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Ramesh Chandra v. State Government Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Opp. Parties.

Allahabad High Court
Dec 23, 1957
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Expert Legal Summary of the Opinion (Sahai, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Ramesh Chandra Shukla, was a permanent government servant employed as a court clerk to the Bench of Magistrates at Rajepur, Farrukhabad. On 5 March 1952 he received an order asking him to submit an explanation concerning a report that he had attended a rally of Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.) volunteers held on 17 February 1952. He submitted an explanation on 6 March 1952 which bore an endorsement that it had been submitted to the officer in charge with a remark that he was at headquarters on 17-2-1952.

On 13 May 1952 a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner and he was suspended the same day. The charges alleged participation in (1) the R.S.S. rally on 17-2-52 at Palra Park, Farrukhabad and (2) a meeting of R.S.S. on 13-4-52 at Farrukhabad. The petitioner was directed to submit a written statement by 26 May 1952 before Shri C.E. David, S.D.O., Kaimganj.

On 22 May 1952 the petitioner applied for copies of the statements of persons whose evidence formed the basis of the charges. He received a note (annexure 6) dated 27 May 1952 identifying the allegations and naming witnesses Constable Brahma Nand and Najmul Hasan of the D.I.S. as witnesses to the petitioner's participation. The petitioner sought further clarification on 5 June 1952 but was informed that all information had already been communicated.

The enquiry proceeded: the petitioner submitted a written explanation on 26 June 1952; witnesses including Brahmanand and Najmul Hasan were examined and cross-examined in July and August 1952. On 28 October 1952 the petitioner produced five witnesses; it is alleged that the enquiring officer Shri C.E. David directed their statements to be recorded by the Ahalmad and left the courtroom, so those statements were not taken in his presence. By order dated 8 February 1953 the petitioner was informed that the charges were found proved and was asked to show cause why he should not be removed from service.

The enquiring officer recommended lenient punishment (non-payment for period of suspension and a strict warning). Despite this, the District Magistrate removed the petitioner from service by order dated 1 April 1953. The petitioner appealed to the Commissioner (dismissed 27 March 1954), then filed a revision before the Board of Revenue (dismissed 31 August 1955), and an application to the State Government was withheld by the Board of Revenue. The petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking quashing of the removal and related orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government Servants' Conduct Rules (to the extent they permit removal of a government servant for association with or attendance at political party meetings) infringe Article 16 of the Constitution of India, as argued by the petitioner.
  2. Whether the petitioner was entitled to and was denied copies of the reports or material that formed the basis of the charges and whether that denial prejudiced his right to cross-examine and defend himself.
  3. Whether the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment, viewed in the light of Article 311 of the Constitution, particularly where a report of the enquiring officer was not supplied to him.
  4. Whether the District Magistrate, when considering the show-cause response, wrongly refused to go into the merits of the case and thereby failed to afford a proper opportunity for defence.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The charges were vague.
  • He was not supplied with copies of the reports which formed the basis of the charges; this deprived him of a fair opportunity to prepare and to cross-examine effectively.
  • He could not properly cross-examine witnesses because the reports he had requested were not supplied to him.
  • The District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the merits of the petitioner's case and acted arbitrarily.
  • He was removed from service without being given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against removal.
  • The petitioner was not personally examined by the enquiring officer and thus was deprived of the opportunity to give an explanation in person.
  • Separately, by leave of the court, counsel for the petitioner urged that the Government Servants' Conduct Rules infringe Article 16 of the Constitution because membership of or attendance at meetings of a political party can lead to removal from service.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.K. Krishnan Kutty v. State of Travancore-Cochin, A.I.R. 1952 Travancore-Cochin 287 Authority for the proposition that a government servant who enters service implicitly accepts conditions and restrictions of service; such acceptance may operate as a waiver of certain fundamental rights arising from an implied contract. The court relied on this decision to reject the Article 16 challenge and to hold that restrictions on government servants' political activity arise from an implied contractual obligation and are not an unlawful infringement of fundamental rights in that context.
High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 121 Principle that where a civil servant has been through an enquiry under the relevant rule, it is not reasonable to require repetition of that stage; nevertheless the civil servant remains entitled to represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the enquiry. The court cited this authority to emphasize that after an enquiry a government servant must still be afforded a real opportunity to represent against proposed punishment—and this representation requires that the petitioner be able to know and meet the grounds on which removal is recommended (here, by seeing the enquiring officer's report).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in three main steps corresponding to the principal contentions raised in the petition:

  1. Article 16 challenge:

    The court held that the contention that the Government Servants' Conduct Rules infringe Article 16 had "no substance." The judge reasoned that it is in the public interest that government servants be free from political bias, and that restrictions forbidding political association or activity by government servants are conditions of service entered into by an implied contract on appointment. Such conditions are obligations rather than unconstitutional infringements of fundamental rights; a government servant who accepts employment thereby accepts these conditions and is deemed to have waived certain fundamental rights in that respect. The court relied on P.K. Krishnan Kutty to support this legal position.

  2. Supply of reports and evidence:

    The court rejected the contention that the petitioner was prejudiced because he was not supplied with copies of the reports which had given rise to the charges. It observed that the reports themselves were not evidence; rather, it was the oral statements of the witnesses (which were produced and subjected to cross-examination) that constituted evidence. The court treated the reports as material usable only to refresh witnesses' memories and therefore not essential as primary evidence to be furnished in copy.

  3. Reasonable opportunity to show cause (Article 311 and procedural fairness):

    The court agreed with the petitioner that he had been deprived of a reasonable opportunity to show cause against removal for two reasons.

    First, the petitioner had not been supplied with a copy of the enquiring officer's report. The court explained that the report would have identified the grounds on which removal was recommended; without seeing that report, the petitioner could not effectively represent against the proposed punishment. The court invoked High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall to support the proposition that, after an enquiry, the civil servant remains entitled to represent against the punishment proposed as a result of the enquiry's findings.

    Second, the District Magistrate's order removing the petitioner indicated a misconception about the role of the authority deciding punishment. The Magistrate stated that "the question, therefore, of going into the merits of the case does not arise" once the petitioner had been given an opportunity to produce a defence. The court held that this was incorrect: after receiving a show-cause response, the removing authority must be free to consider the merits and either accept or reject the findings of the enquiring officer. The authority could in particular conclude that the charges were not made out despite the enquiry's findings. By holding that merits could not be considered at the show-cause stage, the District Magistrate deprived the petitioner of the effective opportunity contemplated by Article 311.

    On these bases the court found a clear disregard of the protections afforded by Article 311 and concluded that the petitioner had not been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed removal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Petition allowed; the removal order is quashed.

Direct effects and orders made by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The court quashed the order of the District Magistrate of Farrukhabad dated 1 April 1953 which removed the petitioner from government service.
  • The court quashed the order of the Commissioner dated 27 March 1954 and the order of the Board of Revenue dated 31 August 1955 which had refused to interfere with the removal.
  • The court issued a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioner as in service.
  • The petition was allowed with costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion applied established principles (including those in the cited precedents) concerning the interplay between conditions of government service, the rights of government servants, and the procedural protections of Article 311. The judgment did not announce a novel legal rule beyond its application of those principles; it remedied the specific procedural deficiency found in the petitioner's case (failure to afford a real opportunity to show cause and the removing authority's misconceived view about going into merits).

Disposition

Petition allowed; orders quashed; writ of mandamus issued directing respondents to treat the petitioner as in service; costs awarded to the petitioner.

Show all summary ...

Sahai, J.:— The petitioner was in permanent government service and was working as court clerk of the Bench of Magistrates at Rajepur in the district of Farrukhabad. On 5-3-1952 he received an order from the officer in charge, collectorate, Farrukhabad, asking him to submit his explanation about the report of the petitioner's attendance in the rally of Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh volunteers held on 17-2-1952. The petitioner filed an explanation on 6-3-1952. This explanation bears an endorsement by one of the Bench Magistrates which is as follows;

“Submitted to officer in charge with remark that he was on head quarters on 17-2-1952.”

2. On 13-5-1952 a charge sheet was served on the petitioner. He was suspended the same day. The charge is as follows:

“Whereas while you Ramesh Chandra Shukla were working as court clerk to the Bench Magistrates Rajepur, and took part in certain political activities which is a contravention of the Government Servants Conduct Rules, the following charges are hereby framed against you:—

1. That you participated in a rally of R.S.S Sangh volunteers held on 17-2-52 at Palra Park, Farrukhabad and thereby associated yourself with the political party.

2. That you participated in a meeting of the R.S.S Sangh on 13-4-1952 held at Farrukhabad.

3. Now, therefore, you are called upon to explain why disciplinary action of the nature of dismissal or otherwise should not be taken against you. You are directed to put in your written statement on or before 26th May, 1952 before Mr. C.E David, “S.D.O Kaimganj and state whether you wish to be heard in person and adduce any evidence on your behalf.

Sd. V. Kumar, I.C.S

Collector, 13.5.1952”

4. The petitioner on 22.5.1952 made an application praying that he may be furnished with copies of the statements of persons on whose evidence the charges had been framed. The petitioner in reply received a note which is made annexure 6 to the petition. The note runs as follows:

“The following are the allegations on which charges have been framed against Shri Ramesh Chandra Shukla.” (1) It has been reported by S.I.D.I.S that Shri Ramesh Chandra Shukla participated in a rally of R.S.S Sangh volunteers held on 17-2-1952 at Palra Park Farrukhabad and thereby associated himself with the political party. He further attended a meeting of the R.S.S Sangh on 13-4-52 held at Farrukhabad. The above participation of Shri Ramesh Chandra Shukla was witnessed by constable Brahma Nand, and Najmul Hasan of the D.I.S

5. A copy of this is being handed over to Shri Ramesh Chandra Shukla as desired by him in his application dated 22-5-52 and he is called upon to submit his written explanation by June 6, 1952.

Sd. C.E David, P.C.S,

Combined Office, Collectorate,

Fatehgarh. May 27, 1952.

6. The petitioner made another application on 5th of June 1952 asking for further clarification of the evidence against him. He was however informed by the officer in charge that all the information had already been communicated to him in the note which I have reproduced above. On 26-6-1952 the petitioner submitted his explanation. On 22-7-52 the enquiring officer Shri C.E David recorded the statement of constable Brahmanand and adjourned the enquiry to 25-8-52 on which date Brahmanand was Cross-examined and constable Najmul Hasan was examined and cross examined. The petitioner was called upon to produce his witnesses on 28-10-1952. The petitioner presented himself along with five witnesses before Shri C.E David the enquiring officer on 28-10-52. It is alleged that Shri David instead of recording the statements of these witnesses himself directed the statements of these witnesses to be recorded by the Ahalmad and it is alleged that while the statements of these witnesses were being recorded by the Ahalmad Shri David himself left the court room and those statements were not recorded in his hearing but in his absence. By an order dated 8th Feb. 1953 the petitioner was informed by Shri David that the charges against him were found proved and he was required to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service.

7. The petitioner's case is that he was not supplied with a copy of the report of the enquiring officer and he remained ignorant about the matter contained in the said report. The petitioner complains that by not receiving a copy of the enquiring officer's report he was prejudiced still he submitted an explanation on 15-3-1953. The enquiring officer made the following remark on the petitioner's explanation:

“Collector, I herewith attach the explanation submitted by Ramesh Chandra Shukla on the final notice given to him why he should not be removed from service.

“Shri Shukla is a young man, and in view of his explanation I suggest that it shall be sufficient punishment if he is not given pay for the period of his suspension and strict warning is given to him for the future.

“He could not submit his explanation earlier, as he fell ill. The District Magistrate, however removed the petitioner from service by his order dated 1-4-1953. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner which was dismissed. He then filed a revision application before the Board of Revenue which was also dismissed. The petitioner then sent an application to the State Government which was withheld by the Board of Revenue.”

8. The grounds on which this petition is founded are that the charges levelled against the petitioner were vague, that he was not supplied with copies of the reports which formed the basis of the charges, that he could not properly cross-examine the witnesses because the reports he had asked for were not supplied to him, that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the merits of the petitioner's case and therefore his order is wholly arbitrary, that he was removed from service without a reasonable opportunity being given to him for showing cause against it and lastly that the petitioner was not examined by the enquiring officer and thus was deprived of an opportunity of giving an explanation. The prayer in the writ petition is that a writ of certiorari or other suitable writ or direction quashing the order of the Collector, Farrukhabad, dated 1-4-53 and the Commissioner's order dated 27-3-54 and the Board's order dated 31-8-55 be issued. During the course of arguments Mr. Saksena the learned counsel for the petitioner made an application for permission to urge a ground which was not taken in the petition, i.e, that the Government Servants' Conduct Rules infringe Art. 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as a member of a political party is liable to be removed on that ground. Though no ground specifically was taken to the effect that a person could not be removed from government service only because he attended a meeting of a political party or was a member of a political party, this point was urged by Mr. Saksena in his arguments and I have allowed him to do so.

9. I will first take the ground of Art. 16. In my opinion there is no substance in this point. It is in public interest that government servants should not be allowed to join political parties because it is of paramount importance that government servants should be free from all political bias. The petitioner has not been victimised on the ground of religion, caste, race, birth, place of residence etc., and there is no allegation that there has been any discrimination on any of these grounds. In my opinion therefore Art. 16 would not apply to the petitioner's case. When a government servant enters government service there is an implied contract that he would abide by the rules and conditions of service. He cannot try to avoid the restrictions imposed by the rules and conditions of service by saying that they offend the Constitution of India which recognises fundamental rights in favour of the citizens of this country. Such restrictions as imposed by the rules far from being infringement of a fundamental right are fundamental obligations arising out of an implied contract entered into by the petitioner. The petitioner by his conduct would be deemed to have waived those fundamental rights see P.K Krishnan Kutty v. State of Travancore-Cochin A.I.R 1952 Travancore-Cochin 287..

10. I do not think there is any substance in the allegation of the petitioner that he was not supplied with copies of the reports which formed the basis of the charges. The persons who had made reports against him were examined and the petitioner was allowed to cross-examine them. The reports which they had made were not evidence. It is the statement of the witness which is the evidence and the reports could only be used for refreshing the memory.

11. The ground on which I am inclined to agree with the petitioner is that he was removed from service without a reasonable opportunity having been given to him to show cause against the order of removal which was ultimately passed against him. This I say for two reasons. In the first place the report of the enquiring officer, copy of which was not supplied to the petitioner, would have indicated the gronuds on which the petitioner's removal was recommended and inasmuch as that was not supplied to the petitioner he had no reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. It was held in the case of High Commissioner for India v. I.M Lall A.I.R 1948 P.C 121. that—

“If the civil servant has been through an enquiry under Rule 55 it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out for that would not exhaust his statutory right and he would still be entitled to represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the enquiry.”

12. How could the petitioner represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the enquiry if he never saw the report of the enquiring officer?

13. Another ground on which I say he had no reasonable opportunity of showing cause is that the District Magistrate, who as I have already said above was not the enquiring officer, has observed in the order removing the petitioner as follows:—

“After a thorough enquiry conducted by Shri C.E David, Deputy Collector, S.D.O Sadar and after Shri Ramesh Chandra had been given an opportunity of producing defence, the charges framed were found to have been established. He was found guilty being a member of a political party while in government service, and was consequently asked to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. He submitted a lengthy statement in this connection. At this stage he was asked to show cause as to why the punishment proposed should not be given to him. The question, therefore, of going into the merits of the case does not arise.”

14. In my view the petitioner could urge before the District Magistrate that no case had been made out against him and therefore the notice asking him to show cause why he should not be removed from service be discharged. It was open to the District Magistrate to have considered the merits of the case and agreed with the opinion of the enquiring officer. It was unequally open to the District Magistrate to have after reconsidering the merits of the case come to the conclusion that the charges which were found proved by the enquiring officer had not really been proved and thus to have refrained from imposing the punishment which he inflicted upon the petitioner. The view the District Magistrate took was that he could not consider the question of merits at all. The opportunity of showing cause contemplated by Art. 311 is the opportunity after the issuing of the show cause notice and it is always open to a Government servant against whom an enquiry has already been held to urge before the dismissing or removing authority that on the basis of the material on the record the proposed punishment should not be awarded to him. Therefore the observations of the District Magistrate that “at this stage he was asked to show cause as to why the punishment proposed should not be given to him. The question, therefore, of going into the merits of the case does no arise” are based on a complete misconception of the provisions of Art. 311 of the constitution of India. In that view of the matter it must be held that the petitioner had no reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. It is thus not one of those cases where there has been any disregard of rules only. It is a case where there has been a clear disregard of the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution itself. I therefore allow this petition with costs and quash the order passed by the District Magistrate of Farrukhabad dated 1-4-1953 removing the petitioner from government service as also the orders of the Commissioner dated 27-3-1954 and of the Board of Revenue dated 31-8-1955 refusing to interfere with the order of the petitioner's removal. I further issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioner as in service.

15. Petition allowed.