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Dharmendra Kumar Dikshit v. Superintendent Of Police
Case Summary — Opinion by Mehrotra, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The applicant, a substantive head constable who was officiating as a Sub-Inspector of Police, was posted at Cantonment police station in Kanpur and put in charge of Rail Bazar Chauki. It was alleged that on the night between 23rd and 24th August 1952 the applicant, together with two constables, entered the house of Nadir Husain, threatened to lock up the occupants under the Gambling Act to extort money, and thereafter received money from them. On these allegations the applicant was suspended and reverted to his substantive rank of head constable on 26th August 1952.
Proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act were initiated and conducted by Sri S.K. Saxena, officiating Deputy Superintendent of Police, who submitted findings on 26th November 1952 recommending removal from the force. The officiating Superintendent of Police (Sri Mardan Singh) invited the applicant's explanation, and by order dated 20th December 1952 upheld Saxena's findings and dismissed the applicant. The applicant's first appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Southern Range, Kanpur) was rejected by order dated 12th May 1953; a second appeal to the Inspector General of Police was dismissed by order dated 18th March 1954. A subsequent representation to the State Government was directed to be made through proper channel and was withheld. The applicant then filed the present writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the dismissal order.
The opposite parties filed a counter-affidavit which broadly confirmed the reporting and suspension timeline and stated that a Circle Inspector's report (dated 6th September 1952) led to the initiation of Sec. 7 proceedings. The applicant later filed an affidavit (24th August 1955) asserting that Sri Saxena was not authorised by the Deputy Inspector General under paragraph 479(f) of the Police Regulations to conduct the Sec. 7 inquiry.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an officer conducting an inquiry under Section 7 of the Police Act must possess magisterial powers so as to be covered by Section 35 of the Police Act (this point was not pressed in view of a Full Bench decision).
- Whether the procedure applicable to an inquiry should have followed rules for a Sub-Inspector because the applicant had been reverted after charges were levelled or whether the reversion itself amounted to a reduction in rank attracting paragraphs 480 onwards of the Police Regulations.
- Whether Sri S.K. Saxena (the Deputy Superintendent who conducted the inquiry) had authority under paragraph 479(f) of the Police Regulations to hold the inquiry and, relatedly, whether the inquiry held by him was without jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- Initially contended that, under Section 35 of the Police Act, a charge under Section 7 can be gone into and decided only by an officer who has magisterial powers. (This contention was later not pressed because of a Full Bench decision.)
- Argued that on the date the inquiry was started he was still an officiating Sub-Inspector and therefore the procedure provided in the rules for inquiries against a Sub-Inspector should have been followed.
- Contended that the reversion to substantive head constable amounted to a reduction in rank and that such a reduction required compliance with the disciplinary procedure in paragraphs 480 onwards of the Police Regulations.
- Asserted that Sri S.K. Saxena was not competent to hold the inquiry because he had not been specially authorised by the Deputy Inspector General under paragraph 479(f) to exercise the powers of a Superintendent of Police for the purposes of paragraphs 478–491.
Opposite Parties' / Standing Counsel's Arguments
- Produced a factual account of reporting and suspension: matter reported on morning of 24th August 1952; suspension and reversion on 26th August 1952; Circle Inspector's report of 6th September 1952; Sec. 7 proceedings thereafter; Saxena submitted findings 26th November 1952; dismissal on 20th December 1952.
- Relied on a 1950 letter from the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, to the Superintendent of Police, Kanpur, indicating that once an officer is authorised to take Sec. 7 proceedings under amended paragraph 479(d) he continues to be so authorised unless authority is withdrawn and that it was not necessary to re-authorise Shri S.K. Saxena on his transfer to the Range.
- Argued that the DIG's letter should be treated as constituting the required authority under paragraph 479(f) so that Sri Saxena was competent to conduct the Sec. 7 inquiry in Kanpur.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri Mahendra Singh v. State of U.P., 1955 A.L.J. 643 (Full Bench) | Held that Section 35 of the Police Act does not apply to departmental inquiries under Section 7; therefore, an officer conducting a Section 7 inquiry need not have magisterial powers. | The applicant did not press his argument based on Section 35 in view of this Full Bench decision; the court treated the point as resolved against the applicant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined each of the three points raised by the applicant and applied the Police Act and the Police Regulations (paragraphs 478–491) to the facts as presented.
- On the Section 35 point: The court noted the Full Bench decision in Shri Mahendra Singh (1955 A.L.J. 643) holding that Section 35 does not apply to Section 7 departmental inquiries; accordingly the applicant did not press this contention and the court did not rely on Section 35 to set aside the proceedings.
- On the reversion/procedure point: The court accepted the opposite parties' account that the applicant had been reverted to his substantive rank before the Sec. 7 inquiry was started. Consequently, the procedure applicable to a Sub-Inspector's inquiry did not apply. The court further held that the order of reversion was not a punishment passed under paragraph 478 and thus was not a "reduction in rank" requiring the disciplinary procedure under paragraphs 480 onwards; the reversion was the ordinary administrative step of terminating an officiating appointment.
-
On the competence of Sri S.K. Saxena to hold the inquiry: This was the central legal question for determination. The court set out the relevant Police Regulations:
- Paragraph 478 lists punishments that may be awarded on an inquiry under Section 7.
- Paragraph 479 identifies which officers are empowered to award such punishments, and sub-paragraph (f) allows certain Assistant or Deputy Superintendents (permanent who crossed first efficiency bar, or others specially authorised by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for his range) to exercise the powers of a Superintendent as detailed in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e).
- Paragraph 491 prescribes the procedure to be followed in departmental trials and provides that officers mentioned in paragraph 479(f) shall follow the procedure in paragraph 490 and that their orders shall have the same force as those of the Superintendent, except in cases involving dismissal or removal where the Superintendent must give copy of findings and ask for show-cause.
The court rejected the Standing Counsel's interpretation for two principal reasons:- The text of paragraph 479(f), specifically the phrase "so far as his range is concerned," indicates that authority granted by a Deputy Inspector General for a particular range is operative only while the officer remains in that range; upon transfer to another range the authority ceases to be operative (rather than requiring an express withdrawal).
- The 1950 letter itself only referred to authorisation under amended paragraph 479(d) and made no reference to sub-paragraph (e) or to a specific grant of authority under paragraph 479(f); indeed, the letter indicated a view that no fresh order was necessary, but did not in terms confer the special authority required by paragraph 479(f). Thus the letter could not be treated as having conferred the requisite authority on Sri Saxena for the purpose of paragraph 479(f) when he conducted the inquiry in Kanpur.
- On the procedural objection that the applicant failed to raise the jurisdictional point before the inquiring officer or the Superintendent: the court distinguished this as a question going to the root of jurisdiction rather than a mere factual issue to be resolved at trial. Consequently, the applicant was entitled to raise the lack of authority in the writ petition despite not having raised it earlier in the internal proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The order of the Superintendent of Police dated 20th December, 1952 is quashed.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the dismissal order passed on 20th December 1952, which was based on an inquiry conducted by Sri S.K. Saxena, is set aside because the inquiry was held without the requisite authority under paragraph 479(f) and therefore without jurisdiction.
- The court held that where a Deputy Superintendent of Police has been authorised by a Deputy Inspector General to exercise powers for a particular range, that authorisation operates only while the officer remains within that range; on transfer to another range a fresh authorisation is required if paragraph 479(f) is to apply. This interpretation was central to the court's decision that no valid authority existed for Sri Saxena to conduct the inquiry in Kanpur.
- The opinion does not expressly order any further remedial step (for example, a re-trial) in the text provided; it confines its relief to quashing the impugned order because the underlying inquiry lacked jurisdiction. The court's decision displaces the disciplinary outcome reached on the basis of the invalid inquiry but the opinion as provided does not elaborate additional directions or consequences beyond quashing the order.
This summary is limited strictly to the material and rulings contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or outcomes not explicitly stated therein.
Mehrotra, J.:— This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that a writ of certiorari or any direction be issued to the opposite parties quashing the order of the Superintendent of Police Kanpur, dated 20th December, 1952 by which he dismissed the applicant from service.
2. The facts alleged in the affidavit filed along with the petition are that on August, 19, 1952, the applicant, who was holding the substantive post of a head constable, was officiating as a Sub-Inspector of Police and was posted at police station Cantonment as incharge of Rail Bazar Chauki in the city of Kanpur. The allegation was that on the night between 23rd and 24th August, 1952, the applicant along with two constables entered the house of one Nadir Husain in mohalla Mirpur and threatened to lock him up and other inmates of the house under the Gambling Act in order to extort money from them and thereafter the applicant and the constables received money from them. On these allegations, the applicant was suspended and reverted to the substantive rank of head constable on 26th August, 1952. Thereafter proceedings under Sec. 7 of the Police Act were started against him and were conducted by Sri S.K Saxena, officiating Deputy Superintendent of Police. Sri Saxena gave his findings on the 26th November, 1952 and recommended that the applicant be removed from the police force. The findings were submitted to the Superintendent of Police, Kanpur for necessary orders. Sri Mardan Singh, who was at that time officiating Superintendent of Police, Kanpur City, issued a letter under his signature to the applicant and the applicant was asked to give his explanation to the findings arrived at by Sri Saxena. The applicant submitted his explanation to the officiating Superintendent of Police and the Superintendent of Police, by his order dated the 20th December, 1952, upheld the findings arrived at by Sri Saxena and the applicant was dismissed from service. An appeal was filed by the applicant to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, Kanpur who, by his order dated 12th May, 1953, rejected the appeal. The applicant then filed a second appeal before the Inspector General of Police who, by his order dated 18th March, 1954, upheld the decision of the subordinate authorities. The applicant then made a representation to the State Government but he was directed to make his representation through proper channel and the representation was then withheld. Thereafter the present petition was filed. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties in which it is stated that on the morning of 24th August, 1952 the matter was reported to the Station Officer Cantonment, Sri Gajendra Singh. On the 26th August, 1952, Sri Gajendra Singh informed through phone to the Superintendent of Police, City. Same day the Superintendent of Police suspended the applicant and reverted him to the substantive rank of head constable. Thereafter the Superintendent of Police ordered an inquiry into the matter by the Circle Inspector. The Circle Inspector submitted his report on the 6th September, 1952 and on the strength of that report, proceedings under Sec. 7 of the Police Act were started against the applicant. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sri Saxena, who held the inquiry against the applicant, eventually submitted his findings to the Superintendent of Police on the 26th November, 1952 with the recommendation that the applicant should be removed from service. The recommendation was accepted by the Superintendent of Police by his order dated the 20th December, 1952 and he dismissed the applicant from service. An affidavit was further filed by the petitioner on the 24th August, 1955 in which he deposed that the applicant came to know that Sri Saxena, Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not authorised by the higher authorities, that is the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range Kanpur under paragraph 479(f) of the Police Regulations to conduct the inquiry under Sec. 7 of the Police Act.
3. Three points have been raised by the applicant in the present petition. Firstly, it is contended that under Sec. 35 of the Police Act, a charge under Sec. 7 of the Police Act can only be gone into and decided by an officer who has got magisterial powers. In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Special Appeal No. 76 of 1955 Shri Mahendra Singh v. State of U.P 1955 A.L.J 643. this point has not been pressed by the applicant. It has now been held by the Full Bench that for departmental inquiries under Sec. 7 of the Police Act it is not necessary that an officer conducting an inquiry should have magisterial powers as Sec. 35 does not apply to such inquiry.
4. The next point urged by the applicant was that the applicant was reverted to his substantive post of head constable after the charges had been levelled against him under Sec. 7 and on the date when the inquiry was started against him, he was still an officiating Sub-Inspector of Police and as such the procedure provided in the rules for inquiries against a Sub-Inspector should have been followed. As I have already pointed out, in the counter-affidavit it has been stated that before the inquiry under Sec. 7 was started against the applicant, he had been reverted to his substantive post of head constable and consequently there is no substance in this argument of the applicant that the procedure provided for an inquiry against a Sub-Inspector of Police should have been followed in his case. On this question, a further argument was advanced by Mr. Khare. He contended that the reversion of the applicant itself amounted to reduction in rank and such an order could not have been passed by the opposite-parties without following the procedure provided in paragraphs 480 onwards of the Police Regulations. There is no substance in this argument either. Firstly, there is no prayer in the petition asking for the order reverting the applicant to be quashed and secondly, the order of reversion was not passed under paragraph 478 of the Police Regulations. The applicant was not reverted as a punishment but as he was only officiating as a Sub-Inspector of Police, it was open to the authorities to revert him to the substantive post and the reversion cannot be called as a reduction in rank.
5. The last argument advanced by the applicant was that Sri Saxena was not competent to hold an inquiry against him. Sec. 7 of the Police Act provides that subject to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector-General, Assistant Inspector-General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks on certain grounds. Sec. 7, as will appear from the opening part of the section, is subject to rules framed by the State Government. It is, therefore, clear that before an action can be taken under Sec. 7, the authorities, enumerated in the section, must follow the procedure provided in the rules. Paragraph 478 of the Police Regulations enumerates the punishments which can be awarded to the Police Officers on an inquiry under Sec. 7 of the Police Act. Paragraph 479 enumerates the officers who are empowered to award the punishments enumerated in paragraph 478. It is necessary to refer to three sub-paragraphs of paragraph 479. Sub-paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) are as follows:—
“(d). The Superintendent of Police may punish all inspectors, and sub-inspectors temporarily or, permanently subordinate to him except with dismissal or removal. Any case in which he proposes the dismissal or removal of an inspector or sub-inspector of any branch of the force must be forwarded for orders to the Deputy Inspector General of Police in accordance with the instructions contained in sub-paragraph 8 of paragraph 490 below.
“(e). The Superintendent may punish all head constables and constables temporarily or permanently subordinate to him.
“(f). Subject to the provisions of paragraph 491(i) all permanent Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendents of Police who have crossed the first efficiency bar in the time scale of pay applicable to them and (ii) other Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendents of Police, specially authorised in this behalf by the Deputy Inspector General of Police so far as his Range is concerned; may exercise all the powers of a Superintendent of Police as detailed in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph other than powers relating to the punishment of inspectors of police and powers under Fundamental Rules 24 and 25.”
6. From a perusal of these sub-paragraphs, it is clear that the Superintendent of Police could, under sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 479, punish the applicant. All the powers of the Superintendent of Police can be exercised by the officers enumerated in sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 479. Paragraph 491 provides for the procedure for the inquiry before an order under paragraph 478 is passed by any of the officers mentioned in paragraph 479. Paragraph 491 provides that the officers holding the post enumerated in paragraph 479(f) shall follow the procedure prescribed in paragraph 490 when conducting departmental trials, and their orders shall, with the concurrence of the Superintendent of Police, have the same executive force in all cases as the orders of the Superintendent of Police except in cases in which the officer conducting the proceedings recommends the dismissal or removal of a constable or under officer. In such cases, the Superintendent of Police shall give the officer a copy of the finding of the enquiring officer and ask him to show cause within a reasonable time against the punishment proposed. Paragraph 491, therefore, provides for the procedure to be followed in such inquiries. The contention of the applicant is that the officers mentioned in paragraph 479(f) can only make an inquiry under paragraph 491. An officer, who is not mentioned in paragraph 479(f), has no power to hold any inquiry under paragraph 491, and recommend to the Superintendent of Police to exercise his powers under paragraph 479(e). [The Standing Counsel's contention is that paragraph 479(f) provides that subject to the provisions of 491(i) all permanent Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendents of Police who have crossed the first efficiency bar in the time-scale of pay applicable to them and other Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendents of Police, specially authorized in this behalf by the Deputy Inspector General of Police so far as his range is concerned, may exercise all the powers of a Superintendent of Police as detailed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph.] Sri Saxena, who conducted the inquiry, was the Deputy Superintendent of Police and unless he was specially authorised in this behalf by the Deputy Inspector General of Police so far as his range was concerned, he had no power to conduct the inquiry under paragraph 491. The question to be determined is whether Sri Saxena had any such authority on the date when he conducted the inquiry. The Standing Counsel, who appears for the opposite parties, has relied upon a letter sent by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, Kanpur to the Superintendent of Police Kanpur in August, 1950. As the applicant's counsel has no objection, I have ordered a copy of this letter to be placed on the record of this petition. It appears that in 1950 certain cases under Sec. 7 of the Police Act were started against some constables and the Superintendent of Police, Kanpur wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, Kanpur for the necessary authority to be granted to Sri Saxena to conduct such inquiries and a reply was sent by the Deputy Inspector General of Police Southern Range, Kanpur in the following terms:—
“Once an officer has been authorised to take Sec. 7 proceedings under the amended paragraph 479(d) of P. Rs., he continues to be so authorised to take Sec. 7 proceedings, unless this authority is withdrawn from him.
As such it is not necessary to empower Shri Surendra Kumar Saxena, Officiating Deputy Superintendent of Police City I again on his transfer to this Range.”
7. In the first place the Standing Counsel's contention is that the interpretation put on paragraph 479(f) of the Police Regulations by the Deputy Inspector General of Police in this letter is a correct interpretation. According to the Standing Counsel, once the Deputy Superintendent of Police has granted the authority to conduct an inquiry under Sec. 7 no fresh authority need be granted to him on his transfer to some other range. If this interpretation of paragraph 479(f) is accepted, then the words “so far as his range is concerned,” in the said paragraph after the words “Deputy Inspector General of Police” will become redundant. In my judgment what paragraph 479(f) means is that the authority granted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police of a particular range to a Deputy Superintendent of Police to conduct an inquiry under Sec. 7 of the Police Act is operative only so long as the Deputy Superintendent of Police is working within that range. As soon as he is transferred to some other range, the authority ceases to be operative. It is not a case of withdrawal of the authority. The authority in its own force becomes in-operative as soon as the Deputy Superintendent of Police is transferred to some other range. It was, therefore, necessary to grant a fresh authority to Sri Saxena. In my opinion, therefore, a fresh authority was necessary to be given to Shri Saxena when he was transferred from Sultanpur, to Kanpur.
8. The next contention of the Standing Counsel is that even if it be accepted that a fresh authority was needed, the letter of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, who was authorised to grant an authority under paragraph 479(f), should be treated as granting the required authority under paragraph 479(f). In my opinion there are two objections to this contention of the Standing Counsel. Firstly, in the letter itself the Deputy Inspector General of Police says that the officer had been authorised to take proceedings under Sec. 7 under the amended paragraph 479(d) only. There is no reference to sub-paragraph (e) in this letter and consequently it cannot be argued that the letter gave any authority to the Deputy Superintendent of Police under paragraph 479(f) to act under sub-paragraph (e). Secondly the letter did not in terms confer any authority on Sri Saxena. On the contrary the contents of the letter show that the Deputy Inspector General of Police was definitely of opinion that no fresh order conferring the authority was needed and if the authority who could confer such a power, itself definitely holds that it was not necessary for him to grant any fresh authority, it cannot be said that such a letter by itself granted any authority to Sri Saxena to conduct the inquiry within the meaning of paragraph 479(f). Sri Saxena, when he made the inquiry, therefore, had no power under paragraph 479(f) of the Police Regulations to conduct the inquiry under paragraph 491 and consequently the inquiry made by him was without jurisdiction and the order passed consequent upon this inquiry must be set aside. The last contention of the Standing Counsel is that the question as to whether Sri Saxena was authorised under paragraph 479(f) to hold the inquiry should have been raised before him or before the Superintendent of Police, the Tribunal which had to determine the question of fact and it is not open to the applicant in the present petition to raise the question of fact at this stage. The question really urged by the applicant is not one of fact but goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the officer holding the inquiry. The contention of the applicant, as I have already pointed out, is that unless an officer is authorised under paragraph 479(f), he has no power to hold an inquiry under paragraph 491 and in challenging the order of the Superintendent of Police on the ground of want of jurisdiction, it is open to the petitioner here to urge that there was no proper authority given to Sri Saxena under paragraph 479(f) of the Police Regulations. The failure to raise that point before Sri Saxena or the Superintendent of Police is no bar to the applicant to raise the question of the power of Sri Saxena to hold the inquiry in this writ petition.
9. I, therefore, quash the order of the Superintendent of Police dated 20th December, 1952.
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