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Durga Prasad Decree-Holder, v. Mst. Ganga Dei And Others Judgment-Debtors,

Allahabad High Court
Jul 26, 1957
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Structured Summary of the Opinion: Execution Second Appeal

Factual and Procedural Background

A final mortgage decree was passed in favour of the decree-holder on 13 August 1938. On 12 September 1938 an execution application was filed; the execution was stayed under Act X of 1937 and later revived. The mortgaged property was auctioned and purchased by the decree-holder. The judgment-debtors filed an objection under Order 21 rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC); that objection was dismissed on 2 August 1941 and the sale was confirmed on 11 August 1941. The execution case was struck off in part satisfaction, and a sale-certificate was granted to the decree-holder on 18 September 1944.

On 30 November 1944 the decree-holder applied for possession. One of the judgment-debtors, Srimati Kalawati, had died during the pendency of execution; her heirs, Srimati Ganga Dei and Srimati Tarawati, had not been brought on the record. Ganga Dei resisted delivery of possession; the execution court held that a one-third share of Srimati Kalawati was not affected by the auction sale because her heirs were not impleaded after her death.

The decree-holder then applied for the auction sale to be set aside and for a fresh sale; all judgment-debtors including the heirs were impleaded, but that application was rejected on 10 September 1945. On appeal, the parties reached a compromise (text of the compromise appears verbatim in the record). An application for execution in terms of the compromise was made on 15 March 1947 (the compromise dated 12 September 1946). The learned Munsif held the compromise unlawful because a confirmed and absolute auction sale could not later be set aside by agreement in the execution proceedings, and because permitting a fresh sale after expiry of the period of limitation was unlawful. The court below upheld that view. The decree-holder (the appellant) filed the present second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether parties to execution proceedings may enter into a compromise that effectively treats a previously held and confirmed auction sale as cancelled and permits a fresh sale.
  2. Whether a compromise made in execution proceedings that permits enforcement (or a fresh sale) beyond the ordinary period of limitation is lawful and enforceable in execution.
  3. Whether an application made after such a compromise should be treated as a continuation/revival of the prior execution proceedings (and thus not a "fresh application" for the purposes of limitation under Section 48 CPC).
  4. Whether a decree-holder may, during execution proceedings, bring the heirs or legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor on record so that the earlier execution proceedings may continue against them without filing a fresh execution petition.
  5. Whether the executing court is bound to give effect to a compromise reached between the parties in execution proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The parties were at liberty to enter into a compromise during the execution proceedings and the executing court was bound to give effect to that compromise.
  • The application filed after the agreement was not a fresh execution application but an application to revive the original execution proceedings dated 12 September 1938.
  • Because the parties had agreed on 12 September 1946 to treat the prior sale as no longer binding, actions taken pursuant to the earlier application should be treated as undone and the earlier application treated as still pending (despite the record stating it had been struck off in part satisfaction).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The execution application dated 12 September 1938 could not be deemed to be pending; the earlier execution proceedings had terminated and therefore could not be revived by compromise.
  • There was no power in the parties to enter into a compromise in the execution proceedings after a sale had already taken place and been confirmed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Oudh Commercial Bank, Fyzabad v. Bind Basni Kuer, AIR 1939 PC 80 Authority that parties may enter into a fair bargain in execution proceedings which can treat a prior sale as cancelled and treat a later application as a revival/continuation of earlier proceedings rather than a fresh application under Section 48 CPC. The court relied on this Privy Council decision to support the proposition that a confirmed sale could nevertheless be treated as cancelled by agreement between the parties and that a subsequent enforcement step could be regarded as reviving the prior proceedings.
Mahendra Rao v. Bishambhar Nath, AIR 1940 All 270 (FB) Recognizes that agreements made in execution proceedings (extending time or altering mode of payment) can be enforced; if the agreement is breached, the decree-holder's application is an application to revive earlier execution proceedings. Used to support the view that the present agreement could be enforced in execution and that the appellant's application was in the nature of reviving prior proceedings.
Bhiki Mal v. Kundan Lal, AIR 1940 All 107 Where a decree is converted by compromise into payment by instalments, an application for execution after default may be within limitation if made within three years of the last payment under the compromise. Applied as authority that execution agreements can affect the computation of limitation and permit execution beyond what would be the limitation period measured from original decree date.
Partab Bahadur Sahi (Judgment-Debtor) v. Hari Ram Marwari (Decree-Holder), AIR 1940 All 423 Where parties enter into a compromise in execution by instalments, the period of limitation is computed from the date of default under that compromise (not from the original decree date). Relied upon to hold that the present agreement could allow enforcement beyond the ordinary limitation period and that the appellant's application was not barred by Section 48 CPC.
Hrishikesh Saha v. Radha Rani Kar, AIR 1946 Cal 51 Although a decree-holder cannot proceed against a new party whose name was not in the execution petition, where the decree-holder does not want to proceed against a new party but seeks continuance of proceedings against heirs/legal representatives, the decree-holder can continue the same execution proceedings by bringing them on record (no need for a fresh application). Applied to reject the contention that the earlier execution application could be of no avail now as against the heirs; it supported the proposition that Kalawati's heirs could be brought on record and the earlier execution continued.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the Privy Council decision (Oudh Commercial Bank) and noted that in that case a prior sale had been cancelled by agreement and the parties had agreed arrangements that kept the earlier execution proceedings effectively alive. From that authority the court derived the proposition that a fair bargain between parties in execution proceedings can have the effect of treating earlier proceedings as not finally disposed of; consequently, a subsequent application for enforcement may be regarded as a revival or continuation of the prior execution application rather than a fresh application under Section 48 CPC.

The court then addressed the specific objections raised against giving effect to the compromise in the present matter:

  • Confirmed Sale: The court rejected the view that a confirmed sale, having become absolute, made it impossible for parties to agree subsequently to treat that confirmation as cancelled. The Privy Council authority showed that cancellation by agreement is possible in execution contexts.
  • Order 21 rule 90 Objection Dismissal: The court held that the dismissal of an earlier objection under Order 21 rule 90 did not prevent the parties, in appropriate circumstances, from entering into an agreement to treat the sale as cancelled.
  • Limitation: Citing the All-India and provincial decisions (Mahendra Rao, Bhiki Mal, Partab Bahadur Sahi), the court accepted that parties to a decree may, during execution, make agreements that alter the time or mode of payment and thereby affect how limitation is computed. Where an agreement shows the prior application was not finally disposed of, later enforcement steps are an application to revive the earlier proceedings and are not barred by Section 48 when taken within the appropriate time measured from the default under the compromise.
  • Heirs and Parties: Drawing on Hrishikesh Saha, the court concluded that the decree-holder could bring the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor on the record of the original execution proceedings and continue those proceedings without filing a fresh execution petition; thus the failure to implead heirs immediately did not preclude continuation now or enforcement pursuant to the compromise.

On those bases, the court concluded that the compromise in the present case was enforceable in execution, that the present application was in the nature of reviving the earlier execution application, and that the lower courts erred in holding the compromise unlawful because the sale had been confirmed and because of limitation concerns.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside, and the decree will be executed in accordance with the agreement reached between the parties.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The compromise agreement reached between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtors (including the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor) is to be given effect; the decree is to be executed in accordance with that agreement. The lower courts' refusals to give effect to the compromise are set aside.
  • Costs: Costs are awarded on the parties of this appeal and of the courts below (as stated in the opinion).
  • Leave/Appeal: Leave to appeal to a Division Bench is refused (as stated in the opinion).
  • Precedential note: The court applied existing authorities to reach its conclusion; the opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal principle beyond the application of cited precedents.

Disposition: Appeal allowed. (Final line of the opinion: "Appeal allowed.")

Show all summary ...

1. This is a execution second appeal. The appellant is the decree-holder. A final mortgage decree was passed in favour of the decree-holder on the 13th August 1938. One of the judgment-debtors under the decree was Srimati Kalawati. On the 12.th September 1938 an execution application was made. On account of Act X of 1937 the execution was stayed. It was, however;, revived. The mortgaged property was sold and purchased by the decree-holder at auction. An objection under Order 21 rule 90 of the CPC was filed by the judgment-debtors which was dismissed on the 2nd August 1941 where after the sale was confirmed on 11th of August 1941 and the execution case was struck off in part satisfaction. Subsequently on 18th of September 1944 a sale certificate was granted to the decree-holder purchaser. Thereafter on the 30th of November 1944 the decree-holder auction-purchaser applied for possession over the property purchased by him at auction sale. Srimati Ganga Dei and Srimati Tarawati are the heirs of Smt. Kalawati who had died during the pendency of the execution application. They were not brought on the record of the execution application. Srimati Ganga Dei offered resistance to the delivery of possession. Her claim was investigated and it was held by the execution court that the one-third share of Srimati Kalawati was not affected by the auction sale in favour of the decree-holder because of the failure to implead her heirs after her death.

2. Thereupon the decree-holder filed an application praying that the auction sale should be set aside and that the sold property should be presold again. To that application all the judgment-debtors including Srimati Ganga Dei and Srimati Tarawati, heirs of Srimati Kalawati were impleaded. That application was rejected on the 10th of September 1945. An appeal was preferred and during the course of the appeal a compromise was arrived at between the decree-holder auction-purchaser and all the judgment-debtors including the impleaded legal representatives of Srimati Kalawati. The compromise was in the following terms:

“Baham fariqain tasfiya hogaya hai. Appeal manzur kardiya jawe. Nilam jayedad yani kul makan nizai jo ijrai sabaa me ho chuka hai woh mansuq kerdiya jawe. Madyunan respondent-an jo raqam degree ki alawa kharcha ijrai subqa wa hai id wajibulada hogi uski adayegi ke zimmedar xahengey aur degree ko dobara ijra karaneka haq decreedar ko hoga lekin berbinaya nilam sabqa ko haq decreedar bahaisiyat mushari ke hasil na hoga. Kul makan nilamsuda ke malik madyunan hain aur rahenge tawaqteke woh dubra degree men nilam na howe ya degree ada na ho jawe”.

3. On the 15th of March 1947 an application was made for execution of the decree in terms of the compromise arrived at on the 12th of September 1946. The learned Munsif held that the compromise was unlawful inasmuch as the auction sale having been confirmed and having become absolute could not be set aside later in the course of the execution proceeding's by an agreement between the parties. It also was of the view that the compromise dated 12th of September 1946, which permitted a fresh sale under the mortgage decree after the expiry of the period of limitation, was unlawful. Upon an appeal by the decree-holder the court below upheld the view of the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal. This second appeal is by the decree-holder.

4. Mr. Brij Lal Gupta appearing for the appellant has argued that it was open to the parties to enter into a compromise during the course of execution proceedings and that the executing court was bound to give effect to the compromise. His contention further was that the present application was only an application to revive the original execution proceedings initiated on 12th of September 1938. He claims that inasmuch as on the 12th of September 1946 there was an agreement to treat the sale held pursuant to the execution application dated 12th of September 1938 as no longer binding on the parties all that was done pursuant to that application must be deemed to have been undone and all orders passed by the court with reference to that application must be deemed to be without force and the application dated 12th of September 1938 must be deemed to be still undisposed of despite the fact that it was stated to have been struck off in part satisfaction.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent's urges that the execution application dated 12th of September 1938 cannot be deemed to be pending and that there was not power in the parties to enter into a compromise in execution proceedings after sale had taken place and had been confirmed. Mr. Brij Lal Gupta relied upon the case of Oudh Commercial Bank Fyzabad v. Bind Basni Kuer, AIR 1939 PC 80 (A) that was a case where in a mortagage suit a final decree was passed and a prior execution was terminated by a court order and then a subsequent application being made it was held;

“That the application could not be regarded as a fresh application in the sense of S. 48 of the Code merely by reason of the steps which the decree-holder thought it necessary to take to undo the action of the executing Court in terminating the execution case contrary to the intention of the parties. Nor the claim of interest at increased rate agreed to in the agreement made the application a fresh application as distinct from one to continue the previous proceedings as contemplated by the compromise of 1927. Nor did the fact that only part of the original properties remained bound by the security and sale able under the decree. It was on the contrary an application to revive the previous proceedings on the footing that they had not terminated. Hence the application was not a fresh application as contemplated by S. 48”.

6. A perusal of the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council shows that at one stage there had been a sale, of the property but that sale was cancelled on 18th of November 1922 by agreement and the judgment-debtors had agreed to pay certain sums by October 1923 which sums they paid. Thereafter there were Other agreements and on 9th of March 1927 there was a final agreement made by the parties whereby inter alia it had been agreed that the proceedings for auction sale should remain in abeyance in case the fixed instalments were paid regularly but if there was default the decree-holder would be competent to take out the execution immediately of its entire demand.

7. When a default was committed the decree-holder applied for an execution of its decree. The contention was that this application was a fresh application and was barred by the 12 years' rule. The Subordinate Judge upheld the contention but their Lordships of the Privy Council treated that application as a continuance of the earlier application where under the sale already referred to had been held. The Privy Council case is an authority for the proposition that a fair bargain may be entered into between the parties relating to the execution of the decree in execution proceedings and if the nature of the agreement is such that the execution application in connection with which that agreement is made cannot be deemed to have been finally disposed of as having been satisfied then a subsequent application made for enforcement of the agreement is merely in the nature of an application to revive the prior application.

8. If it is open to parties to treat a sale as cancelled by an agreement as appears from this Privy Council case I do not see why the fact that the sale had been confirmed should make it impossible for the parties in a situation as in the present case to agree that the confirmation of sale should be considered as cancelled nor do I think that the dismissal of a previous objection under Order 21 rule 90 of the CPC should prevent parties in circumstances similar to that in this case from agreeing to treat the sale as cancelled. As already stated the Agreement in this case, which was entered into between the parities, was in connection with an application of the decree-holder that a fresh sale should be held under the decree because the previous sale could not bind the interest of Srimati Kalawati as she was not impleaded in the execution application.

9. It was open to the judgment-debtors to have urged that such an application was not competent and to have it thrown out on that contention but if they chose to enter into an agreement with the decree-holder there is no reason why in the light of the Privy Council case effect should not be given to that agreement. It has long been recognized that agreements could be made in execution proceedings extending the time for payment or providing for a mode of payment which was not incorporated in the decree under execution and in such cases when the failure to comply with the agreement takes place and the decree-holder applies for execution it has been held that the decree-holder's application is merely in the nature of an application to revive the previous application for execution in which the agreement was made. See Mahendra Rao v. Bishambhar Nath AIR 1940 All 270 (FB) (B). It has also been held in Bhiki Mal v. Kundan Lal AIR 1940 All 107 (C) that where the original decree had been converted by compromise into a decree for payment by instalments and the decree-holder cannot execute the decree until the judgment-debtor had defaulted, the decree-holder's application though after twelve years from the date of the original decree but within three years of the last payment by the judgment debtor under the compromise was within limitation.

10. The same view was taken in Partab Bahadur Sahi…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Hari Ram Marwari…(Decree-Holder).*, AIR 1940 All 423 (D). Here too a person had obtained a decree against the judgment-debtor on the 17th of May 1926. On the 21st of April 1928 a compromise was entered into between the parties in the execution proceedings by which the decretal money was to be paid in eight yearly instalments, each instalment payable on the 31st of May. The judgment-debtor paid the first four instalments but made a default in the payment of the fifth instalments which fell due on 31st of May 1933.

11. The application for execution was made by the decree-holder on 5th of July 1938. It was held that the period of 12 years would be computed from the date of the default, i.e, 31-5-1933, and the application was within time and was not barred by section 48. It will thus be seen that without an amendment of the decree having been effected the parties to the decree can during the course of execution come to an agreement which not only has the effect of varying the mode of payment but which has the effect of permitting the execution of the decree beyond the period of limitation which would be available if the period of limitation was to be calculated with reference to the date of the decree. In my view, therefore, the agreement between the parties in this case could be enforced in execution and the present application is in the nature of an application to revive the previous execution application.

12. There is one point which was urged and that was that inasmuch as in the previous execution application Srimati Kalawati's heirs were not made parties after her death that previous execution application could be of no avail now as against the heirs of Srimati Kalawati even though they had agreed that the previous sale should be set aside and a fresh sale should take place. In Hrishikesh Saha v. Radha Rani Kar, AIR 1946 Cal 51 (E) it was held that though the decree-holder alter he has presented his petition for execution could not proceed against any new party whose name was not mentioned in the petition yet that principle did not apply where the decree-holder does not want to proceed against any new party but prays for continuance of the proceedings against the heir or legal representatives of the judgment-debtor originally on the record. It was also indicated that where a judgment-debtor dies pending the execution proceedings it is not necessary for the decree-holder to file a fresh application. He can continue the same execution proceedings against the heirs of the deceased by bringing them on the record. There is no bar to the names of Srimati Kalawati's heirs now being brought on the record of the first execution application, as no question of limitation arises. In my view, therefore, the agreement should have been given effect to by the courts below. This appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgments and the decrees of the courts below are set aside and the decree will now be executed in accordance with the agreement arrived at between the parties. Costs on parties of this appeal and of the Courts below. Leave to appeal to a Division Bench is refused.

V.B.B

13. Appeal allowed.