- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ram Prasad And Others v. State
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Section 522, CrPC)
Factual and Procedural Background
Ram Prasad and others were convicted by a Magistrate under Sections 147, 447 and 352 of the Indian Penal Code. The convicting Magistrate, exercising powers under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered that possession of certain immovable property be restored to the complainant, Ram Gopal, and possession was in fact delivered to the complainant.
On appeal the Assistant Sessions Judge acquitted Ram Prasad and others on 19 September 1955, observing that the prosecution had not satisfactorily established the complainant's prior possession and describing the dispute as one over rights in land to be decided in proper civil proceedings.
On 20 September 1955, the acquitted persons applied to the Assistant Sessions Judge for restitution of possession to them under Section 522, CrPC. The Assistant Sessions Judge rejected that application on 17 October 1955, holding that an appellate court could not pass an order under Section 522 when it had acquitted the accused, and that any order under Section 423(1)(d), CrPC could be made only while the appellate court was disposed of the appeal (i.e., when it was seized of it) and not after disposal.
The acquitted persons filed the present revision challenging the Assistant Sessions Judge's order of 17 October 1955. The presiding judge considered whether a larger Bench reference was necessary but concluded it was not, and proceeded to determine the revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appellate or revisional Court can pass an order under Section 522, CrPC, restoring possession to a person who has been acquitted on appeal (i.e., whether an order under Section 522 can be made in favour of an accused acquitted on appeal).
- Whether an appellate Court can, by using the powers contained in Section 423(1)(d), CrPC, pass an order setting aside or reversing a Magistrate's order under Section 522 after the appellate Court has disposed of the appeal (i.e., whether such an order can be made subsequent to disposal and not while the Court is seized of the appeal).
- Whether this High Court, in revision, should set aside a Magistrate's order under Section 522 on the ground that the accused has subsequently been acquitted on appeal (i.e., whether subsequent acquittal justifies revisional interference with a previously validly-made Section 522 order).
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants' Arguments
- The applicants urged that this Court should exercise its revisional powers and set aside the Magistrate's order under Section 522, CrPC, and thereby order restitution of possession to them, on the basis that they had been acquitted on appeal and were no longer convicted persons.
- The applicants' submission was that the subsequent event of acquittal justified revisional interference to restore possession to the acquitted persons.
No detailed account of opposing (respondent) arguments appears in the provided opinion text.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) | Application by the Court (how the opinion treats or applies the precedent) |
|---|---|---|
| Manki v. Bhagwanti, ILR 27 All 415 (A) | Held that the High Court had no power in revision to interfere with an order under Section 522, CrPC (repelling contention to the contrary). | The opinion relies on this case as supporting the proposition that a High Court cannot interfere with an order under Section 522; it treats the case as authority for the non-interference position and refers to it repeatedly. |
| Ram Chandra Mistry v. Nobin Mirdha, ILR 25 Cal 630 (B) | Referred to as a case decided before Act No. V of 1898; that earlier decisions were modified by the addition of powers in Section 423 after the Act. | The opinion cites the case as having been distinguished on the basis that enactment of Act No. V of 1898 (which enlarged powers under Section 423) changed the scope of revisional powers; the opinion notes this historical context but treats the Manki decision as authoritative for non-interference. |
| Lachman v. Emperor, AIR 1924 All 212 (C) | Observed that an appellate Court could not itself pass an order under Section 522 but, if a trial Court had passed some order under Section 522, the appellate Court acting under Section 423(d) might have power to interfere with that order. | The opinion cites this case for the proposition that an appellate Court cannot directly make a Section 522 order for the first time in favour of a party; it notes the case's incidental observation but treats it as not fully developed authority for broad interference with Section 522 orders. |
| Malkhan Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1945 All 226 (D) | Waliullah, J., observed that a Court of revision had power under Section 439 read with Section 423(1)(d), CrPC, to reverse an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 522, CrPC. | The opinion reproduces the observation but criticises that no reasons were given for that view; the opinion does not accept it as controlling and indicates disagreement with that reasoning. |
| Mahomod Din v. Emperor, AIR 1919 Lah 399 (E) | Held that an order under Section 522 directing restoration of immovable property cannot be regarded as a consequential or incidental order within the purview of Section 423(1), clause (d), of the Code. | The opinion cites this case as supporting the position that Section 522 orders are independent and not merely consequential or incidental to a conviction, and uses it to bolster the conclusion that appellate/revisional interference is not justified on the basis that such orders are incidental. |
| Bhagabat Shaha v. Sadique Ostagar, ILR 39 Cal 1050 (F) | Expressed the same view as Mahomod Din that a Section 522 order is not a consequential or incidental order within Section 423(1)(d). | The opinion cites this decision as another authority supporting the non-consequential character of Section 522 orders and uses it to support refusal to treat reversal of a Section 522 order as a mere consequential order. |
| Gouhari Gope v. Alay Gopini, ILR 29 Cal 724 (G) | Held that an appellate Court could interfere with an order under Section 522 in view of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 423, CrPC. | The opinion notes this authority but observes that no reason is given there why such interference would amount to making a consequential or incidental order; the opinion treats it as a conflicting view without elaboration in that case. |
| Ahmed Ali v. Keenoo Khan, ILR 36 Cal 44 (H) | Held that where a Magistrate did not pass orders under Section 522 (but passed other orders), it was the Magistrate's duty to pass orders under Sections 522 and 517 directing restoration to the person forcibly dispossessed. | The opinion cites this case to illustrate circumstances in which a higher Court directed restoration under Section 522 where the trial Court had omitted to pass a required order; the opinion distinguishes that situation from the present case because here a valid Section 522 order had in fact been passed by the Magistrate. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds from statutory text and a close analysis of the powers given by Section 522 read with Section 423(1)(d) and related provisions:
- Statutory construction of Section 522: The court reproduces Sub-sections (1)–(3) of Section 522, CrPC, and interprets Sub-section (1) as authorising the convicting Court to order restoration of possession to a person dispossessed by criminal force or intimidation where the offender is convicted. Sub-section (3) expressly allows "any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision" to make an order under Section 522, but the court reads this to mean those superior Courts may make a Section 522 order only in the circumstances set out in Sub-section (1) — i.e., when they themselves convict or uphold a conviction.
- Distinction between a convicted person and an acquitted person: The court emphasises that an acquitted person is not a convicted person. Where dispossession resulted from lawful compliance with a Magistrate's valid Section 522 order, the dispossession is lawful and cannot be treated as dispossession by criminal force or intimidation that would justify a fresh Section 522 order in favour of the acquitted.
- Temporal and jurisdictional limits of Section 423(1)(d): The court accepts the Assistant Sessions Judge's concession that while disposing of an appeal an appellate Court could make consequential or incidental orders under Section 423(1)(d), such amendments or consequential orders must be made in the course of disposing of the appeal while the Court is seized of it. Once the appeal is disposed of, the appellate Court no longer has jurisdiction to make such an order; therefore the Assistant Sessions Judge rightly refused to exercise Section 423(1)(d) powers after disposing of the appeal.
- Finality of a Section 522 order: The court reasons that an order under Section 522(1) is intended to be final in character. If the Legislature had intended appellate/revisional courts to have the broad power to stay, modify or annul a Section 522 order during the pendency of an appeal, Sub-section (3) could have been drafted along the lines of Section 520, which explicitly provides those powers for certain kinds of orders. Further, Sub-section (2) of Section 522 — which preserves civil rights and interests in the property — indicates the Legislature contemplated civil remedies for disputed rights rather than appellate disturbance of a Section 522 dispossession.
- Limited scope for revisional interference: The court accepts that the High Court may, in revisional jurisdiction, interfere with inferior Court orders on the usual grounds of impropriety, illegality or incorrectness of the order itself — that is, where the Section 522 order was invalid when passed. But the present revision does not challenge the correctness of the Magistrate's order at the time it was passed; it instead asks that the order be set aside because of a subsequent acquittal. The court is reluctant to permit revisional interference on that basis unless there are very strong and clear reasons.
- Role of acquittal in relation to entitlement to possession: The court explains that acquittal in criminal cases often rests on doubts about the prosecution's case and does not necessarily establish that the accused is entitled to possession of the property. Consequently, the mere fact of acquittal does not automatically translate into a legal right to restitution of possession taken under a valid Section 522 order.
- Precedential survey and weighing of authorities: The court surveys a number of earlier cases (both favouring and disfavoring appellate/revisional interference) and concludes that, on balance and on statutory construction, Section 522 orders are independent and not merely consequential orders that fall within the incidental power under Section 423(1)(d). The court expresses explicit disagreement with authorities that treat reversal of Section 522 orders as allowable under Section 423(1)(d) without adequate reasoning.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The revision against the order of the Assistant Sessions Judge is dismissed; the Assistant Sessions Judge's order of 17 October 1955 is correct and has no force for interference by this Court in revision on the basis of subsequent acquittal.
Implications (direct consequences and scope):
- Direct effect: The Magistrate's original order under Section 522, CrPC — directing restoration of possession to the complainant and resulting in actual delivery of possession to the complainant — remains operative and is not set aside by this revision. The acquitted persons are not entitled, on the sole ground of subsequent acquittal, to restitution of possession by way of this revision.
- Scope of appellate/revisional power as articulated: The court holds that appellate or revisional Courts may make orders under Section 522 only in the circumstances envisaged by Sub-section (1) (i.e., where they themselves convict or uphold a conviction) and that an order under Section 522 is not to be treated as a mere consequential or incidental order that an appellate Court can routinely reverse under Section 423(1)(d) after disposal of an appeal. Revisional interference is limited to the conventional grounds of impropriety, illegality or incorrectness of the Section 522 order itself when passed.
- On broader precedent: The opinion critiques certain earlier decisions that allowed broader interference but does not purport to restate or create a new legislative rule; it applies statutory construction and precedential reasoning to deny the specific relief sought in this revision.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the reasoning, findings and references contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion text has been introduced.
1. Ram Prasad and others were convicted of offences under Sections 147, 447 and 352, I. P. C. Subsequent to their conviction, the Magistrate convicting them passed an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, ordering them to restore possession to the complainant Ram Gopal. Possession was actually delivered to the complainant. On appeal, Ram Prasad and others were acquitted by the Assistant Sessions Judge on 19th of September, 1955. The Court observed :
In view of what I have observed above it cannot be said that the prosecution has satisfactorily established the possession of Ram Gopal on the plots in suit immediately before the occurrence. No case Under Sections 147, 447 and 352, I. P. C. has thus been established. The real dispute between the parties seems to be about their rights in the land but they should be solved through proper Court by proper proceedings.
2. On 20th of September, 1955, Ram Prasad and others, the acquitted persons, applied to the Assistant Sessions Judge for the restitution of possession over the land in dispute under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure. This application was rejected on 17th of October, 1955. It was held that the appellate Court could not pass an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, when it acquitted the accused-appellants.
It was further held that though the appellate Court could pass an order of restitution of possession to the accused against whom an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure had been passed by the trial Court, yet such an order under Section 423 (1) (d), Code of Criminal Procedure could be passed only when the appellate Court was seized of the appeal and not subsequent to its disposal.
3. Ram Prasad and others have filed this revision against the order of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge dated 17th of October, 1955. At the time of hearing of this revision, I was inclined to the view that a reference to a larger Bench would be necessary in view of some previous decisions of this Court with which I was not in full agreement and which views have been expressed practically without any discussion of the points. I have now reconsidered the whole matter and am of opinion that no such reference is necessary for purposes of disposing of this revision.
4. No exception can be taken to the views expressed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge on both the points. Section 522, Code, of Criminal Procedure is:
"522 (1). Whenever a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation and it appears to the Court that by such force or show of force or criminal intimidation any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit, when convicting such person or at any time within one month from the date of the conviction order the person dispossessed to be restored to the possession of the same.
(2) No such order shall prejudice any right or interest to or in such immovable property which any person may be able to establish in civil suit.
(3). An order under this section may be made by any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision."
Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure authorises the Court convicting a person of certain type of offences committed in certain circumstances, to order the person dispossessed to be restored to the possession of the property. This power can be exercised by any Court of appeal, confirmation, refer-Jence or revision also in view of Sub-section (3).
Such Courts can, therefore, also pass an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Proce dure in the circumstances set out in Sub-section (1), that is, when a person is convicted by them or his conviction is upheld by them for specific types of offences. There is nothing in this section which empowers the appellate. Court to pass an order for re-delivery of possession to tho person acquitted on appeal. In fact, such an order will not come within the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure at all.
An acquitted person is surely not a convicted person. He was not dispossessed by Criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation. He was dispossessed in compliance with the order of the Magistrate duly passed under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure. His dispossession was lawful and the order dispossessing him will have to be set aside by an authority competent to set it aside in proper proceedings.
5. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge conceded that he could have set aside the Magistrate's order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, at the time of the disposal of the appeal in view of Section 423 (1) (d), Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 423 deals with the powers of the appellate Court in disposing of an appeal and provides in Clause (d) that the appellate Court may make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper.
It is clear that such a type of order must be passed when disposing of the appeal and not subsequently when the appellate Court has ceased having jurisdiction over the appeal. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge was, therefore, right that he could not pass an order purporting to be an order under Section 423 (1) (d), Code of Criminal Procedure after he had disposed of the appeal.
5a. In view of the above, the revision against the order of the Assistant Sessions Judge has no force, the order sought to be revised being a correct order.
5b. I may note at once that I have grave doubts about the correctness of the view that an appellate Court, when disposing of an appeal, can pass an order setting aside an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, considering such an order to be a just or proper amendment or a consequential or incidental order. I shall enlarge on this subject later on.
6. It has been urged for the applicants that this Court should exercise its own revi-sional powers and order the restitution of possession to the applicants by setting aside the order of the Magistrate. Such an order, if passed, will not be in the exercise of the powers tinder Sub-clause (3) of Section 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of what I have said above.
Such an order would be an order in the exercise of powers under Section 439 read with Section 423 (1) (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate's order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure was a correct order, when passed. No revision was filed against that order as an incorrect order. The present revision too does not challenge the correctness of the order under Section 522, Code of Ciiminal Procedure on the ground that it could not have been passed when it was ac- tually passed.
The submission for the applicants is that this Court should set aside the order validly passed in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction in view of subsequent event, the event in this case being that the accused were acquitted on appeal and are no longer convicted persons. I would hesitate to exercise revi-sional powers in such circumstances unless it be for very strong and clear reasons justifying such interference.
7. I am of opinion that the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates an order under Section 522 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure, to be a final order. Of course, no appeal is provided against such an order. The Courts of appeal, confirmation reference or revision have been given a power to make an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, that is, to order a convicted person to restore possession to the complainant who had been dispossessed by force or show of force or by criminal intimidation. Sub-section (3) does not empower such Courts to set aside an order passed by a Magistrate under Sub-section (1) of Section 522 or even to modify or alter it or to pass any further just orders. It can pass only one type of order and that order can be, as just mentioned, to restore possession to the dispossessed complainant. A comparison of Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure, prominently brings out this fact.
Sections 517, 518 and 519 provide for orders about certain property in Court at the conclusion of an inquiry or trial. Section 520 empowers Courts of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision to direct the stay of orders passed by the inferior Court and to modify, alter or annul such orders and make any further orders that may be just.
Similar Courts have not been empowered to stay the operation of an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, during the pendency of an appeal, or revision or reference and they have not been expressly given any power to modify, alter or annul such order or to make any such order. If the Legislature did intend such Courts to exercise these powers, which are now sought to be held to be incidental powers, Sub-section (3) of S- 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, could have contained provisions similar to those in Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure.
8. In this connection it is significant to refer to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that an order under Sub-section (1) will not prejudice any right or interest to or in such immovable property which any person may be able to establish in a civil suit. This is a clear indication of the fact that the Legislature intended an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522 to be a final order and did not intend it to be the subject of interference by any superior Court. Such an order was to be final subject to an aggrieved party establishing his right or inte-rest to the immovable property in a civil suit. An order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522 can be revisable like other orders of an inferior Court by the High Court on the grounds of impropriety, illegality or incorrectness of the order itself, that is, on the ground that that order could not have been properly or legally passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Criminal Procedure Code. I have already indicated that that is not the question in the present case.
9. In this view of the matter, there is no jurisdiction for interference with the original order passed by the Magistrate under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
10. I do not subscribe to the view urged for the applicants that the mere fact that the applicants have been acquitted of the offence, they were convicted of, justifies the restitution of possession of the property in dispute. Acquittal in criminal cases is not always on a definite finding about the accused being in possession or being entitled to possession of the immovable property. Acquittals mostly are on the basis of the Courts entertaining doubts about the correctness of the prosecution version. .
The mere fact of acquittal does not neces-sarily mean that the acquitted person is entitl-ed to the possession of the property over which possession had been delivered to the complain-ant under an order of the convicting Court un-der Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure. Unless this Court be in a position to say definitely that the accused is entitled to the property and not the complainant, the question of exercising inherent powers of this Court in the interest of justice does not arise and it cannot be said that justice requires that the acquitted person should be re-delivered possession of the property which had been taken out of his possession under the valid order of a Court.
11. I may refer to certain cases of this Court which have some bearing on the questions considered by me. The first case is reported in Manki v. Bhagwanti, ILR 27 All 415 (A). In that case, the District Magistrate moved the High Court to interfere in revision and restore the possession to the acquitted person. It was held, in repelling the contention based on the case reported in Ram Chandra Mistry v. Nobin Mirdha. ILR 25 Cal 630 (B), that the High Court had no power to interfere with an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, that --
That case was decided before Act No. V of 1898 came into force. Among the powers conferred on this Court as a Court of revision are all the powers set out in Section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By Act No. V of 1898 one additional power to those which already existed was added, namely, the power of mak ing any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. These powers, are very wide, and in our opinion authorise this Court to interfere in a case like the present.
As mentioned by me earlier, no reasons have been given why an order setting aside an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure could come within the provisions of Section 423(1) (d), Code of Criminal Procedure, which empowers an appellate Court, when disposing of an appeal, to make any just or proper amendment or any consequential or incidental order.
12. Till Sub-section (3) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1923, it had been held that a Court of appeal or revision could not pass an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, and that such an order could be passed only by the Court which convicted a person. It follows from this that an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, is not a consequential or incidental order vis-a-vis an order of conviction.
It is an independent order. If it was a consequential or an incidental order, there was no necessity of specifically providing for it in Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, and such an order could be made by the appellate Court when the trial Court omitted to pass such an order. The appellate Court could not pass this order because it was an independent order.
Anyway, if an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, could be said to be a consequential or incidental order to a conviction, the order reversing such an order on an acquittal cannot be said to be a consequential or incidental order as it does not necessarily follow that an order of acquittal must lead to the conclusion that the accused is entitled to the restoration of possession.
Unless it can be held so, no question of justness or propriety would arise and no ques-tion would arise of such an order flowing auto-matically as a result of an acquittal. To me the reasons given in the Calcutta case, refer-red to above, appear to hold good for the view that the appellate Court cannot reverse an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure.
13. The next case is reported in Lachman v. Emperor, AIR 1924 All 212 (C). There the appellate Court ordered the convicting Court, when confirming the conviction in appeal, to pass an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held by Sulaiman, J., as he then was, that such an order could not be passed. It was, however, observed --
"Had some order been passed by the trial Court under Section 522, Criminal Procedure Code, then the appellate Court acting under Section 423, Sub-clause (d) of the Criminal Procedure Cnde, had power to make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that might be just or proper and thus to interfere with that order."
Nothing more is said in that connection and this observation could be just the result of what has been held in ILR 27 All 415 (A).
14. The next case is Malkhan Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1945 All 226 (D). In this case, the acquitted persons applied to the Magistrate, who passed the order under Section 522. Code of Criminal Procedure, to rescind his order under that section. Their application was rejected by the Magistrate. Their revision was also rejected by the Sessions Judge. They came in revision to the High Court. Waliullah, J., observed :--
"It seems to me that the point is a very simple one. The question is whether under the circumstances set out above, possession over the house should be restored to the applicants from whom it had been taken away on their conviction and delivered to the complainant. There can be no doubt whatsoever that this Court has power as a Court of revision under Section 439 read with Section 423, Sub-section (1), Sub-clause (d). Criminal P. C., to reverse an order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 522, Criminal P. C."
Again, no reasons for the view have been given except that such had been the view in ILR 27 All 415 (A). Section .423(1) (d), Code of Criminal Procedure, provides for the making of any consequential or incidental order. Reversal of orders is contemplated inClause(c) and can be done in an appeal from any order other than an order convicting or acquitting a person. No appeal is provided against an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, such an order cannot be reversed by con-sideling an order of reversal to be a consequential or incidental order.
15. The facts of this case would bear out what I have said above that an acquittal does not necessarily mean that the accused is, in law, entitled to the possession of, the property. The learned Judge further observed in continuation of what has been quoted above --
"It has been urged by the learned counsel for the complainant that in this particular case the findings by the appellate Court come to this that the house really belonged to the complainant and he was deprived of the possession of the same on account of the commission of the offence under Section 448, Penal Code. It is, however, clear that after the quashing of the conviction by the appellate Court the accused (the applicants) must be deemed to be innocent of the crime."
With respect to the learned Judge, it appears to me that the accused was restored possession though he was not entitled to it and the mere presumption of innocence is not a clinching ground to consider restitution of possession to be just. It was, however, observed in the same continuation --
When once their conviction has been set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 522, Criminal P. C., which was obviously passed in consequence of such a conviction must also be set aside and the property should be restored to the accused even though the equities may in a sense be in favour of the complainant.
With respect, I am of opinion that it is not in consequence of a conviction that an order under Section 522(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, is passed. Such an order is not automatically passed merely on the basis of conviction. The convicting Court has to consider wnether it is fit to restore possession to the complainant.
There may be circumstances in which even thougn an aucused is convicted of offences coming within the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 522, the convicting Court may not consider it fit to restore possession to the complainant. An order under that sub-section, theretore, is an independent order, the necessdry condition precedent to the making of that order being that the person, against whom an order is passed, be a convicted person, but such an order is not in consequence of the conviction of such a person.
I do not, therefore, with respect, subscribe to the view that an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, must be set aside after the acquittal of the accused even though it be not just to do so. The Court must see, if it is passing an order, which it considers to be incidental or consequential, that it is a just or proper order. It was held in Mahomod Din v. Emperor, AIR 1919 Lah 399 (E), that --
"an order under Section 522, Criminal P. C., directing the restoration of immovable property to the person entitled thereto cannot be regarded as a consequential or incidental order within the purview of section 423(1),clause(4), of the Code."
The same view was taken in Bhagabat Shaha v. Sadique Ostagar, ILR 39 Cal 1050 (F).
16. It was held in Gouhari Gope v. Alay Gopini, ILR 29 Cal 724 (G), that an appellate Court could interfere with an order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, in view ofClause(d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 423, Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no reason given why sucn interference would amount to the making of a consequential or incidental order.
17. In Ahmed Ali v. Keenoo Khan, ILR 36 Cal 44 (H), an accused was convicted under Section 323, I. P. C. It was also found by the Magistrate that the accused had dispossessed the complainant. The Magistrate did not pass any order under Sub-section (1) of Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure, in favour of the complainant, rather he passed orders for the return of the property to the party in whose possession they were found and further ordered that the possession of the bungalow he delivered to the accused in whose possession it was found by the police. The High Court set aside these orders holding that --
"In those circumstances it was the duty of the Magistrate to pass orders under Sections 522 and 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directing restoration to the petitioner of, the bungalow and its contents from which it was found he had been forcibly dispossessed."
Relying on ILR 27 All 415 (A), they repelled the contention that they could not interfere witn an order passed under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure. No such question really arose in that case because the Magistrate had passed no order under Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure. His orders were under Section 517, Code of Criminal Procedure, and those orders could be interfered with under Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure.Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure.Section 522, Code of Criminal Procedure,Alert