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Syed Abdul Hamid v. Fatima Begum
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Srimati Fatima Begum, filed a suit for ejectment against the defendant (her tenant), seeking possession of certain premises in Lucknow. The learned Munsif decreed the suit, granting the defendant one month to vacate and ordering payment of Rs. 26/4/- as rent for that period. The Civil Judge, Lucknow, confirmed that decree. The defendant appealed; this is the defendant's second appeal to the Full Bench of the Court.
Central factual events relevant to the proceedings:
- On 27 February 1948 the District Magistrate issued an order authorising Mr. S.S. Nigam to perform functions of the District Magistrate under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and designated him Rent Control and Eviction Officer (R.C.E.O.).
- The plaintiff applied on 15 January 1949 under Section 3 of the Act for permission to file an ejectment suit. On 24 January 1949 the District Magistrate gave directions that the plaintiff be permitted to file after two months.
- On 28 January 1949 the R.C.E.O. issued an order allowing the plaintiff to take ejectment proceedings after two months (stating permission given in view of genuine need).
- The defendant sent applications on 22 and 26 February 1949 to the District Magistrate alleging the permission had been granted without notice to the tenant and asking that it be withdrawn and the tenant be heard.
- On 6 April 1949 the District Magistrate ordered cancellation of the permission granted by the R.C.E.O., directed that notice be issued, and both parties be heard before final orders were passed.
- After hearing both parties, the R.C.E.O. reported on 4 May 1949 recommending maintenance of the original permission; the District Magistrate commented (5 May 1949) that it was unfair to turn out a long-standing tenant without alternative accommodation; subsequently on 8 May 1949 the R.C.E.O. passed an order refusing the plaintiff's permission on grounds the case did not appear genuine and there was no alternative accommodation (signed "for D.M").
- The suit was filed on 23 August 1949. Although various grounds under Section 3 were pleaded in the plaint, the plaintiff ultimately abandoned those grounds and relied solely on the R.C.E.O.'s permission of 28 January 1949 to support maintainability. The trial court held that permission once granted could not be cancelled and decreed the suit; the lower appellate court upheld that view and attached significance to the “for D.M.” signature.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the permission to sue granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 28 January 1949 could be cancelled by the District Magistrate by his order dated 6 April 1949.
- Whether the order dated 8 May 1949 could be considered to be the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and whether it amounted to a withdrawal of the permission already granted on 28 January 1949.
- Whether permission to file a suit for ejectment once granted could ever be withdrawn.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant-Appellant's Arguments
- The defendant contended the plaintiff could not maintain the suit because she had not obtained the permission of the District Magistrate to file the suit and the statutory grounds under Section 3 (including clause (f)) did not exist.
- Learned counsel for the defendant argued that a mere delegation of power does not divest the delegating authority of jurisdiction, and relied on authorities for the proposition that the District Magistrate retained jurisdiction notwithstanding any delegation; therefore the District Magistrate could cancel the permission granted by the R.C.E.O. (i.e., the order of 6 April 1949 was within his power).
Plaintiff-Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The plaintiff applied for permission under Section 3 and initially relied on various grounds in the plaint under Section 3 of the Act; however the plaintiff ultimately abandoned those grounds and relied solely upon the R.C.E.O.'s permission dated 28 January 1949 to justify filing the suit.
- The record reflects that the plaintiff relied on the R.C.E.O.'s permission as the basis for maintainability of the suit; the lower courts held that permission, once granted, could not be cancelled and thus decreed the suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Subodh Chandra Chakravarty v. Janendra Nath Chakravarti, A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 718 | Illustrates that by mere delegation of power the authority delegating does not necessarily cease to have jurisdiction; the District Magistrate was not divested of authority by delegation. | The Full Bench cited it as supporting the proposition that delegation does not automatically divest the delegator of power; the case informed the discussion whether the District Magistrate retained power to act after authorising the R.C.E.O. |
| Nirendra Mohan Lahiri v. Government of Assam, A.I.R. 1949 Assam 37 | Held that conferring powers on a subordinate officer does not mean the superior has divested itself of power to act. | Used to support the general principle that delegation/authorisation does not necessarily remove the superior authority's residual power to act. |
| P. Ramiah v. Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 100 | Delegation does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation; it merely confers authority to act. | Relied on to emphasize that authorisation of an officer to perform functions does not amount to complete divestment of the District Magistrate's powers. |
| Huth v. Clarke, 1890 25 Q.B.D. 391 | Authority cited for the general common-law proposition that delegation does not imply a parting with power by the person who grants the delegation. | Referred to in support of the proposition (adopted in subsequent local decisions) that the delegator retains ultimate authority and that delegation does not exclude further action by the delegator. |
| Blackpool Corporation v. Locker, 1948 I.K.B. 349 | Distinguished in the authority cited (i.e., treated as not applicable to the present proposition). | Not applied; noted as distinguishable from the principles relied upon in the Indian authorities about delegation and retained jurisdiction. |
| R.N. Seth v. Girja Shanker Srivastava, A.I.R. 1952 All. 819 | Followed Huth v. Clarke: delegation does not imply parting with power; District Magistrate remains able to perform functions; observed that once the District Magistrate authorized the R.C.E.O., he could not revoke or cancel an order of that officer by constituting himself an appellate or revisional authority (as interpreted in that case). | The Full Bench recounted this decision and its reasoning as part of the spectrum of authority on delegation; it was considered among contrasting authorities when determining whether the District Magistrate could cancel the R.C.E.O.'s permission. |
| C.D. Hans v. Shri Mannu Lal, 1951 A.L.J. 479 | Held that the authority empowered to grant sanction under Section 3 must be deemed to have the power to revoke that sanction in suitable cases; treating the R.C.E.O.'s actions as administrative/executive rather than judicial/quasi-judicial. | Cited as an authority supporting the view that a sanction/permission granted under Section 3 may be revoked and that the function is administrative, thereby relevant to whether the District Magistrate could recall permission. |
| Jang Bahadur v. District Magistrate, Banaras, 1954 A.L.J. 225 | Held that if two officers exercise the same powers concurrently, one may review the order of the other; where jurisdiction is concurrent, review may be possible. | Referred to as authority holding that the R.C.E.O. and District Magistrate could have concurrent jurisdiction and that the District Magistrate might review an order of the R.C.E.O. |
| Shri 1008 Swami Hariharanand Saraswati v. The Superintendent, Central Jail, Banaras, A.I.R. 1948 All. 435 | Held there was no rule requiring that an authority delegating power must divest itself completely; the notification showed the Government reserved powers to act under the relevant Act. | Used to support the proposition that delegation does not necessarily render the delegator powerless and that reservation of power to act is permissible. |
| Shri Mannu Lal…-Applicant; v. Shri Chakradhar Hans…-Opposite-Party, 1952 A.L.J. 278 | Noted that the Act did not specifically authorise delegation to the R.C.E.O.; discussed administrative nature of the power to grant or refuse permission under Section 3. | Applied by the Full Bench to observe that there was no specific statutory provision allowing the District Magistrate to divest himself of functions; supported the conclusion that the R.C.E.O. acted as an officer authorised by the District Magistrate and that the District Magistrate retained supervisory control. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench conducted a step-by-step legal analysis focused on the three framed questions (see Legal Issues Presented). The key elements of the Court's reasoning are set out below, following the sequence used in the opinion.
1. Character of the power under the Act:
- The Court noted there is no express provision in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act authorising the District Magistrate to delegate his powers; Section 2(d) only defines “District Magistrate” to include “an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under this Act.” The Court read this as a widening of the expression, permitting either the District Magistrate or an authorised officer to perform functions assigned to the District Magistrate, but not as a statutory divestment of the District Magistrate's duties or authority.
- The Court accepted prior authority observing that the function under Section 3—granting permission to file an ejectment suit—is administrative or executive in character rather than judicial or quasi-judicial, and is therefore subject to supervisory control by the superior officer.
2. Effect of delegation/authorisation:
- The Court surveyed case law showing two strands: (a) decisions saying delegation does not divest the delegator of jurisdiction (Subodh Chandra, Ramiah, Huth, Swami Hariharanand), and (b) cases holding that once an authorised officer grants permission the delegator cannot constitute himself as an appellate/revisional authority to set that permission aside (R.N. Seth). The Court recognized conflicting decisions and acknowledged that the point had been treated differently in different cases.
- The Court accepted the principle that delegation or authorisation generally does not amount to a complete divestment of the superior's power. The District Magistrate, as the superior officer, retains supervisory control and can, within limits, review administrative action taken by his authorised officers.
3. Application of the principles to the facts:
- The Court observed that the R.C.E.O.'s order of 28 January 1949 was made in accordance with directions previously given by the District Magistrate (the District Magistrate's 24 January 1949 direction). Therefore the R.C.E.O. was not acting as an independent final adjudicator but was acting under the District Magistrate's direction.
- The defendant's representations (dated 22 and 26 February 1949), supported by recommendations from two Members of the Legislative Assembly and an I.C.S. officer, convinced the District Magistrate that it was necessary to give the tenant a fair opportunity to be heard. On 6 April 1949 the District Magistrate ordered cancellation of the earlier permission and directed that notice be issued and both parties be heard. The Court found this order was within the District Magistrate's jurisdiction because the underlying function was administrative and supervisory and because the R.C.E.O. had been acting under the District Magistrate's directions.
- After hearing the parties, the R.C.E.O.'s report and the District Magistrate's intervening comment led to the R.C.E.O.'s 8 May 1949 order refusing the permission. The Court interpreted the R.C.E.O.'s 8 May order (signed “for D.M.”) together with the prior events to mean that the R.C.E.O. treated the permission as having been recalled and, after hearing, formally refused it. The Court considered the addition “for D.M.” immaterial; the R.C.E.O. had throughout acted for and under the District Magistrate.
4. Natural justice and the exercise of administrative discretion:
- The Court emphasised that the District Magistrate's discretion must be exercised honestly and not capriciously and that where affected persons are likely to be prejudiced the District Magistrate should allow them a hearing. The Court found the District Magistrate was justified in recalling an ex parte permission and ordering reconsideration with notice to the tenant, particularly given the recommendations supporting the defendant's request for reconsideration.
5. Conclusions from the analysis:
- Given the totality of the circumstances—(a) the R.C.E.O. acted under the District Magistrate's directions in granting the 28 January permission, (b) the District Magistrate recalled that permission by his 6 April order directing notice and hearing, and (c) after hearing the parties the R.C.E.O. (acting for the District Magistrate) refused permission—the Court concluded the original permission of 28 January 1949 stood recalled and had been effectively withdrawn by the time the suit was filed.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
DISPOSITION: The appeal is allowed. The Full Bench set aside the decrees of the lower courts and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
The Court's specific legal conclusions (as stated in the opinion) are:
- In the circumstances of this case, the order passed by the R.C.E.O. on 28 January 1949 could be cancelled by the District Magistrate by his order dated 6 April 1949.
- The order dated 8 May 1949 was an order by the R.C.E.O. which amounted in fact to a withdrawal of the permission already granted by him.
- Permission to file a suit for ejectment once granted can be withdrawn under the circumstances indicated in the judgment (noting that the exercise of such discretion must be honest and in accordance with principles of natural justice).
Practical consequences and costs:
- The direct effect on the parties is that the plaintiff's ejectment suit is dismissed and the lower courts' decrees are set aside.
- In view of the particular facts, the Court directed that each party shall bear their own costs throughout.
Note on precedent or broader law:
This opinion addressed the scope of delegation/authorisation and supervisory control by the District Magistrate under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The Court applied and reconciled prior authorities to reach conclusions appropriate to the factual matrix of this case.
Malik, C.J:— This case was referred to a Full Bench by a learned single Judge as he considered that the point of law that arose for decision was sufficiently important to need an authoritative pronouncement.
2. This second appeal was filed by the defendant against a decree passed by the Civil Judge of Lucknow confirming a decision of the Munsif decreeing the plaintiff's suit for ejectment of the defendant from certain premises situate in Lucknow. The learned Munsif had granted to the defendant one month's time to vacate the premises and had directed that he should pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 26/4/- as rent for this period. It is not disputed that the defendant is plaintiff's tenant. The defence is that the plaintiff could not file the suit as the plaintiff had not obtained the permission of the District Magistrate to file the suit and grounds (a) to (f) of Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947) did not exist. The plaintiff, Srimati Fatima Begum, had applied under Sec. 3 of the Act on the 15th of January, 1949, to the District Magistrate for permission to file a suit for ejectment of the defendant. On the 27th of February, 1948, the District Magistrate had passed an order (Ex. 4) which reads as follows:—
“Under clause (D) of Sec. 2 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, I hereby authorise Mr. S.S Nigam, Deputy Town Rationing Officer (Cloth) Lucknow, to perform any of the functions of the District Magistrate, under the Act and he will be designated as Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow.
Sd. A.D Pandit, I.C.S,
District Magistrate, Lucknow.
27-2-1948.”
3. The application of the 15th of January, 1949, was, however, not addressed to Mr. S.S Nigam, Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, but to Sri A.D Pandit, District Magistrate. On the 24th of January, 1949, the District Magistrate passed the following order:—
“R.C.E.O This is a hard case and may be permitted to file a suit after two months. The occupant may be asked to make his arrangements in the meantime.”
4. On receipt of this order the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed the following order:—
“Shrimati Fatima Begum w/o Shri Abdul Mahbood, wants her house No. 171, Ghasiari Mandi, Lucknow, at present occupied by Shri Abdul Hamid, for personal use. She has no independent plaice and has purchased the house for personal use. In view of her genuine need she is allowed to take ejectment proceedings against the occupant after two moths.
Sd. S.S Nigam,
R.C.E.O
28-1-1949.”
5. When the defendant-appellant, the tenant, came to know of it he sent an application dated the 22nd of February, 1949, to the District Magistrate, Lucknow, that he was an old retired official and had been living in the house for the last 20 years, that Srimati Fatima Begum was living in a three storeyed house in the same mohalla for about 26 years and her claim that she wanted to live in the house which was in the occupation of the defendant, was a device to get the permission, and that the permission had been granted without issuing any notice to the tenant and without giving him a chance to be heard and he, therefore, prayed that the permission be withdrawn and proper orders be passed after hearing him. On the 26th of February, 1949, the tenant sent another application to the District Magistrate similarly worded as he was afraid that his first application might not have reached him, the District Magistrate being on tour. On the 6th of April, 1949, the District Magistrate passed the following order (Ex. A-9):—
“It was necessary to give the applicant due opportunity to contest the landlord's application for obtaining permission to file a suit for ejectment. This was not done in this case. I, therefore, order the cancellation of the permission granted to the landlord by the R.C.E.O I further direct that the notice should be issued and both parties heard in this case before final orders are passed”
6. On the 4th of May, 1949, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer sent the following report to the District Magistrate:—
Kindly see your orders flag A. In this case permission had been given to the applicant but subsequently cancelled as the order was ex parte.
Both the parties appeared on 30-4-1949 and pleaded their cases. The applicant's case is that she has purchased the house in question occupied by the opposite-party for her use and that she has no suitable accommodation.
The opposite-party says that he has been occupying the house for several years and that he has no other place. But his son who is Secretariat employee is already having a house in Babooganj. This is admitted fact. The applicant says that the opposite-party should shift over there. Under these circumstances I think the permission originally granted under your instruction flag B should be maintained.
Sd. S.S Nigam, R.C.E.O
4-5-1949.”
7. On receipt of the report, however, the District Magistrate wrote as follows on the 5th of May, 1949:—
“It will be unfair to turn out a tenant of long-standing without giving him alternative accommodation. The house suggested by Nigam is said to be too small for his family.” On the 8th of May, 1949, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed the following order:—
“Permission applied for by Mst. Fatima Begum to eject Shri Syed Abdul Hamid from her house in Ghasiarimandi is refused as the case does not appear to be genuine and there is no alternative accommodation for the occupant of the house. Parties be informed.
Sd. S.S Nigam, R.C.E.O
For D.M
8-5-1949.”
8. On the 23rd of August, 1949, the suit was filed out of which this Second Appeal has arisen. In the plaint a number of grounds, were alleged which, under Sec. 3 of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act, entitled the plaintiff to file the suit, but all those grounds were ultimately given up and the question of the maintainability of the suit was based entirely on the permission given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the 28th of January, 1949. The trial court held that permission once granted under Sec. 3 of the Act could not be cancelled or withdrawn and decreed the suit.
9. The lower appellate court came to the conclusion that permission to sue was granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the 28th of January, 1949, that the District Magistrate had no power to cancel this permission and the order of the 8th of May, 1949 could not be construed as an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer withdrawing the permission given by him on the 28th of January, 1949. Great significance was attached to the fact that he had signed this order “for District Magistrate.”
10. When the case came up before the learned single Judge arguments at great length were advanced before him and the learned Judge referred the case to a Full Bench as he thought that there was some conflict of decisions and also because the point was of general importance.
11. The questions, therefore, that have to be considered are—
(1) “Whether the permission to sue granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the 28th of January, 1949, could be cancelled by the District Magistrate by his order dated the 6th of April, 1949?
(2) Whether the order dated the 8th of May, 1949 could be considered to be the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and could it amount to a withdrawal of the permission already granted?
(3) Whether permission to file a suit for ejectment once granted could ever be withdrawn?
12. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant has, in support of his argument that the District Magistrate had authority to pass the order dated the 6th of April, 1949, cited cases A to show that by mere delegation of power the authority delegating does not cease to have jurisdiction in the matter. It is urged that the order of the 27th February, 1948, appointing Mr. S.S Nigam Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not take away the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate conferred on him by the Act. Learned counsel has relied on the decision of Nasim Ali and Remfry, JJ. in Subodh Chandra Chakravarty v. Janendra Nath Chakravarti A.I.R 1937 Cal. 718.. That case was under the Bengal Local Self Government Act. The suit was for a declaration that a decision of Mr. R.L Dey, Senior Deputy Magistrate, Faridapur, under Sec. 18-B of the Bengal Local Self Government Act setting aside the election of the plaintiff as a member of the Local Board was without jurisdiction. The Magistrate of the district was authorised by rule 1-A of the Election Rules framed by the Local Government under Sec. 138-A of the Bengal Local Self Government Act to decide disputes relating to elections. Sec. 5 of the Act defined ‘Magistrate of the District’ as including any Magistrate subordinate to the Magistrate of the District to whom he may delegate all or any of his powers under the Act. The District Magistrate delegated his powers to decide election disputes to the Sub-Divisional Officer of Madaripur. The Sub-Divisional Officer had on an objection made by the principal defendant refused to postpone the election and had intimated to the District Magistrate that the allegation of the defendant that there were irregularities and illegalities in the recording of votes was unfounded. Thereafter the defendant filed an application before the District Magistrate under Sec. 18-B of the Act for setting aside the election of the plaintiff and the proforma defendant. The District Magistrate transferred this application for disposal to the Senior Deputy Magistrate, Mr. R.L Dey, who decided the matter in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. The argument was that after the District Magistrate had delegated his powers to the Sub-Divisional Officer he had no power to entertain the application under Sec. 18-B and transfer it to a Magistrate subordinate to him. The learned Judges pointed out that the word ‘includes’ in the definition of the “Magistrate of the District” in Sec. 5 of the Bengal Local Self Government Act, indicated that the District Magistrate was not divested of his authority after he had delegated his powers, that the Sub-Divisional Officer had not decided the matter but had made a report probably because he thought it was an important matter which the District Magistrate had better himself decide and that the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Sec. 18-B and to transfer it to Mr. Dey for disposal. In Nirendra Mohan Lahiri v. Government of Assam A.I.R 1949 Assam 37., a case under the Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act (No. V of 1947), the Government of Assam purporting to act under Sec. 9 of the Act had by an order directed that the powers and duties conferred on the Provincial Government by Sec. 21 shall be exercised and discharged by the District Magistrate in each District of the Province. It was held that this did not mean that the Provincial Government had divested itself of the power to take action. In P. Ramiah v. Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras A.I.R 1950 Mad. 100. a similar view was taken that delegation does not imply a panting with powers by the person who grants the delegation but merely to conferring an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have no right to do. Reliance was placed on certain observations in Huth v. Clarke 1890 25 Q.B.D 391. and the decision in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker 1948 I. K.B 349. was distinguished. In R.N Seth v. Girja Shanker Srivastava A.I.R 1952 All. 819. the learned Judges followed the decision in Huth v. Clarke that delegation does not imply a parting with power by the person who grants the delegation and went on to hold that the District Magistrate cannot be said to have deprived himself of the power to perform his functions under the Act (U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act) by authorising another Magistrate to do the work for him and that either of them would be able to perform those functions. Having held that, the learned Judges went on to hold that once the District Magistrate had authorised the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to grant permission he could not revoke or cancel a permission granted by that Officer by constituting himself an appellate or revisional authority. In C.D Hans v. Shri Mannu Lal 1951 A.L.J 479, Misra, J. took the view that the authority empowered to grant the sanction for the commencement of a suit under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act must be deemed to have also the power to revoke that sanction in suitable cases and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in either granting the sanction or revoking it does not act in judicial or quasi judicial capacity. In Jang Bahadur v. District Magistrate, Banaras 1954 A.L.J 225., V. Bhargava, J. held that if two officers exercised the same powers one cannot revise the order of another but if the jurisdiction is concurrent it may be possible for one to review the order of another. It was held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, who had been authorised by the District Magistrate to perform his functions, exercised concurrent jurisdiction, the District Magistrate could review an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In Shri 1008 Swami Hariharanand Saraswati v. The Superintendent, Central Jail, Banaras A.I.R 1948 All. 435. a learned single Judge of this Court held that there was no rule of law or of natural justice which required that before an authority which had the power to delegate could delegate its function to another, it must divest itself completely of the power so delegated. That even though the powers had been delegated to the District Magistrate the notification showed that the Government had reserved to itself powers to act under Sec. 3 of the Act and that did not make the delegation ultra vires or void.
13. In the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, so far as we can see, there is no section authorising the District Magistrate to delegate his powers and the question whether even after delegation he must be deemed to have retained the powers does not arise. The Act has conferred certain powers on the District Magistrate and there is no section in the Act which entitles him to divest himself of those powers either by delegation or in any other manner. The only provision on which reliance has been placed in support of the argument that the District Magistrate can delegate his powers is the definition of “District Magistrate” in Sec. 2, clause (d) which is as follows:—
““District Magistrate” includes an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under this Act;”. The definition, however, would make it clear that the District Magistrate can authorise a person to perform any of his functions and this does not mean that he can divest himself of the duty imposed on him under the Act. All that it suggests is that wherever the words “District Magistrate” occur in the Act they should be read as if they mean ‘the District Magistrate and the officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act.’ The section widens the definition of a District Magistrate and does not provide for taking away the authority of the District Magistrate. In Shri Mannu Lal…-Applicant; v. Shri Chakradhar Hans…-Opposite-Party. 1952 A.L.J 278 it was pointed out that there was no specific provision in the Act authorising the District Magistrate to delegate his powers to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It would, therefore, necessarily follow that wherever under this Act any function has to be performed by the District Magistrate it would be understood that function could be performed by the District Magistrate as also by the person authorised by him to act on his behalf.
14. In Mannu Lal's case already cited it was pointed out that when considering the question of granting or refusing permission to file a suit the District Magistrate was performing an administrative or executive function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function. Chaudhri Niamat Ullah, on behalf of the respondent, has not urged that the Magistrate performs a judicial or a quasi judicial function. He has, however, pointed out that, if the District Magistrate and the Magistrate authorised by him both have the same powers, there is a likelihood of conflict and that if the District Magistrate can set aside an order of the Rent Control Officer, the Rent Control Officer, exercising the same jurisdiction, may set aside an order of the District Magistrate. Though, in theory, there may be no bar to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer setting aside an order of the District Magistrate, if a District Magistrate can set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, in practice there is no likelihood of there being any such conflict. As was pointed out in Mannu Lal's case there can be no objection to an administrative or executive power being exercised subject to the control and guidance of the superior officer. The District Magistrate being the superior officer would no doubt have the right to supervise and control the action of the Magistrates working under him and, even though both of them may be exercising the same jurisdiction, the subordinate officer would not, without consulting his superior officer, ever think of interfering with an order passed by him.
15. Learned counsel has not contended that the permission once granted under Sec. 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Order can never be recalled but he has urged that the observations made in Mannu Lal's case that the power being merely administrative it cannot be said that “if on further consideration the Magistrate thought it proper to revise his previous order he had no jurisdiction to do so” must be confined within certain well defined limits. The only limit that we can suggest is, what has already been suggested in that case, that the District Magistrate must exercise his discretion honestly and not capriciously.
16. We may mention here that the application filed by the tenant on the 22nd of February, 1949, for reconsideration of the matter was recommended by two Members of the Legislative Assembly, one of whom was also the Secretary of the U.P Congress Committee, and the application of the 26th of February, 1949, bore strong recommendation of an I.C.S Officer. If the recommendations made by the two M.L.As and the I.C.S Officer had not been there, it could not have been suggested that there was any impropriety in the permission which had been granted ex parte being recalled and the matter being reconsidered after giving both parties a hearing. Though the District Magistrate has a complete discretion in the matter, yet this discretion must be exercised in accordance with rules of natural justice and it is, therefore, proper that he should give the persons, who are likely to be affected, a chance of placing their view points before him. The question of granting permission to the plaintiff had, therefore, to be reconsidered after notice to the defendant.
17. We have been addressed only on one ground, i.e, whether the permission granted on the 28th of January, 1949, was or was not withdrawn on the date the suit was filed.
18. Coming now to the question whether the permission granted on the 28th of January, 1949, had or had not been withdrawn, we must bear in mind that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been acting throughout under the directions of the District Magistrate. The order passed by him on the 28th of January, 1949, was in accordance with the directions given by the District Magistrate on the 24th of January, 1949. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order of the 28th of January was passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the exercise of his independent views in the matter. Though the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not, in so many words, said that he was withdrawing the permission granted by him on the 28th of January, 1949, his order of the 8th of May, 1949, showed that he took it that the permission stood cancelled and the application dated 15th of January, 1949, was up before him for orders. After having heard the parties he refused to grant the permission by his order of the 8th of May, 1949. The addition made by him of the words “for D.M” are, to our minds, of no importance as he was all the time acting for the District Magistrate, having been authorised by him in that behalf by the order dated 27th February, 1948. The order of the 8th of May, 1949, was passed by him as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and probably by adding the words “for D.M” he intended to make it clear that he was passing that order at the instance of the District Magistrate. He had, however, passed the order of the 28th of January, 1949, also at the instance of the District Magistrate. Reading both the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the light of the facts stated above it must be deemed that the order of the 28th of January, 1949, stood recalled.
19. If the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been acting independently and had passed final orders which are now revisable by the Commissioner and then by the Local Government the District Magistrate who has neither appellate nor revisional powers may not be entitled to interfere, but where, as in this case, the District Magistrate has all along been functioning through the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and bearing in mind that the orders passed were administrative or executive orders, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Magistrate on the 6th of April, 1949, was without jurisdiction as by that order he was merely recalling a permission which had been granted at his instance.
20. The conclusions, therefore, are that—
(1) in our view, in the circumstances of this case, the order passed by the Rent Control and Exiction Officer on the 28th of January, 1949, could be cancelled by the District Magistrate by his order dated 6th of April, 1949;
(2) that the order dated 8th of May, 1949, was an order by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer which amounted in fact to a withdrawal of the permission already granted by him; and
(3) that the permission to file a suit for ejectment once granted can be withdrawn under the circumstances indicated in our judgment.
21. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed, the decrees passed by the lower courts are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case we, however, think that the parties should be directed to bear their own costs throughout.
22. Appeal allowed.
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