State v. Sheo Prasad Jaiswal

Mehrotra, J.:— These appeals have been filed on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh against the respondent Sheo Prasad Jaiswal, alleged to be the proprietor of the Hindustan Oil Mills, Vidyapith Road, Banaras against an order of the Sessions Judge of Banaras acquitting him of the charge under S. 7 read with S. 10, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 for contravention of the conditions of the licence granted to the Hindustan Oil Mills, Banaras under the U.P Oilseeds and Oilseeds Products' Control Order, 1945.

2. The Magistrate convicted him under the foresaid sections and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in each of these cases and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. On appeal the conviction was set aside by the Sessions Judge. The prosecution case is that the Hindustan Oil Mills, Banaras holds a B Class licence. The respondent, Sheo Prasad Jaiswal is its sole proprietor and, according to the conditions of the licence, the firm was bound to maintain a register in English, Hindi and Urdu showing separately he transaction in each kind of oilseed or their products in which it was dealing specifying correctly the opening balance on each day, the quantities received during each day and the quantities old locally each day and also the quantities sold outside the controlled oilseeds and oil markets.

3. The licensee was further bound to furnish correctly such information as might be demanded from it by the Regional Food Controller or by any other person authorised by him in this behalf. The licensee was asked to submit correct fortnightly statements of the stocks received by it and as the returns submitted by the licensee were incorrect, the condition of the licence was contravened.

4. In Appeal No. 404 of 1952 the allegation of the prosecution is that the firm had received 675 maunds of linseed on 15-4-1946, 294 maunds and 30 seers of linseed on 22-4-1946 and 270 maunds of linseed on 9-5-1946 but their receipts were not shown in the fortnightly statements ending on 15-4-1943, 30-4-1946 and 15-5-1946, submitted by the firm to the Regional Food Controller Banaras.

5. In Appeal No. 411 of 1952 the allegation of the prosecution is that the firm had received 267 maunds of linseed on 27-7-1946, 540 maunds of linseed on 8-8-1946, and 1092 maunds of linseed on 14-8-1946 but none of these receipts were shown in the fortnightly statements ending on 31-7-1946 and 15-8-1946 given by the firm in response to the order of the Regional Food Controller.

6. In Appeal No. 412 of 1952, the charge was that the firm had received 297 maunds of linseed on 3-6-1946 and 654 maunds 30 seers of linseed on 25-6-1946 but they were not shown in the fortnightly statements ending on 15-6-1943 and 30-6-1946. The charge against the opposite party was that he, being she sole proprietor of the Hindustan Oil Mills, Banaras, which held a B class licence, violated condition 3 of the licence and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 7 read With Ss. 8, 9, 10 and 17 of Act 24 of 1946.

7. Similar charges were framed in other cases also which are the subject-matter of the connected appeals. The Magistrate, after considering the evidence and the points' of law raised by the opposite party, found him guilty of an offence under S. 7/10 of Act 24 of 1946 and convicted him for the same and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in each of these cases and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months.

8. One Gaya Prasad was a co-accused in the case but he died during the pendency of the trial.

9. The defence taken by the respondent was that he knew nothing about the alleged contravention as he is a mere sleeping partner of 12 annas and Gaya Prasad was working partner of 4 annas share in the firm. The opposite party mostly resided at Calcutta and looked after his business there as his father had become very old and he was the only son.

10. Gaya Prasad, who was a co-accused before the trial Court, in his statement had admitted that the consignments in question had been received on the dates mentioned by the prosecution but they were not entered in the stock register of the firm on the due dates as they were kept outside the mill for being cleaned and after they were cleaned and reweighed, entries were made subsequently in the register.

11. The Magistrate came to the findings that the statements submitted by the firm about receipts of different quantities of linseed were incorrect and that the opposite party was present at Banaras and looked after his business there and the contravention of the condition of the licence was committed within his knowledge.

12. In appeal it was contended by the opposite party that in view of the facts alleged by the prosecution, the opposite party could only be tried under S. 10, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and that, in any case, the liability of the opposite party was not an absolute liability. Mens rea or guilty mind was an essential ingredient of an offence under Sections 7 and 10 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Pdwers) Act.

13. As the prosecution has failed to prove any guilty intention on the part of the respondent inasmuch as he had no knowledge that the statements submitted were false statements, the opposite party could not be convicted under Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. The prosecution had further alleged that in fact the opposite party had knowledge of the receipt of the articles and that the statements submitted were incorrect. The Sessions Judge accepted the contention raised by the defence and acquitted the respondent of the charge under Sections 7 & 10 of the Essential Supplies Act.

14. In appeal before us it has been strenuously contended by the counsel for the State that the element of mens rea is not a necessary ingredient of an offence, under S. 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and there was an absolute liability on the respondent as a licensee to carry out the terms of the licence.

15. Any breach of the terms of the licence made him responsible even though he may have had no knowledge of the transaction. It was also contended by the State Counsel that the respondent was the sole proprietor of the firm. He used to look after the business at Banaras and he used to operate on the accounts occasionally. Gaya Prasad was only working as his agent. The opposite party, therefore, will be deemed in law to have knowledge of the fact that the statements submitted were false.

16. It was also urged by the counsel for the State that the Sessions Judge was not right in holding that the respondent could be tried under S. 10, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. He was rightly convicted by the Magistrate under S. 7 of the Act.

17. At one stage of the arguments, it was contended by the Advocate General that the respondent could not be convicted either under S. 7 or S. 10 of the Act, and that since the order under which the licence was granted to the opposite party and for the breach of the condition of which he was prosecuted, was issued under R. 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules, consequently even though the Defence of India Act and the Rules have come to an end, the opposite party could only be convicted under Rule 81(4) which made the contravention of any order under Rule 81(2) punishable.

18. We shall deal with this argument in Appeal No. 424 of 1952 as it is common to other appeals which were heard along with these appeals.

19. It is a general principle of criminal law that guilty intention is a necessary ingredient of a crime. The Legislature may, by using express language or by implication, exclude an element of mens rea in any particular crime but unless such exclusion is deducible from the express language of the status or by implication, mens rea forms a necessary ingredient of an offence.

20. A large number of authorities were cited by the parties but it is not necessary for us to refer to all the cases. As we have pointed out, the question essentially depends upon the interpretation of the statute under which an offence is made penal. The law on this point was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Srinivas Mall v. Emperor, 1947 PC 135 (AIR V 34) (A). It was observed by their Lordships as follows on page 139 of the Report:—

“The High Court took the view that even if appellant 1 had not been proved to have known of the unlawful acts of appellant 2, he would still be liable, on the ground that ‘where there is an absolute prohibition and no question of mens rea arises, the master is criminally liable for the acts of his servant.’

21. With due respect to the High Court, their Lordships think it necessary to express their dissent from this view. They see no ground for saying that offences against those of the Defence of India Rules here in question are within the limited and exceptional class of offences which can be held to be committed without any guilty mind. See the judgment of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen, (1895) 1 QB 918 (921) (B).

22. Offences which are within that class are usually of a comparatively minor character, and it would be a surprising result of this delegated legislation if a person who was morally innocent of blame could be held vicariously liable for a servant's crime and so punishable ‘with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three, years’.

23. Their Lordships agree with the view which was recently expressed by the Lord Chief Justice of England, when he said: ‘It is in my opinion of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that the Court should always bear in mind that, unless the statute either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a defendant should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind.” This passage was approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Hariprasada Rao v. The State, 1951 SC 204 (AIR V 38) (C). After quoting the above passage of their Lordships of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

“In our opinion, the view of the law as propounded by the Privy Council is the correct view.”

24. The Supreme Court then proceeded to apply the principle to the facts of that case. We shall refer to the Supreme Court decision at a later stage.

25. In an earlier case of this Court Harish Chandra v. Emperor, 1945 All 90 (AIR V 32) (D) it was laid down as follows:—

“The general rule is that there is no criminal liability of the principal for any act or omission of his agent or servant unless the principal himself takes part in, authorises, or connive at, such act or omission.

Furthermore, there is no vicarious liability criminal law; the condition of the mind of the servant is not to be imputed to the master. But the Legislature can enact that a man may be convicted and punished although there was no blameworthy condition of mind.

But this exception would have to be made out convincingly from the language of the statute as it cannot be lightly presumed that the legislature intended that A should be punished for the fault of B. The question whether the statute has by necessary implication made the master liable depends upon various considerations. Primarily it depends upon the language of the statute the words used, then its scope, its object, the nature of the duty laid down and whether it in tends to impose a public duty binding on the master apart from any question of knowledge on frame of his mind.”

26. It is, therefore, clear from the authorities cited above that normally blameworthy condition of mind is an essential ingredient of a crime but is open to the Legislature to exclude the element of mens rea by express words or by implication from any such offence.

27. The State Counsel strenuously contended that having regard to the language of S. 7 an to the nature and the scope of the enactment, must be held that in an offence punishable under S. 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, the Legislature has excluded the element of mens rea. Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 provides that—

If any person contravenes any order made under S. 3, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both, and if the order so provides, any Court trying such contravention may direct that any property in respect of which the Court is satisfied that the order has been contravened shall be forfeited……’

28. This section has been couched in a very wide language. It applies to all persons. The orders contemplated under S. 3 cover a very wide range. It cannot, therefore, be said that S. 7, on its plain language, excludes the element of mens rea from offences punishable under the said section. There are no words in the section including guilty intention as a requirement of the crime but, as we have already pointed out, mens rea is a normal ingredient of every crime and it is for the Legislature to use such language which may be said to exclude such an intention.

29. It was then argued that if S. 10 is read with S. 7, it will be clear that the Legislature purposely intended to lay down mens rea as an essential ingredient of offences under S. 10 and if no such words are found in S. 7, which is in the same statute as S. 10, the necessary inference to be drawn is that the Legislature intended to exclude the element of mens rea from offences punishable under S. 7. We do not see that there is any force in this contention either. Section 10 provides—

“If any person—

(i) when required by any order made under S. 3 to make any statement or furnish Shy information, makes any statement or furnishes any information which is false in any material particular and which he knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be false, or does not believe to be true, or

(ii) makes any such statement as aforesaid in any book, account, record, declaration, return or other document which he is required by any such order to maintain or furnish he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.”

30. Section 10, cl (1) expressly lays down that failure to furnish correct statements or any information is not an offence unless it is further proved by the prosecution that the statement or information is false in material particulars and which he knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be false. This is an additional requirement of the section before a person could be convicted under he said section. But it cannot be argued that because the Legislature has put down other requirements before an act could be regarded as an offence under the section, the general words, that is, ‘without those additional requirements’, would necessarily exclude the requirement of mens rea. It was then contended by the State Counsel that having regard to the nature of the crime and he scope and object of the legislation, an offence under S. 7 must necessarily be regarded as involving an absolute liability on the licensee and any reach of the conditions of the licence amounts to in offence irrespective of an intention on the part of the licensee. As has been laid down by their lordships of the Privy Council and further approved by the Supreme Court in the cases, which we ave already referred to, S. 7 makes a breach of in order passed under S. 3 liable to punishment or three years: this offence, therefore, does not come within the exceptional class of legislation, the offences under which necessarily exclude mens rea.

31. Their Lordships of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court no doubt dealt with the provisions of R. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules but the language of R. 81(4) is similar to that of S. 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. It was conceded by the Government Advocate that for an offence under S. 10, mens rea was a necessary ingredient but he contended that for an offence under S. 7, it cannot be regarded as a necessary ingredient.

32. We do not see that there is any force in this contention. If the same act is made punishable both under the particular S. 10 and also under S. 7, which is a general section, for such an act, at any rate, the Legislature could not have intended to exclude mens rea from the general section and included it in the particular section as suggested by the Act.

33. If such an interpretation is put on S. 7, the result will be that it will depend upon the sweet will of the prosecution to charge a person under S. 7 instead of S. 10 so as to exclude the element of mens rea from the same Act. In our opinion, therefore, mens rea is not necessarily excluded from an offence punishable under S. 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act.

34. It was then contended by the State Counsel that although their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, held that mens rea was essential for an offence committed on contravening cl. 22 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, they have also held that contravention of cl. 27A made a master liable even though he may have had no knowledge of the contravention committed by his servant. It is necessary to refer to the case of the Supreme Court in some detail at this stage.

35. The appellant in that case was a licensee of two petrol filling stations. He was, however, resident of a place 40 miles away from the actual petrol pump and used to manage other business at several other places. Two of his employees were in charge of the filling stations. The employees and the licensee were tried before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Guntur for offences under the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941 and were convicted.

36. In the first case one of the charges against them was that they on 27-6-1945, supplied petrol to three cars without taking coupons, in contravention of cl. 22 read with cl. 5 of the said Order promulgated under R. 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules. They were further charged that at the same place and on the same date they accepted coupons relating to two other cars in advance without supplying petrol in contravention of cl. 27 of the Order.

37. In the second case the charge was that the licensee and his employees in the second pump similarly supplied during the period of 24 hours from 6.00 a.m of 27-6-1945 petrol to four motor vehicles without taking coupons, in contravention of cl. 22 read with cl. 5, accepted coupons of three other vehicles in advance without issuing petrol, in contravention of cl. 27, and supplied petrol to two other vehicles against coupons but without making necessary endorsements and particulars on the reverse of the coupons, infringing thereby cl. 27A of the said Order. The Magistrate convicted the appellant though ultimately the Supreme Court acquitted him of the charge for contravening cl. 22. Clause 22 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, was as follows:

“No person shall furnish or acquire a supply of motor spirit otherwise than in accordance with the provisions contained in this order.”

38. Clause 5 of the said Order provided—

“Motor spirit required for any vehicle not covered by cl. 3 or cl. 4 shall be furnished or acquired only against the surrender to a supplier at the time of supply of valid ordinary coupons or of a valid supplementary coupon and only in accordance with any conditions or instructions appearing on or attached to the coupons.”

39. Clause 27 provided:

“No person shall surrender to a supplied and no supplier shall accept special receipts or coupons at a time other than the time at which the supply of motor spirit authorised by the special receipts or coupons or acknowledged by the receipts is furnished.”

40. Clause 27A runs as follows:

“When motor spirit is furnished against the surrender of one or more coupons, the supplier shall immediately endorse, or cause to be endorsed, on each coupon so surrendered the registration or other identifying mark of the vehicle to which the motor spirit is furnished.”

41. As regards Cl. 22, it was held that

“the clause is not aimed specifically against a supplier, but is general in its language, and will hit the individual person, whether he be the supplier or not, who contravenes the provisions. The language of the clause also suggests that only the person who furnishes motor spirit contrary to the provisions of the Order will be affected by the contravention.”

42. Having regard to the language of the Order, it was, therefore, held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that no absolute liability was created under that Order and the master could not be held liable for the failure of his servant to comply with the provisions of that Rule. Considering, however, the language of cl. 27A of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, it was held that the said clause throws the responsibility for making the necessary endorsement on the supplier.

43. The object of this clause clearly was that the supplier of petrol should set up a complete machinery to ensure that the necessary endorsements were made on the coupons against which petrol was supplied. It is conceivable that in many cases the default would be committed by the servants of the supplier, who were in charge of the petrol pump, but that fact itself would not exonerate the supplier from liability.

44. In this connection reliance was placed on the following observations of Reading C.J in the case of Mousell Brothers v. London and North Western Rly, (1917) 2 K.B 836 (844) (E):

“Prima facie, then, a master is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servant to which the master is not a party. But it may be the intention of the Legislature, in order to guard against the happening of the forbidden thing, to impose a liability upon a principal even though he does not know of, and is not party to the forbidden act done by his servant. Many statutes are passed with this object.

Acts done by the servant of the licensed holder of licensed premises render the licensed holder in some instances liable, even though the act was done by his servant without the knowledge of the master. Under the Pood and Drugs Acts there are again instances well-known in these Courts where the master is made responsible, even though he knows nothing of the act done by his servant, and he may be fined or rendered amenable to the penalty enjoined by the law. In those cases the Legislature absolutely forbids the act and makes the principal liable without a mens rea.”

45. In the same case, Atkin J. expressed the same view as follows:

“I think that the authorities cited by my Lord make it plain that while prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants.

To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be formed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed. If authority for this is necessary it will be found in the judgment of Bowen L.J in Reg v. Tyler International Commercial Co., (1891) 2 QB 588 (P).”

46. A careful reading of this case will show that their Lordships approved of the observations of the Privy Council case referred to above and held that it cannot be said that as general rule all contraventions which are punishable under R. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules, necessarily exclude the element of mens rea. At the same time it cannot also be argued that on every contravention of the orders issued under R. 81(2) or S. 3, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, necessarily the element of mens rea can be regarded as having been excluded.

47. In each case it will depend upon the language of the order the contravention of which is sought to be punished and also regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be formed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed, in the words of Atkin, J.

48. In the present case we have carefully considered Cl. 13 of the U.P Oilseeds and Oilseeds Products Control Order and also condition 3 of the licence and we are of opinion that having regard to the language of those provisions, it cannot be said that the element of mens rea was necessarily excluded from an offence committed on the contravention of the provisions of that Order.

49. On 15-6-1944, the following letter was issued by the Regional Pood Controller, Banaras Region, at Gorakhpur, addressed to all the managers of oil mills:

“You are hereby required to submit the stock statement in the attached form so as to reach my office on 11th and 20th days of each month without fail.”

50. This letter was in terms addressed to the managers of oil mills. It was the manager who was called upon to furnish the necessary statements of accounts. The submission of the alleged false statements of accounts was the act, therefore, primarily of the manager and unless the duty to furnish such a statement, when called upon to do so, could be regarded as an absolute duty of the licensee, it cannot be said that the submission of a wrong statement by the manager in pursuance of the aforesaid order will make the master liable for the contravention of the conditions of the licence.

51. It was argued by the Government Advocate that although the letter was addressed to the managers of all the oil mills, it was issued in pursuance of the power given to the Regional Pood Controller under cl. 3 of the conditions of the licence. It was served on the manager as an agent of the licensee and as such any breach of the conditions of the licence or failure to comply properly with the order will make the master liable and again submission of the statement of the stock will be considered to be the act of the master.

52. As we have already pointed out, in the criminal,Jaw, every individual is only liable for his own acts. Unless there is some absolute duty cast upon, the master, he cannot be held responsible for the act of his servant. We have already discussed the point and, in our opinion, there is nothing in the Oilseeds and Oilseeds Products Control Order, which makes the duty to furnish statement absolute of the master and for the breach of which he can be made liable although the act was done by his servant.

53. We have already indicated that the Government Advocate had conceded that if the offence was punishable under S. 10, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, knowledge was an essential element but as in the present case, according to him, the trial was rightly held under S. 7, it was not necessary in order to make the opposite party liable to prove the knowledge on his part. As we have already stated, it will be inconsistent to hold that the opposite party could be held guilty for the same act on the mere wish of the prosecution to try him under S. 7 and not under S. 10.

54. It is true that if there is an act which is an offence both under the general and the particular section, the person may be tried for that act under either of the two sections but if the element of ‘mens rea’ is necessary to constitute an offence under the special section, the general section will also be so interpreted so as to include the element of ‘mens rea’ for the same act.

55. In the present case, therefore, in our opinion, the Sessions Judge was right in holding that unless the prosecution established that the opposite party had knowledge that the statements were false or that there could be a guilty intention proved against him, he could not be convicted under S. 7 for the contravention of the conditions of the licence granted under the Oilseeds and Oilseeds Products Control Order.

56. It was then contended by the State Counsel that the opposite party was the sole proprietor of the firm and the Sessions Judge was not right in holding that Gaya Prasad was the owner of one-fourth share in the firm. In fact in the other case, the Sessions Judge held that the opposite party was the sole proprietor of the firm; but to our mind that will not make any difference so far as the present case is concerned.

57. It is admittedly that Gaya Prasad was the manager and it has also been found as a fact by the Sessions Judge that the opposite party had no knowledge that the returns, which were submitted by Gaya Prasad, were false. The opposite party, therefore, even though he was the sole proprietor, could not be held guilty unless knowledge was established by the prosecution.

58. It was then strenuously argued that the opposite party was present at Banaras on certain dates. An account in the Bank was opened in his name and he had issued certain cheques also. These facts, according to the prosecution, go to suggest that the opposite party was not a sleeping partner in the firm.

59. As we have already indicated, the fact that occasionally he had issued cheques or that the Bank account stood in his name, will not be enough to hold that the opposite party had knowledge of the fact that the statements which were submitted by Gaya Prasad were false. We see no reason to differ from the finding of the Sessions Judge that the opposite party had no knowledge of the fact that the statements were false.

60. The prosecution, besides the Bank account, relied upon the oral statements of Bishwanath Prasad and Sarju Prasad to prove the fact that the opposite party took active interest in the management of the affairs of the mills. Bishwanath Prasad and Sarju Prasad were not named in the police charge-sheet as witnesses. They were examined for the first time in 1950 and the case began so far back as in 1947.

61. Bishwanath Prasad has, however, accepted that Gaya Prasad was the manager of the mill and was managing the affairs and Sheo Prasad Jaiswal was the proprietor. He was Marketing Inspector in Banaras in 1946 and visited the mills several times in 1947 in connection with his duties and that he found the opposite party and Gaya Prasad present there, in cross-examination, however, he has not been able to give the names of the managers and the proprietors of Bajrang Oil Mills or Shankar Oil Mills though he had occasion to visit those mills also. He had also not been able to say whether he had mentioned the presence of Sheo Prasad Jaiswal in the mill premises in his diary.

62. The Sessions Judge has, therefore, rightly remarked that no reliance could be placed on his testimony as there was no particular reason why he should remember the presence of Jaiswal in the mill premises on the particular dates. Sarju Prasad was formerly a servant of the Hindustan Oil Mills. It was suggested that he had been dismissed but he denied it. He had, however, admitted that he was discharged and later on took service with S. Kumar and Co. and he left there also and at the time he was employed in the Anti-Corruption Department. He was also not mentioned in the police charge-sheet. He admitted that all the papers sent to the Regional Pood Controller from the Hindustan Oil Mills were signed by the manager.

63. As the Sessions Judge has remarked, no satisfactory explanation is given as to why he had been visiting the mills after his removal from there. Ia any way, he being in the service of the Anti-Corruption Department for the last three years, an employee who had been discharged from the mills, no reliance can be placed on his testimony. We find no reason, therefore, to differ from the finding of the Sessions Judge that the prosecution has failed to prove by satisfactory evidence that the opposite party Sheo Prasad Jaiswal had knowledge that the fortnightly statements submitted by the firm were false and incorrect. In our opinion, therefore, there is no force in these appeals and they are dismissed.

V.S.B

64. Appeals dismissed.