Krishna Lal Dalela Petitioner- v. The Director Of Education, U.P Lucknow Opp. Party-Respdt.

Dhavan, J.:— This is a special appeal against an order of Jagdish Sahai, J. rejecting the appellant's petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The facts which led to the filing of that petition, as alleged by the petitioner in his affidavit, were these:

The petitioner was appointed a clerk in the office of the Director of Education, Uttar Pradesh in 1936. In 1948 he was sent on deputation to the Secretariat in a superior scale, but was reverted in due course. In 1953 The Director of Education selected several persons for the posts of Incharge and Assistant Incharge. The petitioner was considered for this post and was called for interview, but he was not selected. He made enquiries and was informed that he had not been selected because the departmental selection committee had not considered him fit for the post. In 1957 another vacancy occurred and the petitioner pressed his claim, but his representation or application was rejected. Aggrieved by the decision of the Government he filed a petition in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned Judge rejected it on the ground that it was misconceived. He observed that the posts of Incharge and Assistant Incharge are filled by selection and the basis of selection is seniority-cum-fitness.

2. The petitioner contended before the learned Judge that the refusal to select him for these posts amounted to a reduction of his rank within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The learned Judge rejected this argument. The appellant has now filed a special appeal against the decision of the learned Judge.

3. We are of the opinion that there is not the slightest force or merit in this case. Mr. Singh, who holds the brief for Mr. S.C Khare, made a gallant attempt to support the grounds of appeal, but he found it impossible to support what is manifestly insupportable. As regards the ground that the refusal to promote the appellant has resulted in a reduction of his rank, we are constrained to observe, borrowing a remark of the Privy Council in an old case, that it would be waste of time for this Court even to consider such a ground; and Mr. Singh wisely refrained from pressing it seriously. He, however, contended that the Government should have followed the principles laid down in their own memorandum dated 27th December, 1956, which is Annexure ‘A’ to the affidavit supporting the petition. This was a circular issued by Mr. A.N Jha, Chief Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the various Heads of Department in the State stating that the Governor had decided that promotions should be made on the basis of three principles which were specified in the circular. In the first class of cases, promotion should be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit. This principle would apply to promotion from one lower grade of post to the higher grade of post within the same service or from one subordinate service to another. In the second class of cases, selection should be based entirely on merit. This principle would apply to promotion from certain subordinate services to State services. In the third class of cases, it was recommended that promotion could be made on the basis of exceptional brilliance in preference to seniority. I do not see how the principles laid down in this circular help the appellant's case at all. In its letter dated 23rd July, 1958, in reply to his representation to the Government protesting against his claims for promotion having been ignored, he was informed that he had not been selected because the departmental selection committee had not considered him fit. Thus, even under the Circular, the first principle would apply to the appellant's case for, though senior, he was considered unfit for selection.

4. There is another and more serious objection to the petition filed by the appellant. He asked for a writ of mandamus commanding the State to decide the petitioner's “claim” whatever it may be “according to law.” Mr. Singh conceded, very properly in our opinion, that mandamus shall be only to compel the performance of a duty imposed by law. It is the settled view of this Court and several other High Courts in India that any directions issued by the President or the Governor under Art. 309 of the Constitution do not create legal rights or obligations. In Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State A.I.R 1937 P.C 31 the Privy Council held that the rules made by the Secretary of State under Sec. 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919 did not give any Government official a right to enforce the privileges conferred under them in a court of law. In that case the petitioner had been dismissed from service in violation of the procedure laid down by the statutory rules. Their Lordships of the Privy Council deplored the fact that “mistake of a serious kind” had been made and wrongs had been done which call for redress but they held that they were unable as a matter of law to hold that any redress was obtainable by the petitioner from the courts by action. This case was approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Jagannath Prasad v. State of U.P A.I.R 1954 All. 629. in which Mootham, J. held that the rules made under Art. 309 of the Constitution are administrative rules and the contravention of their provisions will not confer upon the aggrieved official a cause of action. It was held by Kapur, J. In Ram Saran Das v. Union of India A.I.R 1954 Pun. 142. that “though there may be rules of service made under the statute they do not become a part of the contract between the Government servant and the State.” In that case, the petitioner had filed a civil suit against the Union of India for a declaration that, according to the rules which had been made under the statute, he was entitled as a matter of right to the seniority claimed by him. The High Court held that a suit did not lie to enforce the right.

5. We are in respectful agreement with the principles enunciated in these cases and hold that the appellant has no legal right to be selected or promoted to a particular post. The petitioner has relied, not on any rules under Art. 309, but on a memorandum issued on behalf of the Governor by the Chief Secretary. We are unable to hold that there has been any violation even of the principles laid down in this memorandum.

6. The appeal fails and is rejected.

7. Appeal rejected.