Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Damodar Sinha v. Land Reforms Commissioner U.P.

Allahabad High Court
Dec 23, 1958
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Damodar Sinnha, had been a Naib Tahsildar since 1937 and was selected for the post of Tahsildar in 1950. He was appointed and placed on probation for two years effective 30 April 1951. That initial probationary period expired on 30 April 1953, but on 15 June 1953 the petitioner was informed that his probation had been extended by one year to 30 April 1954. During this period he continued to serve as Tahsildar and received an increment.

In July 1955 — approximately fifteen months after the alleged expiry of the extended probation — a notice (a copy of which was produced from departmental records) informed the petitioner that his service during the probationary period 30-4-1951 to 30-4-1953 was “unsatisfactory” and that his performance “deteriorated further in 1954”; the notice asked him to show cause within 15 days under rule 55(3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules why his probation should not be terminated and he reverted to his substantive post of Naib Tahsildar.

The petitioner replied, denying inefficiency, pointing to passing the requisite departmental examination, allowance to cross the efficiency bar, and a recommendation for confirmation by the Collector. He also said the notice lacked particulars of any adverse entries or instances of failure of duty and therefore did not afford him an opportunity to frame an explanation. No particulars were supplied. In August 1955 the petitioner's reversion to Naib Tahsildar was gazetted and his probation was terminated. Administrative representations failed to obtain relief, and the petitioner filed this petition seeking certiorari to quash the termination/reversion order and mandamus to be confirmed as Tahsildar.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner had been confirmed or whether his probationary period had expired (i.e., did the period of probation end on 30-4-1953 or on 30-4-1954, or was it effectively extended beyond those dates).
  2. Whether Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Article 311 of the Constitution applied to the petitioner’s reversion/termination.
  3. Whether sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 — which applies where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer for a specific fault or unsuitability — was attracted and, if so, whether its procedural requirements were complied with.
  4. Whether the notice served on the petitioner constituted a sufficient opportunity to show cause by apprising him of the grounds (including particulars or adverse entries) which formed the basis of the proposal to revert him.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that his probationary period had expired on 30-4-1953 (and in any case on 30-4-1954), after which it was not permissible to revert him from the post of Tahsildar.
  • He asserted that he was automatically confirmed when the probationary period ended.
  • He argued there was non-compliance with Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules and Article 311 of the Constitution, and that he was not afforded the required opportunity to show cause because the notice lacked particulars of any alleged faults or adverse entries.

Respondents' (State) Arguments

  • The State maintained that the petitioner continued to be on probation up to the date of the reversion order; consequently he was not entitled to the benefits of Rule 55(1) or Article 311 as if he were a confirmed incumbent.
  • They contended that sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 applied and that the requisite show cause notice had been given (they referred to a notice dated 5 January 1955 and alleged that adverse entries had been recorded against the petitioner).
  • The State asserted the petitioner was reverted because, despite extended probation, he proved unsuitable for the post.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion refers to statutory provisions and constitutional article rather than case law.

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the decisive issue narrowly around procedural compliance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 rather than determining whether the petitioner was a confirmed Tahsildar or whether the probationary period had validly been extended. The key analytical steps were:

  1. Identification of the applicable rule: Sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 applies where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability. Under that sub-rule the probationer must (a) be apprised of the grounds of the proposal, (b) be given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action, and (c) have his explanation, if any, considered before orders are passed.
  2. Factual finding of attraction: The respondents themselves treated the case as one governed by sub-rule (3), alleging the petitioner’s probation was being terminated because he proved unsuitable. The court accepted that sub-rule (3) was engaged on the respondents’ own case.
  3. Examination of the notice: The court confined scrutiny to the actual notice served on the petitioner. It found the notice did no more than make vague statements that the petitioner’s service was “unsatisfactory” in the initial probationary years and “deteriorated further in 1954.” The notice did not enumerate any specific instances, adverse entries, warnings, or particulars of alleged failures of duty.
  4. Legal significance of particulars: The court explained that to be a meaningful opportunity to show cause, the notice must contain the facts reflecting on suitability vis-à-vis the duties of the post so the probationer can effectively meet them. A vague assertion of unsatisfactory performance cannot substitute for the identification of concrete grounds or adverse entries that formed the basis for reversion.
  5. Irrelevance of extraneous allegations unless communicated: Even if adverse entries existed elsewhere in the departmental record or were alleged in the respondents’ affidavits, their mere existence did not satisfy sub-rule (3) unless they were communicated to the petitioner in the show-cause notice. The court emphasized that the authority issuing the notice had the duty to apprise the petitioner of the specific facts relied upon.
  6. Failure to supply particulars on request: The petitioner had specifically requested particulars of the grounds; these were not furnished, and instead the reversion was gazetted. This reinforced the conclusion that the procedural requirements of sub-rule (3) were not fulfilled in essential particulars.
  7. Conclusion of law: Because the requirement of apprising the probationer of the grounds in sufficient detail had not been complied with, the order terminating the petitioner's employment as a probationer and reverting him was procedurally defective and liable to be quashed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court issued the following operative orders: The petition is allowed; the order terminating the petitioner’s employment as a probationer and reverting him to the post of Naib Tahsildar is quashed; the respondents are directed not to give effect to the notification dated 27 August 1955; and the petitioner is to receive costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is the quashing of the specific administrative order of termination/reversion gazetted in August 1955 and an instruction that that notification not be given effect.
  • The petitioner was awarded costs against the respondents.
  • The opinion did not formulate or declare any new legal precedent beyond applying the settled procedural requirements of sub-rule (3) of Rule 55; it confined itself to the particular facts and the failure to furnish particulars necessary to afford a meaningful opportunity to show cause.

Case Disposition: Petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner is one Damodar Sinnha who held the post of a Naib Tahsildar since 1937. In 1950 he was selected in due course for the post of Tahsildar through the Public Service Commission. He was thereafter appointed by the Board of Revenue in the post of Tahsildar and placed on probation for a period of two years with effect from April 30, 1951. This period expired on 30-4-1953, but on 15th June 1953 he was informed that the probationary period had been extended by one year which carried it to 30-4-1954. During all this period he continued to work as Tahsildar and also earned one increment after one year of service as Tahsildar. In July 1955, nearly 15 months after the expiry of the extended period of probation, he was served with a notice, at the instance of the Land Reforms Commissioner U.P, to the effect that his record of service as Tahsildar during the period of probation from 30-4-1951 to 30-4-1953 was unsatisfactory and that he had further deteriorated in 1954. By the same notice he was also asked to show cause why his probation should not be terminated and he be reverted to his substantive post of Naib Tahsildar. This notice has not been produced by the petitioner but the learned Standing Counsel has produced for the Court's inspection its copy in the departmental record. It is as follows:

“Shri Damodar Sinha, Tahsildar Mahoba. As directed in letter No. 27541/3 TNT 8p/54 dated 28-12-1954 from the Land Reforms Commissioner, U.P.S 3, Lucknow, I am to ask you that as the record of your service during the period of your probation from 195.1 to 1953 though unsatisfactory your probation was extended upto 29-4-1954. Instead of making any improvement you deteriorated further in 1954. It has, therefore, been considered that your probation should be terminated as you failed to give satisfaction as Tahsildar. As required under rule 55(3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules you are hereby apprised of the reasons of the terminating your probation and are also required to submit your explanation within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this order through the S.D.O in triplicate. Please acknowledge receipt of this order.”

2. In reply to the above notice the petitioner submitted his explanation to the Land Reforms Commissioner pointing out that he had not only passed the requisite departmental examination and was also allowed to cross efficiency bar but his work too throughout was satisfactory. He further pointed out that he had actually been recommended by the Collector Allahabad for confirmation. Having thus refuted the allegation of inefficiency, he also specifically pointed out that the notice served upon him failed to mention any instance, warning or adverse entry concerning failure of duty by him or pointed to any deterioration in his work, and that in the absence of those particulars he was not in a position to offer any explanation.

3. It does not appear that despite the petitioner's asking particulars of charges and adverse entries against him they were ever supplied to him. But in August 1955 his reversion to the post of Naib Tahsildar was gazetted. His probation period, too, was terminated. Against the said order terminating his probation and reverting him to the post of Naib Tahsildar, the petitioner then represented to the Land Reforms Commissioner but got no redress, Ultimately he filed the present petition impugning the legality of the order dated 27-8-1955 terminating his probation and reverting him to the post of Naib Tahsildar. Besides asking a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the said order, he has asked a mandamus also directing the opposite parties, to confirm him as a Tahsildar.

4. The grounds urged are that under the rules applicable to his case his period of probation expired, firstly, on 30-4-1953 and, in any case, on 30-4-1954 after which it was not permissible to revert him from the post of Tahsildar. His claim also is that he was automatically confirmed with effect from the date the probationary period came to an end. The further ground urged is that there was no compliance of R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as also of Article 311 of the Constitution and that in any case an opportunity to show cause, required to be given to him, was not given.

5. The facts as stated above are not disputed. What, however, has been contended on behalf of the State is that the petitioner continued to be on probation right upto the date on which his reversion was ordered, as such he was not entitled to the benefit either of R. 55 or of Article 311. Again, it is urged that sub-r. (3) of R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules applied to his case and that the necessary show cause notice as required by that rule was duly given to him. The right of the petitioner to challenge the impugned order is thus disputed.

6. Sub-rule (3) of R. 55 has provided that the main rule, which is contained in sub-r. (1) will not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation, for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service.

7. In such cases the probationer has to be apprised of the grounds of the proposal, given an opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him and his explanation in this behalf if any, is to be considered before orders are passed by the competent authority. Thus according to this sub-rule though the main rule is inapplicable, it is necessary, wherever it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer on account of any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability firstly, to apprise him of the grounds of the proposal to revert him, secondly, to give him an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and, thirdly, to consider the explanation, if any, offered by him. The petitioner's contention is that this procedure too was not followed in the present case, so that even if he was a probationer there was non-compliance of rule 55(3) also.

8. In the view of the matter that I am taking it does not seem necessary for disposing of this petition to decide the controversy as to whether the petitioner was or was not a confirmed Tahsildar after the expiry of the period of probation. Similarly, it does not seem necessary to decide whether the probationary period had been effectively extended at any time or did it come to an end on 30-4-1953. In either view of the matter the petitioner will to my mind be able successfully to challenge the order of his reversion.

9. It is the case of the respondents themselves that the impugned order terminated the employment as probationer of the petitioner and that his case was governed by Sub-rule (3) of rule 55. It also is not disputed that his probation was terminated because despite the extended probation he proved unsuitable for the post of Tahsildar. On these facts Sub-rule (3) of rule 55 was attracted a circumstance which again has not been contested by the learned Standing Counsel. What he has nevertheless urged is that the petitioner was apprised of the grounds for the proposal and also given an opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him. He has referred in this connection firstly, to the notice given to the petitioner dated 5th January 1955 and, secondly, to certain allegations made in the counter affidavit to the effect that he had received several adverse entries from time to time. The petitioner has not admitted that any adverse entries were communicated to him, on the contrary, he has produced a copy of a letter dated 15th May, 1953, sent by the Collector to the Land Reforms Commissioner in which the former recommended that there was nothing against the integrity of the petitioner and that he was fit for confirmation. This letter does run counter to the allegations contained in the respondents' affidavit, but how far one or the other allegation is true need again not be decided in this case. In order that the requirements of sub-rule (3a) of Rule 55 are fulfilled attention will need to be confined to the notice given to the petitioner asking him to show cause why he should not be reverted. If this notice does not contain reference to the alleged adverse entries nor he was asked therein to show cause in respect of them, the existence of such entries elsewhere will not meet the demands of Sub-rule (3) aforesaid.

10. To revert, therefore, to the notice given to the petitioner one finds that beyond making a vague reference to the fact that his service was unsatisfactory during the first two years of probation and it further deteriorated during 1954, no fact, much less any adverse entry or instance, was mentioned. Sub-rule (3) requires that the probationer shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to revert him. He shall be given an opportunity also to show cause against the action to be taken against him. In Order that the opportunity may be an opportunity and the person called upon to show cause is in a position to do so, all those facts which reflect on the suitability of the person vis-a-vis his work should be contained in the notice. A vague reference that his work was unsatisfactory or that it further deteriorated, hardly conveyed to the person asked to show cause any material which he can explain. Though the document given to him be a notice it does not amount to an opportunity to show cause demanded by Sub-rule (3). In the present case this requirement remained completely unfulfilled on the showing of the respondents themselves. According to them there were a number of adverse entries against the petitioner. There were faults in his work. If these tilings were existent in his case and they had influenced the proposal to revert him to his substantive post, as according to the respondents they had, it was the clear duty of the authority issuing the notice to apprise him of those facts. The conclusion that his work was unsatisfactory or that he had deteriorated during 1954 could by no stretch of reasoning take the place of the grounds for reversion which under Sub-rule (3) it was the duty of the authority issuing the notice to apprise the petitioner of. Their absence becomes all the more damaging when it is noticed that the petitioner on service of the notice upon him made a request to the Land Reforms Commissioner to let him know the same but instead of being delivered those grounds his reversion was gazetted. In view of the above discussion it is clear that Sub-rule (3) of rule 55 was not complied in its essential details. As such the order terminating his employment as probationer ought to be quashed and I order accordingly. The respondents are further directed not to give effect to the notification dated August 27, 1955. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondents.

K.S.B

11. Petition allowed.