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Batti Kunwar v. Chunni Lal Shukla

Allahabad High Court
Jan 6, 1964
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Concise, Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicants are members of the family of the late Lakshmi Narain: Smt. Batti Kunwar (widow) and two sons, Munna Lal and Kamal Krishna. The opposite parties include another son of Lakshmi Narain, Chunni Lal, and Chunni Lal's sons, Rajendra Prasad and Surendra Kumar.

The factual narrative put forward by the applicants is that Lakshmi Narain established a Pan-ka-Masala business (under the style "Badshah Pasand Pan Ka Masala") at Kanpur in 1912 and obtained three trade mark registrations: a device of Lord Ganesh (registered in 1950 and renewed in 1957), the words "Badshah Pasand" with the device (registered in 1951), and a label bearing his photograph and the words "Badshah Pasand Karyalaya, Morhatoli, Kanpur" (registered in 1955). Lakshmi Narain was said to be the absolute owner of those three trade marks until his death on 22-3-1959.

Applicants allege that shortly after the death of Lakshmi Narain, the opposite parties procured a document (described by applicants as fraudulently obtained) that led to an application for substitution of names as Lakshmi Narain's heirs being presented to the Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi. As a result, the opposite parties' names were recorded in the Register of Trade Marks as legal representatives of the deceased. The applicants claim the opposite parties had no concern with the trade marks and thus seek expunging the opposite parties' names from the Register and cancellation of an alleged deed of partnership dated 23-3-1959.

The opposite parties filed a written statement raising a preliminary objection that the Court before which the application was filed has no jurisdiction to try the matter. The Court addressed the jurisdictional preliminary issue under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and ultimately dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Which High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, where applicants seek rectification/expunging of entries in the Register of Trade Marks?
  2. Whether clause (a) of Section 3 of the 1958 Act, which determines the High Court having jurisdiction "in relation to a trade mark on the Register of Trade Marks at the commencement of this Act," applies to applications under Section 56(2) as well as Section 56(1).
  3. Whether the phrase "appellate jurisdiction" in Section 3 limits the meaning of "High Court having jurisdiction" to only those High Courts with appeal jurisdiction under Section 109, or whether Section 3 is broader and determines original as well as appellate jurisdiction under the Act.
  4. Whether Section 3 of the 1958 Act is valid insofar as it confers jurisdiction on the Punjab High Court to dispose of cases arising from the Kanpur district (i.e., whether jurisdiction can be conferred on the Punjab High Court given the situs of the Trade Marks Registry office and the locus of the cause of action).
  5. Factually, whether the Trade Marks Registry office relevant to these trade marks (Assistant Registrar, New Delhi / Okhla Industrial Estate) lies within the territorial limits and appellate jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court or within the territorial limits of Uttar Pradesh.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Gopi Nath Kunzru)

  • Clause (a) of Section 3 should govern cases under Section 56(1) but does not govern cases falling under Section 56(2) (i.e., contended that S.3 clause (a) might not apply to the present S.56(2) application).
  • The expression "appellate jurisdiction" in Section 3 should be read to refer to Section 109 (appeals) of the Act, implying a narrower meaning of which High Court is to be treated as having jurisdiction.
  • Suggested that the registry office in question (Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks, Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi-20) is actually situate within Uttar Pradesh (implying the present Court has jurisdiction).
  • Contended that Section 3 of the Act is invalid insofar as it purports to confer on the Punjab High Court jurisdiction to dispose of cases from district Kanpur.

Opposite Parties' Arguments and Evidence

  • Opposite parties raised a preliminary objection that the Court before which the application was filed lacks jurisdiction to try the suit.
  • They disputed the applicants' contention regarding the situs of the registry office (i.e., disputed that the office is within Uttar Pradesh).
  • Chunni Lal (opposite party No. 1) filed an affidavit attaching a letter from the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks (Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi-20) stating that the office of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi-20, is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chamundeeswari Weaving and Trading Co. (Pte.) Ltd. v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 Mad 214 Held (under the Trade Marks Act, 1940) that an application for rectification of the Trade Marks Register can be filed either in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Trade Marks Register is situate or in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the owner of the marks resides or carries on business. The Court noted the decision but held it to be of little assistance in disposing of the question of jurisdiction under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (Act No. XLIII of 1958).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined statutory definitions and provisions relevant to jurisdiction. Clause (h) of Section 2 defines "High Court" as the High Court having jurisdiction under Section 3. Section 3 prescribes which High Court shall have jurisdiction for matters under the Act and uses the expression "the High Court within the limits of whose appellate jurisdiction the office of the Trade Marks Registry ... is situate," with clause (a) addressing trade marks on the Register at the commencement of the Act.

The Court identified the applicants' relief as falling under Section 56(2) (rectification/expunging of entries in the Register) because the applicants alleged that the opposite parties' names had been wrongly recorded. The Court rejected the applicants' counsel's contention that clause (a) of Section 3 governs only subsection (1) of Section 56 and not subsection (2), reasoning that the language "in relation to a trade mark" covers an application under Section 56(2) because it is, in substance, a case in relation to a trade mark.

Regarding the suggestion that the phrase "appellate jurisdiction" in Section 3 should be read narrowly to refer only to Section 109 appeals, the Court held that the opening words of Section 3 are wider. Section 3 is meant to determine the High Court having jurisdiction in matters under the Act generally and thus governs not only appeals under Section 109 but also original applications under Section 56.

The Court then examined the situs of the Trade Marks Registry offices. It noted the statutory location of the head office at Bombay and a branch office at New Delhi (per the Rules). The applicants had caused notice to be issued to the Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi; thus the district of Kanpur fell within the territorial limits of the Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks, New Delhi. The Court needed to ascertain whether the New Delhi office lay within the appellate jurisdiction of the present Court or another High Court.

When the applicants suggested the New Delhi office was situate in Uttar Pradesh, that was disputed by the opposite parties. The Court allowed affidavits; no affidavit was filed by the applicants, and the opposite parties produced an affidavit with a letter from the Assistant Registrar (Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi-20) stating that the office is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court. The Court observed it is well known that the jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court had been extended to the Union Territory of Delhi, and concluded from the address "New Delhi-20" and the Assistant Registrar's letter that the office is located at New Delhi and does not lie within Uttar Pradesh.

The Court considered the cited Madras decision (Chamundeeswari) but found it of little assistance because that decision was under the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and the instant question involved interpretation of the 1958 Act's Section 3.

The applicants' contention that Section 3 is invalid insofar as it confers jurisdiction on the Punjab High Court to deal with cases from Kanpur was considered. The Court noted that the principal relief sought by the applicants was amendment of the Register maintained at New Delhi and thus the cause of action partly arose at New Delhi. Because the cause of action partly arose at New Delhi, the Court found no objection to conferring jurisdiction on the Punjab High Court, which has original and appellate jurisdiction at Delhi. Consequently, the Court upheld Section 3 as valid in the present application.

On the basis that the relevant Trade Marks Registry office at New Delhi falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court, and that the applicants' cause of action partly arose at New Delhi, the Court concluded that under Section 3 of the 1958 Act the Punjab High Court has jurisdiction to deal with the application under Section 56. Therefore, the Court held that the present Court has no jurisdiction to dispose of the application.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The application under Section 56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, as before this Court, is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. The opinion expressly states that the present Court has no jurisdiction and dismisses the application with costs.

Implications:

  • The immediate and direct effect is that the applicants' Section 56 application cannot be heard by this Court; jurisdiction to hear the application lies with the Punjab High Court because the relevant Trade Marks Registry office at New Delhi falls within its appellate jurisdiction and the cause of action partly arose at New Delhi.
  • The Court upheld the validity of Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 as applied to these facts (i.e., it found no basis to declare Section 3 invalid insofar as it confers jurisdiction on the Punjab High Court in matters where the cause of action partly arises at New Delhi).
  • No broader precedent or novel legal rule beyond the statutory interpretation and application to the specific facts was announced; the Court limited its pronouncements to the facts and statutory construction before it. (The opinion does not state that it is setting a new precedent beyond its holding on jurisdiction in this case.)

Disposition: "This application under Section 56 of Act No. XLIII of 1958 is dismissed with costs." (Final line in the opinion: "Application dismissed.")

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application under Section 56 of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (Act No. XLIII of 1958 hereafter referred to as the Act). Parties are related to one another. Smt. Batti Kunwar, applicant No. 1 is the widow of one Lakshmi Narain. Munna Lal and Kamal Krishna, applicants Nos. 2 and 3 are two sons of Lakshmi Narain deceased. Chunni Lal, opposite party No. 1 is another son of Lakshmi Narain deceased. Rajendra Prasad and Surendra Kumar, opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are sons of Chunni Lal opposite party No. 1.

2. The applicants' case is that in the year 1912 Lakshmi Narain established a business of manufacturing and selling Pan-ka-Masala in the name and style of “Badshah Pasand Pan Ka Masala” The business was carried on at Kanpur. In 1950 Lakshmi Narain got the device of Lord Ganesh with other representation registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. That Trade mark was later renewed in the year 1957. In 1951 Lakshmi Narain got the words “Badshah Pasand” with the device of Lord Ganesh registered under another trade mark. Thirdly, in the year 1955, Lakshmi Narain got the label bearing his photograph and the words “Badshah Pasand Karyalaya, Morhatoli, Kanpur” registered. Lakshmi Narain was the absolute owner of all the three trade marks. Chunni Lal, opposite party No. 1, separated, himself from his father Lakshmi Narain in the year 1932. Lakshmi Narain lived jointly with his two sons, Munna Lal and Kamal Krishna. Lakshmi Narain remained the owner of the business all along. He died on 22-3-1959. Soon after Lakshmi Narain's death, the opposite parties prevailed upon, the applicants to enter into a so-called agreement. That document was fraudulently obtained. On the strengh of that document, an application for substitution of names as Lakshmi Narain's heirs was presented to the Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi. Names of the opposite parties were recorded in the Register of Trade Marks as legal representatives of Lakshmi Narain deceased. As a matter of fact, opposite parties have no concern with the three trade marks obtained of Lakshmi Narain. The applicants have, therefore, prayed that names of the three opposite parties be expunged from the Register of Trade Marks in respect of the three trade marks in question. There is also a prayer for cancellation of the alleged deed of partnership, dated 23-3-1959.

3. The opposite parties have filed a written statement. Their preliminary objection is that, this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit.

4. in order to dispose of the preliminary question of jurisdiction, the relevant provisions of the Act may be examined. According to clause (h) of S. 2, High Court means the High Court having Jurisdiction under S. 3. Section 3 states:

“The High Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be the High Court within the limits of whose appellate jurisdiction the office of the Trade Marks Registry referred to in each of the following cases is situate, namely:

(a) in relation to a trade mark on the Register of Trade Marks at the commencement of this Act, the office of the Trade Marks Registry within whose territorial limits the principal place of Business in India of the proprietor of the trade mark as entered in the Register at such commencement is situate…………”.

5. section 56 of the Act confers power to cancel or vary registration and to rectify the Register. Section 56 states:

“(1) On application made in the prescribed manner to a High Court or to the Registrar by any person aggrieved, the tribunal may make such order as it may think fit for cancelling or varying the registration of a trade mark on the ground of any contravention, or failure to observe a condition entered on the Register in relation thereto. (2) Any person aggrieved by the absence or omission from the Register of any entry, or by any entry made in the Register without sufficient cause, or by any entry wrongly remaining on the Register, or by any error or defect in any entry in the Register, may apply in the prescribed manner to a High Court or to the Registrar, and the tribunal may make such order for making, expunging or varying the entry as it may think fit……”.

6. The applicants' grievance is that, names of opposite parties have been wrongly recorded in the Register. The applicants have prayed that their names should be expugned from the Register. Their case, therefore, falls under sub-section (2) of Section 56 of the Act. Under S. 56(2), the aggrieved party may approach a High Court. The question arises as to which is the appropriate High Court. That matter has been discussed in Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 determines the High Court having jurisdiction in a certain matter under this Act. Clause (a) of S. 3 deals with a case in relation to a trade mark existing at the commencement of this Act. In the present case Lakshmi Narain obtained the three trade marks much before the commencement of the 1958 Act. It, therefore, appears that the present case fails under clause (a) of Section 3 of the Act. Mr. Gopi Nath Kunzru, appearing for the applicants, contended that, clause (a) of S. 3 may govern cases falling under sub-s. (1) of S. 56, but will not govern cases falling under sub-s. (2) of S. 56. I am unable to agree. The expression used in clause (a) is “in relation to a trade mark”, liven if the applicants' grievance is under sub-section (2) of S. 56, that would be a case in relation to a trade mark. That case will, therefore, fall under clause (a) of Section 3 of the Act.

7. We find the expression “appellate jurisdiction” in Section 3 of the Act. Mr. Kunzru suggested that, that expression has reference to Section 109 of the Act, which provides for appeals. It is true that S. 3 does contain the expression “appellate Jurisdiction”. But the opening words of Section 3 are much wider. Section 3 is meant for determining the High Court having jurisdiction in cases falling under the Act. Section 3 will govern, not only appeals under Section 109 of the Act, but also applications under Section 56 of the Act.

8. Clause (a) of S. 3 mentions the office of the Trade Marks Registry within whose territorial limits the principal place of business in India of the proprietor of the trade mark is situate. Lakshmi Narain was the original owner of the trade mark. The applicants claim the present ownership of the trade mark. Lakshmi Narain and the applicants lived at Kanpur, section 5 of the Act deals with Trade Marks Registry and its offices. The head, office of the Trade Marks Registry is located at Bombay. There is a branch office at New Delhi under Chapter XXXV, Rule 5 of Rules of Court, notice was sent to the Registrar of Trade Marks. That notice was issued at the applicants' instance to the Registrar Trade Marks, New Delhi. It, therefore, appears that district Kanpur lies within the territorial limits of the Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks, New Delhi. We have to find out whether the office of the Trade Marks Registry, New Delhi lies within, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court or soma other High Court.

9. When this case was taken up on 26-11-1963, Mr. Kunzru suggested that the office in question is actually situate within Uttar Pradesh. This position was disputed on behalf of the opposite parties. I, therefore, gave the parties an opportunity to file affidavit on this point. No affidavit was filed by the applicants. Chunni Lal filed one affidavit today. He has annexed to this affidavit a letter from the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Okhla Industrial Estate, New; Delhi 20, in that letter the Assistant Registrar reports: “The office of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Trade Marks Registry, Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi-20 is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court”.

10. It is well known that the jurisdiction of Punjab High court has been extended to the Union Territory of Delhi. We find the expression “New Delhi-20” in the address of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. That address and the letter sent by the Assistant Registrar indicate that, the office in question is located at New Delhi, and does not lie within Uttar Pradesh.

11. In Chamundeeswari Weaving and Trading Co., (Pte.) Ltd. v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 Mad 214 it was held that an application, for rectification of Trade Marks Register can be filed in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Trade Marks Register is situate or in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the owner of the Marks resides or carries on Business. That was a decision under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. That decision is of little assistance in disposing of the question of jurisdiction under Act No. XLIII of 1958.

12. Mr. Kunzru contended that, Section 3 of the Act is invalid, in so far as it purports to confer on the Punjab High Court jurisdiction to dispose of cases from district Kanpur. The point would have had much force, if the cause of action was confined to Uttar Pradesh. It is, however, to be noted that, the principal relief claimed by the applicants is amendment of the Register of Trade Marks maintained at New Delhi, It, therefore, appears that the cause of action partly arose at New Delhi. Since the cause of action partly arose at Mew Delhi, there can be no objection if jurisdiction in the matter is conferred on the Punjab High Court, which has original and appellate jurisdiction at Delhi. Section 3 of the Act appears to be valid.

13. We have seen that, although the parties reside at Kanpur, the place of business is within the territorial limits of the Trade Marks Registry at New Delhi. That office is within the appellate Jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court. So, under Section 3 of the Act, it is the Punjab High Court, which has Jurisdiction to deal with the present application under Section 56 of the Act. This Court has no jurisdiction to dispose of the present application. This application under Section 56 of Act No. XLIII of 1958 is dismissed with costs.

HH/D.H.Z

14. Application dismissed.