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Shri Rameshwar Nath v. The U.P Union Bank Ltd. .

Allahabad High Court
Apr 17, 1956
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Agarwala, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was the landlord of premises in Agra that had been let to U.P. Union Bank Ltd. at a monthly rent of Rs. 325 plus Rs. 10 house water tax. A portion of the premises was sublet by the Bank to a hotel proprietor, the rest being occupied by the Bank and some officials. The Bank did not pay rent regularly.

On 3 September 1949 the appellant sued in Munsif Court, Agra, for arrears of rent for July, August and September 1949, and obtained an attachment before judgment of the Bank's furniture on 5 September 1949; the goods were locked in the Banking Hall under the Court's seal by consent. The Bank was wound up by order dated 18 December 1949 and Official Liquidators were appointed. A decree for arrears of rent for July–September 1949 was passed on 2 December 1949 in favor of the appellant.

On 30 November 1950 the appellant applied under Section 171 of the Indian Companies Act for leave to sue for arrears accruing after 30 September 1949 (application no. 57 of 1950). The Company Judge (Mr. Justice Mootham) rejected the prayer for permission on 5 January 1951 but, by consent of parties, decided the claim himself under Section 455 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949. On 30 August 1951 the Company Court held the appellant entitled to recover rent at Rs. 325 per mensem from 1 October 1949 until the date the Official Liquidators gave possession to the appellant, and Rs. 500 for damages, subject to a set-off of Rs. 354.

The Official Liquidators filed a special appeal (no. 17 of 1951); the appellant filed cross-objections. Those were dismissed by the High Court on 1 September 1955.

While that appeal was pending, the appellant applied to the Registrar to transmit the 30 August 1951 decree to the District Judge, Allahabad for execution. The Registrar treated it as an ordinary decree and issued a certificate of transfer. The appellant then obtained an attachment of Rs. 12,644/11/- in fixed deposits at Allahabad Bank Ltd.

The Official Liquidators applied to the Company Judge (application no. 29 of 1953 dated 21 July 1953) to declare the execution proceedings in the Civil Judge's court void, stay further proceedings, and withdraw the attachment. The Company Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice Brij Mohan Lall) allowed the petition on 10 February 1954, holding the attachment void for lack of leave under Section 171 and referring to Section 232(1) which declared such attachments without leave to be null and void. The Company Judge further held that the proper procedure was to seek pro rata payment from the Official Liquidator or to claim preferential payment under Section 230.

The appellant appealed from the order of the Company Judge to the High Court (the present special appeal). The principal points raised by appellant were: (1) that the decree of the Company Court was executable under Section 199 of the Companies Act and did not require leave under Section 171; (2) that the decree represented a debt incurred after winding up and thus was not pro rata; and (3) that the debt should be treated as costs of winding up under Section 230(3).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree passed by the Company Court itself is executable in the ordinary manner under Section 199 of the Indian Companies Act without obtaining leave under Section 171 of the Act.
  2. Whether the decree represented a debt incurred by the Official Liquidators after the date of winding up, and if so whether it was liable to be paid pro rata with pre-winding-up debts.
  3. Whether the rent due after winding up should be treated as costs of the winding up and thus be payable preferentially under Section 230(3) of the Companies Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The decree being one of the Company Court itself was enforceable under Section 199 of the Indian Companies Act in the ordinary way and therefore no leave under Section 171 was required to institute execution proceedings in another court.
  • The arrears of rent awarded represented a debt incurred after the date of winding up and therefore were not to be ranked pro rata with pre-winding-up creditors.
  • The arrears should be treated as costs of the winding up and therefore be payable before other debts under Section 230(3).

Official Liquidators' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The attachment obtained by the appellant in execution was contrary to law because it was effected without leave of the Company Court under Section 171, and Section 232(1) renders such attachments null and void.
  • The proper procedure for realizing the decree against assets in liquidation was to approach the Official Liquidators for pro rata distribution along with other creditors or, if preferential payment were claimed, to assert that claim under Section 230.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re Brown, Balley and Dixon; Ex parte Roberts and Wright Principle that a lessor's rights arising after winding up (by reason of the company or liquidator remaining in possession) should be treated independently of pre-winding-up creditor claims; lessor should not be deprived of rights arising after winding up merely because the lessee is insolvent. The Court cited Fry, J.'s observations from this authority to support the view that rights accruing after winding up (where the liquidator remains in possession) are independent and not to be merged with pre-winding-up debts; this reasoning underpins the interpretation of Rule 97's proviso in favor of the landlord.
In re Silkstone and Dodworth Coal and Iron Company Where the liquidator continues in possession of leased property as an asset for the purposes of liquidation, he must pay rent in full as a condition of retaining the lease. The Court relied on the statement that a liquidator who keeps possession for purposes of liquidation must satisfy lease obligations, using it to illustrate the general rule that occupation by the liquidator can give rise to an obligation to pay rent in full.
In re Oak Pits Colliery Company Authority indicating that mere retention of property by the liquidator (where he has done nothing but abstained from getting rid of it) does not necessarily entitle the landlord to distrain or to be paid in full for rent accruing after winding up. The Court discussed this authority and the facts on which it was decided; although recognizing its principle, the Court concluded that under the specific proviso to Rule 97 the landlord's right to full post-winding-up rent arises whenever the Official Liquidator remains in occupation, irrespective of whether occupation is for winding-up purposes.
In re Levy & Company Followed the decision in In re Oak Pits Colliery Company, treating the liquidator's passive retention of property as insufficient to entitle the landlord to full post-winding-up rent. The Court noted that In re Levy & Company followed Oak Pits; it was considered in the sequence of authorities but the Court nonetheless held that, by the express proviso to Rule 97, the landlord's claim for full rent where the Official Liquidator remains in occupation is preserved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each principal point in turn and applied statutory provisions and the Company Rules as they appear in the record.

  1. On the executability point the Court accepted that the Company Court's order awarding rent and damages is an order to which Section 199 of the Indian Companies Act applies and that such an order can be enforced "in the same manner in which decrees of such Court made in any suit pending therein may be enforced." However, the Court held that application of Section 199 does not negate the operation of Section 171 of the Companies Act.
  2. The Court quoted Section 171, which forbids commencing or proceeding with "any suit or other legal proceeding" against a company after a winding up order except by leave of the Court, and explained that Section 171 makes no distinction between proceedings decided by the Company Court and proceedings in other courts. Leave of the Company Court is necessary before commencing execution proceedings in another court, even when the judgment being enforced was rendered by the Company Court itself.
  3. The Court explained the purpose of Section 171: to vest control of suits or legal proceedings against a company under liquidation in the winding-up Court so that one creditor cannot appropriate assets and thereby defeat pro rata distribution. It observed that upon winding up the property of the company is deemed in the custody of the Court (citing Section 178(2)) and the Official Liquidator is directed to take custody. Therefore a creditor cannot take company property without leave.
  4. Consequently, the execution proceedings initiated by the appellant in the Civil Judge's Court were void for contravening Section 171; the Court observed that it was not disputed that "proceedings" in Section 171 includes execution proceedings, and that under Section 232 an attachment without leave is null and void.
  5. Turning to whether the rent award was a post-winding-up debt payable pro rata, the Court examined Section 228, Section 229 and Company Rules (Rule 98 and Rule 97). Rule 97 contains a proviso preserving the landlord's right to claim rent during the period of the company's or Official Liquidator's occupation. The Court held that the proviso is clear: where the Official Liquidator remains in occupation of premises demised to the company, the landlord's right to claim rent which falls due after the date of winding up is not prejudiced by the rules and is not to be classed with pre-winding-up debts to be paid pro rata.
  6. The Court reviewed English authorities. It cited Fry, J.'s reasoning in Re Brown, Balley and Dixon; Ex parte Roberts and Wright, which draws a line at the commencement of winding up: claims arising prior to that date are to be dealt with pro rata, but rights arising after the winding up by reason of the company or liquidator remaining in possession should be treated independently. The Court also discussed In re Silkstone and Dodworth (liquidator in possession must pay rent if he keeps lease as an asset), In re Oak Pits Colliery Company (mere passive retention not sufficient to entitle landlord to full rent), and In re Levy & Company (followed Oak Pits).
  7. The Court considered whether the liquidator's occupation in the present facts was for the purposes of winding up. It noted facts indicating the liquidator was not actively using the premises for liquidation, and may have remained because he could not find a way to dispose of them; some occupiers were holding portions forcibly; the liquidator had asked the landlord to take possession. On those facts the Court observed that, per Oak Pits, it might have held the landlord not entitled to full post-winding-up rent if the rule required occupation for winding-up purposes.
  8. Crucially, however, the Court concluded that the proviso to Rule 97 is not limited to occupation for the purposes of winding up: it makes no distinction as to the purpose of occupation. The proviso states that where the Official Liquidator remains in occupation of demised premises, the landlord's right to claim rent during that occupation is preserved. Therefore, whether the liquidator occupied the premises for winding-up purposes or not is immaterial for the application of Rule 97's proviso.
  9. The Court therefore held that the appellant was entitled to recover in full the rent that fell due from 1 October 1949 (i.e., rent accruing after the date of winding up) and that such rent could be claimed on the same footing as costs of the winding up under Section 230(3).

Holding and Implications

Holding: By the judgment of the Court, the appeal is allowed in part.

The Court modified the order of the learned Single Judge and directed the Official Liquidators to pay to the appellant in full the amount of arrears of rent due from 1 October 1949 until the date on which the tenancy was terminated. The execution proceedings (attachment) effected by the appellant in the Civil Judge's court were held to be void for want of leave under Section 171 and by operation of Section 232(1).

Implications:

  • The decision clarifies that even where a Company Court itself passes an order (an order to which Section 199 applies), Section 171 still governs the institution of execution proceedings in other courts; leave of the winding-up Court is required before execution can be pursued outside the winding-up proceedings.
  • Under the proviso to Rule 97 of the Company Rules (as applied by the Court), if the Official Liquidator remains in occupation of premises demised to a company, the landlord's right to claim rent falling due after the winding-up order is preserved and the landlord is entitled to be paid that rent in full rather than to prove pro rata with pre-winding-up creditors.
  • The Court further held that such rent can be claimed on the same footing as costs of winding up under Section 230(3).
  • Direct effect on the parties: the Official Liquidators were ordered to pay the appellant the full arrears due from 1 October 1949; in other respects the learned Single Judge's order stands; the appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal. The appeal was partly allowed by the Court.

Note: This summary is restricted to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond what the opinion states.

Show all summary ...

Agarwala, J.:— This is an appeal against an order of the learned Company Judge in proceedings arising during the course of liquidation of the U.P Union Bank Ltd. This Bank prior to its liquidation had rented a building belonging to the appellant in the city of Agra at a monthly rent of Rs. 325/- plus Rs. 10/- as house water tax. A portion of the demised premises was let out by the Bank to the proprietor of a hotel called the Man Mohan Hatel and the rest was occupied by the Bank itself and some of its officials also resided in the premises. The rent was not paid regularly and the appellant brought a suit no. 810 of 1949, in the court of Munsif at Agra on the 3rd September, 1949 for the recovery of rent for the months of July, August and September 1949 and on the 5th September, 1949 obtained an order of attachment before judgment of the furniture etc. belonging to the Bank and the same was by the consent of parties kept locked in the Banking Hall of the premises under the seal or the Court. On a petition presented on the 30th September, 1949, the Bank was wound up by an order dated 18th December, 1949 and Official Liquidators were appointed. On the 2nd December, 1949, a decree was passed in favour of the appellant for arrears of rent for the months of July, August and September. After the winding up order the Bank carried on no business in the premises. On the 15th or 16th of September 1950 the attached furniture was sold. Two days later, the Official Liquidator asked the appellant to take possession over the building. As a portion of the building was in the occupation of third parties, the landlord refused to take possession of a portion of the building. Thereafter) on the 30th November, 1950, the appellant by means of an application no. 57 of 1950, under Sec. 171 of the Indian Companies Act prayed for permission to file a suit against the Bank for arrears of rent accruing after the 30th September, 1949 up to the date of delivery of possession and for certain other reliefs. The learned Company Judge, Mr. Justice Mootham, as he then was, by an order dated 5th January, 1951, rejected the prayer of the appellant for permission to file a suit against the Bank as the claim could very well be decided in the winding up proceedings and thereafter by consent of parties proceeded to decide the claim himself, acting under the powers conferred on him by Sec. 455 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949. This claim was decided on the 30th August, 1951 and it was held that the appellant was entitled to recover rent from the Official Liquidators at the rate of Rs. 325/- per mensem from 1st October, 1949 up to the date on which the Official Liquidators gave the petitioner such possession of the premises as would in law terminate the Bank's tenancy, that he was also entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 500/- on account of damages to his property, but from this sum, he was by consent, entitled to set off the sum of Rs. 354/- due by him to the Bank. Against this order a special appeal was filed by the Official Liquidators. This was numbered as 17 of 1951 and the appellant filed a cross-objection. These were dismissed by us by an order dated 1st September, 1955.

2. While this appeal was pending the appellant applied to the Registrar of this Court to transmit the decree passed by the learned Company Judge on the 30th August, 1951 to the District Judge Allahabad for execution. The Registrar considering that this was an ordinary decree granted the certificate of transfer and the appellant applied to the District Judge for execution of his decree against the Bank by attachment of a sum of Rs. 12,644/11/- which was in fixed deposit with the Allahabad Bank Ltd. When the Official Liquidators came to know of this, they applied to the Company Judge by means of an application No. 29 of 1953 dated 21st July, 1953 praying that the proceedings in execution pending in the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad be declared to be void and further proceedings be stayed and the order of attachment withdrawn.

3. This petition was allowed by the learned Company Judge, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Brij Mohan Lall, by an order dated 10th February, 1954. The learned Judge held that the order of attachment made by the Civil Judge was contrary to law inasmuch as permission for the same had not been obtained under Sec. 171 of the Companies Act and Sec. 232(1) declared any such attachment effected without leave of the Court to be null and void and that the proper method of executing the decree passed by the former Company Judge, was to approach the Official Liquidators and to obtain from them pro rata payment along with other creditors or, if the opposite party claimed preferential payment, to put forward such claim under Sec. 230 of the Companies Act.

4. An argument had been advanced on behalf of the appellant to the effect that the decree in question having been passed by the Company Judge himself was executable under Sec. 199 of the Companies Act and no permission under Sec. 171 of the Act was necessary, and the decree could be executed in the ordinary manner. This plea was rejected by the learned Judge.

5. Against this order the appellant has filed the present special appeal and the points urged by him before us are:

1stly that the decree in execution being a decree of the Company court itself was executable in the same manner as any order or decree of the Company Court under Sec. 199 of the Indian Companies Act, and that therefore no permission under Sec. 171 of the Companies Act was required for the purpose.

2ndly that the decree represented a debt which was incurred by the Official Liquidators after the date of winding up and as such was not liable to be paid pro rata along with the debts due from the Bank to the other creditors before the date of winding up.

6. Lastly that this was a debt which should be treated as costs of the winding up and was therefore payable before any other debt under 1 Sec. 230(3) of the Companies Act.

7. As regards the first point, it may be conceded that the order of the learned Company Judge awarding rent and damages to the appellant must be treated as an order to which Sec. 199 of the Indian Companies Act applies and that therefore it could be “enforced in the same manner in which decrees of such Court made in any suit pending therein may be enforced” as provided for by the section. But this does not prevent the operation of Sec. 171 as regards the execution of the order. Sec. 171 lays down that

“When a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed no suit or other legal proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court, and subject to such terms as the Court may impose.”

8. Sec. 171 makes no distinction between a suit or legal proceeding decided by the court itself or by some other court. In the present case the appellant's claim for rent was, by consent of parties, decided by the Company Court itself. It will be assumed that the leave of the Court was implicit so far as the proceeding in this Court was concerned. But no such implied leave can be inferred for the initiation of the execution proceedings in the court of the District Judge. Before the execution proceedings could be instituted, leave of the Company Count was necessary under Sec. 171. The object of Sec. 171 is to vest the control of all suits or legal proceedings against a Company under liquidation in the Court in which winding up proceedings are pending, so that the creditors of the Company may not be deprived of their just dues upon a pro rata distribution, by one creditor taking away the whole or a portion of the assets of the Company, without submitting himself to the pro rata distribution. After the passing of the order of winding up or of the appointment of the provisional liquidator, all the property and effects of the Company are deemed to be in the custody of the Court as from the date of the order of winding up of the Company (Sec. 178(2)) and the Official Liquidator is directed to take into custody or in his control all such property for the purposes of winding up. It would be very anomolous therefore if the property and effects of the Company which is being wound up by the Court are to be taken away without leave of the Court by a claimant who does not come forward to prove his claim in the winding up. The law, therefore, provides that all suits or legal proceedings shall not be commenced or proceeded with against the Company except by leave of the Court in which winding up proceedings are pending. Sec. 171 does, therefore, apply even to the order of the Court which is sought to be enforced not by a petition in the winding up but by instituting execution proceedings in some other Court. It is immaterial in such cases that the claim or debt which is the subject matter of the suit or other legal proceeding came into existence after the date of winding up.

9. The execution proceedings initiated by the appellant in the Civil Judge's Court, therefore, were void, being in contravention of Sec. 171. It was not disputed before us that the word ‘proceedings’ used in Sec. 171 includes execution proceedings also. According to the provisions of Sec. 232 of the Indian Companies Act the attachment made under the orders of the learned Civil Judge not having been affected with the leave of the Court, must be held to be void.

10. As regards the second point raised on behalf of the appellant, the position is this. Sec. 228 of the Indian Companies Act and Rule 98 of the Company Rules made by this Court, vide Ch. XXVIII of the Rules of the Court at page 251, contemplate that all the debts and claims against the Company shall, so far as may be, be estimated according to the value thereof at the date of the order of winding up of the company and under Sec. 229, they are to be paid pro rata as insolvency proceedings. Rule 97 of the Company Rules, however, provides as follows:—

“When any rent or other payment falls due at stated periods, and the order or resolution to wind up is made at any time other than one of such periods, the persons entitled to the rent or payment may prove for a proportionate part thereof up to the date of the winding up order or resolution as if the rent or payment grew due from day to day:

Provided that where the Official Liquidator remains in occupation of premises demised to a company which is being wound up, nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect the right of the landlord of such premises to claim payment by the company, or the Official Liquidator, of rent during the period of the company's or the Official Liquidator's occupation.”

11. The proviso to the rule is clear. The landlord's right to claim payment of the rent which falls due after the date of winding up on account of the Official Liquidator remaining in occupation of the premises demised to the Company which is being wound up, is not affected or prejudiced by anything in the Company Rules. This clearly means that such rent is not to be classed with the debts due from the Company up to the date of winding up, and instead of being paid pro rata along with such debts, is to be paid in full. The reason appears to be obvious. The Official Liquidator is empowered to disclaim a property which he does not wish to retain because it is onerous and not profitable or not necessary for the purposes of winding up, see Sec. 230A of the Companies Act. If he neglects to do so, the landlord should not be made to suffer loss. This rule appears to be based upon the observations of Fry, J. in re. Brown, Balley and Dixon. Ex. parte Roberts and Wright1. Said the learned judge,

“In like manner, a lessor is for many purposes an independent person. His rights ought not to be interfered with, more than is necessary, by reason of his lessee having become insolvent, and having chosen (to use the Lord Justice's expression) to have a winding up. A mortgagee and a lessor, although in one sense independent persons, are nevertheless creditors of the company in respect of any amount due on the mortgage or on the lease at the date of the winding up, and, as such creditors, they ought, in my judgment, to have neither preference nor priority. In respect of any rights arising after the winding up by reason of the company or the liquidators remaining in possession of the demised or of the mortgaged premises, they ought, in my judgment, to be treated as independent persons, and if the company or the liquidator choose to remain in possession of the demised or mortgaged premises, they must so remain upon the terms and conditions of the instrument; just as any other person must observe those terms. In that way, then, I draw the line at the commencement of the winding up; and I hold that all claims of creditors before that date should be dealt with upon the principle of equality; but that with regard to the rights after that, the company is in no better position because it has become insolvant and has had a winding up. That appears to me to be consistent with the current of decision which has drawn the line with regard to the exercise of the power of distress in respect of rent after the winding up; but with respect to rent before the winding up, to allow him only his right to complete with the other creditors by proving in the winding-up.”

12. I may, however, point out that the current of authority in England appears to be that the lessor is entitled to recover his full rent which became due after the order of winding up only if the premises are occupied by the Official Liquidator for the purposes of the winding up and not otherwise.

13. In re Silkstone and Dodworth Coal and Iron Company.2 with reference to the liquidator remaining in occupation of a colliery which had been taken on lease by the Company prior to the winding up, it was observed:

“If he (the liquidator) continued in the possession of the property he could only do so upon the terms of the lease, and it is only equitable, if he keeps the lease as an asset of the company and for the purposes of the liquidation, that he should satisfy those conditions upon which the asset remains his; in other words, he should pay the rent in full.” (Italics mine).

14. Mr. Justice Kay in In re Oak Pits Colliery Company,3 pointed out that:

“No authority has yet gone the length of deciding that a landlord is entitled to distrain for or be paid in full rent accruing since the commencement of the winding-up; where the liquidator has done nothing except abstain from trying to get rid of the property which the company holds as lessee. If the landlord had endeavoured to re-enter and the liquidator had objected, the case might be different.”

15. The facts found in that case were that the liquidator left the company's plant and machinery where he found them until he sold them in July, 1881; that he had them valued in May, 1880, with a view to a sale which was not carried out; and that he took no steps to surrender the company's interest in the Oak Pits Colliery and 163 acres to the landlord. On these facts it was held that they were not sufficient to entitle the landlord either to distrain or to be paid in full. This decision was followed in In re Levy & Company4.

16. If I were to apply the principle laid down in the case of Oak Pits Colliery Company, I would have held that in the present case the liquidator remained in occupation of the premises not for the purposes of winding up but because he could not think of any suitable method of getting rid of the premises in spite of all his desire to do so. It has been noted above that he asked the landlord to take over possession of the premises on the 10th September, 1950 but the landlord refused to do that. He was making no use of the premises. Some persons were occupying some portions of the building forcibly. He attempted to dislodge them. In one instance he did ask one of such persons not to pay rent to the landlord after the landlord refused to take over possession from him. But this appears only because he was not sure what the legal position was. In any case the Bank had closed its business and the liquidator was not carrying on the business after winding up and the property was not used by him for the purposes of liquidation.

17. But it appears to me that under the proviso to Rule 97 it is immaterial whether the premises were retained in his occupation by the liquidator for the purposes of winding up or not. If they remained in occupation of the Official Liquidator, the landlord is entitled to receive the rent in full and is not liable to share pro rata along with other creditors.

18. As regards the third point, in view of what has been observed above, the rent in dispute can be claimed in full on the same footing as costs of winding up under Sec. 230(3) of the Companies Act.

19. In the result I would allow this appeal in part, modify the order of the learned Single Judge and direct the Official Liquidators to pay to the appellant in full the amount that has fallen due to him from 1st October, 1949. In other respects the order of the learned Single Judge will stand. The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal.

20. Upadhya, J.:— I agree.

21. By The Court—We allow this appeal in part, modify the order of the learned single Judge and direct the Official Liquidators to pay to the appellant in full the amount of arrears of rent due to him from the 1st of October 1949 till the date on which the tenancy was terminated. In other respects the order of the learned single Judge will stand. The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal.

22. Appeal partly allowed.