale-deed and subsequent mutation application is barred from cognizance under Section 195(1) of the CrPC. The revision seeking to overturn that conclusion was dismissed.
- Practical consequence for the parties: The applicant cannot proceed by a private complaint in respect of the alleged forgery and must, if necessary, seek redress by invoking the appropriate procedures before the revenue court (for example by applying under Section 476 CrPC to the Tahsildar to make a complaint) or allow the revenue court to determine the issue when the document is produced/given in evidence.
- On precedent/new law: The opinion applies existing statutory definitions and precedent to the facts; it upholds a construction of Section 195 that includes documents fabricated before proceedings but later produced as evidence. The opinion does not indicate the setting of a novel binding precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts of this case.
Result: The finding of the courts below that the complaint was barred by Section 195 of the CrPC is sustained and the revision is dismissed.
1. On the 3rd of April, 1961 applicant filed a complaint before a Magistrate First Class at Meerut on the allegations that he was the Bhumidhar of plots Nos. 836, 837 and 821 of village Shafiabad, that in pursuance of a conspiracy amongst themselves, the opposite parties with a view to cause loss to the applicant got a fictitious sale-deed in respect of the aforesaid plots executed and registered in favour of opposite party No. 1 on 9th January, 1961 for alleged consideration of Rs. 2000/- and on the basis of that forged deed opposite party No. 2 moved an application for mutation of plots before the Tahsildar Hapur and thereby they had all committed offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C
2. The learned Magistrate was of opinion that as the allegations made in the complaint indicated that the alleged offences were committed in relation to a proceeding before the court of the Tahsildar, the complaint was barred by Section 195 of the Cr PC. He, therefore, dismissed it without framing any charge against the accused. The applicant came up in revision against that order before the learned Sessions Judge but it was dismissed. Hence this revision. Learned counsel for the applicant has several contentions in support of this revision. He has argued that a Tahsildar dealing with a mutation case is not a revenue court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code and that as the offence of forgery was complete when a fictitious sale-deed was executed and registered, the subsequent filing of an application by one of the opposite parties on its basis for mutation before the Tahsildar should not have influenced the courts below for holding that the complaint was barred under Section 195 of the Code.
3. Learned counsel has further argued that in any case as opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were not parties to the mutation proceedings, the order of the courts below holding the complaint barred against them also under Section 195 of the Cr PC is not sustainable. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Nirman Singh v. Rudra Partap Narain Singh, reported in AIR 1926 PC 100. I, however, find no force in these contentions.
4. In the case referred to by the learned counsel it was held by the Privy Council that mutation proceedings
“are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid.”
and that it was an error to suppose that such proceedings are “judicial proceedings in which the title to and the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined.”
5. These observations no doubt indicate that a Tahsildar dealing with mutation proceedings may not be a court, but that was not a question in issue before their Lordships and the observations were made only to emphasize the fact that mutation proceedings do not decide the rights of the parties finally. This case, in my opinion, is not an authority for the proposition that the Tahsildar is not a revenue court.
6. Revenue laws and the courts which administer them are mostly the creatures of the administer State Legislatures. Section 4, Sub-clause (8) of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901 reads:
“(8) “Revenue Court” means all or any of the following authorities (that is to say), the Board and all members thereof, Commissioner, Additional Commissioners, Collectors, Additional Collectors, Assistant Collectors. Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers. Record Officers and Assistant Record Officers and Tahsildars”;
7. Section 5 of the aforesaid Act provides that the control of all non-judicial matters concreted with the land revenue is vested in the State Government and the control of all judicial matters is vested in the Board. The orders passed by a Tahsildar in mutation proceedings can be agitated against before the Board. Section 234 of the Act gives power to the State Government and the Board to make rules prescribing the duties of a Tahsildar, defining classes of cases, matters, businesses, orders or proceedings which are to be deemed judicial or non-judicial respectively. In exercise of this power the State Government has issued a notification defining the mutation proceedings as judicial. In view of these provisions in the Land Revenue Act and also because the Tahsildar dealing with a mutation proceeding decides a lis by a definitive judgment on the basis of evidence recorded in accordance with the Evidence Act there can be no doubt that he is a link in the hierarchy of revenue courts as envisaged under Section 195 of the Cr PC.
8. In the instant case it is no doubt true that the application for mutation was dismissed without recording any evidence, on the application of the opposite party but that will not change the nature of the proceedings.
9. In the case of Badri v. State, 1963 All LJ 334 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 64) it was observed:
“It is because the court may not be in possession of all the facts on the basis of which it can decide whether to make a complaint or not that there is a provision in Section 476 of the Code for an application being made to it and for its making an enquiry into the offence alleged to have been committed in relation to the proceeding held by it. If the court has not obtained possession of the necessary facts in the proceedings itself it is open to the applicant bring those facts to its notice and invite it to make a complaint.”
Therefore, if on account of the application filed by the opposite party the mutation case was dismissed summarily and the court of the Tahsildar “has not obtained possession of the necessary facts in the proceeding itself” it was open to the applicant to bring those facts to its notice and to invite it to make a complaint by filing an application under Section 476 of the Code.
10. The contention raised by the learned counsel that the offence of forgery was complete before the document was filed in court and, therefore, the bar of Section 195(1)(b) was not available is also covered by the Division Bench decision of this Court referred to above in which it was observed:
“Section 195(1)(b) simply requires that there should be some relationship between the offence alleged to have been committed and the proceeding: no particular kind of relationship is required. The words “in relation to” do not mean that the offence must have been committed after the proceeding had started. Even if the offence was committed prior to the proceeding it can be said to be in relation to the proceeding if the proceeding was undertaken in consequence of it.
11. In the present case, the allegations made in the complaint are that the forged sale-deed was got executed and registered in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy between the opposite parties on 9-1-1961 and on the same date one of them filed an application for the mutation of the plots on the basis of the aforesaid forged document before the Tahsildar, There can be no doubt, therefore, that on the allegations made in the complaint a close nexus is established between the conspiracy amongst the three opposite parties, its resulting in a forged sale-deed and the subsequent filing of the mutation application on its basis, all of which form various links of the same chain. It must, therefore, be held that the alleged fictitious sale-deed was fabricated as false evidence for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding I and the offence being committed in relation to any proceeding in any court, its cognizance was barred on a private complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code.
12. Even if it is held that the allegations made in the complaint disclose offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C as alleged therein and not under Section 193 I.P.C, their cognizance on a private complaint will be barred if not under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code, as has been held by the courts below, then under Sub-section (c) of the same section. Section 195(1)(c) reads:
“(1) No Court shall take cognizance—
(c) of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such court, or of some other court to which such Court is subordinate.”
13. It will be noticed that the words used in this Sub-section are “in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding……………” which indicate that the intention of the legislature was not to circumscribe the offences described in it only when they are committed when the proceedings are pending in court but also to include them within the ambit of the section, even if they had been committed anterior to it and the fruit of that offence has been relied upon in those proceedings.
14. In other words, the words “in respect of” are wide enough to include even a document which was prepared before the proceedings started in a court of law but was produced or given in evidence in that proceeding. In this view of the matter, I am of opinion that although the document in question was fabricated before the proceedings started in court and although two of the opposite parties were not impleaded in the mutation proceeding before the Tahsildar, it must be held that the cognizance of the offence was barred by Section 195(1)(c) of the Code.
15. The salutary provision of Section 195 of the Cr PC has been engrafted with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. When a document is produced in a court or is given in evidence, it is for that court decide whether it is genuine or forged. If a private party is allowed to lodge a complaint on the basis of that document describing it as a forged document and if that complaint is entertained without affording an opportunity to the court before whom the document had been produced to give its opinion, it will amount to forestalling its decision and is likely to lead to anomalous situation and also sometimes to contradictory findings by two competent courts.
16. I am satisfied that the finding arrived at by the courts below are correct, and this revision has no force. It is, therefore dismissed.
II/HGP/R.G.D
17. Revision dismissed.
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