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Ram Sewak v. State Of U.P And Others Opposite Parties.

Allahabad High Court

Aug 9, 1961

Judgment

Subsequent
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Factual and Procedural Background

These are three connected writ petitions arising out of land acquisition proceedings in the village of Gohand, pargana Rath, district Hamirpur. The principal relief sought by the petitioners was the quashing of the U.P. Government notification No. A-1632.XIIA-663/60 dated 17 March 1960 (issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act) and a writ of mandamus restraining respondents from enforcing that notification. The petitions challenged notifications issued under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of approximately 31 acres in the village of Gohand for the opening of a Government Seed Multiplication Farm. The opinion records that the court will consider the relevant allegations and affidavits in the course of addressing legal submissions made by counsel.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act complied with the statutory requirements (i.e., whether those notifications were in conformity with the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Act).
Whether the notifications were invalid because they did not mention plot numbers or the names of persons whose land was sought to be acquired.
Whether there was a defect in the proceedings because notifications under Sections 4 and 17 were published simultaneously (or otherwise issued in a manner objectionable under the Act).
Whether Section 17 of the Act is ultra vires because it vests an unguided discretion in the Collector/appropriate Government, thereby infringing Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether subsection (4) of Section 17, by permitting the appropriate Government to direct that Section 5-A shall not apply in a particular case, amounts to an impermissible delegation (or effective repeal) of Section 5-A and is therefore void.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced by Mr. Sapru (for the petitioners)

The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are invalid because they do not mention the numbers of the plots or the names of the persons whose land is proposed to be acquired.
The proceedings are defective because notifications under Sections 4 and 17 were published simultaneously (or in such manner as to offend the statutory scheme).
Section 17 is ultra vires: it allegedly vests an unguided discretion in the Collector/appropriate Government to dispense with Section 5-A, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
Subsection (4) of Section 17 effectively permits the State Government to dispense with Section 5-A in particular cases and thereby exercises an essential legislative function (i.e., it amounts to an impermissible delegation or effective repeal of Section 5-A), rendering that provision void.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1203	Support for the proposition that a Section 4 notification need not name specific plots or owners; Section 4 requires identification of the locality rather than particulars of individual holdings.	The court relied on this authority to conclude that the Section 4 notification in the present case (which identified district, pargana and village and approximate area) complied with Section 4 and was not defective for omitting plot numbers or owners' names.
Banarsi Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1958 SC 909	Principle that the legislature may leave details and implementation methods to the executive without being unconstitutional; such delegation of details does not amount to a forbidden delegation of essential legislative functions.	The court invoked this authority to reject the contention that Section 17(4) effected a repeal of Section 5-A or amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of essential legislative functions; the court treated the power to exempt application of Section 5-A in urgent cases as a permissible executive detail.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the submissions in sequence and applied the statutory text and cited authorities to the facts in the record.

Analysis of Section 4: The court examined the language of Section 4(1), which requires publication of a notification when land in a locality is needed for public purpose and public notice of its substance. The court held that Section 4 does not require identification of specific plot numbers or owners; it requires indication of the locality. Because the impugned Section 4 notification specified district, pargana, village and approximate area, the court found it conformed with Section 4. The court expressly relied on Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay in support of this conclusion.
Analysis of Section 6: The court turned to Section 6(1)–(3), and particularly to subsection (2), which requires the declaration to state the district or territorial division, the purpose, the approximate area, and, where a plan has been made, the place where such plan may be inspected. The court emphasized that subsection (1) uses the phrase “any particular land is needed for a public purpose,” importing a requirement of particularity and definiteness in a Section 6 declaration. The court found that the impugned Section 6 declaration failed to particularise the land: although district, pargana, village and area were given, the notification lacked sufficient definiteness (e.g., it did not indicate particulars that would enable the public and affected persons to know which property was being acquired and did not identify where a plan could be inspected). On that basis the court concluded the Section 6 notification suffered from want of particularity and was not in accordance with the law.
Submission about simultaneous notifications under Sections 4 and 17: The court observed that the Section 4 notification was dated 17 March 1960 while the composite notification under Sections 6 and 17 was dated 23 March 1960. Accordingly, it rejected the contention that Sections 4 and 17 notifications were simultaneous in a manner that rendered the proceedings invalid, and found no statutory provision rendering a composite Section 6/17 notification invalid.
Article 14 challenge to Section 17: The petitioners argued that Section 17 vested unguided discretion, violating Article 14. The court rejected this contention by reading Section 17(1) to require that the appropriate Government direct action only “in cases of urgency.” The court treated the existence of urgency as the guiding factor and held that the statutory language required an objective, not merely subjective, assessment of urgency by the appropriate Government. The court further observed that the powers under Section 17 are administrative rather than judicial and concluded that Section 17 did furnish guidance for exercise of the power and therefore did not offend Article 14 on the facts of the case.
Challenge based on subsection (4) of Section 17 (alleged delegation or effective repeal of Section 5-A): The court rejected the argument that Section 17(4) had the effect of repealing Section 5-A or that it represented an impermissible delegation of essential legislative functions. Relying on the principle stated in Banarsi Das that the legislature may leave details and methods of operation to the executive, the court held that permitting the executive to decide whether Section 5-A should not apply in urgent cases is an acceptable delegation of implementational detail and not an unconstitutional surrender of legislative power.
Conclusion of analysis: Although the court repelled the other submissions made by petitioners (as to simultaneity, Article 14, and delegation), it nonetheless held that the Section 6 declaration was invalid for want of particularity. Because that ground was dispositive, the petitions succeeded.

Holding and Implications

The court's core ruling: The notification dated 20th of March, 1960 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was quashed and the petitions were allowed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

The impugned Section 6 notification was declared invalid for want of particularity and was quashed.
The petitions were allowed and the parties were directed to bear their own costs (the opinion states: "Parties shall bear their own costs").
The court upheld the validity of the Section 4 notification as complying with Section 4, and rejected challenges to the composite use of Sections 6 and 17, to Section 17 on Article 14 grounds, and to the contention that Section 17(4) represented an unconstitutional delegation.

Broader implications:

The opinion does not announce any broader change in legal doctrine; the decision rests on a statutory interpretation of Sections 4 and 6 (and on authorities regarding permissible delegation). The court's order resulted in quashing of the specific Section 6 notification in this matter. The opinion does not state that it is laying down any new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities to the facts before it.

Disposition: Petitions allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

1. These are three connected writ petitions and arise out of land acquisition proceedings going on in village Gohand, pargana Rath, in the district of Hamirpur. The substantial prayer of the petitioners is for the quashing of the U.P Government notification No. A-1632.XIIA-663/60 dated March 17, 1960, and for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to enforce the aforesaid notification. The said notification is under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is not necessary at this stage to mention the allegations made in the petition, the affidavit filed in support of it, the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit. I shall deal with the relevant allegations in these documents while considering the various submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.

2. Mr. Sapru has made the following submissions:

(1) The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act issued in this case are invalid because the numbers of the plots have not been mentioned therein.

(2) The present proceedings suffer from the defect, that notifications under Sections 4 and 17 of the Act were published simultaneously.

(3) Section 17 of the Act is ultra vires inasmuch as it gives unguided discretion to the Collector to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act and thus infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

3. I will consider the submissions seriatim. The notification under Section 4 of the Act which is dated 17th of March, 1960 (Annexure II) reads as follows:

“Under sub-sec. (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) the Governor is pleased to ??? for general information that the land mentioned in the Schedule is needed for a public purpose.

(2) The Governor, being of opinion that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to the land, is further pleased under sub-sec. (4) of the said section to direct that the provisions of Sections 5-A of the Act shall not apply.

Schedule

District Pergana Village Approximate area in acres. Hamirpur Rath Gohand 31.50 acres.

For what purpose required:

For the opening of Government Seen Multiplication Farm.”

4. The notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 23rd of March 1960, reads as follows:

“With reference to this department notification No. 1629.XII-A. 660-60, dated March 17, 1960 issued under sub-sec. (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1394) the Governor is pleased to declare under Section 6 of the Act that he is satisfied that the land mentioned in the schedule is needed for public purpose and, under Section 7 of the Act, to direct the Collector of Hamirpur, to take order for the acquisition of the said land.

2. The case being one of urgency, the Governor is further pleased under sub-sec. (1) of section 17 of the Act, to direct the Collector of Hamirpur though no award under Sec. 11 has been made, may on the expiration of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of Sec. 9, take possession of the land, being waste or arable land mentioned in the schedule for public purposes.

SCHEDULE

District Pargana Village Approximate area in acres For what purpose required 1 2 3 4 5 Hamirpur Rath Gohand 31.05 For the opening of Government Seed Multiplication Farm.”

5. It is clear that in the two notifications mentioned above neither the number of the plots nor the names of the persons whose plots are sought to be acquired have been mentioned. All that is mentioned is the total area of the land to be acquired and the village, pargana and the district. The short question, therefore, for consideration is whether such a notification is in conformity with the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act read as follows:

“4.(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality”.

6. It is clear that the law does not require that the notification under Sec. 4 should mention the specific plots or the names of the persons whose land is sought to be acquired. All that is required by the section is that the notification must mention the locality in which the land is being acquired. In the present case the village, the pargana and the district have been clearly mentioned in the notification. The area has also been mentioned. It thus appears to me that the notification under Section 4 of the Act was in conformity With the law and does not suffer from any defect for not mentioning the names of the persons whose land was sought to be acquired as also the numbers of the plots. I find support for the view that I am taking from the case of Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1203. Section 6 of the Act reads as follows:

“6.(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under Sec. 5A, sub-sec. (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders:

Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by such Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some funds controlled or managed by a local authority.

(2) The declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected.

(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing.”

7. It would be noticed that sub-sec. (2) of section 6 of the Act requires mention in the notification in addition to the district or other territorial division the purpose for which the acquisition is being made, the approximate area of the land sought to be acquired and also a statement that a plan has been prepared and is open for inspection at a particular place. It is true that this section does not say that the numbers of the plots sought to be acquired or the names of the persons whose property is sought to be acquired should] be mentioned, but in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 the words used are:

“any particular land is needed for a public I purpose”.

In other words, the law requires the land to be particularised in the notification under section 6. It requires definiteness in the matter and it is clear that in the present case definiteness is wanting. It is not necessary that in every case the number of the plots should be given or the names of the persons whose land is sought to be acquired should be given. If such particulars are given which would indicate to the public & to the persons concerned as to which property is being acquired, it would be sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. In my judgment the impugned notification in the instant case suffers from the defect of want of particularity and is not in accordance with the law. The petition must therefore succeed on this ground alone.

8. I would, however, like to record my conclusion on the other submissions also because the submissions having been made and my judgment being appealable to a Division Bench as of right, it is only proper and fair that I recorded my views in respect of those submissions also. It is not quite correct to say that there were simultaneous notifications under Sections 4 and 1? of the Act the notification under Sec. 4 was issued on the 17th of March 1960, whereas the composite notification under Secs. 6 and 17 was issued on the 23rd of March 1960. Nothing has been pointed out to me to justify the conclusion that a composite notification under Secs. 6 and 17 is bad in law and I have not been able to find anything in the Act to hold that it is so. In my opinion therefore there is no substance in this submission of the learned counsel.

9. The last Submission is that under the provisions of Section 17 of the Act the State Government can in its discretion take possession over land in some cases while in other cases, though similar, refuse to take possession. It is contended that the discretion is completely unguided by any statutory provisions and is consequently in conflict with the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not correct to say that the discretion is completely unguided because the opening words of section 17(1) of the Act are, “In cases of urgency whenever the appropriate Government so directs”. The appropriate Government can direct the Collector only in cases of urgency. Therefore the existence of urgency is the guiding factor. It is another matter that the determination of the question of urgency has been left to the appropriate Government. The words used in this section are not

“In cases where the appropriate Government is of the opinion that the matter is urgent”.

In other words, the matter has not been left to the subjective determination of the State Government but has got to be objectively decided by that Government considering all the circumstances. The powers that the Government exercises under S. 17 are no doubt administrative and not judicial or quasi-judicial. I am therefore, unable to agree With Mr. Sapru that the provisions of Sec. 17 do not render any guidance to the appropriate Government in deciding whether or not to direct the Collector to take possession of any waste or arable land under the provisions of that section. In that view of the matter there can be no application of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India to the facts of the present case.

10. It has next been submitted that inasmuch as sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 17 authorises the appropriate Government to direct that Sec. 5-A shall not apply to a particular case, the appropriate Government has been given the power of repealing Sec. 5-A for the purposes of that case and consequently has been invested with essential legislative functions, and sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 17 is for that reason void.

11. It is not correct to say that the effect of a direction under Section 17(4) of the Act is to repeal Sec. 5-A. Matters of detail and the manner in which to execute the law are often left to the executive, the policy of law and legal principles having been enacted into a binding rule of conduct by the legislature itself. In such case there is no delegation of essential legislative functions. In Banarsi Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1958 SC 909 it was observed as follows;

“Now the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the Legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws such as selection of persons on whom the tax “is to be laid, the rates at it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods, and the like”.

If the decision as to who will be liable to pay the tax & the rates to be charged cannot amount to repealing of the provisions of a taxing statute with regard to persons not selected for taxations, it is difficult to accept the submission that simply because the State Government has been given the power to decide that in cases of urgency the pro-Visions of Sec. 5-A would not apply, it would amount to the repealing of that provision. In the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act it was left to the State Government to decide on what date that Act would come into force, and the power delegated to the State Government was not held to be delegation of essential legislative functions. Similarly, in the Gambling Act it is provided that it shall apply to particular areas and those areas can be extended by notification by appropriate Governments, and yet it has not been held that those provisions are void. I am, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Sapru on this point also.

12. Even though I have repelled the other submissions of the learned counsel, inasmuch as I have held that the notification under Section 6 of the Act is not in accordance with the law and is consequently invalid, These petitions have to succeed. They are allowed and the notification dated 20th of March, 1960, under Section 6 of the Act is quashed. Parties shall bear their own costs.

IF/S/V.B.B

13. Petitions allowed.