- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Shri Rama Shanker v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Desai, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This application sought quashing of criminal proceedings pending against the applicant in the court of a first class Magistrate or, alternatively, transfer of those proceedings to another district. The criminal proceedings arose under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, based on a police report concerning alleged embezzlement of a large sum entrusted to the applicant to carry from one place to another.
A Panchayat Raj Inspector reported that he encashed a cheque for Rs. 5,746-14/- at Ghazipur and, being afraid to carry such a large sum to his headquarters at Dildarnagar, the Inspector entrusted the money (kept in a purse) to the applicant to carry to Tarighat across the Ganges. Later, when the Inspector met the applicant at Tarighat and asked for the money, the applicant said he had already returned it, which was untrue according to the report. The police investigated, raided the applicant's shop and recovered Rs. 1,016/-, found the applicant absent, and arrested his brother. The applicant surrendered to the court the next day and pleaded an alibi during investigation.
The applicant alleged that the investigating officer at first submitted a final report and later submitted a charge-sheet after direction by the District Magistrate while inspecting the police station. The District Magistrate took cognizance on that charge-sheet and the applicant is being tried. Departmental proceedings were also taken against the Inspector; the Inspector deposited the full amount with the District Panchayat Officer. The applicant applied to quash the proceedings or to transfer the case.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant (under Section 406, IPC) could be quashed at this stage on the ground that no offence was made out or because of the applicant's alibi.
- Whether the learned Magistrate committed illegality in taking cognizance of the offence on a charge-sheet submitted by the investigating officer after the investigating officer had earlier submitted a final report.
- Whether an investigating officer may, after submitting a final report, submit a subsequent charge-sheet (especially when directed by a superior such as the District Magistrate or Superintendent of Police), and whether such an act is judicial or administrative in character.
- Whether the case should be transferred to another district on grounds of apprehended unfairness, particularly in view of the District Magistrate's prior direction and subsequent transfer.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The applicant contended that the investigating officer initially submitted a final report (which would normally exonerate him) but later, under direction of the District Magistrate, submitted a charge-sheet; on this basis the applicant challenged the legality of the Magistrate taking cognizance on that later charge-sheet.
- The applicant raised an alibi and argued that the proceedings should be quashed because he had committed no offence.
- The applicant sought transfer of the case to another district, relying on apprehension that he would not receive a fair trial in Ghazipur given the District Magistrate's involvement.
Prosecution / Respondent Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's legal arguments beyond factual assertions in the charge-sheet and the police investigation's finding that the Inspector's report was true.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid, A.I.R. 1928 Patna 585 | Characterized (per that decision) the direction to an investigating officer to submit a charge-sheet as a judicial order. | The Court expressly disagreed with that view. It held that directing an investigating officer to submit a charge-sheet is administrative, not judicial; therefore the act of submitting a charge-sheet is not a judicial act subject to court control in the manner suggested by that precedent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by outlining and applying the relevant statutory framework: Sections 156, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) and Section 190 concerning a Magistrate's power to take cognizance.
- The Court noted that Section 173 requires the investigating officer to report the result of investigation in the prescribed form to the Magistrate, which covers both what are popularly called a "final report" and a "charge-sheet."
- The Court explained that under Section 190 a first class Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a report in writing of facts made by a police officer, which includes a report under Section 173. Thus a Magistrate is competent to take cognizance on such a report.
- Concerning discretionary vs. mandatory aspects, the Court observed that whether taking cognizance is obligatory or discretionary need not be decided because the Magistrate had in fact taken cognizance; even if discretionary, the exercise of discretion can only be challenged if arbitrary or against established principles. The Court found no arbitrariness or error.
- The Court rejected the contention that an earlier final report barred a later charge-sheet. It held that the law does not require the Magistrate to consider whether a prior final report had been submitted or whether the later charge-sheet was submitted under administrative direction — so long as the subsequent report contained facts constituting an offence, the Magistrate could take cognizance. The matter is not governed by res judicata principles.
- The Court reasoned alternatively that even if an investigating officer lacked power to submit a charge-sheet after a final report (an assertion the Court did not accept), the subsequent document still amounted to an "information" to the Magistrate and he had absolute discretion to treat it as such and take cognizance.
- On the character of an investigating officer's act, the Court disagreed with the precedent Shukadeva Sahay to the extent it treated a direction to submit a charge-sheet as judicial. The Court held that investigation and reporting under Section 173 are administrative; a court has no judicial control over the manner of investigation or the circumstances in which an investigating officer makes his report. A superior police officer may direct further investigation and the investigating officer may submit a subsequent report to reflect findings of that further inquiry.
- Regarding quashing at this stage, the Court emphasized that if the report, taken at face value, contains the ingredients of an offence, it is not open at this stage to hold there is no truth in it; the applicant's alibi and other defenses are matters to be tried and decided at trial, not on an application to quash.
- On transfer, the Court found no basis: the District Magistrate who gave the direction had been transferred out of the district and no allegations were made against the trying Magistrate or other authorities; therefore there were no reasonable grounds to apprehend an unfair trial.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: APPLICATION DISMISSED.
Direct effect: The application to quash the proceedings was dismissed and the application to transfer the case to another district was also refused. Consequently, the criminal proceedings under Section 406, IPC, will continue before the first class Magistrate in Ghazipur and the applicant must defend himself at trial (including by producing alibi evidence at the appropriate stage).
Legal implications noted by the Court: The Court explicitly rejected the view in Shukadeva Sahay (A.I.R. 1928 Patna 585) that directing an investigating officer to submit a charge-sheet is a judicial order. The Court held that the act of submitting a report under Section 173 is administrative in character and that a Magistrate may take cognizance on a subsequent report or treat a subsequent report as an information. The opinion therefore clarifies the Court's position on the administrative character of police reporting under Section 173, but the decision's immediate consequence was to permit continuation of the trial rather than to quash or transfer proceedings.
This summary is based exclusively on information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts not stated in that opinion.
Desai, J.:— This is an application for quashing the proceedings pending against the applicant in the court of a first class Magistrate or transferring the proceedings to another district. The proceedings are under Sec. 406, I.P.C, commenced on a report of the police. The case against him is that he embezzled a large sum of money which was entrusted to him for being carried from one place to another. A Panchayat Raj Inspector made a report against the applicant on 8-7-1954 on the following allegations:—
2. The Inspector enchased a cheque for the sum of Rs. 5,746/14/- at Ghazipur in the presence of the applicant who is a businessman. The Inspector was afraid of carrying such a large sum of money from Ghazipur to Dildarnagar where his headquarters are. The applicant offered to carry the money, which was kept in a purse, from Ghazipur to Tarighat across the Ganges. The applicant and the Inspector separated. When some time later the Inspector met the applicant at Tarighat and asked for the money, the applicant told him that he had already returned it to him. Actually the money had not been returned. The police investigated into the matter, raided the applicants' shop and recovered Rs. 1016/-, found the applicant absent and took proceedings against him under Secs. 87 and 88, Cr. P.C, and arrested his brother. The applicant surrendered himself in court on the following day and pleaded alibi during the investigation.
3. It is alleged by the applicant that the investigating officer at first submitted a final report as the result of the investigation but later on he submitted a charge-sheet against him in accordance with a direction given to him by the District Magistrate while inspecting the police station. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on the charge-sheet submitted by the police and the applicant is being tried. Departmental proceedings were taken against the Inspector also for losing the money which belonged to the Panchayat Raj Department. The Inspector deposited the whole amount with the District Panchayat Officer. But these facts do not affect the applicant's guilt, if any.
4. It is stated in the charge-sheet that on investigation the report made by the Inspector was found to be true and that consequently the offence of Sec. 406, I.P.C, was made out. That the allegations made in the report make out an offence under Sec. 406, I.P.C, admits of no doubt. All the ingredients of the offence are alleged and if the report is true, the applicant is guilty. The police have found the report to be true after investigation and it is not open to any court to say at this stage that there is no truth in the report. Whether there is any truth in it or not will be seen when the trial is concluded. Before the trial is concluded no finding on this point can be given and the proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground that the applicant has committed, no offence. This is not the stage for considering the alibi evidence of the applicant; he should produce it when he is called upon to defend himself at the trial.
5. Now I come to the most important question whether any illegality was committed by the Magistrate's taking cognizance of the offence against the applicant on a charge-sheet submitted to him by the investigating officer under administrative directions of the District Magistrate after he had once submitted a final report. The investigation was done by the investigating officer under Sec. 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If upon investigation an investigating officer finds that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify prosecution of the accused, he is required by Sec. 169 of the Code to release him from custody. If, on the other hand, he finds that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, he is required by Sec. 170 to forward him under custody to the Magistrate having jurisdiction over him. Sec. 173 requires the investigating officer on completing the investigation to report the result in the prescribed form to the Magistrate empowered to take sognizance of the offence. This report includes both the reports popularly known as “final report” and “charge-sheet.” Under Sec. 190 a first class Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such offence, or upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer, or upon an information received from any other person, or upon own knowledge or suspicion. The police officer's report referred to in the section includes a report made by an investigating officer under Sec. 173. These are all the provisions of law governing the question before us.
6. A first class Magistrate is competent under Sec. 190 to take cognizance of an offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by an investigating officer. It is unnecessary to go into the question whether he is bound to take cognizance or it is discretionary with him to take cognizance upon a report made by any police officer, because in the present case the Magistrate has taken cognizance. He is not required to take into consideration any particular fact. If there is a report in writing of facts constituting an offence, according to one view he must take cognizance regardless of all other facts. If he is not bound and it is within his discretion whether to take cognizance or not, his taking cognizance cannot be challenged unless he exercises his discretion arbitrarily or against the established principles. Taking cognizance of an offence is certainly a judicial matter and subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. If the learned Magistrate erroneously took cognizance of the offence against the applicant, his order of taking cognizance of the offence could be revised by this Court under Sec. 439 of the Code. When it is open to the applicant to move this Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, he cannot move it to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. But even if he had invoked this Court's revisional jurisdiction, so long as he could not make out that the learned Magistrate had exercised his discretion arbitrarily or erroneously he could not succeed. There was nothing arbitrary or erroneous in the learned Magistrate's taking cognizance, because the report of the investigating officer referred to the first information report made by the Inspector against the applicant and mentioned that the first information report was found to be true upon investigation. The law does not require a Magistrate to take into consideration whether previously the investigating officer had reported that the first information report had not been found to be true or whether he had been directed by the District Magistrate to submit a charge-sheet instead of a final report. It is not known whether the final report had reached the learned Magistrate or not. We assume that it had and he had accepted it. But even then he was not barred by any law from taking cognizance on a subsequent report, provided it mentioned facts constituting the offence. The matter is not governed by any such principle as of res judicata and the learned Magistrate's failure to take cognizance of the offence on the earlier report did not prevent his taking cognizance on the subsequent report. A first class Magistrate's powers to take cognizance are vast and the law has placed no limits on them.
7. Even if it be said that the investigating officer had no power to submit a charge-sheet after he had submitted a final report and consequently the charge-sheet did not amount in the eye of law to a report in writing of facts constituting an offence made by a police officer, it was undoubtedly an information given to the learned Magistrate and there was nothing to prevent his taking cognizance of the offence on it. It was his absolute discretion to treat it as an information and once he treated it as such, it was open to him to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no illegality whatsoever was committed by the learned Magistrate's taking cognizance of the offence.
8. Really no illegality was committed by the investigating officer in submitting a charge-sheet after previously submitting a final report. With great respect we do not agree with the view taken in Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid A.I.R 1928 Patna 585. to the effect that directing an investigating officer to submit a charge-sheet is a judicial order. An investigating officer is required by Sec. 173 of the Code to submit a charge-sheet, but this does not render his act of submitting a charge-sheet a judicial act. A court has no judicial control over investigations and over the manner, or the circumstances, in which an investigating officer makes his report under Sec. 173. An investigating officer's act is wholly administrative. There is, therefore, nothing to prevent his submitting another report in supersession of an earlier one. He can do it on his own initiative, or under direction of the Superintendent of Police or the District Magistrate. If the Superintendent of Police or the District Magistrate directs him to submit a charge-sheet to replace a final report, the direction is administrative and not subject to any control by a court. A report under Sec. 173 has to be made by an investigating officer through a superior officer and the superior officer has been expressly authorized to direct the investigating officer to make further investigation pending the Magistrate's orders. If a final report is submitted at first but on further investigation ordered by the superior police officer the investigating officer finds that the accused has committed an offence, he would naturally be bound to submit a charge-sheet against him to supersede the final report. It would have been useless to direct him to make further investigation if he could not follow up the further investigation with another report.
9. We, therefore, find that no case is made out for quashing the proceedings.
10. There is no justification for transferring the case to another district. The District Magistrate, who had directed the police to submit a charge-sheet, has been transferred from the district. No allegations were made against the trying Magistrate or any other authority in the district. The applicant, therefore, has no reasonable ground for apprehending that he will not have a fair trial in Ghazipur district. The application is dismissed.
11. Application dismissed.
Alert