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Pandit Vidheshwar Pathak D.H v. Budhiram Barai J.D .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant decree-holder obtained a money decree for Rs. 610 plus costs and future interest against the assets of the deceased Smt. Kusma Kunwar in 1956. Execution of the decree led to the attachment of a house, claimed to be an asset of Kusma Kunwar. The respondent, Budhiram, objected to the attachment, asserting that the house did not belong to Kusma Kunwar nor formed part of her assets. Both the trial and appellate courts upheld this objection, concluding that the house was not Kusma Kunwar's property and thus not liable for attachment and sale. The appellant filed the present second appeal challenging these concurrent findings of fact.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the statement of Budhiram, the objector, could be relied upon without having been put to him during cross-examination, given that his counsel admitted the statement subject to all just exceptions.
- Whether the Full Bench decision in Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava (A.I.R 1957 All. 1) applies to the admissibility of Budhiram’s statement in this case.
- Whether the house attached could be considered an asset of Kusma Kunwar for the purpose of execution of the decree.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The statement of Budhiram (Exhibit 3) was admitted by Budhiram's counsel, obviating the need to put the statement to Budhiram during his deposition.
- Relied on the Full Bench authority of Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava to support the position that no formal cross-examination was necessary once the statement was admitted.
Respondent's Arguments
- The admission by Budhiram's counsel was "subject to all just exceptions" under Order XII, Rule 2, C.P.C., meaning it only dispensed with formal proof but did not render the statement admissible for evidentiary value under the Indian Evidence Act.
- The Full Bench decision cited by the appellant was inapplicable as there was no unqualified admission of the document.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava, A.I.R 1957 All. 1 | Whether an unqualified admission of a document by counsel obviates the need to put the statement to the witness during cross-examination for contradiction under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. | The court distinguished this case on the ground that the admission was qualified ("subject to all just exceptions"), thus requiring cross-examination to rely on the statement. Therefore, the Full Bench authority did not apply. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the nature of the admission made by Budhiram's counsel, noting that it was qualified by the phrase "subject to all just exceptions," which under Order XII, Rule 2, C.P.C., removes only the requirement for formal proof but does not affect the evidentiary admissibility under the Indian Evidence Act. The court emphasized Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, which requires that if a party intends to contradict a witness by a previous statement, the relevant portions must be specifically put to the witness during cross-examination. Since Budhiram's statement was not put to him in cross-examination, reliance on it was impermissible. The court further distinguished the Full Bench decision cited by the appellant, explaining that it involved an unqualified admission, unlike the present case. Consequently, the courts below were correct in disregarding Budhiram’s prior statement and in concluding that the house did not belong to Kusma Kunwar, making it not liable for attachment in execution of the decree.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
The court upheld the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts that the house attached was not an asset of Kusma Kunwar and therefore could not be subjected to attachment and sale for satisfying the decree. No new precedent was established; the decision affirms the necessity of complying with procedural requirements under the Indian Evidence Act and C.P.C. for admitting prior statements in evidence.
M. Lal, J.:— This second appeal came up for hearing before a learned single Judge who by his order dated the 27th September, 1957 referred it to a bench because an important question of law arose in the case.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the appellant decree-holder obtained a simple money decree for Rs. 610 besides costs and future interest against the assets of Smt. Kusma Kunwar deceased in the hands of Hira, Gopal and Budhiram, some time in 1956. This decree was put in execution and a house was attached stating that the house was the asset of Kusma Kunwar Budhiram respondent filed an objection stating that the house did not belong to Kusma Kunwar nor was it a part of the assets left by her. This objection has found favour with both the courts below.
3. It has been held that the house did not belong to Kusma Kunwar and was not liable to attachment and sale. It was against these concurrent findings of fact that the present appeal was filed.
4. It appears that the decree-holder relied upon three copies of statements made by Kusma Kunwar, Gulab and Budhiram objector in earlier proceedings. The courts below rejected the statements of Kusma Kunwar and Gulab because they were inconsistent and did not prove that Kusma Kunwar was the owner. The statement of Budhiram objector was also not relied upon by the lower appellate court on the ground that Budhiram having entered the witness-box, the statement was not put to him and consequently it could not be relied upon. This view in the learned judge has been challenged in this appeal.
5. Sri K.B Lal learned Advocate for the appellant, has contended that the statement made by Budhiram, a copy of which is Ex. 3 on record, was admitted by Budhiram's counsel and so it was not necessary for the decree-holder to put the statement to Budhiram at the time of his deposition. In support of this argument the learned counsel has relied upon the Full Bench authority of Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava A.I.R 1957 All. 1 Sri Sripat Narain, learned counsel for the respondent, has, on the other hand, contended that Budhiram's statement was admitted subject to all just exceptions within the meaning of Or. XII, R. 2, C.P.C Only for the purpose of doing away with the formal proof of the document. It was not admitted to make that statement admissible in evidence for purposes of evidentiary value under the Indian Evidence Act. According to him the Full Bench Authority has no application because there was no unqualified admission of the document.
6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties we agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the case is not covered by the said Full Bench authority. The admission of the document which has been made in this case by the learned counsel for Budhiram is worded: “Admitted subject to all just exception.” The learned counsel in admitting the document repeated the language of R. 2 of Order XII. C.P.C This only means that the admission of the learned counsel did away with the formal proof of the document but it did not do away with the requirement of the Indian Evidence Act. Under Sec. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act a witness has to be cross-examined as to his previous statement. If it is intended to contradict the witness by any previous writing, it is necessary to draw his attention to such writing. In particular his attention should be drawn to those specific parts of the statement on which reliance is placed and which show contradiction between his previous and the present statements. The requirement of this section was not done away with by the learned counsel while admitting the document subject to all just exceptions. If it was intended that the statement of Budhiram should be relied upon in order to contradict him, it was necessary that the relevant portion of the document should have been put to him when he was in the witness-box. In the Full Bench case of Ajodhia Prasad Bhargava, the most material thing was that the document which contained the admission was admitted without any exception and it was on the basis of such admission that two of the Judges of the Full Bench held that in such a case where a previous admission is admitted by the counsel it is not obligatory on the party who produces the document to draw in cross-examination the attention of the opponent to the said admission. The view taken by the two Judges was dissented from by V. Bhargava, J. who thought that even in such a case it was necessary that the witness should be contradicted with his previous statement under the provisions of law. In the instant case there being no unqualified admission of the previous statement of Budhiram, it was necessary for the counsel of the decree-holder, if it was intended to rely upon the previous statement, to contradict Budhiram with his previous statement at the time of cross-examination. This not having been done, that statement could not be relied upon to show that Budhiram could not say that the house did not belong to Smt. Kusma Kunwar. We, therefore, find that the lower appellate court committed no error in placing no reliance upon the previous statement of Budhiram. Both the courts below in fact came to the conclusion on the basis of the entire evidence that the house did not belong to Kusma Kunwar. Consequently it could not be treated to be the asset of Kusma Kunwar for realisation of the decretal amount.
7. This appeal must fail and it is dismissed with costs.
8. Appeal dismissed.
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