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Lala Raj Kishore v. District Board Of Seharanpur
Structured Summary of the Opinion — District Board of Saharanpur (Bye-law No. 6)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by eight persons who own machines (for hulling rice, flour mills, oil crushers, sugar-cane crushers etc.). Respondent No.1 is the District Board of Saharanpur; respondents Nos.2–5 are lessees of the right to collect licence fees from the petitioners and others.
The District Board approved draft bye-laws by resolution on 17-1-1948 and directed publication. After publication in local weeklies, the Board finally approved the bye-laws on 11-11-1948 and submitted them to the Commissioner, who sanctioned them. The bye-laws were published in the U.P. Gazette dated 28-5-1949 and came into operation thereafter.
The challenged bye-laws were said to have been framed under Section 174(2)(k) of the U.P. District Boards Act and imposed annual licence fees (e.g., Rs.500 for sugar factories, Rs.100 for crushers and certain mills, Rs.50 for other specified machines). Bye-law No.1 defined “factory” to include various mills and machines; Bye-law No.3 required a licence for operating such factories within rural areas; Bye-law No.4 designated the Secretary as Licensing Officer and provided an appeal to the Board President; Bye-laws 5–9 set conditions, duration, suspension and application procedure; and there was a penalty provision for contravention.
The petitioners paid the licence fee from 1949 for about four years; disputes later arose and the petitioners (and others) refused further payment. The writ petition was filed in this Court on 4-2-1954. The petition sought (a) certiorari quashing Bye-law No.6; (b) mandamus restraining respondents from enforcing Bye-law No.6; and (c) mandamus directing respondent No.1 not to prosecute petitioners for omitting to take licences. No interim order had been passed when the petition was admitted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the levy under Bye-law No. 6 is a valid licence fee or an invalid tax in the garb of a licence fee (i.e., whether the levy bears a permissible relation to regulatory expenses or is intended to raise general revenue).
- Whether the High Court should exercise its discretion under Article 226 to entertain the writ petition despite the availability of alternative remedies (for example, a suit or statutory appeals).
- Whether Section 186 of the District Boards Act (appeal against orders or directions under bye-laws) provided an alternative remedy sufficient to bar the writ petition, or whether it excludes an appeal challenging the validity of a bye-law itself.
- Whether a bye-law originally passed under Section 174(2)(k) and later said to have been passed under Section 174(1) can be validated by recourse to Section 174(1) (i.e., scope and limitations of S.174(1) versus S.174(2)(k)).
- Whether Section 106 (general charging section authorising a Board to charge a fee fixed by bye-law) permits the Board to fix any amount without judicial inquiry into whether the levy is truly a fee rather than a tax.
- On the burden of proof and facts: whether the petitioners have established, on the material before the Court, that the levy is a tax rather than a regulatory fee.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The levy under Bye-law No.6 is in substance a tax, though labelled a licence fee, and has been imposed to raise the general revenues of the District Board rather than to defray expenses of regulating the trade.
- The amount of the fee bears no relation to expenses required for regulation; the Board has not incurred meaningful expenditure to regulate the petitioners' trades.
- The petitioners had paid the fee for about four years but later refused to continue payment when disputes arose.
Respondent Board's Arguments
- The writ petition should not be entertained because an alternative remedy (a regular suit or statutory remedies) was available; the appropriate forum was not Article 226.
- During pendency, the Board amended its record to state the bye-law was passed under Section 174(1) (arguing broader power under that sub-section), thereby validating the levy.
- Initially argued that S.174(1) permitted fixation of any amount as licence fee without requiring relation to regulatory expense, but later conceded the constitutional distinction between “tax” and “fee”.
- The amount fixed bears a “rational nexus” to the expenses incurred by the Board for regulation; employees give time to regulate and inspect, and the Board’s expenditure is close to licence income.
- Section 106 authorises a Board to charge fees as fixed by bye-law, and the Courts should not substitute their view on reasonableness of the amount fixed.
- There is an appeal under Section 186 to the District Magistrate against orders/directions made under bye-laws framed under S.174(2)(k), which the petitioners did not pursue.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pazundaung Bazar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Rangoon, AIR 1931 PC 217 | Licence fees may reasonably cover cost of special services necessitated by duties of municipal bodies in supervision and regulation (distinguishing fee from tax by reference to special benefits/services). | Cited to support the propositions about the nature of licence fees (that fees may cover regulatory costs) and to explain the distinction between a tax and a fee. |
| Ratilal Panachand v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 Bom 242 | Quotations from Findley Shirras about difference between taxes (general revenue contributions) and fees (payments for special services/benefits); conceptual framework distinguishing taxes and fees. | Used to elucidate and endorse the conceptual distinction between a tax and a fee which the Court applied in assessing the impugned levy. |
| Biswa Nath Singh v. District Board, Ballia, AIR 1953 All 415 | Principle on the nature of licence fees; confirmation by this Court of the distinction between fees and taxes for constitutional and statutory purposes. | Relied upon to show the position of this Court on the requirement that fees bear relation to regulatory expenses and to guide the Court’s factual enquiry into whether the levy was a fee or a tax. |
| Buddhu v. Municipal Board of Allahabad, AIR 1952 All 753 (Full Bench) | No absolute rule excluding writ jurisdiction where alternative remedies exist; High Court's discretion under Article 226 should be exercised having regard to public importance, urgency and other circumstances. | Applied to justify entertaining the writ petition despite alternative remedies because the question raised was of general importance and urgency (pending prosecutions, public interest, etc.). |
| Civil Misc. Writ No. 7735 of 1951 (All) — Division Bench judgment dated 6-3-1953 | Authority (Division Bench decision) quashing a bye-law imposing a licence fee on flour-mill owners where facts were similar and the question was of public importance. | Found to have facts similar to the present case; used as persuasive precedent supporting quashing of the impugned bye-law and the Court’s exercise of writ jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a combined legal and factual enquiry guided by constitutional distinctions between taxes and fees, statutory interpretation of the District Boards Act, and the available factual material.
Legal analysis and statutory interpretation:
- The Court accepted the general propositions (agreed by parties) that a licence fee must bear some relation to the expense of regulating the trade, is imposed on the calling/trade (not on income), and cannot be a device for raising general revenue.
- On the maintainability of the writ: the Court reviewed precedents (notably Buddhu and the Division Bench decision in Civil Misc. Writ No.7735) and held that Article 226 jurisdiction can be exercised even when an alternate remedy exists if the matter is of public importance, requires speedy resolution, or large numbers of persons are affected. Factors such as about 200 criminal prosecutions pending and potential public inconvenience supported exercise of writ jurisdiction.
- On Section 186 (appeal): the Court interpreted Section 186 as providing an appeal against orders or directions made under a bye-law, but not an appeal challenging the validity of a bye-law itself. Therefore, that statutory appeal did not preclude the writ petition attacking the bye-law’s validity.
- On Section 174(1) vs. Section 174(2)(k): the Court held that S.174(1) is a general power to make bye-laws and should be read ejusdem generis with the specific illustrative powers in S.174(2). It rejected the contention that S.174(1) conferred an unrestricted power to levy taxes or validate a levy that could not be sustained under S.174(2)(k). Thus, even if the Board sought to rely on S.174(1), it could not use it to validate what was in substance a tax beyond the statutory scope of fee-imposing powers.
- On Section 106 (general charging section): the Court rejected the assertion that the mere presence of the word “fee” in the statute prevents judicial inquiry into whether the levy is in truth a fee or a tax. The Court emphasized that the legal significance of the word “fee” requires that the levy be a fee (i.e., tied to expenses for regulation), not a tax (i.e., for general revenue).
Factual analysis and burden of proof:
- The Court noted that the burden of proving that a purported fee is in fact a tax rests on the party who alleges it — here the petitioners — but that the question is one of fact to be decided on the evidence placed before the Court.
- The petitioners’ affidavits contained specific factual averments: no officer had inspected their factories; the Board had not incurred significant expenditure for regulation; the total license-fee recoverable from all mills was about Rs.48,250 per annum; collection rights had been transferred for Rs.38,500 per year; no additional staff had been hired and budgets from 1948 onward showed no expense for working the bye-law.
- The District Board’s counter-affidavit offered only general/vague assertions that there was a “rational nexus” between fee income and expenses and that Board employees spent time regulating the trades, without producing account-books or concrete expenditure particulars.
- The Court expressly invited production of account-books; the Board failed to produce account-books and furnished only typed extracts instead of full accounts. The Court treated that omission adversely, reasoning that if the Board’s assertions were true, it should have produced accounts to substantiate them.
- Given the petitioners’ specific averments and the Board’s failure to substantiate claims about expenditure, the Court concluded on the factual record that the licence fee was not fixed merely to meet regulation expenses but with a view to augment the Board’s general revenue — i.e., it was a tax in substance.
The Court therefore combined its statutory construction, constitutional principles distinguishing fees from taxes, and a fact-based assessment (including an adverse inference from the Board's failure to produce accounts) to reach its conclusion.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Bye-law No. 6 of the Bye-laws framed by the District Board of Saharanpur (published in the Gazette dated 28-5-1949) was held ultra vires the Board. The Court directed the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding respondent No.1 to refrain from enforcing Bye-law No.6 against any of the petitioners. The petitioners were awarded costs of Rs.100.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The respondents are prohibited from enforcing Bye-law No.6 against the petitioners; the petitioners receive costs of Rs.100.
- Legal consequence: On the facts before the Court, a levy denominated a “licence fee” was treated as ultra vires where it lacked demonstrable connection to regulatory expenditure and appeared intended to raise general revenue. The decision applied and followed prior authorities distinguishing fees from taxes and guiding the exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction; the opinion does not purport to create an entirely new principle beyond these applications of existing law.
Note: This summary faithfully reflects only the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions beyond those expressly stated in the opinion have been added.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by eight persons, who own machine, for hulling rice, or a flour mill, or an oil crusher or a sugar-cane crusher. Respondent No. 1 is the District Board of Shaharanpur and respondent No. 2 to 5 are lessees of the right of the respondent No. 1 to collect licence fee from the petitioners and others. On 17-1-1948 the District Board of Shaharanpur (respondent No. 1) approved certain draft bye-laws by means of a resolution and directed their publication in papers. They were published in the Hindi Weekly called “Hindu”, and in the English Weekly called the “Peoples General of Shaharanpur”. After the publication, the matter came up before the Board on 11-11-1948 when the Board finally approved the bye-laws and resolved that they should he submitted to the Commissioner for his sanction. The Commissioner sanctioned them and the bye-laws were published in the U.P Gazette dated 28-5-1949, when they came into operation.
2. These bye-laws were purported to have been framed under Section 174(2)(k) of the U.P District Boards Act, and they directed the levy of a licence fee of Rs. 500/- per year on sugar factories propelled by petrol, steam or electricity, a fee of Rs. 100/- per year on crushers propelled by petrol, steam or electricity, a fee of Rs. 100/- on centrifugal machines propelled by engines, and a fee of Rs. 50/- each on certain flour mills, oil mills, rice making machines, sawing machines, cotton cloth mills and certain other machines.
3. Under bye-law No. 1 the word “factory” was to include sugar factory, flour mills, oil machines, rice making machines, cotton machines and sawing machines. Sugar factory was said to include any factory in which sugar was prepared from sugar-cane juice or from molasses or in which Gur is prepared from ‘shira’ and which was worked by electricity, steam or oil, or by manual labour by the old Khanchi or Bojha system or by centrifugal machines.
4. Flour mills, oil, cotton, rice-making and sawing machines were to mean all such machines where work was done by electricity or petrol or water or wind or any other mechanical contrivance. The machines worked by all the different petitioners came within the definition of factory.
Bye-law No. 3 prohibited the starting, establishing or maintaining of any factory within the rural area of Shaharanpur district, unless a licence had been granted on payment of the prescribed fee.
Bye-law No. 4 made the Secretary of the District Board as the Licensing Officer for the purposes of these bye-laws and an appeal against his decision was to lie to the President of the District Board. Certain conditions for the grant of the licence were imposed by bye-law No. 5 and the licence fee mentioned above was imposed by bye-law No. 6.
Bye-law No. 7 provided for the procedure for making an application; bye-law No. 8 provided the period during which a licence was to remain in force and bye-law No. 9 authorised the Licencing Officer to suspend a licence.
At the end the penalty for disobedience of the bye-laws was provided, which could extend to Rs. 100/-, and, in the event of a continuing breach, might extend to Rs. 5/- for every day after the first conviction during the period that the offender was proved to have persisted in the continuance of the offence.
5. The petitioners had been paying the licence fee since the date of its imposition in 1949 for about four years, when disputes arose and the petitioners and other factory owners refused to pay the licence fee. The present petition was filed in this Court on 4-2-1954, and the prayers contained in this petition are that a writ or direction in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing bye-law No. 6 mentioned above, that a writ or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued to the respondents restraining them from enforcing bye-law No. 6 and that another writ or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued directing respondent No. 1 not to prosecute the petitioners for omitting to take the licence for working their machines. There was a prayer for an ad interim order also, but no such interim order was passed at the time when this petition was admitted.
6. The petition is based mainly on the ground that the licence fee levied under bye-law No. 6 was really a tax and has been imposed in order to raise the general revenues of the Board and that it has wrongly been called a licence fee. It is said that the amount of the fee bears no relation to the expenses required for regulating the trade, nor has the District Board incurred any expense worth the name for the purpose of regulating the petitioner's trade.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent Board has controverted the petitioners' case on the points mentioned above, and has further argued that this writ petition should not be entertained, because there was the alternative remedy of a regular suit open to the petitioners and that under the circumstances of the case, the more appropriate remedy is the remedy of a suit and not that of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
8. He also urged that during the pendency of this writ petition, the Board had amended the provision under which the bye-law was originally passed and it is now said that the bye-law should be deemed to have been passed under Section 174(1) of the District Boards Act, & this sub-section authorised the District Board to fix any amount of fee that it considered proper, there being no limitation imposed in this sub-section as there is in Section 174(2)(k) of the Act.
9. Originally the position taken up by the learned counsel for the Board was that any amount could be fixed by the Board as licence fee, and that it was not necessary that the amount fixed should bear any relation to the expenses that were to be incurred in regulating the trade. But this position was subsequently given up and the learned counsel agreed that our Constitution had made a clear distinction between a ‘tax’ and a ‘licence fee’, and he referred me to items Nos. 82 to 89 in List I of the 7th Schedule attached to the Constitution and said that these items related to the imposition of taxes, and item No. 96 authorised the levy of “fees”. Similar was the position with respect to item Nos. 46 to 58, 60 and 62 which related to ‘tax’, and No. 66 which related to ‘fees’ in List II.
10. He said that the main characteristics of a licence fee were that the fee was imposed on trade or calling itself, and not on the income derived from the trade or calling; that the licence fee could not be imposed for raising the general revenues but only for purposes of being spent over the regulation of the trade or calling; and that it must bear a relation to the expense that was expected to be incurred in doing so. I entirely agree with the propositions urged by the learned counsel subsequently, and the learned counsel for the petitioners also does not challenge their correctness.
11. Some of these propositions are borne out by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of — ‘Pazundaung Bazar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Rangoon’, AIR 1931 PC 217 (A). Their Lordships agreed with the views of the High Court and held that the licence fee might reasonably cover the cost of all special services necessitated by the duties and liabilities imposed upon the Corporation in respect of the supervision and regulation of private markets.
12. The Bombay High Court had to consider the point in the case of — ‘Ratilal Panachand v. State of Bombay’, AIR 1953 Bom 242 (B). The learned Judges quoted with approval a passage from Findley Shirras in his Science of Public Finance, which is helpful in understanding the difference between a tax and a fee. Findley Shirras says:
“Taxes are compulsory contributions to public authorities to meet the general expenses of Government which have been incurred for the public good and without reference to special benefits. Fees are payments primarily in the public interest for special services which people must accept whether willingly or not;…. Fees are for governmental services, while prices are for services of a business character. They differ also from taxes in that they are payments for special benefits enjoyed by the payer, while taxes are for general benefits, expenses which are laid, as Adam Smith says ‘for the benefit of the whole society’. The essence of a tax is the absence of ‘quid pro quo’ between the tax payer and the public authority.”
13. The same is the principle laid down by this Court in the case of — ‘Biswa Nath Singh v. District Board, Ballia’, AIR 1953 All 415 (C).
14. The nature of licence fee having thus been explained, I have to consider whether the imposition of the fee in this case was really for the purposes for which fee could be levied or it was imposed for purposes of raising the general revenues of the Board. The burden of proving that the levy is not what it purport to be on the face of it lies on the person, who says that it is not a fee but a tax, and in the present case it is for the petitioners to show that the fee levied is really a tax in the garb of a licence fee. The question is really one of fact, and will be considered after considering the other legal issues raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1.
15. The learned counsel for the respondent urged that a writ petition was not maintainable as a suit for the same reliefs could have been instituted before a regular civil court. The general rule is that if another remedy is open, the High Court does not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which has been filed for obtaining the same relief. The rule is not one of universal application, and, in appropriate cases, the High Courts do entertain writ petitions, even though a regular suit may be maintainable.
16. A Full Bench of this Court in — ‘Buddhu v. Municipal Board of Allahabad’, AIR 1952 All 753 (D) had to consider this question and its decision was that no hard and fast rule could be laid down as to the class of cases in which directions, orders or writs could be issued under Article 226 and the class of cases in which they ought not to be issued. It held that there was no inflexible rule that in every case in which a fundamental right was involved, a decision should be given by the Court on merits in an application under Article 226 and that there are also cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy may be a ground for the rejection of the application.
17. The circumstances of each case have to be considered and then a decision taken as to whether the discretion should be exercised or not. They then laid down some of the principles which would justify the High Court in issuing a writ and their Lordships said:
“Where a general question of some public importance has been raised and it is desirable that it should be speedily decided and the parties should not remain under suspense for a long time and on the determination of the question the decision of the petitioner and others of his class whether to continue in the present avocation or to take some other will depend, the High Court can entertain the petition under Article 226, even though an alternative remedy by way of a suit for injunction is available to the petitioner”.
18. The learned Judges had to consider the validity of a bye-law passed by the Municipal Board of Allahabad prohibiting the slaughter of cows, and they held that in a case of that kind the High Court could properly enter into the merits of the petition and come to decision thereon.
19. A Division Bench of this Court, of which I was a member in — Civil Misc. Writ No. 7735 of 1951 D/- 6-3-1953 (All) (E)’ quashed a bye-law passed by the Municipal Board of Allahabad imposing a licence fee on the owners of certain flour mills. The point was considered in that case and it was held that, where a large number of persons were involved and the question was of general importance, it would be a proper exercise of the discretion of the High Court to decide the petition under Article 226 on the merits. These cases cover the point and conclude it against the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, and it is not necessary to go further into the matter.
20. The question then arises whether, on the peculiar facts of the case, I should refuse to hear the petition on the merits. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has laid great stress on the fact that the licence fee had been paid for four years by the petitioners who have shown by this conduct of theirs, that there is no urgency in the matter and they might, therefore, very well be relegated to the ordinary procedure provided by law.
21. This delay on the part of the petitioners in filing the present petition is very much against the petitioners, but there are other circumstances of the case, which outweigh this consideration. The Constitution came into force in January 1950 and before that date this Court had no power of issuing writs. The question that has been raised in the present petition, namely, that the licence fee must bear some relation to the amount of expenditure incurred in regulating the trade was not generally known to the members of the Public, or even to the members of the Bar in the districts. The position was made clear, as far as this Court is concerned, in the case of — ‘Biswa Nath Singh (C)’ mentioned above.
22. I also find that about 200 criminal prosecutions are pending at the instance of respondent No. 1 on account of failure to pay the licence fee, and it appears to be a bit hard that the persons be allowed to be convicted of the offence before the main question raised in the petition is finally determined. The matter also, to some extent, concerns the public at large because if the petitioners' trades are unduly hampered, it is bound to result in inconvenience to the members of the public. I, therefore, think that this is a petition which ought to be considered and decided on the merits. I may also mention that the Supreme Court has quashed a number of bye-laws passed by the Municipal Boards or the District Boards on the ground that they interfered with the petitioners' fundamental right of trade.
23. The next point urged by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 was that the remedies provided by the District Boards Act were not pursued by the petitioners and they, therefore, were not entitled to have the question determined in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. He referred to Section 186 of the District Boards Act, which provides for an appeal by any person aggrieved by any order or direction made by a Board under the powers conferred upon it by S. 95 or under a bye-law made under clause (k) of sub-section (2) of S. 174, to the District Magistrate in case no other officer has been appointed by the State Government, for the purpose.
24. It is argued that the petitioners could have filed an appeal under this section, but they failed to seek this remedy.
25. I have considered the argument, but I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel. The appeal that is provided, is against any order or direction made by a Board under a bye-law passed under Section 174(2)(k) of the Act, but it does not provide for an appeal to challenge the validity of the bye-law itself. To my mind, the wording of this section is quite clear, and it does not confer any right of appeal against the resolution of a Board passing a bye-law. I think no appeal lay to the District Magistrate at the instance of the petitioners challenging the validity of the bye-law, and this contention of the learned counsel also fails.
26. I now come to the question of the interpretation of Section 174(1) of the District Boards Act.
27. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 on this point was that S. 174(2)(k) imposes a restriction on the District Board while prescribing a licence fee on certain trades, which is to the effect that the fee can be prescribed in order to defray the expenditure incurred by the Board for purposes of regulating the trades, but it is said that there is no such restriction contained in Section 174(1) of the Act. But I think that this sub-section authorises the Board to make bye-laws consistent with the Act for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants and for the furtherance of the administration of the district under this Act, but it does not say whether a bye-law framed under this sub-section may also impose licence fees or taxes. It gives a general power to the District Boards to make bye-laws for the purposes mentioned therein. The clauses contained in sub-section (2) are really illustrations of the power contained in sub-section (1), and they show what nature of power has been conferred on the Board by S. 174(1). The power, in my opinion, contained in sub-section (1) should be read as ‘ejusdem generis’ to the powers contained in the different clauses of sub-section (2).
28. The respondent No. 1 expressly passed the resolution in 1949 under S. 174(2)(k) and it is somewhat curious that after the institution of this petition, it passed a resolution saying that the power should be taken to have been exercised under S. 174(1). Still if sec. 174(1) had given it any power to impose taxes or fees, and the provision of this Subjection had authorised the passing of the bye-law, the bye-law could not be held to have been invalid. But, in my opinion, S. 174(1) just gives a power to frame a bye-law and cannot read in it any general power to levy taxes and fees under the bye-laws passed under that sub-section. Even if it be assumed that it had the power to levy licence fees, its power should be read to be the same as contained in the different clauses enumerated in, sub-section (2). A bye-law passed under S. 174(1) may go beyond the matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (w) of sub-section (2), and it may not strictly be justified under those clauses, but the power under sub-section (1) is similar and of the same nature as illustrated by clauses (a) to (w) of sub-section (2). If the fees imposed by this bye-law cannot be validated under S. 174(2)(k), I do not think that it can be validated under S. 174(1).
29. The next section that was referred to was Section 106 of the Act, which may be called the general charging section authorising a Board to charge a lee to be fixed by the bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission. It was argued that there is no limit imposed by this section, and the Courts are not entitled to determine whether the amount of fee that has been fixed by the bye-law is a reasonable one or not.
30. I am unable to accept this argument either, because the use of the word “fee” by itself denotes as to what kind of levy the District Board can impose. The legal significance of the word “fee” is quite clear and its object is to recover money I necessary for defraying the expenses of carrying out the purpose for which it is levied. The “fees” that a District Board could impose must be “fees” and not “tax”. I am also unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel that the only restriction imposed on the District Board in determining the amount of fees is that which goes beyond the reasonable restrictions which may be imposed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. That restriction is certainly there, but the District Boards are statutory bodies having only those rights which are conferred upon them by the statute. The statute does not authorise them to impose taxes but only gives them a power to levy certain fees.
31. This brings me to the question of fact as to whether it has been proved in the case that a tax has been imposed on the petitioners' trade in the garb of a licence fee.
32. The relevant paragraphs of the affidavit filed with the petition are paragraphs Nos. 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 23. The averments in paragraph 6 are somewhat general, and what is stated therein is that the licence fee levied under the impugned bye-law is a tax, though it is called a licence fee, and the same has been imposed to raise the general revenues of the Board and not to cover the expenses necessary for the purpose of supervising the factories.
33. In paragraph 14 it has been stated that the District Board merely takes the licence fee, but at no time has any single officer of the Board visited or inspected any of the factories belonging to the petitioners and others, and that the District Board has not spent anything out of the huge amount realised as licence fee on the working of the bye-law, excepting perhaps some insignificant amount.
34. Paragraph 15 gives the number of the mills and crushers that exist within the area of the District Board, and the total licence fee recoverable from all these mills comes to a sum of Rs. 48,250/- per annum. Paragraph 17 states that the Public Health Scheme was introduced in 1930, that there has been staff employed under the scheme since that year, that after the enforcement of the present bye-law there has been no increase in the staff of the Public Health Department and that no special staff has been employed by the Board for this purpose, nor has any additional expense been incurred due to the enforcement of these bye-laws excepting the cost of issuing licence.
35. Paragraph 20 says that in the budget from 1948 onwards no expense for the working of the impugned bye-laws is shown. According to the averments in paragraphs 21 the licence fee bears no relation to the expense that was likely to be incurred in the issue of licences and regulating the licensed factories. The right to collect the licence fee has been transferred to the respondents for a consideration of Rs. 38,500/- per year.
36. As against these clear and definite allegations the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the District Board contains merely some vague statements. These statements are contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
37. In paragraph 5 it is stated that the licence fee levied under the bye-law is just, proper and fair, and there is a rational nexus between the amount of the fee and the expenses incurred by the Board for the purpose of the subject matter of the licence.
38. Paragraph 6 says that the employees of the Board have to give their time to regulate and control the business and trades mentioned in the bye-laws, that they have to inspect the buildings wherein these trades are housed, and that the expenditure incurred by the Board is very close to the income earned out of the licence fee.
39. Paragraph 7 merely records a denial of the facts contained in certain paragraphs of the petitioners' affidavit.
40. Paragraph 8 is to the effect that the entire staff is employed and is maintained by the Board, and the expenses of the staff are met by the Board.
41. According to paragraph 9 certain officers of the Board have to discharge certain duties in connection with the running of the trades in question.
42. A rejoinder affidavit was also filed on behalf of the petitioners, which mainly reiterates the facts contained in the first affidavit.
43. The facts stated above would show that in the counter-affidavit no attempt has been made to actually show what expense the District Board has to incur in issuing the licence and in regulating the petitioners' trades. It is stated that there is a “rational nexus” between the amount of the fee and the expenses, and that the expenditure incurred is very close to the income earned out of the licence fee. These assertions, in my opinion, merely amount to a statement of the case of the District Board. But the counter-affidavit does not disclose what actual expenditure is incurred by the Board every year for the purpose of carrying out the duties imposed upon the Board by the bye-law in question.
44. The learned counsel for the Board strenuously contended that it must be accepted by the Court that there is a “rational nexus” between the amount of the fee and the expenses, and the same are very close to each other because the Board says that it is so. But accepting this argument would really amount to a failure to consider the question. The Board has made certain allegations, and I have to see how far those allegations are borne out by the facts placed before me. If allegations like these are accepted it would amount to accepting the ‘ipse dixit’ of the Board. If there were any truth in the allegations contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the counter-affidavit, I see no reason why the Board should not have filed their accounts, because the bye-law has been in force since 1949 and the income and expenditure must have been entered in the account-books during all these years.
45. The facts, as they have been stated in paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit, actually go to support the petitioners' case because they show that no separate staff has been engaged for the purpose of regulating the petitioners' trades. The paragraph merely contains an assertion that the officers, mentioned in the paragraph, regulate and control the trades for which the licence fee has been prescribed. Definite facts have been asserted in the affidavit filed along with the petition, which have given the approximate amount of money recovered as the licence fee by the Board every year, and it is also said that not a single officer of the Board visited or inspected any of the factories belonging to the petitioners and to others, nor has the District Board spent anything on the working of the bye-law under which the licence had been issued. There is a clear assertion in paragraph 17 that there has been no increase in the staff of the Public Health Department at all since the introduction of the bye-law, & no special staff has been employed by the Board for the purpose of regulating the petitioners' trades, nor has any additional expenditure been incurred due to the enforcement of these bye-laws. It has further been said that in the successive budgets from 1948 onwards no expense for the working of the impugned bye-law is shown. None of these facts have been controverted in the counter-affidavit.
46. After the arguments were practically over, I gave an opportunity to the learned counsel to produce the account-books of the District Board, and adjourned the case for the purpose. But on the adjourned date the learned counsel informed me that the District Board had not sent the account-books to him, but had only sent him certain extracts from the account-books typed on separate sheets of paper. They are not even copies of the account-books, but merely extracts from them. These papers, therefore, could be of no possible assistance to me. The omission of the District Board to file the account-books, in spite of an opportunity being given to it, goes against the District Board, and this fact can be taken into consideration in coming to a conclusion on the facts that have to be decided in the case.
47. As a result of what I have stated above, I have come to the conclusion that the amount of licence fee fixed under the bye-law was not fixed with the object of meeting merely the expenses of regulating the trade or of meeting the expenses that became necessary by virtue of the framing of these bye-laws, but that the fee was fixed with a view to enhance the general revenues of the District Board. The facts of this case are very similar to the facts of the case in ‘Civil Misc. Writ No. 7735 of 1951 (All) (E)’ decided on the 6th March 1953 by a Division Bench of this Court, of which I was a member.
48. For the reasons given above, I hold that Bye-law No. 6 of the Bye-laws framed by the District Board of Saharanpur, which were published in the Gazette, dated the 28th May 1949 was ultra vires the Board, and I direct the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 1 to refrain from enforcing Bye-law No. 6 of the impugned Bye-laws against any one of the petitioners. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs of this petition, which I assess at Rs. 100/-.
A/R.G.D
49. Writ issued.
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