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Debi Prasad And Others v. Sri Khelawan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents (with several others) applied on 6 March 1953 to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumariaganj, requesting an enquiry into their possession over certain land in village Tandauthi. Although the application did not specify the statutory provision relied upon, it was conceded to be under the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act (Act No. XXXI of 1952) and was made within six months of the Act's commencement (the Act began on 7 November 1952). The application also did not specify the plots or the names of the zamindars.
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate directed the Tahsildar to enquire. The Girdawar Qanungo reported that because the applicants could not specify the plots or zamindars, an enquiry could not be made and recommended dismissal and that applicants file a regular suit. Acting on this, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed an order on 3 June 1953 stating: "Seen. File. Inform the applicant to file a regular suit."
Subsequent applications were made on 1 July 1953 (dismissed as time-barred) and on 4 August 1953. Following the August application, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate reviewed and set aside the 3 June order and ordered that an enquiry be held regarding possession in 1359 Fasli. The appellants challenged that review-order (dated 8 December 1953) by writ; a learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. This special appeal followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Sub-Divisional Officer had power to review and set aside the earlier order dated 3 June 1953 and thereby order an enquiry under the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952.
- Whether the order setting aside the 3 June 1953 order (and the consequent holding of an enquiry) affected legal rights so as to be amenable to writ relief (certiorari and prohibition).
- Whether the Single Judge was correct in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the petition was premature because no final order had been made on the enquiry.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The Sub-Divisional Officer had no power to review the earlier order dated 3 June 1953; that power was not conferred by the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act.
- The 8 December 1953 order setting aside the earlier order affected the legal rights of parties (because an enquiry under Sec. 4 of the Act can result in entries conferring Asami/Adhivasi rights) and was therefore challengeable by writ of certiorari and prohibition.
- Even if a power to review existed, the statutory conditions for exercise of such power were absent (no fresh evidence, no error on the face of the record, no other sufficient reason), so the review was impermissible and amounted to exercise of a jurisdiction not vested by law.
Respondents' Arguments
- The power to review the earlier order could be inferred either (a) from inherent jurisdiction in every court to review its own orders, or (b) because the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. (review) apply by virtue of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by reason of Section 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Drew v. Wills, Ex Parte Martin (1891) 1 Q.B.D. 450 | That no court has power to set aside a properly made order unless such power is given by statute. | Cited as authority for the general rule that courts lack inherent power to set aside final orders absent statutory authority. |
| Hession v. Jones (1914) 2 K.B. 421 | Reiterates the same rule restricting inherent power to set aside final orders. | Grouped with other English authorities to support the proposition that final orders cannot be varied without statutory provision. |
| Charles Bright & Co. Ltd. v. Seller (1904) 1 K.B. 6 | Another authority for the general rule limiting the power of courts to alter final orders. | Used to reinforce the principle that review of final orders requires statutory sanction. |
| Baij Nath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar I.L.R. 40 Cal. 552 | Indian decision cited in support of the limitation on inherent review power. | Relied upon as an Indian authority consistent with the general rule. |
| Nanak Chand Shadi Ram v. Mahabir | Indian authority cited regarding the rule on finality of orders. | Included among cases showing limits of inherent review power. |
| Flower v. Lloyd (1879) 10 Ch.D. 327 | Principle of finality of litigation. | Invoked to explain the policy reason behind the restriction on review of final orders. |
| Lawric v. Lees (1881) 7 A.C. 19 | Exception: courts may vary orders prior to signing/delivery to reflect intended meaning; correction of clerical mistakes. | Quoted to enumerate recognized qualifications to the general rule (i.e., pre-signing variation and clerical corrections). |
| The Bolivier (reference in Halsbury) | Exception: where judgment entered without notice to a party who had the right to be heard, the court may set it aside. | Cited among recognized exceptions to the finality rule. |
| Jai Karan v. Panchaiti Akhara A.I.R. 1933 All. 49 | Recall of an order signed inadvertently or by mistake. | Used as an example of a circumstance where an order may be recalled because of inadvertence or failure of memory. |
| Debi Bux Singh v. Habib Shah I.L.R. 35 All. 331 | Setting aside a decree passed against a dead person (exception to finality). | Cited as an instance where rehearing may be permitted due to special circumstances. |
| Lazard Brothers & Co. v. Barque Industrialle de Moscow (1932) 1 K.B. 617; (1933) A.C. 289 | Setting aside orders where party was non-existent or company dissolved (exceptional grounds). | Asked to illustrate exceptional situations allowing vacatur of orders. |
| Tafazzul Husain v. Raghunath Prasad 14 M.I.A. 40 | Courts have larger power to modify interlocutory orders than final orders. | Used to show that interlocutory orders can be more readily varied than final ones. |
| Mt. Siraj Fatima v. Mahmood Ali A.I.R. 1932 All. 293 | Proposition that review/appeal provisions are not mere procedural matters and thus do not automatically apply to other proceedings by virtue of a general procedural provision. | Cited for the principle that provisions of review and appeal are substantive and do not become applicable merely by a general procedural application clause. |
| Mt. Abhilaki v. Sada Nand A.I.R. 1931 All. 244 | Similar authority on the limits of applying CPC review provisions by general procedural clauses. | Relied on to argue that Sec. 141 (or similar provisions) cannot be read to import review provisions universally. |
| Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hagade A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 244 | Another precedent supporting the same principle regarding limits of procedural incorporation. | Grouped with other Indian authorities to support the Court's view on Sec. 141/341 arguments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in logical steps, grounded on the statutory provisions and established authorities:
- Statutory framework and effect of enquiry: The Court examined the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act and, in particular, Sections 3, 4 and 5. It noted that an enquiry under Section 4 could result in an entry in the record of rights for 1359 Fasli. Under Section 5 such an entry is "deemed to be correct" unless proven wrong. Consequently, a finding of cultivatory possession for 1359 Fasli confers upon the person the rights of an Asami or Adhivasi so long as the entry stands. From this the Court concluded that an enquiry under Sec. 4 does affect legal rights of parties; therefore, orders concerning such enquiries are amenable to writ scrutiny.
- Availability of writs despite interlocutory character: The Single Judge had dismissed the petition as premature because no final order had been made on the enquiry. The Court rejected this as unsound in the circumstances: where an inquiry is being proceeded with pursuant to an order that itself may be void for lack of jurisdiction, the proceedings are being held where there is no jurisdiction; this justifies issuing writs (certiorari to quash the jurisdictional order and prohibition to stop the inquiry) even before a final enquiry result.
- Whether the Sub-Divisional Officer had power to review: The Court addressed whether the Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act itself conferred power of review. It found no such provision. The respondents' two bases for inferring review power were considered: (a) inherent jurisdiction to review, and (b) application of CPC review provisions by virtue of Sec. 141 of the CPC or Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
- Inherent power analysis: The Court surveyed the established rule that, as a general rule, no court or judge has power to rehear, review, alter or vary a final judgment or order once entered, unless a statute authorizes it. The Court set out recognized qualifications (e.g., power to alter prior to signing/delivery, correction of clerical mistakes, setting aside judgments entered without notice, recalling orders signed inadvertently, orders against dead/non-existent parties, and a greater flexibility for interlocutory orders). The Court found that none of those exceptions applied here: the 3 June order was not unsigned, not the product of inadvertence, nor otherwise within those narrow exceptions.
- Applicability of CPC review provisions: The Court explained that Section 141 (which makes certain "procedure" provisions of the CPC applicable) does not convert substantive rights of review and appeal into procedural provisions applicable to all proceedings. It relied on authorities holding that review provisions are not merely procedural and thus cannot be imported simply by a general procedural application clause. Section 341 of the Zamindari Act makes CPC provisions applicable to proceedings under that Act, but does not by its own force refer to the Supplementary Act. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the Supplementary Act might be treated as part of the principal Act; even then, the Court found no ground permissible under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. for review (no fresh evidence, no error on the face of the record, no other sufficient reason).
- Application of facts to law: The Court reviewed the factual basis for the 3 June order — the Girdawar Qanungo's report that the original application failed to specify plots and zamindars, making enquiry impossible — and concluded the 3 June order was not erroneous on the face of the record. Because no statutory power of review existed and none of the recognized exceptions for inherent modification applied, the subsequent order of 8 December 1953 setting aside the 3 June order was made without jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 8th December, 1953 (which set aside the earlier order of 3rd June, 1953) is quashed, and the Sub-Divisional Officer is directed to abstain from proceeding with the enquiry which he had ordered to be held. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the appellant is awarded costs.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The 8 December 1953 order is quashed by certiorari and the officer is prohibited from further proceeding with the enquiry he ordered.
- The appellant is entitled to costs of the proceedings before the Single Judge and of the present appeal.
The opinion focused on the statutory interpretation and application of established authorities concerning the limits of inherent review power and the conditions under which procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure may be held applicable to other statutes. The Court did not purport to discuss broader policy beyond the immediate legal conclusions and their effect on the parties.
Agarwala, J.:— This is a special appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing a writ petition. The respondents along with several other persons made an application to the Sub-Divisional officer, Dumariaganj, on 6th March, 1953, praying that an enquiry be held as to their possession over certain land lying in village Tandauthi. It was not stated in the application under what provisions of law it was being made, but it is conceded that this was an application under the U.P Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act (Act No. XXXI of 1952). Although the year was not mentioned in the application it was probably intended that the enquiry was to be made about the possession of the applicants in the year 1359 Fasli. Such an enquiry is envisaged in Sec. 4 of the aforesaid Act upon an application made within six months from the commencement of the Act. The Act came into force on the 7th November, 1952 and the application having been made on the 6th March, 1953 was within time.
2. Upon this application the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered the Tahsildar to make an enquiry and to submit his report. The Tahsildar made an enquiry through the Girdawar Qanungo who appears to have gone on the spot and enquired from the applicants about the details of the plots in respect of which they wanted an enquiry to be made. As already stated, the plots were not mentioned in the application nor were the names of the zamindars mentioned. The Girdawar Qanungo reported that as neither the plots in possession of each individual applicant were known nor the names of the zamindars were known, it was impossible to make the enquiry about the possession of the applicants and he suggested that the application be dismissed and the applicants be directed to file a regular suit for correction of papers. This report was forwarded by the Tahsildar to the sub-Divisional Officer with the remark that the application may be filed, and the applicants should be asked to file a regular case for correction of the papers. When this report came to the Sub-Divisional Officer he passed an order on the 3rd June, 1953 to the following effect:—
“Seen. File. Inform the applicant to file a regular suit.”
3. Later on, on the 1st July, 1953, a second application was made by some of the original applicants including the present respondents. This application is not before us, but we are informed that this was an application for an enquiry to be made as to the possession of the applicants and probably in this application the details of the plots in respect of which the enquiry was sought to be made were given. On the 21st July, 1953 this application was dismissed as barred by time. It will be seen that the application of 1st July, 1953 was made beyond six months of the commencement of the Act.
4. A third application was made by the respondents on the 4th August, 1953. This application is also not before us, but we presume that under this application the respondents wanted enquiries regarding their possession in 1359 Fasli over the plots which were specified in the application. Upon this application the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order saying that as no local enquiry was done on the first application and the applicants were directed to file regular suits “I think an enquiry under that section (Sec. 4) should have been done and the application should not have been summarily rejected.” He went on to observe that “I, therefore, review that order and hold that enquiry shall be done on that application now regarding possession of the applicants in 1359 Fasli.” It is this order which was challenged by the appellants by means of a Writ application presented to this Court which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge.
5. The main ground upon which the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was challenged was that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no power to review the order dated 3rd June, 1953 and to order an enquiry.
6. The learned single Judge dismissed the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on two grounds:
7. Firstly, that the order of the 8th December, 1953 was passed in the course of proceedings which did not decide any legal right of the parties and therefore could not be made the subject matter of a writ petition; and secondly, that the petition was premature because the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had only ordered that an enquiry should be made and no final order upon the enquiry had been made so far.
8. Against this order the above special appeal has been filed and it has been urged that the order did affect the legal rights of the parties and that the order reviewing the earlier order of the 3rd June, could be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari and further proceedings regarding an enquiry as to possession are being held without jurisdiction and could be quashed by the issue of a writ of prohibitation. It has been further urged on the merits that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no power of review of the previous order passed by his predecessor as the power was not conferred on him by the aforesaid Act. It has been further urged that, even if the officer had the power to review the earlier order, the conditions for exercising the power were totally absent and that therefore he exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law.
9. The U.P Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act is an Act which is intended to supplement the provisions of the U.P Zamindari and Land Reforms Act for certain purposes. By Sec. 3 it is provided that persons in cultivatory possession in 1359, Fasli not being persons who as a consequence of vesting under Sec. 4 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had become Bhumidbars, Sirdars, Adhivasis or Asamis under Secs. 18 to 21 of the said Act, shall become either Asamis or Adhivasis according to the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Sec. 3 and shall be entitled to all the rights and liabilities conferred or imposed upon an Asami or Adhivasi in the principal Act. Then, under Sec. 4 a provision is made for an enquiry being made by a Special Officer. The section runs as follows:—
“(1) With a view to ascertain whether any person referred to in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 was in cultivatory possession of the land during 1359 Fasli, the State Government may, as soon as may be, after the commencement of this Act, appoint an officer, not lower in rank than an Assistant Collector of the Second class, for the correction of the record of rights for 1359 Fasli in any area.
(2) It shall be the duty of such officer either suo moto or on the application of any person presented to him within six months of the date of commencement of this Act, after such local investigation as he may consider necessary to enter the name of every such person as occupant of the land in the record of rights for the year 1359 Fasli, any law to the contrary not with standing.”
10. Sec. 5 then provides:—
“The entry made in the record of rights in pursuance of Sec. 4 shall be deemed to be correct unless the party challenging proves it to be wrong.”
11. The effect of these provisions clearly is that if as a result of an enquiry made by the Special Officer under Sec. 4 it is found that a certain person was in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli, then an entry to that effect shall be made in the revenue papers and such an entry will be deemed to be correct unless the contrary is established. From the fact that the entry will be deemed to be correct, it clearly follows that the finding that he was in cultivatory possession in the year 1359 Fasli will also be deemed to be correct unless the contrary is established. Under Sec. 3 a person who is found to be in cultivatory possession of the land during 1359 Fasli will get the rights of an Asami or Adhivasi. It is clear therefore, that where after an enquiry under Sec. 4 it is found that a certain person was in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli, and an entry is made in the record of rights, then the entry has the effect of conferring upon the person so found to be in cultivatory possession the right of an Asami or Adhivasi so long as the entry stands and is not set aside in other proceedings. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the enquiry under the Act affects the rights of parties must be accepted. A person found to be in cultivatory possession in the year 1359 Fasli gets certain specified rights of tenancy even though these rights are liable to be questioned in separate proceedings.
12. The second ground also upon which the petition was dismissed does not, with respect, appear to be sound. The enquiry which is now being proceeded with before the Sub-Divisional Officer is the outcome of an order setting aside the order of dismissal dated 3rd June, 1953. If the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to review the order of 3rd June, 1953, his order setting aside that order is clearly vitiated and the enquiry which he is holding as a result of quashing the order of 3rd June, 1953 is also being held without jurisdiction. Even though, therefore, no final order has been passed upon the enquiry, the enquiry itself is being held where no jurisdiction exists of holding it and thus it is a case which calls for the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order by which the order of the 3rd June, 1953 was set aside and also to issue a writ of prohibition prohibiting the officer concerned from proceeding with the enquiry, provided that it is held that the officer concerned had no jurisdiction to review that order.
13. This brings us to the merits of the application of the appellants. The Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act by itself does not make any provision for a review of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that this power may be inferred on two grounds:— First that there is inherent jurisdiction in every court to review its own orders, and second that the provisions of review contained in O. 47, R. 1, C.P.C apply either by virtue of Sec. 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by reason of Sec. 341 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951.
14. As regards the inherent power of courts of law to modify or set aside their orders, the law may be stated thus:—
15. As a general rule no court or judge has power to rehear, review, alter or vary any judgment or order after it has been entered or drawn up respectively, see Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition) Vol. 19 p. 260; see Order 20, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
16. In Drew v. Wills, Ex Party Martin 1891 1 Q.B.D 450., it was stated by Lord Esher M.R— “No Court has such a power of setting aside an order which has been properly made, unless it is given by Statute.” The same view was expressed in Hession v. Jones 1914 2 K.B 421., Charles Bright & Co. Ltd. v. Seller 1904 1 K.B 6., Baij Nath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar I.L.R 40 Cal. 552. and Nanak Chand Shadi Ram v. Mahabir.5
17. This rule is based on the principle of finality of litigation Flower v. Lloyd 1879 10 Ch.D 327 333..
18. But the rule is subject to certain qualifications.
(1) Until a judgment or order has been delivered and signed there is inherent in every court the power to vary its own orders so as to carry out what was intended and to render the language free from doubt, or even to withdraw the order so that the decision may be reconsidered—Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition) Vol. 19 p. 261; Lawric v. Lees 1881 7 A.C 19 35..
(2) After the judgment or order has been entered or drawn up or singned, there is power both under Sec. 152 of the Civil Procedure Code, and inherent in the judge who gave or made the judgment or order to correct any clerical mistake or error arising from any accidental slip or omission so as to do substantial justice and give effect to his meaning and intention Lawrie v. Lees.
(3) If an order for judgment has been made or judgment entered without notice to a party when that party had the right to be heard, the court or judge may set it aside— The Bolivier8 Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Ed.) Vol. 19, p. 263.
(4) If an order has been signed by in-advertance or failure of memory when it was intended that it should not be signed at that stage, the court or judge may recall the order Jai Karan v. Panchaiti Akhara A.I.R 1933 All. 49..
(5) Where a decree has been passed against a dead person, the order may be vacated and the case reheard Debi Bux Singh v. Habib Shah I.L.R 35 All. 331.. The same rule applies to an order passed against a company which has already been dissolved or which was non-existent— Lazard Brothers & Co. v. Barque Industrialle de Moscow 1932 1 K.B 617 624 S.C on appeal 1933 A.C 289 296..
(6) A court has larger power of modifying or setting aside interlocutory orders than it has in respect of final orders. Thus an order for sale of unsaleable property may be set aside—Tafazzul Husain v. Raghunath Prasad 14 M.I.A 40..
19. It will thus be seen that unless authorised by Statute a court or judge has no inherent power to set aside or modify a final order once made merely because it is wrong. None of the grounds on which judge may exercise his inherent power to modify or alter his previous order exist in the present case.
20. As regards the second ground the provisions under Sec. 141 make the “procedure” relating to suits applicable to other proceedings. The provisions relating to review and appeals do not become applicable to all proceedings by virtue of Sec. 141 as they are provisions not so much of “procedure” as of “substantive rights”, vide Mt. Siraj Fatima v. Mahmood Ali A.I.R 1932 All. 293, F.B., Mt. Abhilaki v. Sada Nand A.I.R 1931 All. 244., Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hagade A.I.R 1919 Mad. 244..
21. Sec. 341 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides:—
“Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870, the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to the proceedings under this Act.”
22. As this section makes all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings under the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, the provisions of Review are applicable to such proceedings. But the section clearly refers to the proceedings under the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and does not of its own force refer to the U.P Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952. But it is urged that this later Act should be treated as part of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Assuming, without deciding, that the U.P Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952 must be so treated and that by virtue of Sec. 342 the power of review as provided in O. 47, R. 1, C.P.C is vested in the Sub-Divisional Officer acting under the aforesaid Act, no case has been made out for a review of the order dated 3rd June, 1953 under the provisions of O. 47, R. 1, C.P.C, i.e upon the grounds of (a) fresh evidence (b) error on the fact of the record or (c) for other sufficient reason.
23. In the present case, as we have already stated, the application dated 6th March, 1953 did not specify the plots in respect of which investigation was desired. The Girdawar Qanungo reported that in view of this omission and in view of the fact that the applicants were not able to specify the plots which each individual applicant asserted to be in his possession in the relevant year, the enquiry could not be made and the application was bound to be dismissed. This report was the basis of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer passed by him on the 3rd June, 1953. It cannot be said that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was erroneous on the face of the record. There is no question of fresh evidence in the case. Sufficient reason mentioned in O. 47, R. 1. C.P.C must be ejusdem generis with the other two grounds on which a review may be sought. No such ground exists in the present case.
24. I am therefore of opinion that the order of the 8th December, 1953 by which the Sub-Divisional Officer set aside the previous order of the 3rd June, 1953 was made wholly without jurisdiction and the subsequent proceedings which he has ordered to be proceeded with are also without jurisdiction. In the circumstances the order of the 8th December must be quashed and the officer must be restrained from proceeding with the enquiry.
25. I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge, allow the application of the appellant under Art. 226, and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated the 8th December, 1953, and direct that he shall abstain from proceeding with the enquiry which he has ordered to be held.
26. The appellant is entitled to his costs of the proceedings before the learned single Judge as well as of this appeal from the respondents.
27. Mootham, C.J:— I agree that this appeal must be allowed. The Sub-Divisional Officer had no statutory power to review his predecessor's order dated the 3rd June, 1953, and in my opinion he had no inherent power to do so. That order was not made inadvertently nor under any misapprehension as to the fact; on the contrary it was made after consideration of the Qanungo's report and was in my opinion a proper order in the circumstances. I agree with my brother that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have no application, and for the reasons which he has given that this is a case in which a writ of certiorari should issue and further proceedings in the enquiry be prohibited.
28. By The Court:— We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and quash the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 8th December, 1953 and direct that he shall abstain from proceeding with the enquiry which he has ordered to be held. The appellant shall have his costs of the proceedings before the learned single Judge and of this appeal.
29. Appeal allowed.
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