Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Messrs A. Tellery And Sons v. Carpet Mazdoor Sabha, A Registered Trade Union And Others

Allahabad High Court
Mar 31, 1960
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Messrs A. Tellery and Sons, a joint stock company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, carried on the business of manufacturing and selling carpets at Varanasi. There had been disputes between the company and its workmen concerning annual increments (which had not been given) and later medical facilities. The Government of Uttar Pradesh referred the annual increments dispute to the State Industrial Tribunal on 21 January 1952; the Tribunal gave an award on 26 May 1952 fixing annual increments for all workmen except night watchmen. A further dispute concerning medical facilities was referred on 5 June 1952 and the Tribunal awarded medical facilities on 18 August 1952. By agreement dated 30 June 1955 the company agreed to give annual increments.

The petitioner later contended that its financial condition deteriorated and, invoking provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, served notice (stating it had decided to stop annual increments from 1 July 1958 until its financial position improved) and, acting under Section 4-I of the U.P. Act, stopped payment of the increments. A similar notice was given to stop medical facilities.

Workmen raised an industrial dispute and the Deputy Labour Commissioner purportedly, under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act, issued a reference (No. 906 (Reference) 76 (ALR) 1958 dated 22 November 1958) to the Industrial Tribunal (General), Allahabad. The Tribunal framed issues including (1) whether the reference was without jurisdiction; (2) whether the employers' financial position entitled them to withdraw benefits; (3) whether statutory requirements to ignore previous awards had been complied with; and (4) what relief the workmen were entitled to.

The Industrial Tribunal held the reference was within jurisdiction, did not decide factually whether the employers' financial condition had deteriorated, but concluded that Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act applied and that a two months' notice (rather than the little more than one month given) was required; consequently it directed the employers to pay the amenities as per awards and agreement. The petitioner challenged the Tribunal's order by a writ petition under Article 226, raising principally (i) a contention about improper delegation/authority for the reference under Section 4-K and (ii) that Section 19 of the Central Act did not apply to proceedings under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and, in any event, the Tribunal should have decided the matter on merits rather than on the technical ground of Section 19.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act applies to proceedings and awards under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act in the circumstances of this case.
  2. Whether the employer was entitled to change or withdraw benefits secured to workmen by prior awards and agreement by giving notice under Section 4-I of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (including the sufficiency of the notice period given).
  3. Whether the reference under Section 4-K to the Industrial Tribunal was validly made by the Deputy Labour Commissioner (i.e., whether the State Government's power to refer could be delegated or had been delegated properly).
  4. Whether the Industrial Tribunal erred in declining to decide the matters on merits and instead disposing of the reference on a technical preliminary ground.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The reference under Section 4-K should have been made by the State Government and not by the Deputy Labour Commissioner; the State Government could not delegate such power (and in fact no valid delegation had occurred).
  • Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (which prescribes a two months' notice in certain circumstances) did not apply to awards and settlements under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act; the words "award" and "settlement" in Section 19 refer to awards or settlements arrived at under the Central Act (Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal), and thus not to awards under the State Act.
  • Even if Section 19 could be said to apply, the Industrial Tribunal should not have disposed of the reference on this technical ground without considering the merits; industrial tribunals should not refuse to act on mere technicalities.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Industrial Tribunal relied on the doctrine of repugnancy (Article 254) to hold that the Central Act would prevail where there was repugnancy between Central and State Acts; hence Section 19 applied.
  • It was argued (on behalf of respondent) that although Section 4-I gives power to change terms and conditions, such a change could not be effected without an industrial dispute being raised by the employer and a reference to a Tribunal or Court (i.e., that a further industrial process was necessary before effecting changes introduced by awards).
  • Respondent relied on Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329, for the proposition that once an award had been made it could not be challenged (an argument the Court noted but qualified).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Cawnpore Omnibus Service Ltd. v. Their Employees, (1951) 2 Lab LJ 287 (Addl. R.C.O Kanpur) Applied Section 10 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act in that reference (a Central Act referral). The Court observed this was a Central Act reference (not a local Act case) and therefore not helpful to a dispute under the U.P. Act; it has no binding force on the High Court in the present provincial context.
Cawnpore Omnibus Service Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1953) 1 Lab LJ 47 (LATI-All) Addressed enforceability of an award giving increments: whether award operates for future time unless set aside. The Court noted the Labour Appellate Tribunal held that rights to increments endure for the future unless appropriate proceedings are taken to get rid of the award; the High Court treated this as authority for the proposition that awards, once given, continue to have effect unless set aside or varied by appropriate proceedings.
Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Their Workers, (1952) 2 Lab LJ 804 (LATI-Cal) One of several decisions where Section 10 of the Central Act was applied. The Court said this case was a Central Act reference and therefore not of assistance in interpreting the U.P. Act for this province.
Cuttack Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1954) 1 Lab LJ 723 (Ind. Tri.-Orissa) Decision in a Central Act reference (Section 10). The Court treated it as not helpful because it was not a U.P. provincial Act case and arose under the Central Act.
Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v. Their Employees, (1954) 2 Lab LJ 218 (Ind. Tri. W.B) Decision where Section 19/central procedure had been applied in a Central Act reference. Held not to be helpful to the present provincial context as it was a Central Act reference.
B.M.S Motor Service v. Their Workmen, (1955) 1 Lab LJ 597 (Ind. Tri.-Coimbatore) Decision under Section 10 of the Central Act. The Court noted it was not a case of this province and so provided no assistance for interpreting the U.P. Act.
Workmen of Burn and Co. v. Burn and Co., AIR 1957 SC 38 Principle that agreements/awards are intended to have long-term operation yet are liable to modification by change in circumstances. The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to support the view that awards giving recurring benefits (such as annual increments) should be regarded as having long-term effect but remain modifiable by appropriate proceedings.
Trichy Srirangam Transport Co. (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, (1959) 2 Lab LJ 515 (Mad) State High Court view that awards are intended to have long-term operation but liable to modification. The High Court cited this as taking a similar approach to the Supreme Court in Burn and Co.: awards should be treated as long-term but capable of modification depending on the nature of the award.
Guest, Keen Williams Pr. Ltd. v. P.J. Sterling, AIR 1959 SC 1279 Admonition that technical legal principles should be avoided where possible in adjudication of industrial disputes; tribunals should deal with merits. The Court relied on this authority to stress that industrial tribunals should avoid disposing of disputes on mere technicalities and should endeavour to decide merits where reasonably possible.
Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329 Invoked by respondent for the proposition that once an award has been made it could not be challenged. The Court observed that Niemla does not establish that an award cannot be modified by appropriate proceedings; thus the respondent's reliance was limited and did not support the Tribunal's conclusion that no modification by statutory notice was permissible.
Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 208 Principle that tribunals adjudicating industrial disputes should not be unduly influenced by academic questions of law and should attempt to deal with merits. The Court invoked this decision to reinforce the point that industrial tribunals should address merits rather than dispose of matters on technical preliminary points.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a step-by-step legal analysis rooted in statutory interpretation and precedent, constrained by the materials in the record:

  1. Scope of Section 19 of the Central Act: The Court examined the definitions of "settlement" and "award" in the Central Industrial Disputes Act and observed that those terms, as used in Section 19, refer to awards and settlements made under the Central Act (Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal constituted under the Central Act). The Court noted that the awards and settlement in the present case were not produced under the Central Act and thus the words in Section 19 could not be taken to refer to provincial awards and settlements unless there is compelling reason.
  2. Article 254 and Repugnancy: The Tribunal's reliance on Article 254 (repugnancy between Central and State law) was considered. The Court emphasized that Article 254 applies only where there is repugnancy or inconsistency between Central and State Acts. If no repugnancy exists, Article 254 does not operate to import a provision of the Central Act into the State Act. In any event, the U.P. Act had been enacted with the President's assent (so if there were repugnancy the State Act would prevail), and the Court found no repugnancy here but rather an omission in the State Act.
  3. Intention of State Legislature: The Court reasoned that when the U.P. Legislature amended its Act in January 1957 it was aware of Section 19 of the Central Act but deliberately did not incorporate a similar provision. The Court treated this omission as intentional, indicating that the U.P. Legislature did not intend to incorporate Section 19 into the State Act's scheme.
  4. Effect and Duration of Awards: The Court explained that awards granting benefits of a recurring or continuing nature (such as annual increments and medical facilities) become part of the terms and conditions of service and continue in force unless and until they are appropriately varied. The Court relied on Supreme Court authority (Burn and Co.) and other decisions indicating awards are intended to have long-term effect but may be modified by change in circumstances or by appropriate proceedings.
  5. Application of Section 4-I of the U.P. Act: The Court analysed Section 4-I (notice of change) and concluded that where an award forms part of conditions of service, an employer seeking to change those terms may do so under Section 4-I by giving prescribed notice (21 days). The Court rejected the respondent's argument that a change under Section 4-I could not be effected without a fresh industrial dispute and a reference; had the Legislature intended such an additional requirement it could have been included explicitly in Section 4-I as in Section 33 of the Central Act.
  6. Tribunal's Error and Need to Decide Merits: The Court held that the Industrial Tribunal erred in holding that the employer could not change terms by notice under Section 4-I (because it mistakenly imported Section 19 of the Central Act). By disposing of the reference on that technical ground, the Tribunal failed to consider the merits — in particular, whether the withdrawal of amenities was justified given the employer's pleaded financial deterioration. The Court noted binding and persuasive authorities that industrial tribunals should avoid technical preliminaries and attempt to decide disputes on merits where reasonably possible.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE PETITION IS ALLOWED; the order of the Industrial Tribunal is QUASHED.

The Court directed the Industrial Tribunal to "act in accordance with law" — i.e., the Tribunal's decision based on the applicability of Section 19 of the Central Act was quashed and the Tribunal should reconsider the matter (including the merits whether the amenities could justifiably be withdrawn) consistent with the High Court's legal conclusions.

Consequences and Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Industrial Tribunal's order requiring the employers to pay the amenities as per the awards and agreement has been quashed and the Tribunal is directed to reconsider the matter in accordance with the legal views expressed by the High Court.
  • Statutory interpretation: The High Court held (on the facts before it) that Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act does not automatically apply to awards or settlements made under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, particularly where the State Act omitted a corresponding provision and the omission appears intentional.
  • Employers' statutory remedy preserved: The Court recognized that awards forming part of service conditions can be modified by employers by following the procedure in Section 4-I of the U.P. Act (notice in prescribed manner and the 21-day period), and that awards are nonetheless capable of modification by appropriate proceedings.
  • Procedural guidance for tribunals: The Court reiterated that industrial tribunals should avoid disposing of matters on technical preliminary objections where the merits can reasonably be considered, and should aim to adjudicate disputes so as to maintain industrial peace.
  • Costs: The petitioner was awarded costs against both the State and respondent No. 1 (separately).
  • Precedential note: The Court set out interpretive and procedural guidance in this opinion, but the judgment primarily applies the law to the facts of this case; it does not purport to create any novel statutory provision beyond the interpretive conclusions recorded.

Disposition: Petition allowed. Industrial Tribunal's order quashed. Tribunal directed to act in accordance with law. Costs awarded to petitioner against the State and respondent No. 1.

Show all summary ...

1.This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Messrs A. Tellery and Sons which is a joint stock company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, having its registered office at Varanasi. The business of the Company is of manufacturing and selling carpets. There had been disputes between the petitioner and its workers. It appears that there was no annual increment being given to the work men.

2. The dispute was referred for adjudication on the 21st of January 1952 by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the State Industrial Tribunal. U.P, Allahabad, which gave an award on the 26th of May, 1952 by which annual increments were fixed for all workmen except night watchmen. Thereafter, there also appears to be a dispute between the petitioner and its workmen about the medical facilities to be given to the workmen. That also formed a matter of industrial dispute and was referred by the Government on 5th as June, 1952, to the State Industrial Tribunal which gave an award dated the 18th of August, 1952, under which medical facilities were given to the workmen. By an agreement dated 30th of June, 1955, the Company agreed that it will give annual increments. We are not at the present moment concerned with the details of these awards and the agreement.

3. These awards had been given in the yeas 1952. According to the petitioner its financial condition had changed and it had been suffering losses for several years. Therefore, under Section 4-B of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act the petitioner had served a notice upon its workmen to the following effect:

“Please, therefore, take notice that it has been decided to stop the Annual Increments which would accrue to the workmen of the Concern from 1st July, 1958 and onwards until its financial position improves as there is at present no further capacity with the concern to meet such extra charges.”

Thereafter acting under Section 4-1 of the U.P Indus trial Disputes Act the petitioner stopped payment of the Annual increments. Similar notice was also given with respect to the stopping of the medical facilities and the reason given was also the same.

4. The workmen of the concern raised an industrial dispute which was by an order of reference No. 906 (Reference) 76 (ALR) 1958, dated November 22, 1958, issued by Sri Sri J. Prasad, Deputy Labour Commissioner (Industrial Relations), Uttar Pradesh, in purported exercise of his powers under Section 4-K of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, referred (the matter) (sic) for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal (General) at Allahabad. The matter which had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal was as follows:

“MATTER OF DISPUTE:

1. Whether the action of the employers in stopping the annual increments to their workmen with effect from 1st July, 1958 is unjustified and/or wrongful? If so, to what relief are the workmen entitled?

2. Should the employers be required to “continue to provide free medical treatment to the workmen? If so, from which date and with what details?”

The matter came up before the Industrial Tribunal, and, inter alia several questions were raised and on the questions raised the following issues were framed:

1. Whether the reference is without jurisdiction and, therefore, void?

2. Whether the financial condition of the employers has deteriorated? If so, does that circumstance entitle them to withdraw the benefits secured to the workmen by awards and agreement?

3. Whether the employers have complied with the requirements of law which entitled than to ignore the previous awards and the agreements.

4. To what relief, if any, are the workmen entitled?

5. The Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the reference was within jurisdiction. It did not decide the question whether the financial condition of the employers had deteriorated or noil and whether that circumstance entitled them to withdraw the secured benefits of the workmen. It came to the conclusion that Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947) applied, and, therefore two months' notice should have been given. A notice of little more than one month was not enough, and, therefore, the employers were not entitled to withdraw the benefits.

6. Questions of fact actually had not been decided at all by the Industrial Tribunal. It directed that the employers would pay all the amenities to which the employees were entitled under the awards and the agreement Aggrieved by that decision the petitioner has come to this Court and has inter alia, raised the following grounds: (1) that the reference under Sec. 4-K should have been by the State Government and it should be the opinion of the State Government and not of the Deputy Labour Commissioner; and the State Government had no power to delegate this power to the Deputy Labour Commissioner.

7. It was further alleged that in fact there had been even no such delegation of power also. (2) That Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act did not apply to the proceedings and the awards made under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act that could be only applicable to proceedings under the Central Industrial Disputes Act (3) Even if for the sake of argument it be accepted that Section 19 applied to the proceedings under of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, then instead of disposing of the reference on this technical ground, the Tribunal should have gone into the matter and decided it on merits, because the Industrial Tribunal should not have refused to act on mere technical grounds.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that if grounds Nos. 2 and 3 prevail that he does not wish to press his ground No. 1 at this stage. It appears that a matter similar to ground No. 1 has been referred to a larger Bench but I do not propose to postpone the decision of this petition till the decision of that petition by a larger Bench, because, in my opinion, it can be disposed of on the other two grounds. In case this court takes the view that the State Government has no power to delegate or that there had been no proper delegation in the other case it may be open to the parties to take such objection at a time whenever they consider it necessary.

9. On the question whether Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act applies to the facts of the present case the learned counsel had argued, that in section 19 the words ‘settlement’ and ‘award’ have been used. ‘Settlement’ has been defined in Sec. 2(p) as follows:

“‘Settlement’ means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the appropriate Government and the con filiation officer.”

‘Award’ has been defined in Sec. 2(b) as follows:

“‘Award’ means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Sec. 10A”.

Labour Court, National Tribunal and Tribunal have also been defined in Sec. 2(kka), 2(11) and 2(r). All of them have to be constituted under Sections. 7, 7A and 7B of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. It was argued, that, when the words ‘award’ and ‘settlement’ have been used, they have been used as awards of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as constituted under the Central Act.

10. If the award is not under any of the Court or Tribunal constituted under the Central Act, it cannot be deemed to be an award for the purpose of the Central Act and similarly the present settlement had not been arrived at during the conciliation proceedings under the Act nor was it sent to the appropriate Government as required under the section defining ‘settlement’.

11. The argument of the learned counsel, therefore, was that the words ‘settlement’ and ‘awards’ could only refer under section 19, to the ‘settlement’ and the ‘award’, which, had been arrived at during the proceedings under that Act and not otherwise. It is nobody's case that the present awards or settlement had been arrived at in the proceedings under the Central Act.

12. The Industrial Tribunal has repelled this argument on the ground that there being little repugnancy between the Central Act and the Provincial Act the Central Act would prevail and therefore Sec. 19 would apply and has based its argument on Art. 254 of the Constitution.

13. Article 254 of the Constitution is applicable only to cases where there is any inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act if there is no inconsistency between the two, in my opinion, Art. 254 would not come into play at all. Both the clauses of Art. 254 refer to the word ‘repugnancy’. In sub-cl. (1) reference is made to the cases where a Parliament has made a law in the Concurrent list and if there is repugnancy subject to sub-cl. (2) it shall prevail.

14. Sub-cl. (2) provides that if a legislature of a State legislates a law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent list which contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State.

15. In the present case the assent of the President had been obtained for the U.P Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, if there is any repugnancy it will be the State Act which would prevail. But I have already mentioned that the present case is not a case of repugnancy or any inconsistency; it is a case of omission of a certain thing in one Act.

16. When the State Legislature was amending the U.P Industrial Disputes Act in January 1957 by U.P Act I of 1957 it was fully aware of Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. It did not choose to incorporate any similar provision in its own Act. It was not that it was an unintentional omission. In my opinion, if there is a law which is to the knowledge of the legislature and if any analogous law is being made and the Legislature does not incorporate a portion of that law, then the intention of the Legislature clearly is that it did not list to incorporate a similar provision in its Act.

17. There are certain Acts, where some provisions of Central Act are adopted en bloc. In that case the Legislature by means of one section enacts that the provisions of these sections shall apply in the case of other Acts also. In the present case, there being no such provision, in my opinion, the intention should be taken that the U.P Legislature never wanted the introduction of the provisions of Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act to the proceedings under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act.

18. The Industrial Tribunal while giving the award has relied on some of the decisions of the Industrial Tribunal and labour Appellate Tribunal. These decisions are: Cawnpore Omnibus Service Ltd. v. Their Employees, (1951) 2 Lab LJ 287 (Addl. R.C.O Kanpur), Cawnpore Omnibus Service Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1953-1 Lab LJ 47 (LATI All); Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Their Workers, (1952) 2 Lab LJ 804 (LATI-Cal.); Cuttack Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1954) 1 Lab LJ 723 (Ind. Tri.-Orissa); Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v. Their Employees, (1954) 2 Lab LJ 218 (Ind. Tri. W.B) and B.M.S Motor Service v. Their Workmen, (1955) 1 Lab LJ 597 (Ind. Tri.-Coimbatore).

19. In some of these cases Sec. 19 had been applied, and therefore, it came to the conclusion that since Sec. 19 had been applied, therefore, Sec. 19 will apply in the present case also. So far as (1951) 2 Lab LJ 287 (Addl. RCO Kanpur), is concerned, it was a reference not under any local Act, but was a reference under Section 10 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. It was not a case of Uttar Pradesh at all but a case of Orissa. We do not know whether any State Industrial Disputes Act at that time was in force or not.

20. Moreover, even if that was in force and the appropriate Government (State Government) preferred to refer under the Central Act, then all the provisions and procedures of the Central Act will apply and not of the Provincial Act. Moreover, this decision is by the Industrial Tribunal only and has no binding force on this court. Similarly, the case of (1954) 2 Lab LJ 218 (Ind. Tri. W.B), (1955) 1 Lab LJ 597 (Ind. Tri.-Coimbatore) and (1952) 2 Lab LJ 804 (LATI-Cal.), are cases which were referred under Section 10 of the Central Act. They are also not cases of this province. Therefore, these decisions are of no help at all.

21. The case of (1953) 1 Lab LJ 47 (LATI-All), was a case where no question of application of Sec. 19 was raised at all. The earlier agreement had fixed certain annual increments. The question that arose in that case was whether that award by which increment had been given would be enforceable for all future time or only for a limited period. The Labour Appellate Tribunal decided as follows:

“The right to increments being thus established by the awards it must be held to ensure for the future unless and until the appellants are able to get rid of the effect of the award by recourse to appropriate proceedings taken afresh for the purpose. Admittedly the appellants did not give fresh notice for determining the award after the expiry of the period of six mondis and we are unable to presume in their favour that notice once given, though superseded by the order of Government had the effect of determining the award.”

It is not clear whether the reference in this easel was under Section 10 of the Central Act or under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act and if so under what notification. If it was under Section 10 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, then no question arises and Section 19 of the Central Act would definitely apply and there can be no dispute.

22. But if the reference was under the local Act, even then the award once given will continue to have the force of the law unless some appropriate proceedings are taken. What those appropriate proceedings would be would depend on different facts. According to me in the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, if award has once been given it will continue to have its effect until it has been (to be) (sic) varied with a notice under Section 4-I of the Industrial Disputes Act.

23. Sec. 4-I reads as follows:

“4-I. Notice of Change No employer who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of matter specified in the third schedule, shall effect such change—

(a) without giving to the workmen likely to be affected by such change a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; or

(b) within twenty one days of giving such notice.”

24. In my opinion, when once an award is given it will remain in force as contemplated by the Industrial Disputes Act. But after the expiry of the period, if the award is not of a temporary character but is of a permanent character giving certain benefits for good, the award would be deemed to be part and parcel of the conditions of service and each party would be bound by the award.

25. It has been held in Workmen of Burn and Co. v. Bum and Co., (S) AIR 1957 SC 38, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that the Court should regard those agreements as intended to have long term operation and at the same time their Lordships held that they are liable to be modified by change in the circumstances on which they were based and both the purposes of the Legislature would be served.

26. The via media adopted by the Court, therefore, appears to be that though there is no specific provision in the Industrial Disputes Act as to the period during which these awards should continue after the period prescribed under the State and the Central Acts, yet they should be deemed to have the force of the law on the principle of maxim interest re publican sit finis Iitium. Their Lordships considered this principle as a sound principle of law.

27. The Madras High Court in Trichy Srirangam Transport Co. (Private) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, (1959) 2 Lab LJ 515 (Mad) also appears to have taken a similar view that the Court should record those agreements as intended to have long term operations. There it was also held at the same time, that they are liable to modification or change. This will also depend to a certain extent, in my opinion, on the nature of the award.

28. If the award had decided something which was to be given in the past or something which would be only for a limited period then in that case the award has to be enforced within the time otherwise it may lapse by efflux of time, but on the other hand if the award is of the nature as in the present case of allowing annual increments then in that case unless it is set aside by appropriate proceedings it will continue to form part and parcel, as I have already said, of the terms and conditions of the service.

29. If the granting of the annual increment and the medical facilities had become the terms and conditions of the service, then in that case, I do not see why Sec. 4-I would not be applicable, if the employer wants to change those terms and conditions of service. Sec. 4-I clearly gives the power to the employer to effect any change in the conditions of service, but the only condition is that such change shall not be effected without giving notice to the workmen likely to be affected and the period of notice is fixed 21 days.

30. Learned counsel for the respondent had argued that though Sec. 4-I gives power to change terms and conditions of service, yet, that could not be done without an industrial dispute having been raised by the employer and again having referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal or the Court. I fail to see how that argument can be urged on the basis of Sec. 4-I. Wherever, the Legislature intended that without the sanction or the permission of an authority no condition of service shall be changed it specifically provided so.

31. In the Section 33 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, there is which, inter alia, provides that if during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before any industrial authority an employer wants to make any change in the terms and conditions of service he has to obtain an express permission in writing of the authority concerned before he can start proceedings.

32. If the intention of the Legislature similarly, was that if by virtue of an award certain conditions have been introduced as conditions of service between the employer and the employee and they could only be modified by means of another industrial dispute having been made and another reference to a court then there was nothing more easy than to include that provision in Sec. 4-I. There are already two conditions attached and a third condition could have easily been added to it.

33. If acting under the powers given to the employer under Sec. 4-I, he has given notice to change the terms and conditions of the service, and, if the employees are not satisfied, it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute and if the State Government thinks that the matter is of importance, it is open to the State Government to refer the matter as provided under Sec. 4-K of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act.

34. Learned counsel for the respondent had relied on Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd Punjab Tribunal, (S) AIR 1957 SC 329, for the proposition that if once the award had been made it could not be challenged. But that decision has not laid down that it could not be modified by appropriate proceedings. If it could be modified under Sec. 4-I it would be an appropriate proceeding and no objection to it can be taken.

35. Under the circumstances, I think the Industrial Court was in error when it held that the employer was not entitled to change the terms and conditions by giving a notice under Sec. 4-I. The whole decision of the Industrial Court is based on that erroneous decision on a question of law. If the Industrial Court had held otherwise it might have gone into the merits of this case.

36. Apart from this fact, Industrial Courts are actually made for the purpose of maintaining industrial peace and harmony. They should not be concerned too much with mere technicalities, and when a matter comes before the Industrial Court the question that arises in a case should not be refused to be decided on mere technicalities, but an attempt should be made to have the case decided.

37. For example, in the present case the matter has been simply decided on the ground that no notice under Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act having been given, the employees were entitled to the increments as had been awarded under the award. The employers thereafter had only to give a notice of two months and the industrial dispute would again be between the employer and the employee; no peace and harmony has been restored.

38. Under the circumstances, the appropriate proceedings, as has been held in Guest, Keen Williams Pr. Ltd. Calcutta v. P.J Sterling, AIR 1959 SC 1279, in dealing with industrial disputes the application of technical legal principles should as far as is reasonable possible be avoided. (Sic) Workmen affected by standing orders may not always and in every case succeed in obtaining a reference to the industrial tribunal on the relevant points.

39. That is why the tribunals should be slow and circumspect in applying the technical principles of acquiescences and estoppel in the adjudication of industrial disputes. If a dispute is raised after a considerable delay which is not reasonably explained the tribunal would undoubtedly take that fact into account in dealing with the merits of the dispute. But unless the relevant facts clearly justify such a course it would be inexpedient to throw out the reference on preliminary technical objections of acquiescence and estoppel.”

40. With great respect I add that these observations equally apply to the technical objections as have been taken in the present case. Supposing after two months' notice had been given and the conditions are changed in accordance with Section 19 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act and when the dispute is raised this time the State Government might refuse to refer the matter. In that case the employees may suffer and, therefore, irrepairable harm may be done to them. Under the circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Indus trial Tribunal to consider the question on merits whether the amenities which were being withdrawn could be justifiably withdrawn or not.

41. In another industrial case their Lordships of the Supreme Court had taken a similar view. In Kays Construction Co. (Private) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 208, it was observed that:

“In dealing with industrial disputes the tribunals should not be unduly influenced by academic questions of law and they should make an attempt to deal with the merits of each case according to its facts and circumstances. The functions of industrial tribunals while adjudicating upon disputes referred to them for adjudication are quite different from those of arbitration tribunals that deal in matters of commercial dispute.”

42. In the circumstances, therefore, when the Industrial Tribunal had failed to consider the question on merits, I think it had failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly. In my opinion, therefore, the order of the Industrial Court has to be quashed which I hereby quash and direct the Industrial Court to act in accordance with law. So far as respondents, Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned they have not put in any appearance. The petition was opposed on behalf of respondent No. 1, and on behalf of the State, Although the counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 but they have not contested the petition.

43. The result is that the petition is allowed, the order of the Industrial Court is quashed and/it is directed to act in accordance with law.

44. The petitioner is entitled to his costs from both the respondents separately i.e, from the State as well as respondent No. 1.

KD/R.G.D

45. Petition allowed.

Industrial Disputes Act.Industrial Disputes Act.