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Ram Kishore v. Raj Narain Dubey
Factual and Procedural Background
The parties entered into an arbitration agreement on 20th October 1959, naming four arbitrators but without any provision for the appointment of an umpire or a clause making the majority decision binding. The reference to arbitration was made on 20th November 1959, and the award was filed on 16th December 1959. The plaintiff objected to the award, seeking to set it aside on grounds of arbitrators' misconduct and non-compliance with Para 2 of Schedule I to the Indian Arbitration Act, specifically the failure to appoint an umpire. The trial court upheld the objection on both grounds, while the appellate court focused on the legal question of the umpire's appointment, relying on the precedent of Jwala Prasad v. Amar Nath, and found the award vitiated for non-appointment of an umpire. The defendant challenged this finding in revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of Para 2 of Schedule I to the Indian Arbitration Act, requiring the appointment of an umpire by arbitrators in cases of an even number of arbitrators, are mandatory or merely directory.
- Whether, in a case where no opportunity arose for parties to seek court intervention under section 8(1)(c) due to the award being made within one month, the failure to appoint an umpire constitutes a mere irregularity or invalidates the award.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jwala Prasad v. Amar Nath, AIR 1951 All 474 | Para 2 of Schedule I to the Arbitration Act is mandatory; arbitrators must appoint an umpire within one month in case of an even number of arbitrators. | The court relied on this authority to hold that non-appointment of an umpire invalidated the award in the present case. |
| Shambhu Nath v. Hari Shanker Lal, AIR 1954 All 673 | Where a party had opportunity to apply under section 8(1)(c) but failed to do so, failure to appoint an umpire can be waived and does not vitiate the award. | The court distinguished this case as factually different since no opportunity to apply under section 8(1)(c) arose here, so the principle of waiver did not apply. |
| United Printing and Binding Works Ltd. v. Kishori Lal, AIR 1956 Cal 593 | Failure to appoint an umpire is curable by procedure under section 8; estoppel applies if parties fail to seek umpire appointment before award. | The court noted this precedent involved estoppel where opportunity to apply existed, which was not the case here; thus it was inapplicable. |
| Tikaram v. Hansraj, AIR 1954 Nag 241 | Whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory depends on convenience and justice; “shall” does not always imply nullification of proceedings. | The court held that this general principle does not apply where no opportunity to seek umpire appointment under section 8(1)(c) arose. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined Para 2 of Schedule I to the Arbitration Act, which mandates that arbitrators appoint an umpire within one month when there is an even number of arbitrators. In the present case, four arbitrators were appointed, but no umpire was appointed, nor was there a provision in the agreement for an umpire or binding majority decisions. The award was made within one month of the arbitrators' appointment, so no party had the opportunity to invoke section 8(1)(c) of the Act to request court appointment of an umpire.
The court relied heavily on the Division Bench decision in Jwala Prasad v. Amar Nath, which held that the appointment of an umpire under Para 2 is mandatory and failure to comply invalidates the award. It distinguished this from cases where parties had the opportunity to apply under section 8(1)(c) but failed to do so, which could lead to waiver or estoppel, as in Shambhu Nath and United Printing. Since no such opportunity arose here, the principles of waiver or estoppel were inapplicable.
The court further considered the general principle from Tikaram v. Hansraj that statutory mandates are not always mandatory, but found that principle inapplicable here because the parties had no chance to seek umpire appointment through the court. Consequently, the failure to appoint an umpire was not a mere irregularity but a fatal defect invalidating the award.
Holding and Implications
The revision petition is dismissed with costs.
The court held that the provisions of Para 2 of Schedule I to the Indian Arbitration Act are mandatory and failure to appoint an umpire where required invalidates the arbitral award. Since the award was made within one month, no opportunity arose for parties to apply to the court under section 8(1)(c) to appoint an umpire, and thus the failure to appoint an umpire could not be waived or cured. The direct effect is the invalidation of the award and dismissal of the revision. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming the mandatory nature of Para 2 in circumstances where no court application opportunity arises.
1. I have heard learned counsel for the parties rather at some length. The point involved in this revision is whether the provisions of para 2 of Sch. I to the Indian Arbitration Act relating to the appointment of an umpire on the request of the arbitrators, is mandatory or merely directory; and whether in a case where no opportunity for taking recourse to the provisions of section 8(1)(c) arose, the provisions of para 2 could be treated to be merely directory and failure to appoint an umpire should be treated to be a mere irregularity.
2. In this case the parties entered into an agreement to refer their disputes to arbitration on the 20th October, 1959. Four persons were named as arbitrators. There is nothing in the agreement for the appointment of an umpire. It also does not contain a clause that the decision by the majority shall be binding on the parties. Reference to arbitration was made on the 20th November, 1959 and the award was filed in court on the 16th December, 1959. The plaintiff filed an objection praying for setting aside the award on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrators, as well as on the ground that there being no compliance with Para 2 of Sch. I to the Arbitration Act, the award was not a valid award and should not be made the rule of the court. The trial court upheld the objection both on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrators as well as on the ground of illegality due to non-appointment of an umpire. The lower appellate court did not give any specific finding on the misconduct of the arbitrators, but on the question of law it came to the conclusion on the basis of the authority of Jwala Prasad v. Amar Nath, AIR 1951 All 474, that no umpire having been appointed as required by Para 2 of Sch. I the award had been vitiated, it is against this finding that the defendant has come in revision.
3. Para 2 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act lays down—
“If the reference is to an even number of arbitrators, the arbitrators shall appoint an umpire not later than one month from the latest date of their respective appointments.”
This para will show that it is open to the arbitrators to appoint an umpire within one month, but in this case they neither appointed any umpire nor any opportunity was given to the parties to take recourse to section 8(1)(c) for the appointment of umpire. Because after the reference on 20th November, 1959, the award was given within one month and was filed in court on 16th December, 1959. In cases where the arbitrators fail to appoint an umpire within the aforesaid period, it is open to the parties to make a prayer to the court for appointment of an umpire under section 8(1)(c). This opportunity never arose in the case because the prayer could only be made to the court if the arbitrators failed to appoint an umpire within one month, and as the award was also given within one month no party could approach the court for appointment of an umpire as required by section 8(1)(c).
4. The present case stands concluded by the Division Bench authority of AIR 1951 All 474. The facts of that case were similar, except that the award in that case was express provision to the contrary in the agreement, the arbision Bench of this Court held that where reference is to an even number of arbitrators, then, unless there is an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, the arbitrators are under a statutory obligation under Schedule I. para 2 to appoint an umpire not later than one month from the latest date of their respective appointments. The provisions of para 2 of Sch. I are of a mandatory character and it is clearly the duty of the arbitrators to appoint an umpire. In the absence of the appointment of the umpire, the I award made will be invalid.
5. This authority was considered in a later case, Shambhu Nath v. Hari Shanker Lal, 1954 All LJ 332 : (AIR 1954 All 673), and it was laid down that where a party has opportunity to approach the court under section 8(1)(c) of the Act, but neither the arbitrators could appoint an umpire within one month, nor any party has approached the court for appointment of an umpire under section 8(1)(c) after the expiry of one month, it shall be deemed that the failure to appoint an umpire is not such a breach of the above provisions as to vitiate the award and could be waived. The facts of that case are quite distinct from the facts of the present case. In the present case no opportunity for the parties to make an application under section 8(1)(c) arose because the award itself was given within one month, and consequently neither party could apply for appointment of an umpire. The principle of waiver can have no application to such a case.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on the authority of AIR 1956 Cal 593, United Printing and Binding Works Ltd. v. Kishori Lal. There a single Judge of that Court held that section 8(1)(c) expressly provides for the case where the parties are required to appoint an umpire. Therefore a failure of the arbitrators to appoint an umpire under clause 2 is a breach curable by the procedure prescribed by section 8 of the Act itself and if a party fails to follow the procedure permitted by me Statute to remedy the breach and stands by till the award is made he cannot later on put forward non-appointment of an umpire as a ground for setting aside the award, ??? that was a case in which neither the arbitrators nor the parties made any prayer for appointment of an umpire. The parties failed to make any prayer to the court for appointment of an umpire. It was on this basis that the principle of estoppel was applied and it was held that the parties should not be allowed to challenge the award on this ground, that is, non-appointment of umpire. It was not considered in that case as to what will happen in a case where opportunity to make an application under section 8(1)(c) never arose and the award was given within one month of the appointment of the arbitrators.
7. Reference was also made to the authority of A.I.R 1954 Nag 241, Tikaram v. Hansraj, in which it was held that no universal rule can be laid down for the construction of the statutes as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. When the command of the Legislature is disregarded, nullification may be the usual consequence. But the mere presence of the word “shall” does not necessarily mean that proceedings in disregard of the requirement of the statute are null and void and the question whether it is so is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice. That again is not a case where the award was given within one month of the appointment of the arbitrators. The parties opportunity to move the court under Sec. 8(1)(c). The law laid down above, though of general application, cannot be deemed to apply in a case where the parties could not get opportunity to make an application under section 8(1)(c).
8. The authorities of 1954 All LJ 332 : (AIR 1954 All 673), AIR 1956 Cal 593 and AIR 1954 Nag 241, cited above have, therefore, no application to the present case, nor can they be deemed to lay down a different law.
9. They will apply where the question of estoppel or the question of waiver is involved, but in a case where there was no opportunity for making an application under section 8(1)(c) because the award was given within one month of the appointment of the arbitrators, these authorities have no application. The award was rightly held to have been vitiated by non-compliance with para 2 of the Sch. I of the Arbitration Act.
10. The result is that the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.
IF/J/D.H.Z
11. Revision dismissed.
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