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Industrial Employees Union v. State Of Uttar Pradesh
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ petition was filed by the Industrial Employees Union through its General Secretary against: (1) the State of Uttar Pradesh, (2) the Adjudicator at Kanpur, (3) Messrs Cawnpore Tannery Limited, and (4) the Electric Inspector to Government Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow.
The petition sought (a) quashing of the Adjudicator's order dated 20 May 1957, (b) a direction to the Electric Inspector not to enforce the award made by the Adjudicator, (c) a direction to the Government of Uttar Pradesh not to enforce that award, and (d) an award of compensation to Sri Abdul Rashid (a wire-man employed by Cawnpore Tannery Limited).
Factually, Abdul Rashid worked as an electric wire-man whose licence was renewed periodically. For the year 1954 his licence was sent for renewal but was not renewed and was cancelled on 21 July 1954. Under the rules framed under the Electricity Act a wire-man without a licence cannot work as an electric wire-man, and as a result Abdul Rashid's services were terminated.
The Industrial Employees Union took up the matter and referred it to the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator framed the issue whether the employers had wrongfully or unjustifiably discharged Abdul Rashid and what relief, if any, was due. The Adjudicator held that the workman had been rightly discharged and was not entitled to any relief.
The Union filed this writ petition challenging that order on grounds that Abdul Rashid was entitled to retrenchment compensation and that the cancellation of his licence was unjustified (seeking a direction that the Electric Inspector renew the licence).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a trade union (the Industrial Employees Union) that is not the union of the same trade/industry and which has no direct legal interest can maintain a writ petition under Article 226 on behalf of an individual employee (Abdul Rashid) whose personal rights are affected.
- Whether the Adjudicator's order of 20 May 1957 (which held that the discharge of Abdul Rashid was justified) should be quashed and whether the Electric Inspector / Government should be directed not to enforce the award and to renew Abdul Rashid's licence.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Industrial Employees Union) Arguments
- Where a matter is before an industrial court, representation and espousal of a case by a trade union is appropriate; if the dispute is to be treated as an industrial dispute, then a union taking up the cause should be treated as the party in proceedings rather than the individual worker himself.
- If that principle is not accepted, practical difficulties will arise as many individuals affected by similar orders of an Adjudicator may each have to file separate writ petitions in this Court.
Respondents' / Objectors' Contentions (Preliminary Objections)
- The writ petition is not maintainable because it is the individual (or corporation) whose rights are affected who must approach this Court; an association (such as the petitioner Union) cannot espouse the cause of that individual.
- The Industrial Employees Union was registered as "miscellaneous" and not as a union for the leather industry; there were other unions representing the leather industry. It was contended that only a union of the trade to which the worker belongs is the proper union to represent the worker.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P., AIR 1957 SC 532 | It was held that a matter becomes an industrial dispute only when a trade union espouses the cause (i.e., power of representation in industrial courts is vested in unions). | The court acknowledged this principle but distinguished industrial court jurisdiction from writ jurisdiction, holding that in writ jurisdiction the individual whose rights are affected must come to the Court. |
| Uma Shanker Rai v. Divisional Northern Rly. Lucknow, 1959 All LJ 864 : AIR 1960 All 366 | Two persons cannot combine in a writ petition when they have separate rights. | Used to support the proposition that a writ petition is to be filed by the person whose rights are directly affected and that separate individual rights require separate petitions. |
| Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secretary to Govt., U.P., Labour Dept., AIR 1951 All 1 | Only those persons whose interests are directly affected by a statute or order can apply for redress under Article 226; an association's membership alone does not necessarily permit it to sue on behalf of members. | Relied upon to hold that the petitioner Association (or Union), whose rights were not directly affected, could not present the petition on behalf of Abdul Rashid. |
| Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 | Shareholders cannot challenge a law on behalf of a company when the shareholders' individual rights are not directly affected; the company itself must sue. Principle: only those whose rights are directly affected can challenge. | Applied analogically: a union (a separate legal entity) cannot assert the personal rights of an individual member in writ jurisdiction where the individual's rights alone are affected. |
| McCabe v. Atchison, (1914) 235 U.S. 151 (Hughes J.) | Only those whose rights are clearly and directly injured may obtain extraordinary relief; the complainant must show personal injury and lack of adequate remedy at law. | Quoted to emphasize the principle that constitutional or extraordinary relief may be granted only to complainants who show direct, personal injury — supporting the conclusion that the Union lacked standing to sue for Abdul Rashid. |
| J.K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. v. U.P. Govt., Writ Petn. No. 2471 of 1957; AIR 1960 All 734 | Union of a different trade cannot represent a worker of another industry; representation by unions of other industries is improper and may disrupt industrial harmony. | The court referred to this earlier decision and adopted a similar view that the Union of a different trade (registered as "miscellaneous") could not properly represent a leather industry worker. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by focusing on the nature of the right affected and the proper locus standi (standing) to seek relief in writ jurisdiction. The analysis unfolded in these steps:
- Identification of the directly affected party: The court observed that the rights affected by the contested action (cancellation of licence and consequent termination) were the individual rights of Abdul Rashid, not rights of the Union or the employer.
- Distinction between industrial tribunal jurisdiction and writ jurisdiction: While industrial courts grant unions the power of representation and an industrial dispute may come to exist when a union espouses a cause, the court stressed that the writ jurisdiction is different and requires the person whose rights are affected to approach the Court.
- Reliance on authority limiting standing: The court cited and discussed Indian and foreign authorities (including the Supreme Court and a U.S. decision) establishing that only those whose interests are directly affected by an order or statute may apply for relief — the need for the complainant to show direct injury was emphasized.
- Application of those principles to the facts: Because Abdul Rashid alone suffered the injury from the licence cancellation and termination, the Union (which was registered as "miscellaneous" and not specifically a leather-industry union) had no standing to present the writ petition on his behalf.
- Consideration of industrial policy: The court referred to the preamble and purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act — to prevent strikes and settle industrial disputes — and observed that allowing unions of other trades to take up individual cases of another industry would risk disharmony and was not desirable.
- Disposition on amendment request: The petitioner's counsel sought leave to amend the petition to make Abdul Rashid himself the petitioner. The court declined to permit amendment at that late stage, noting concern that expressing views on the merits might prejudice Abdul Rashid, who was not before the court.
The court expressly refrained from deciding the merits of the substantive dispute (i.e., whether the licence cancellation or discharge was justified) because Abdul Rashid, the directly affected person, was not a party to this proceeding.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
Direct Consequences for the Parties
- The Industrial Employees Union was held not to have standing to maintain the writ petition on behalf of Abdul Rashid because his rights alone were directly affected.
- The court declined to decide on the merits of the Adjudicator's order or on the validity of the licence cancellation and therefore did not grant the relief sought (quashing the Adjudicator's order, preventing enforcement of the award, or directing renewal of the licence).
- The court refused the late amendment to substitute or add Abdul Rashid as a petitioner.
Broader Implications
The opinion emphasises the principle that in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 a person must ordinarily be the one to seek relief when his or her rights are directly affected. The court distinguished the representation rules applicable before industrial tribunals from the standing requirements in writ proceedings.
The opinion did not adjudicate the substantive merits of the underlying termination or licence cancellation; it dismissed the petition on procedural standing grounds. No broader legal doctrine altering standing principles in writ jurisdiction was announced beyond the application of established authority cited in the opinion.
Disposition in the Opinion: Petition dismissed.
1. This is a writ petition filed by the Industrial Employees Union through its General Secretary, against the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Adjudicator at Kanpur, Messrs Cawnpore Tannery Limited, and the Electric Inspector to Government Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. The prayer in the writ petition is that the order of the Adjudicator dated the 20th of May, 1957, be quashed, a direction be issued to the Electric Inspector to Government of Uttar Pradesh not to enforce the award given by the Adjudicator; a further direction be issued to the Government of Uttar Pradesh not to enforce the award dated 20th of May, 1957; and Sri Abdul Rashid Wireman be given compensation. Abdul Rashid was working as a wire-man in the concern of respondent No. 3, Messrs Kanpur Tannery Limited. He was working as an electric wire-man and his licence used to be renewed from time to time. For the year 1954 the licence was sent to the Assistant Electric Inspector to Government for renewal along with the forwarding letter of respondent No. 3, but his licence was not renewed and it was cancelled on the 21st July, 1954.
2. After the cancellation of the licence under the rules framed under the Electricity Act a wire-man cannot work as an electric wire-man in any concern if he does not hold a licence. Therefore, the services of Abdul Rashid were terminated. This matter appears to have been taken up by the Industrial Employees Union, petitioner, and the matter was referred to the Adjudicator. The issue before the Adjudicator was whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably discharged Shri Abdul Rashid? If so, to what relief is the workman entitled? The Adjudicator came to the conclusion that the workman had been rightly discharged and he was not entitled to any relief.
3. The writ petition has been filed challenging this order on the ground that he was entitled to retrenchment compensation. The order was also challenged on the ground that the cancellation of the licence was unjustified and, therefore, the Electric Inspector to Government should be directed to renew the licence of Sri Abdul Rashid.
4. A preliminary objection has been taken to ??? maintainability of this writ petition on the round that in a writ petition it is the individual a corporation, whose rights are affected, who in come to this Court. Any other association cannot espouse the cause of the person, who has been injured. The second ground taken is that the in industrial Employees Union had been registered as trade Union not for leather, but as ‘miscellaneous’.
5. There were at that time at least four other ??? of leather representing leather industry. They were Cawnpore Tannery Employees Union, Kanpur Tannery and Leather Workers Union, Chamra Mazdoor Panchayat and Kanpur Chamra ??? Karmachari Union. It was contended that an ??? only of the trade to which the worker beings, is the proper Union to represent and on that ??? also the present petitioner has no right to present the employee.
6. There can be no doubt that so far as this case is concerned, it is the individual right of Abdul ??? which had been affected. No other person ??? the whole firm of the Kanpur Tannery Limited ??? in any way affected. The question, therefore, is ??? in such circumstances can the petitioner Union ??? a writ petition?
7. On behalf of the petitioner it has been ??? that it is only an industrial dispute which ??? go before an industrial court. If it were an individual dispute it would not be an industrial dispute and, therefore, in the industrial court, it is necessary that it should be taken up by the work ??? of that industry or by some trade union and ??? it is necessary for the purpose of industrial dis-ate, that an Union should take its cause, then it would be deemed that it is the Union and the ??? alone which would be the party even in the ??? petition and not the individual. It was further contended, that, if this view is not accepted, it light lead to great difficulties. There may be cases here many people might be affected by one order the Adjudicator and in that event all individuals ill have to file writ petitions in this Court.
8. It is true that so far as industrial courts ??? concerned, power of representation has been ??? to the Unions and it has been held in ??? Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P, (S), AIR 1957 SC 532, that it is only when an Union ??? a cause, that it will become an industrial dispute. But I think the jurisdiction which is exercised in a writ jurisdiction is different om the jurisdiction which is exercised ??? an industrial court or tribunal; and under the ircumstances in a writ jurisdiction, it is the individual who must come before the Court.
9. It is not in industrial dispute alone, but ??? have been several cases where by one order ??? or thousands of people have been affected ??? or example, U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land ??? Act when passed affected thousands of ??? and each one of them filed separate petitions in this Court. It has been held by a Bench this Court in Uma Shanker Rai v. Divisional ???. Northern Rly. Lucknow, 1959 All LJ 864 : AIR 1960 All 366), that even two persons cannot combine in a writ petition having separate rights.
10. A writ petition can be filed only by one unless the right is joint. In Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secretary to Govt., Uttar Pradesh, Labour Dept., AIR 1951 All 1, the writ petition was filed on behalf of several sugar mills by the Indian Sugar Mills Association. All the sugar mills of U.P were members of the Indian Sugar Mills Association and the order which affected was passed by the Government affecting every sugar mill. But the Full Bench of this Court had held:
“Though Article 226 makes no mention as to who shall apply for an appropriate order under the Article, other writs, directions or orders cannot be placed on the same footing as the writ of habeas corpus and only those persons whose interests are directly affected by a statute or an order can apply for redress under the Article.”
11. Thus if the right of the petitioner is not directly affected, but the order for the sake of argument be accepted as unconstitutional, I do not think that the petitioner would be entitled to present the petition. In that case the petitioner Association also was registered under Section 4 of the Trade Unions Act, but that was held not to give right to present a petition.
12. In Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41, the same view had been taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. There Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act (XXVIII of 1950) was challenged by one of the share-holders and it was held that the shareholder's right not being affected directly, he had no right to challenge and it was the Company itself which was to challenge the Act. Hon'ble Fazal Ali J., has observed as follows:
“It has been held in a number of cases in the United States of America that no one except those whose rights are direcdy affected by a law can raise the question of constitutionality of that law. This principle has been very clearly stated by Hughes J., in Mc Cabe v. Atchison, (1914) 235 U.S 151, in these words:
“It is an elementary principle that in order to Justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are persons of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant — not to others — which justifies judicial interference.”
13. Here there cannot be the least doubt that it was not the Industrial Employees Union which was directly hit. It is Abdul Rashid who has been Injured and he should come to this Court.
14. His Lordship further observed that:
“On this statement of the law, with which I entirely agree, the scope of the discussion on this petition is greatly restricted at least in regard to the first two fundamental rights. The company and the shareholders are in law separate entities, and if the allegation is made that any property belonging to the Company has been taken possession of without compensation or the right enjoyed by the Company under Article 19(1)(g) has been infringed, it would be for the Company to come forward to assert or vindicate its own rights and not for any individual shareholder to do so.”
15. At another place Hon'ble Mukherjea J., laid down:
“Article 32(1) of the Constitution guarantees to everybody the right to move this Court, by appropriate proceeding, for enforcement of the fundamental rights which are enumerated in Part III of the Constitution. Cl. (2) of the Article lays down that the Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.
16. Thus anybody who complains of infraction of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, is at liberty to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of such rights and this Court has been given the power to make orders and issue directions or writs similar in nature to the prerogative writs of English law as might be considered appropriate in particular cases. Thereafter his Lordship held that the fundamental right is available not only to an individual citizen but also to corporate bodies as well, and since the corporation has a distinct personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligations separate from those of its individual members, the petition was considered to be not proper by a shareholder. The Union, if I may say so has also a separate entity, legal personality of its own with rights I and capacities, duties and obligations separate from the individual. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner has no right to present this petition on behalf of Sri Abdul Rashid.
17. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1957 SC 532, held that an individual can be represented only by a Trade Union of the same nature and of which he was a member at the time when this dispute arose. I had an occasion to refer to that observation in J.K Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. v. U.P Govt., Writ Petn. No. 2471 of 1957 decided by me on the 10th of February 1960: (AIR 1960 All 734). In that case also an Union of an entirely different trade had represented a worker and I had come to the conclusion that it was not open to the worker to be represented by a Trade Union of a different nature. I had held that:
“The Union which had espoused his cause was not of the same trade and industry, but was an entirely different industry. Taking up causes, by other industries, or by unions of other concerns, is likely to create more trouble and disturb the peace and tranquillity of the industry concerned.”
18. The Industrial Disputes Act has been framed as its preamble shows to provide for powers to prevent strikes and lock outs and for the settlement of industrial disputes and other incidental matters. It the services of any employee are terminated in any industry and no worker of that industry is in any way affected, then I do not think that it should be permissible for the Unions of other industries or of other concerns to take up the cause and create a disharmony in the industry itself. In the present case the present petitioner had been registered as ‘Miscellaneous’. No Union of the Kanpur Tannery had taken up the case nor any Union of the workers of leather industry had taken up the case. In the circumstances, I think that the Industrial Employees Union was not entitled to take up the case of Sri Abdul Rashid. For that reason also the petitioner is not entitled to present this petition in this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that he may be allowed to make Abdul Rashid as a petitioner. I do not think at such a late stage that it will be advisable to amend the petition. I do not wish to express any opinion on the merits of the case because that might affect the case of Abdul Rashid who is not before me. Under the circumstances this writ petition is dismissed with costs.
GD/K.S.B
19. Petition dismissed.
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