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R.B. Lal v. State
Legal Opinion Summary — Kidwai, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
On 14-7-1952 a truck (registration U.S.J 3125) was found being used on a public road without a permit and without a fitness certificate. The truck was driven by Hazari Lal and was registered in the name of the Divisional Superintendent of the Northern Railway, Sri R.B. Lal, who was prosecuted along with the chauffeur under relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Hazari Lal's defence was that he acted under orders and carried only cash. Sri R.B. Lal pleaded that he believed the vehicle did not require a permit and that both the Railway and the Transport Authorities shared that impression.
Evidence was led that the fitness certificate had expired and that attempts were made to renew it at the Regional Transport Office on 12-7-1952 and again on 14-7-1952, when the truck was stopped. The trying Magistrate held Sri R.B. Lal guilty under Sections 38(1)/112 and 42/123 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Act and imposed fines. On appeal the Additional Sessions Judge upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence under S.42/123 to a warning (finding a bona fide mistake about the need for a permit) while maintaining the conviction and sentence under S.38/112. Sri R.B. Lal applied in revision to the High Court; the application was referred to a Bench and heard by Kidwai, J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person in whose name a vehicle is registered (but who is not the owner because the vehicle belongs to the Central Government) can be punished under Section 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act for allowing or causing the vehicle to be used without a permit.
- Whether Section 42(3) (or other provisions relied upon) exempted the vehicle in question from the requirement of taking a permit under S.42(1).
- Whether the vehicle in question was a "transport vehicle" (in particular, a "goods vehicle") so as to require a permit and a fitness certificate under the Act.
- Whether the vehicle was being used in connection with the business of the Railway (which would affect the applicability of exemptions under S.42(1)).
Arguments of the Parties
Defence (Hazari Lal)
- Hazari Lal's defence was that he acted under the orders of his superiors and that the vehicle was carrying nothing but cash.
Applicant / Appellant (Sri R.B. Lal)
- Contended he is not the owner of the vehicle and therefore cannot be punished under S.123 (ownership argument).
- Argued that S.42(3) exempts the vehicle from the requirements of S.42(1).
- Maintained that the vehicle was not a "transport vehicle" and thus no permit was required.
- Asserted (earlier) that he believed no permit was necessary and that that belief was shared by both Railway and Transport Authorities.
Prosecution / Record Evidence
- Evidence established the truck was plying on a public road without a permit and without a fitness certificate.
- Witness Ram Sundar Pandey produced evidence that an application for renewal of the fitness certificate was made only at the last minute and that the Regional Transport Office had asked him to come on another day when he visited on 12-7-1952 and again on 14-7-1952.
- Police witnesses described the vehicle as a "truck" and correspondence referred to it as a "cash lorry" used to carry Railway earnings to and from the Imperial Bank.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Uma Shanker Tewarv v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 234 (A) | Previously held (by Agarwala, J.) that only the owner could be punished because the owner alone is required to take out a permit. | The Court respectfully differed from that view: it held that Section 123 is wider in scope than S.42(1) and applies not only to the owner but also to any person in charge of the vehicle who causes or allows its use in contravention of permit requirements. The earlier decision was therefore not followed on that point. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, applying statutory language and the record evidence to each issue raised.
- Interpretation of S.123 vs S.42(1): The Court noted that Section 123 (quoted in the opinion) uses language extending liability to "whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be used" in contravention of Section 42(1). By contrast, S.42(1) limits the duty to take out a permit to the owner. Therefore, the Court concluded S.123 is wider in scope and can reach persons in charge of the vehicle (even if they are not the legal owner).
- On the effect of prior authority: The Court addressed the decision in Uma Shanker Tewarv where it was held only the owner could be punished. The Bench disagreed with that view, finding no lacuna in the statute and holding the words of S.123 are broad enough to cover a person who is in control of the vehicle and thereby allows its unlawful use.
- Whether the vehicle was used "in connection" with the Railway's business: The Court rejected a narrow reading that such use must be passenger or goods carriage. It held that carrying railway earnings between stations and banks, and conveying money for payment of salaries, is ancillary to the business of the Railway; thus the vehicle was used "in connection" with Railway business and not exempt under S.42(1).
- Whether the vehicle was a "transport vehicle": The Court examined statutory definitions. "Transport vehicle" is defined in S.2(33) and includes a "goods vehicle" under S.2(8), which is any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for the carriage of goods (actual use not required). The factual question whether the truck was constructed or adapted for carriage of goods had not been raised earlier, but the record contained relevant evidence: witnesses called it a truck, the Railway described it as a "cash lorry," and the Railway previously obtained fitness certificates for it. From these admissions and the fact fitness certificates were sought, the Court found sufficient material to conclude the truck was a "transport vehicle" and therefore required both a permit and a fitness certificate.
- On the fitness certificate and Rule 28(d): Evidence (D.W.1 Ram Sundar Pandey) showed the Railway authorities applied for renewal at the last minute and that under Rule 28(d) they ought to have applied one month earlier. The Court emphasized the purpose of Rule 28(d) (to avoid last-minute difficulties and provide for inspection at a fixed date/time) and held the Railway's failure to comply justified upholding the conviction under S.38/112 for lack of a fitness certificate.
- Sentencing and bona fide mistake regarding permit: The correspondence and record demonstrated the Railway Authorities were laboring under a bona fide mistake about the need for a permit — a mistake that the Transport Authorities at one time shared. Given that, the Court agreed with the Additional Sessions Judge that a warning (rather than a harsher sentence) in respect of S.42/123 was appropriate.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The application in revision was dismissed; the conviction and sentence under S.38/112 of the Motor Vehicles Act were upheld, and the reduction of sentence under S.42/123 to a warning (by the Additional Sessions Judge) was appropriate in light of a bona fide mistake about the need for a permit. Leave to appeal was refused.
Implications and consequences:
- The Court clarified that Section 123 is not confined to the owner: it applies to anyone who is in charge of a vehicle and causes or allows it to be used in contravention of permit requirements. The Bench expressly disagreed with the earlier view in Uma Shanker Tewarv on that point.
- The truck in question was held to be a "transport vehicle" requiring both a permit and a fitness certificate; the Railway's delay in renewing the fitness certificate (contrary to Rule 28(d)) justified upholding conviction under S.38/112 and maintaining the fine.
- Because the Railway Authorities and initially even the Transport Authorities laboured under a bona fide mistake about the need for a permit, a mitigated sentence (warning) for the offence under S.42/123 was appropriate — and the Court endorsed that approach.
- No broader new legal principle beyond the Court's interpretation of S.123 and its application to persons in charge (as distinct from owners) was framed as a binding precedent beyond the decision recorded here; the decision nonetheless records a departure from the earlier All. judgment on the owner-only view.
Disposition: Application dismissed; conviction under S.38/112 upheld with fines maintained; warning appropriate for S.42/123; leave to appeal refused.
Kidwai, J.:— The applicant Sri R.B Lal, is the Divisional Superintendent, posted at Lucknow, of the Northern Railway. Truck registered as U.S.J 3125 was found being used, on 14-7-1952, without a permit and without a fitness certificate. Hazari Lal was driving the truck and since it was registered in the name of the Divisional Superintendent, who happened at the time to be Sri R.B Lal he and the chauffeur were prosecuted under Sections 38/112 and 42/123 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
2. The defence of Hazari Lal was that he acted under the orders of his superiors and carried nothing but cash. Sri R.B Lal pleaded that the vehicle did not require a permit and in any case that was the impression both of the Railway and of the Transport Authorities. Evidence was led to prove the fact that the vehicle was plying on a public road without a permit and without a fitness certificate. The defence produced a witness Ram Sunder Pandey to prove that he had gone to the Regional Transport Office on 12-7-1952, the day after that on which the fitness certificate expired, for its renewal. The witness was told by the office people to come some other day.
3. The next day was a Sunday and he went again on 14-7-1952, but he was again told to come some other time and the office people were busy. On that very day the truck was stopped by Sub-Inspector Quraishi.
4. The trying Magistrate in an elaborate judgment discussed the whole matter and held:
“1. That though the vehicle belonged to the Central Government, Sri R.B Lal “can rightly be held to be the person in whose possession, and control the vehicle in question runs and as such he can rightly be called the owner of the vehicle.”
2. That the vehicle in question is used for carrying Railway earnings from the station to’ the Imperial Bank and also for collecting other income earned by the railway and for carrying money from the Bank for the payment of salaries of the Railway staff:
3. That the vehicle in question “was a subsidiary instrument engaged for the purpose of the business of the Railway:”
4. That the Divisional Superintendent, who, on the relevant date was Sri R.B Lal, is responsible for an infringement of the law since to him was assigned the duty of controlling the vehicle which stood registered in his name:
5. That the delay in obtaining a certificate of fitness was not due to any action of the registering authority but owing to the fact that the person in whose name the vehicle was registered did not comply with Rule 28(d) of the U.P Motor Vehicles Rules.
5. As a result the learned Magistrate found Sri R.B Lal guilty Under Sections 38(1)/112 and 42/123 of the U.P Motor Vehicles Act and sentenced him to pay fines of Rs. 15/- and Rs. 230/- in respect of the two offences.
6. Sri R.B Lal appealed and the learned Additional Sessions Judge considered the matter equally carefully in view of its importance and being more or less in the nature of a test case. He held:
1. That the truck in question, being used for the carriage of money from and to the station and the Bank, was used in connection with the business of the Railway; and
2. That those responsible for the truck were grossly negligent in not getting the fitness certificate renewed within time.
7. He accordingly upheld the conviction but he held that the appellant before him was labouring under a bona fide mistake about the need for taking out a permit. He accordingly reduced the sentence under S. 42/123 of the Motor Vehicles Act to a mere warning but maintained the sentence under S. 38/112 of the Act.
8. Sri R.B Lal has applied to this Court in revision and sines an authoritative decision was required the application was referred to a Bench. Before us the learned Advocate for the applicant contended:
1. That it is only the owner that is required to take out a permit a id the applicant is not the owner of the vehicle and cannot be punished under S. 123 of the Act.
2. That the provision of S. 42(3) exempt the vehicle in question from the requirements of S. 42(1) and
3. That the vehicle in question is not a transport vehicle and that consequently no permit is required.
9. It is no doubt true that though the vehicle is registered in the name of the Divisional Superintendent it is not his property but the property of the Central Government. Sri R.B Lal cannot, therefore, be punished for not obtaining a permit. Section 123, however, does not unlike S. 42(1), limit the responsibility to the owner: it says:
“(1) Whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be used or lets out a motor vehicle for use in contravention of sub-s. (1) of S. 42…………”
10. Thus S. 123 is wider in scope than S. 42(1) since the latter is limited to the owner while the former is applicable not only to the owner but to any person who is in charge of the vehicle and allows it to be used in contravention of the terms of a permit.
11. The use of the motor vehicle without a permit is also an infringement of S. 42(f) since that section forbids the use of the vehicle by the owner” save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used.”
12. If a vehicle is being plied without a permit, it is not being plied in accordance with the conditions of a permit authorising its use in that place and that manner —Vide — ‘Uma Shanker Tewarv v. Rex’, AIR 1950 All 234 (A).
13. In the case to which reference has just been made our learned brother Agarwala, J. held that it is the owner alone that can be punished since it is he alone who is required to take out a permit. We respectfully differ from this view. Our learned brother pointed out what he considered to be a lacuna in the law: we find, however that there is no lacuna. It is not only the owner who is guilty under this section but whoever causes or allows the vehicle to be used without any permit or in breach of any conditions of the permit.
14. These words are wide enough to cover the case of a person who is in charge of the vehicle. It is not disputed that the vehicle is registered in the name of the Divisional Superintendent and that he was in general charge of it. Although he may not have caused the vehicle to be used without a permit, he must be held to have allowed the vehicle to be used. Indeed he never disputed the responsibility for such an action he only disputed the fact of ownership of the vehicle.
15. The next point for consideration is whether the vehicle was being used in connection with the business of the Railway. It was contended, that it could only be said to be so used if it was used for the transport of passengers or goods. The business of a Railway is to carry goods and passengers. For the performance of that business it must employ a staff and it is entitled to realise charges. Money realised from passengers or the consignors of goods must be kept in a place of security and money must be conveyed to places where payment has to be made to the servants of the Railway.
16. The conveying of money to the Bank from the station or other place where it is collected and from the Bank to the place where it is to be paid is ancillary to the business of the Railway and the vehicle used as a conveyance for these purposes is used, if not for the business of a Railway, at least “‘in connection’ with the business of a Railway”. The exemption from the necessity of taking a permit contained in S. 42(1) is therefore, not applicable to the vehicle in dispute.
17. The last contention is that the vehicle in question is not a “transport vehicle” and that consequently there was no necessity for anyone to take out a permit. In this connection reliance was first of all placed upon sub-s. (2) of S. 42. That sub-section does not assist us in determining what a transport vehicle is; it only lays rules down for determining whether a vehicle which is a transport vehicle is used for the carriage of goods for hire or reward.
18. Sub-section (1) of S. 42 requires a permit to be taken for every transport vehicle and not only for those which are used for the carriage of goods for hire or reward. Sub-section (2) is, therefore, not relevant to the determination of the question which we are called upon to determine.
19. Transport vehicle is defined in S. 2(33) as follows:
“‘Transport vehicle’ means a public service vehicle, a goods vehicle, a locomotive or a tractor other than a locomotive or tractor used solely for agricultural purposes.”
20. Admittedly the motor vehicle in question is not a locomotive or tractor or a public service vehicle as defined in S. 2(14), 2(30) and 2(25) of the Act. Is it then a goods vehicle? A goods vehicle is defined in S. 2(8) as follows:
“‘Goods Vehicle’ means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers.”
21. It has, therefore, to be seen whether as a fact the vehicle is “constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods;” it is not necessary that it should actually be used for that purpose. The first point to notice is that this question of fact was not raised in any of the Courts below and it is taken for the first time in the revision before us. It has, therefore, to be ascertained whether there is any evidence upon which a finding can be based.
22. P.W 1 Sub-Inspector Quraishi, P.W 2 Head Constable Akbar Ali and D.W 1 Ram Sundar all call the vehicle a truck. In Ex. D-3, a letter from the office of the Divisional Superintendent to the Regional Transport Officer, Lucknow thus describes the “truck”:
“U.S.J 3125 (Cash lorry). Carries Railway earnings from Railway Station to Imperial Bank and vice versa………”
23. This description is inconclusive because a truck may or may not “be constructed or adapted for the carriage of goods.” What is, however, of great significance is the admission of the Railway Authorities and the statement of D.W 1 Ram Sundar Pandey, a motor mechanic of the Road Transport of the Northern Railway that a fitness certificate used to be taken out for this vehicle.
24. Section 38 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for the necessity of taking out a fitness certificate for “Transport Vehicles” only. From this evidence and on these facts the case of the Railway Authorities was that although the truck in question was a transport vehicle requiring a fitness certificate, it was exempt from the requirements of S. 42(1) of the Act because it was a vehicle belonging to the Central Government not used in connection with the business of a Railway. There is thus sufficient material to establish that the truck in question is a “Transport Vehicle”. It, therefore, required both a permit and the fitness certificate.
25. The correspondence on the record establishes that the Railway Authorities were labouring under a bona fide mistake as to the need of a permit — a mistake which was at one time shared even by the Transport Authorities. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, acted rightly in giving only a warning.
26. The conviction and the sentence in respect of the charge under S. 38/112 of the Motor Vehicles Act must be upheld. The evidence of D.W 1 Ram Sundar Pandey shows that the Railway Authorities applied at the last minute for a renewal of the certificate. Under Rule 28(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act Rules, they ought to have applied one month earlier. D.W 1 admits that it takes about an hour to test the vehicle before a certificate is issued. He also states that on each occasion when he went to obtain a certificate there were other vehicles there being tested.
27. It is in order to obviate difficulties of this kind that a salutary rule is laid down that an application for the renewal of fitness certificate must be made a month in advance and then the vehicle must be produced at the date and time fixed for its inspection. The Railway Authorities chose to ignore this rule. The conviction was accordingly correct and must be upheld. In the circumstances we see no reason to reduce the fine.
28. This application is accordingly dismissed. Leave to appeal is refused.
H.G.P
29. Application dismissed.
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